Tag: confidence

Back in June, we examined the macroeconomic forecasts of the three agencies, the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission, all of which publish forecasts every six months. The IMF has recently published its latest World Economic Outlook (WEO) and its accompanying database. Unlike the April WEO, which, given the huge uncertainty surrounding the pandemic and its economic effects, only forecast as far as 2021, the latest version forecasts as far ahead as 2025.

In essence the picture is similar to that painted in April. The IMF predicts a large-scale fall in GDP and rise in unemployment, government borrowing and government debt for 2020 (compared with 2019) across virtually all countries.

World real GDP is predicted to fall by 4.4%. For many countries the fall will be much steeper. In the UK, GDP is predicted to fall by 9.8%; in the eurozone, by 8.3%; in India, by 10.3%; in Italy, by 10.8%; in Spain, by 12.8%. There will then be somewhat of a ‘bounce back’ in GDP in 2021, but not to the levels of 2019. World real GDP is predicted to rise by 5.2% in 2021. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the growth chart.)

Unemployment will peak in some countries in 2020 and in others in 2021 depending on the speed of recovery from recession and the mobility of labour. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the unemployment chart.)

Inflation is set to fall from already low levels. Several countries are expected to see falling prices.

Government deficits (negative net lending) will be sharply higher in 2020 as a result of government measures to support workers and firms affected by lockdowns and falling demand. Governments will also receive reduced tax revenues. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the general government net lending chart.)

Government debt will consequently rise more rapidly. Deficits are predicted to fall in 2021 as economies recover and hence the rise in debt will slow down or in some cases, such as Germany, even fall. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the general government gross debt chart.)

After the rebound in 2021, global growth is then expected to slow to around 3.5% by 2025. This compares with an average of 3.8% from 2000 to 2019. Growth of advanced economies is expected to slow to 1.7%. It averaged 1.9% from 2000 to 2019. For emerging market and developing countries it is expected to slow to 4.7% from an average of 5.7% from 2000 to 2019. These figures suggest some longer-term scarring effects from the pandemic.

Uncertainties

In the short term, the greatest uncertainty concerns the extent of the second wave, the measures put in place to contain the spread of the virus and the compensation provided by governments to businesses and workers. The WEO report was prepared when the second wave was only just beginning. It could well be that countries will experience a deeper recession in 2000 and into 2021 than predicted by the IMF.

This is recognised in the forecast.

The persistence of the shock remains uncertain and relates to factors inherently difficult to predict, including the path of the pandemic, the adjustment costs it imposes on the economy, the effectiveness of the economic policy response, and the evolution of financial sentiment.

With some businesses forced to close, others operating at reduced capacity because of social distancing in the workplace and with dampened demand, many countries may find output falling again. The extent will to a large extent depend on the levels of government support.

In the medium term, it is assumed that there will be a vaccine and that economies can begin functioning normally again. However, the report does recognise the long-term scarring effects caused by low levels of investment, deskilling and demotivation of the parts of the workforce, loss of capacity and disruptions to various supply chains.

The deep downturn this year will damage supply potential to varying degrees across economies. The impact will depend on various factors … including the extent of firm closures, exit of discouraged workers from the labour force, and resource mismatches (sectoral, occupational and geographic).

One of the greatest uncertainties in the medium term concerns the stance of fiscal and monetary policies. Will governments continue to run large deficits to support demand or will they attempt to reduce deficits by raising taxes and/or reducing benefits and/or cutting government current or capital expenditure?

Will central banks continue with large-scale quantitative easing and ultra-low or even negative interest rates? Will they use novel forms of monetary policy, such as directly funding government deficits with new money or providing money directly to citizens through a ‘helicopter’ scheme (see the 2016 blog, New UK monetary policy measures – somewhat short of the kitchen sink)?

Forecasting at the current time is fraught with uncertainty. However, reports such as the WEO are useful in identifying the various factors influencing the economy and how seriously they may impact on variables such as growth, unemployment and government deficits.

Report, speeches and data

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Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘scarring effects’. Identify various ways in which the pandemic is likely to affect aggregate supply over the longer term.
  2. Consider the arguments for and against governments continuing to run large budget deficits over the next few years.
  3. What are the arguments for and against using ‘helicopter money’ in the current circumstances?
  4. On purely economic grounds, what are the arguments for imposing much stricter lockdowns when Covid-19 rates are rising rapidly?
  5. Chose two countries other than the UK, one industrialised and one developing. Consider what policies they are pursuing to achieve an optimal balance between limiting the spread of the virus and protecting the economy.

For the majority of people, a house (or flat) is the most valuable thing they will ever own.

It is important to understand the role that house prices play in the economy and how much of an impact they have.

The Bank of England monitors changes in the housing market to assess the risks to the financial system and the wider economy. The housing market employs large numbers of people in construction, sales, furniture and fittings, and accounts for a sizeable percentage of the value of GDP. The market is closely linked to consumer spending and therefore is a crucially important sector of the economy.

The concepts of supply and demand can be applied to understand house price changes and the impacts on the economy.

What is the housing market?

The housing market brings together different stakeholders, such as homeowners who are selling their properties, people seeking to buy a property, renters, investors who buy and sell properties solely for investment purposes, contractors, renovators and estate agents, who act as facilitators in the process of buying or selling a property.

In the UK, two-thirds of households own the property in which they live, and the remaining third of households are renters, split fairly equally between private and social renting. We can thus divide people into:

  • Homeowners – either outright owners or with a mortgage;
  • Private renters – people renting from private landlords;
  • Social renters – people renting from local authorities and housing associations.

There are many determinants of demand and supply in the housing market, many of which are related to demographic factors. Such factors include the size of the market, rate of marriages, divorces, and deaths. However, factors such as income, availability of credit, interest rates and consumer preferences are also important.

Why is the housing market important for the economy?

Changes in the housing market are always given such importance due to the relationship house prices have with consumer spending. Changes in house prices and the number of sales affect how much money people have to spend. Given that household spending accounts for two-thirds of Britain’s total economic activity, any changes in consumption is likely to have a major impact on the wider economy. Observing the housing market helps us to assess the overall demand for goods and services.

When house prices increase, those consumers who own their own homes have now become better off as their houses are worth more. This ‘wealth effect’ increases the confidence of homeowners, which in turn increases consumption. Some of these homeowners will decide to acquire additional borrowing against the value of their home. The borrowing is then spent in the economy on goods and services, thereby increasing aggregate demand and GDP.

However, when house prices decline, homeowners lose confidence as their home is now worth less than before. This becomes a major issue if prices have decreased enough to make their house worth less than the remainder of the unpaid mortgage – known as ‘negative equity’. Homeowners will therefore reduce their consumption and will be less likely to undertake any new borrowing.

The vast majority of homeowners will have taken out a mortgage in order to purchase their home. Mortgages are the largest source of debt for households in the UK. More than 70% of household borrowing is mortgage debt. Half of all homeowners who live in the house they own are still paying off their mortgage. Therefore, households might suddenly hold back on their spending during times of uncertainty because they start to worry about repaying their debts. This has a knock-on effect on the rest of economy, and a small problem can suddenly become a big one.

In addition to affecting overall household spending, the buying and selling of houses also affects the economy directly. Housing investment is a small but unpredictable part of total output in the economy. There are two different ways in which the buying and selling of houses impacts GDP.

The first is when a new build is purchased. This directly contributes to GDP through the investment in the land to build the house on, the purchase of materials and the creation of jobs. Once the homeowners move in they also contribute to the local economy: i.e. shopping at local shops.

The second is when an existing home is bought or sold. The purchase of an existing home does not have the same impact on GDP. However, it does still contribute to GDP: i.e. from estate agents’ and solicitors’ fees and removal costs to the purchase of new furniture.

Why house prices change: demand and supply

Demand: the demand for housing can be defined as the quantity of properties that homebuyers are willing and able to buy at a given price in a given time period. Factors affecting the demand for housing include:

  • Real incomes: If real incomes increase the demand for housing increases due to a rise in the standard of living.
  • The cost of a mortgage: If there is a rise in interest rates in the economy, mortgage interest rates are likely to rise too. This makes the cost of financing a loan more expensive and therefore will see a decline in demand.
  • Availability of credit: The more lending banks and building societies are willing to provide, the more people will borrow and spend on housing and hence the higher house prices will be.
  • Economic growth: When the economy is in the recovery and boom stages of the business cycle, wages rise. This will increase the demand for houses.
  • Population: When the population increases or if there is an increase in single-person households, demand for housing increases.
  • Employment/unemployment: The higher the level of unemployment in an economy, the less people will able to afford housing.
  • Confidence: If consumers feel optimistic about the future state of the economy, they will be more likely to go ahead with purchasing a house, thereby increasing demand. House prices tend to rise if people expect to be richer in the future.

Supply: The supply of housing can be defined as the flow of properties available at a given price in a given time period. The supply of housing includes both new-build homes and existing properties. Factors affecting the supply for housing include:

  • Costs of production: The higher the cost of production, the fewer houses are built, reducing the supply of housese coming to the market. Example of costs include: labour costs, land for development and building materials.
  • Government policy: If the government increases taxation and/or reduces subsidies for new house developments, there will be fewer new houses built.
  • Number of construction companies: Depending on their objectives, the more construction companies there are, the more likely there is to be an increase in the supply of housing. The construction industry accounts for around 7% of UK GDP.
  • Technology and innovation: With improved technology and innovation in the construction industry, houses become cheaper and easier to build, thus increasing the supply.
  • Government spending on building new social housing: The government has the ability to influence the supply of housing by increasing spending on new social housing.

Price elasticity of supply

The supply of new housing in the short run is price inelastic. The main reason for this is the time it takes to build a new home. The production of a house can take many months, from the planning process to the project’s completion. Supply also relies on access to a skilled labour force and the availability of certain construction materials.

Because of the inelastic supply, any changes in demand are likely to have a significant effect on price. This is illustrated by the diagram, which shows a larger proportionate increase in price than quantity when demand increases from D1 to D2.

The current UK housing market

Despite the current economic climate and the effects of the lockdown restrictions on consumers, house prices have increased, and sales have now resumed. Rightmove, which advertises 95% of homes for sale, states that the housing market has seen its busiest month in more than 10 years in July. During the summer, the housing market usually sees a lull in activity. However, since the easing of lockdown, there has been a flurry of activity from buyers and sellers. Since July 2019, house prices have increased by 1.7%, according to the Nationwide Building Society.

London estate agency, Hamptons, states that homeowners are now bringing forward their moving plans as the experience of lockdown has encouraged them to seek more space. The mortgage market is also very favourable right now in terms of interest rates, and rental demand is continuing to surge across the UK.

The increase in activity in the market has also been helped by the announcement of a stamp duty ‘holiday’ until March 2021. This sees the threshold above which stamp duty is paid rising from £125 000 to £500 000. Estate agency, Savills, has also seen an increase in the number of new buyers registering with its service, more than double the number registered in July 2019. It is thought that, along with the tax savings from stamp duty, people’s experiences in lockdown have made them evaluate their current living space and reconsider their housing needs.

However, given the that the economy is experiencing its deepest recession on record, there is concern about just how long the market can resist the economic forces pulling prices down.

Historically, a drop in house prices has been both a cause and a consequence of economic recessions. During the 2008 financial crisis, house prices fell by about 30%. As previously mentioned, for the majority of people, a house is the most valuable thing they will ever own and therefore consumers are extremely interested in its value. Consumer confidence is one of the key factors affecting the demand for housing. If consumers feel pessimistic about the future state of the economy, they will be less likely to go ahead with purchasing a house, thereby decreasing demand. Britain’s Office for Budget Responsibility, the country’s fiscal watchdog, forecasts that during this downturn prices will fall 5% this year and 11% in 2021.

Various government schemes put in place to help during lockdown are starting to come to an end. The main one – the furlough scheme, which replaced 80% of eligible workers’ incomes – comes to an end in October. It is forecast that labour market conditions will weaken significantly in the quarters ahead, with unemployment predicted to rise for the rest of the year. If these predictions materialise, it would likely dampen housing activity once again.

Conclusion

Fluctuations in house prices and transactions tend to amplify the volatility of the economic cycle. Therefore, it is crucial that we understand what influences such changes. Understanding how supply and demand factors influence the housing market can enable key stakeholders to make better predictions about future activity and plan accordingly. The current market has seen a growth since the easing of restrictions but there is concern that this has been powered by pent-up demand. Therefore, the outlook for house prices is uncertain and the full effects of an economic downturn are yet to be realised.

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Questions

  1. Explain why the supply of housing is inelastic in the short-term.
  2. Given that the elasticity of housing supply in the UK is low, what policies could be introduced to ensure that house building is more responsive to changes in market demand?
  3. If unemployment does increase as predicted, explain what impact this would have on the demand in the housing market and house prices? Use a supply and demand diagram to aid your answer.
  4. Explain how changes in house prices affect the government’s key macroeconomic objectives.

Share prices are determined by demand and supply. The same applies to stock market indices, such as the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 in the UK and the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500 in the USA. After all, the indices are the weighted average prices of the shares included in the index. Generally, when economies are performing well, or are expected to do so, share prices will rise. They are likely to fall in a recession or if a recession is anticipated. A main reason for this is that the dividends paid on shares will reflect the profitability of firms, which tends to rise in times of a buoyant economy.

When it first became clear that Covid-19 would become a pandemic and as countries began locking down, so stock markets plummeted. People anticipated that many businesses would fail and that the likely recession would cause profits of many other surviving firms to decline rapidly. People sold shares.

The first chart shows how the FTSE 100 fell from 7466 in early February 2020 to 5190 in late March, a fall of 30.5%. The Dow Jones fell by 34% over the same period. In both cases the fall was driven not only by the decline in the respective economy over the period, but by speculation that further declines were to come (click here for a PowerPoint of the chart).

But then stock markets started rising again, especially the Dow Jones, despite the fact that the recessions in the UK, the USA and other countries were gathering pace. In the second quarter of 2020, the Dow Jones rose by 23% and yet the US economy declined by 33% – the biggest quarterly decline on record. How could this be explained by supply and demand?

Quantitative easing

In order to boost aggregate demand and reduce the size of the recession, central banks around the world engaged in large-scale quantitative easing. This involves central banks buying government bonds and possibly corporate bonds too with newly created money. The extra money is then used to purchase other assets, such as stocks and shares and property, or physical capital or goods and services. The second chart shows that quantitative easing by the Bank of England increased the Bank’s asset holding from April to July 2020 by 50%, from £469bn to £705bn (click here for a PowerPoint of the chart).

But given the general pessimism about the state of the global economy, employment and personal finances, there was little feed-through into consumption and investment. Instead, most of the extra money was used to buy assets. This gave a huge boost to stock markets. Stock market movements were thus out of line with movements in GDP.

Confidence

Stock market prices do not just reflect the current economic and financial situation, but also what people anticipate the situation to be in the future. As infection and death rates from Covid-19 waned around Europe and in many other countries, so consumer and business confidence rose. This is illustrated in the third chart, which shows industrial, consumer and construction confidence indicators in the EU. As you can see, after falling sharply as the pandemic took hold in early 2020 and countries were locked down, confidence then rose (click here for a PowerPoint of the chart).

But, as infection rates have risen somewhat in many countries and continue to soar in the USA, Brazil, India and some other countries, this confidence may well start to fall again and this could impact on stock markets.

Speculation

A final, but related, cause of recent stock market movements is speculation. If people see share prices falling and believe that they are likely to fall further, then they will sell shares and hold cash or safer assets instead. This will amplify the fall and encourage further speculation. If, however, they see share prices rising and believe that they will continue to do so, they are likely to want to buy shares, hoping to make a gain by buying them relatively cheaply. This will amplify the rise and, again, encourage further speculation.

If there is a second wave of the pandemic, then stock markets could well fall again, as they could if speculators think that share prices have overshot the levels that reflect the economic and financial situation. But then there may be even further quantitative easing.

There are many uncertainties, both with the pandemic and with governments’ policy responses. These make forecasting stock market movements very difficult. Large gains or large losses could await people speculating on what will happen to share prices.

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Questions

  1. Illustrate the recent movements of stock markets using demand and supply diagrams. Explain your diagrams.
  2. What determines the price elasticity of demand for shares?
  3. Distinguish between stabilising and destabilising speculation. How are the concepts relevant to the recent history of stock market movements?
  4. Explain how quantitative easing works to increase (a) asset prices; (b) aggregate demand.
  5. What is the difference between quantitative easing as currently conducted by central banks and ‘helicopter money‘?
  6. Give some examples of companies whose share prices have risen strongly since March 2020. Explain why these particular shares have done so well.

With promises by the newly elected Conservative government to increase investment expenditure on health, education, innovation and infrastructure, it was expected that Rishi Sunak’s first Budget would be strongly expansionary. In fact, it turned out to be two Budgets in one – both giving a massive fiscal boost.

An emergency Budget

The first part of the Budget was a short-term emergency response to the explosive spread of the coronavirus. An extra £12 billion is to be spent on the NHS and other public services. Whether this will be anything like enough to cope with the effects of the pandemic as businesses fail and people lose their jobs remains to be seen. (See the blog A global supply-side shock: the impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak.)

A key issue is just how quickly the money can be spent. How quickly can you train health professionals or produce more ventilators or provide extra hospital beds?

This emergency part of the Budget was co-ordinated with the Bank of England’s decision to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% to 0.25%.

This combined fiscal and monetary response to the crisis was further enhanced by the agreement of central banks on 15 March to boost world liquidity by increasing the supply of US dollars through large-scale quantitative easing. The US central bank, the Federal Reserve, also cut its main federal funds rate by one percentage point from 1–1.25% to 0–0.25%.

The planned Budget

The second part of the Budget is to raise government investment by 9% in real terms over the next four years, bringing overall government expenditure to 41% of GDP, financed largely by extra borrowing. As the IFS observes, “That is above its pre-crisis level and bigger than at any point between the mid 1980s and the start of the financial crisis.”

But despite this rise in the proportion of government spending to GDP, in other respects the spending plans are less expansionary than they may appear. Increases in current spending on health, education and defence had already been promised. This leaves other departments, such as social security, facing cuts, or at least no increase. And when compared with 2010/11 levels, if you exclude health, government current spending per head of the population will around 14% lower, or 19% lower once you account for spending that replaces EU funding.

The Chancellor’s hope is that, by focusing on investment, there will be a supply-side effect as well as a demand-side boost. If increases in aggregate demand are balanced by increases in aggregate supply, such a policy would not be inflationary in the long run. But in the light of the considerable uncertainty of the effects of the coronavirus, the plans may well require significant adjustment in the Autumn Budget – or earlier.

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Podcasts and Videos

Official documentation

Questions

  1. To what extent is this Budget ‘Keynesian’?
  2. Is the extra government expenditure likely to crowd out private expenditure? Explain.
  3. Demonstrate the desired long-term economic effect of the infrastructure policy using either an AD/AS diagram or a DAD/DAS diagram.
  4. How is the coronavirus pandemic likely to affect potential GDP in (a) the short run (b) the long run?
  5. Why is public-sector debt likely to soar over the next four years while annual government debt interest payments are likely to continue their gentle decline?
  6. What is missing from the Budget that you feel ought to have been included? Explain why.

It is perhaps timely given the ongoing uncertainty around Brexit to revisit and update our blog Desperately seeking confidence written back in January. Consumer and business confidence reflects the sentiment, emotion, or anxiety of consumers and businesses. Confidence surveys therefore try to capture these feelings of optimism or pessimism. They may then provide us with timely information for the short-term prospects for private-sector spending. For example, declining levels of confidence might be expected to play a part in weakening the growth of consumption and investment spending.

Attempts are made to measure confidence through the use of surveys. One long-standing survey is that conducted for the European Commission. Each month consumers and firms across the European Union are asked a series of questions, the answers to which are used to compile indicators of consumer and business confidence. For instance, consumers are asked about how they expect their financial position to change. They are offered various options such as ‘get a lot better, ‘get a lot worse’ and balances are then calculated on the basis of positive and negative replies.

The chart plots confidence in the UK for consumers and different sectors of business since the mid 1990s. The chart captures the volatility of confidence. This volatility is generally greater amongst businesses than consumers, and especially so in the construction sector. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Confidence measures rebounded across all sectors during the 2010s, with positive balances being recorded consistently from 2013 to 2016 in services, retail and industry. Subsequently, confidence indicators became more erratic though often remaining at above-average levels. However, confidence indicators have eased across the board in recent months. In some cases the easing has been stark. For example, the confidence balance in the service sector, which contributes about 80 per cent of the economy’s national income, fell from +10.9 in February 2018 to -16.2 in February 2019, though recovering slightly to -9.2 in March 2019.

Chart 2 shows how the recent easing of consumer confidence has seen the confidence balance fall below its long-term (median) average of -7. In March 2019 the balance stood at -11.7 the lowest figure since November 2013. To put the easing into further perspective, the consumer confidence balance had been as high as +8.2 in September 2015. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Changes in confidence are used frequently as an example of a demand shock. In reality changes in consumer confidence are often likely to be an amplifier of shocks rather than the source. For example, the collapse in aggregate demand in 2007/8 that followed the ‘credit crunch’, the severe tightening of credit conditions and financial distress of many sectors of the economy is likely to have been amplified by the collapse in consumer confidence. The weakening of confidence since 2016 is perhaps a purer example of a ‘confidence shock’. Nonetheless, falls in confidence, whether they amplify existing shocks or are the source of shocks, are often a signal of greater economic uncertainty.

Greater uncertainty is likely to go and hand in hand with lower confidence and is likely to reflect greater uncertainty about future income streams. The result is that people and businesses become more prudent. In the context of households this implies a greater willingness to engage in self-insurance through increased saving. This is known as buffer stock or precautionary saving. Alternatively, people may reducing levels of borrowing. In uncertain times prudence can dominate our impatience that encourages us to spend.

Chart 3 plots the paths of the UK household-sector saving ratio and consumer confidence. The saving ratio approximates the proportion of disposable income saved by the household sector. What we might expect to see, if greater uncertainty induces buffer-stock saving, is for falls in confidence to lead to a rise in the saving ratio. Conversely, less uncertainty as proxied by a rise in confidence would lead to a fall in the saving ratio. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The chart provides some evidence of this. The early 1990s and late 2000s coincided with both waning confidence and a rising saving ratio, whilst the rising confidence seen in the late 1990s coincided with a fall in the saving ratio. However, the easing of confidence since 2016 has coincided with a period where the saving ratio has been historically low. In the first quarter of 2017 the saving ratio was just 3.3 per cent. Although the saving ratio has ticked up a little, in the final quarter of 2018 it remained historically low at just 4.9 per cent. Hence, the available data on the saving ratio does not provide clear evidence of the more cautious behaviour we might expect with waning confidence.

Consider now patterns in the consumer confidence balance alongside the annual rate of growth of consumer credit (net of repayments) to individuals by banks and building societies. Consumer credit is borrowing by individuals to finance current expenditure on goods and services.

Data on consumer credit is more timely than that for the saving ratio. Therefore, Chart 4 shows the relationship between consumer confidence and consumer credit into 2019. We observe a reasonably close association consumer credit growth and consumer confidence. Certainty, the recent easing in confidence is mirrored by an easing in the annual growth of net consumer credit. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The year-to-year growth in net consumer credit has eased considerably since the peak of 10.9 per cent in November 2016. In February 2019 the annual growth rate of net consumer credit had fallen back to 6.3 per cent, its lowest rate since September 2014. As we noted in our recent blog Riding the consumer credit cycle (again) it is hard to look much past the effect of Brexit in acting as a lid on the growth in consumer credit. Therefore, while the recent falls in consumer confidence have yet to markedly affect the saving ratio they may instead be driving the slowdown in consumer credit. The effect will be to weaken the growth of consumer spending.

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Questions

  1. Draw up a series of factors that you think might affect both consumer and business confidence. How similar are both these lists?
  2. Which of the following statements is likely to be more accurate: (a) Confidence drives economic activity or (b) Economic activity drives confidence?
  3. What macroeconomic indicators would those compiling the consumer and business confidence indicators expect each indicator to predict?
  4. What is meant by the concept of ‘prudence’ in the context of spending? What factors might determine the level of prudence
  5. How might prudence be expected to affect spending behaviour?
  6. How might we distinguish between confidence ‘shocks’ and confidence as a ‘propagator’ of shocks?
  7. What is meant by buffer stock or precautionary saving? Draw up a list of factors that are likely to affect levels of buffer stock saving.
  8. If economic uncertainty is perceived to have increased how could this affect the consumption, saving and borrowing decisions of people?