Recently, US regulators have decided not to impose further increases in capital requirements on US large and mid-sized banks. The increased requirements, proposed in late 2023, would have been stricter than required under the Bank for International Settlements’ Basel framework1 and provoked a fierce backlash, involving public statements by senior bank executives, aggressive lobbying and extensive media campaigns, including an ad-spot during the Superbowl.
Following bank insolvencies in the USA during 2023, such as Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and First Republic, which required bailouts from US banking authorities, many commentators argued that the failures were caused by the institutions having insufficient capital to cover losses on their portfolios of US Treasuries. The implication was that banks, particularly mid-sized ones (which were exempt from the Basel framework), needed to have more capital.
US regulators duly responded by proposing what was officially known as ‘the finalisation of Basel III’, but was commonly referred to as ‘the Basel Endgame’. The proposed system-wide reforms involved more conservative calculations of the risk-weighted value of assets such as mortgages, corporate loans and loans to other financial institutions. Further, the proposals also sought to subject banks with $100bn to $250bn of assets to Basel capital adequacy requirements for the first time. Previously they applied only to banks with $250 of assets.
The issue focused attention on the capital banks hold to protect against insolvency and provoked discussion about how much of a capital buffer these institutions should have.
Critics argued the changes would lead to significant increases in the capital required to be held by all US banks compared to international rivals and have an adverse effect on their profitability and international competitiveness. Further, critics pointed out that problems at SVB and First Republic were down to confidence issues and it was argued that more capital would not have saved those institutions from insolvency.
This blog examines these issues. It analyses the role of capital in banks and discusses the trade-off that banks face between profitability and security in their activities which underpinned their resistance to the proposed increases. I will also discuss the other trade-off that banks face – between liquidity and profitability – and how liquidity is just as important an influence on bank’s survival in times of crisis.
The role of capital in banks
As with any limited company, a bank’s capital is the difference between total assets and its liabilities. It is the funding provided by long-term investors. These are primarily shareholders, but also long-term debtholders. Bank capital acts as a buffer to prevent insolvency. Capital represents the amount that the value of assets have to fall before the bank is insolvent (value of assets is below liabilities). Higher capital provides a greater buffer. Lower capital provides a smaller buffer.
Capital is uniquely important for commercial banks compared to non-financial companies because of the nature of the assets banks hold – financial securities and loans. Banks are susceptible to losses from financial securities and ‘bad debts’, which are directly reflected in the value of their capital. Further, unlike non-financial companies, the failure of a bank has a significantly negative impact on wider economic activity.
The trade-off between profitability and security
As limited companies, banks face a trade-off between profitability and security in lending. The more profitable a loan, the more risky (less secure) it is likely to be. This creates the potential for the interests of deposit holders and regulators on the one hand and bank executives and shareholders on the other to diverge.
Depositors place their funds with banks and will want the bank to be secure, holding lots of capital to prevent insolvency. However, bank executives and shareholders have a strong incentive to lower the capital buffer, particularly equity, because it produces a higher return for shareholders.
Let’s analyse the implications of different capital buffers on profitability and return, particularly the return to shareholders. A performance measure used to analyse the return to shareholders is Return on Equity (RoE) – the amount of profit each pound of equity capital generates, expressed as a percentage. It is calculated by dividing net profit by equity capital and multiplying by 100.
If a bank has a net profit of £1m and holds £10m of equity capital, the RoE is:
If it has a net profit of £1m and holds £5m of equity capital, the RoE is:
In the first case, the capital buffer generates a 10 per cent RoE. In the second case, the lower capital buffer generates a higher RoE of 20 per cent. This provides a simple illustration of the trade-off banks face. The lower the amount of capital they hold, the higher the return to shareholders but the lower capital buffer, which increases the risk of insolvency.
In different time periods, banks have held varying percentages of capital. For much of the 20th century, banks had capital ratios of around 20 per cent, generating a return on equity of between 5 and 10 per cent. Bank lending was restricted, with shareholders accepting a lower return on equity, while holding a higher amount of capital to cover potential losses from financial assets. Indeed, in the 19th century, banks typically held even more capital, amounting to about 50 per cent of their assets, making bank lending even more restricted.
However, starting from the 1960s, but accelerating during the 1980s, banks began to change their view of the trade-off between profitability and security. This coincided with the liberalisation of credit markets and a greater emphasis on ‘shareholder value’ in business. Average capital ratios fell from over 20 per cent in the 1960s to below 10 per cent in the early 2000s. The return on equity went in the opposite direction. In the 1960s, it was typically between 5 and 10 per cent; by the decade before the 2008 financial crisis it had risen to above 20 per cent. The trade-off had shifted in favour of profitability.
However, the dangers of this shift were exposed during the 2008 financial crisis. The capital held by banks was very thin and not designed to cope with extremely stressful economic circumstances. Banks found they had insufficient capital to cover losses from big decreases in the value of their securitised debt instruments like CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) and struggled to raise additional capital from worried investors.
After the crisis, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) determined that banks needed to hold sufficient capital, not just to cope with the ebbs and flows of the business cycle but also as a buffer in the rare, yet extremely stressful, economic circumstances that might arise. Therefore, international bank regulations were redrafted under the auspices of the BIS’s Basel Committee. The third version of these regulations is known as ‘Basel III’. It was agreed in 2017, with the measures being phased in from 2022. Basel III significantly raised the capital buffers for large global banks, known as ‘globally systemically-important banks’ (G-SIBs) and the use of stress-tests to model the robustness of banks’ balance sheets to cope with severe economic pressures.
Figure 1 shows the changes to the average return on equity (RoE) and average tier 1 capital ratios for a sample of 10 G-SIBs as a result of Basel III. By 2022, all the banks had capital buffers which were well above the minimum required under Basel III for tier 1 capital – 8.5 per cent. The trade-off was that banks’ average return on equity was much lower – around 8 per cent in 2022, compared to 16 per cent in 2007.
How much capital is enough capital?
Ever since the Basel III agreement, there had been discussions around tightening capital requirements further but no agreement had been reached. One aspect of Basel III was that increased capital was only required of the largest banks. Mid-sized and smaller banks, which are a significant part of the US market, were exempt. The failures of the mid-sized US Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and First Republic Bank provoked unilateral proposals by the US authorities through the ‘Basel Endgame’. This would raise capital requirements for large banks and extend capital requirements to mid-sized institutions.
But large US banks resisted these proposals, arguing that the authorities were pushing the trade-off too far in favour of security, attempting to make banks very safe but offering a poor return for investors and decreasing the amount of lending banks would conduct.
The furore raises the question as to what is an adequate amount of capital. One reference point is non-financial institutions. These typically hold much more capital relative to the value of total assets – in the range from 30 per cent to 40 per cent. If banks had capital ratios at that level, or even higher, they would be perceived as extremely safe, but might not offer much return to shareholders, impinging on the ability of banks to raise additional capital when they needed it.
Further, other critics argue that there is too much emphasis placed on capital adequacy. Focusing on capital ignores the other significant trade-off banks face in their activities – between liquidity and profitability. Indeed, recent bank failures were not due to insufficient capital but other problems relating to the management of the institution, which led to a loss of confidence by not only by investors, but primarily, deposit-holders.
The other trade-off: liquidity and profitability
While banks have to be solvent, they have to manage their trade-off between liquidity and profitability carefully too. A commercial bank’s basic business model involves maturity transformation – transforming liquid deposits into illiquid assets, such as government bonds and loans, to generate profit. This requires balancing the desire for profitability with the liquidity needs of depositors. If banks get it wrong, then it can lead to a loss of confidence and a ‘run’ on deposits. This is what happened to both Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Credit Suisse. The failures of both institutions were not due to insufficient capital but poor liquidity management, which eventually caused a loss of confidence.
Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) demonstrated poor liquidity management, involving a narrow depositor base which was very responsive to changes in interest rates, and an illiquid asset portfolio. During the coronavirus pandemic, tech start-ups received substantial venture capital funding and deposited it with SVB. SVB did not have the capacity or inclination to lend all of the extensive deposits which they were receiving. Instead, the management decided to invest in long-term fixed rate government debt securities. Such securities represented 56 per cent of SVB’s assets in 2020.
Since SVB’s depositors were businesses, unlike retail depositors they were more sensitive to changing interest rates. As rates rose, businesses moved their funds out in search of higher rates, creating a liquidity problem for SVB. The bank was forced to sell $21bn of its long-dated bonds to provide liquidity. However, it endured losses when it sold the bonds as bond prices had fallen, reflecting higher interest rates. Therefore, it needed to raise capital to replace the losses from those sales.
Investors baulked at this, however, particularly when they observed the accelerating deposit outflows. It was the ‘run’ on deposits that was the problem ($42 billion on 8 March 2023 alone), not the unrealised losses on government bonds relative to capital. It was only when the losses were realised that the problem arose. Indeed, Bank of America was in a similar situation with a substantial portfolio of long-term government debt. However, it did not have to realise its ‘paper losses’ since its deposits were more ‘sticky’.
Once confidence is lost and there is a run on deposits, even a bank which has a capital buffer deemed to be more than sufficient is doomed to fail. Take Credit Suisse. It was subject to the Basel framework and had capital ratios similar to its ultimate acquirer UBS. However, it had a risky business culture that pushed the trade-off too much towards profitability. This led to repeated scandals, fines and losses, which caused investors to lose confidence in the institution.
But, once again, it was not the financial losses that was the problem. It was the loss of confidence by depositors. The institution suffered deposit withdrawals of CHF 67 billion in the first three months of 2023. Attempts to stem the outflow with a ‘liquidity backstop’ provided by the Swiss National Bank on 15 March 2023 failed to reassure investors and depositors. Instead, the bank run intensified, with daily withdrawals of demand deposits topping CHF 10bn in the week afterwards. Credit Suisse failed and the Swiss banking regulators quickly forced its acquisition by UBS.
Conclusion
Bank capital is important. After the financial crisis, banks needed to redress the trade-off between profitability and security in lending. However, while the US authorities desire to improve the security of their banking system is laudable, the focus on capital is misplaced. Ever-increasing capital is not the solution to every banking crisis.
Ultimately, banks depend on confidence. Once that confidence is lost, there is little an institution can do to prevent failure. More emphasis needs to be placed on better management of assets and liabilities to maintain sufficient profitability, while at the same time being both liquid and secure. This will maintain confidence, not only by investors, but particularly by deposit-holders.
1 See Economics 11e, section 18.2; Economics for Business 9e, section 28.2; Essentials of Economics 9e, section 11.2.
Articles
- Basel III: The US has started a race to the bottom
Financial Times, Daniel Davies (14/9/24)
- Basel III: What It Is, Capital Requirements, and Implementation
Investopedia, Peter Gratton (22/6/24)
- BofA: dumb, or just unlucky?
Financial Times, Robert Armstrong (30/6/24)
- Why America’s banks need more capital
The Economist (19/10/23)
- The Fed gets ratioed, bank capital edition
Financial Times, Steven Kelly (31/8/23)
- The US pushback against ‘Basel Endgame’
Financial Times, Laura Noonan, Claire Jones and Joshua Franklin (19/3/24)
- SVB is not a canary in the banking gold mine
Financial Times, Robert Armstrong (10/3/23)
- Basel Endgame stumbles at the finish line
The Banker, Farah Khalique (16/7/24)
- Why did Silicon Valley Bank fail?
Economics Observatory, John Turner (17/3/23)
- Why did Credit Suisse fail and what does it mean for banking regulation?
Economics Observatory, Rebecca Stuart (13/4/23)
Video
Blog
Information
Questions
- Explain the role of capital for a commercial bank.
- Research the ‘Basel Endgame’ proposals. Why would US regulators want banks to hold more capital?
- Explain the trade-off between profitability and security that banks face.
- Explain the trade-off between profitability and liquidity that banks face.
- Research Silicon Valley Bank’s failure and trace the ‘run’ on deposits in the bank. Explain why investors baulked at injecting more capital.
- Research Credit Suisse’s demise and trace the ‘run’ on deposits in that bank. Explain why investors baulked at injecting more capital.
In recent months there has been growing uncertainty across the global economy as to whether the US economy was going to experience a ‘hard’ or ‘soft landing’ in the current business cycle – the repeated sequences of expansion and contraction in economic activity over time. Announcements of macroeconomic indicators have been keenly anticipated for signals about how quickly the US economy is slowing.
Such heightened uncertainty is a common feature of late-cycle slowing economies, but uncertainty now has been exacerbated because it has been a while since developed economies have experienced a business cycle like the current one. The 21st century has been characterised by low inflation, low interest rates and recessions caused by various types of crises – a stock market crisis (2001), a banking crisis (2008) and a global pandemic (2020). In contrast, the current cycle is a throwback to the 20th century. The high inflation and the ensuing increases in interest rates have produced a business cycle which echoes the 1970s. Therefore, few investors have experience of such economic conditions.
The focus for investors during this stage of the cycle is when the slowing economy will reach the minimum. They will also be concerned with the depth of the slowdown: will there still be some growth in income, albeit low; or will the trough be severe enough to produce a recession, and, if so, how deep? Given uncertainty around the length and magnitude of business cycles, this leads to greater risk aversion among investors. This affects reactions to announcements of leading and lagging macroeconomic indicators.
This blog examines what sort of economic conditions we should expect in a late-cycle economy. It analyses the impact this has had on investor behaviour and the ensuing dynamics observed in financial markets in the USA.
The Business Cycle
The business cycle refers to repeated sequences of expansion and contraction (or slowdown) in economic activity over time. Figure 1 illustrates a typical cycle. Typically, these sequences include four main stages. In each one there are different effects on consumer and business confidence:
- Expansion: During this stage, the economy experiences growth in GDP, with incomes and consumption spending rising. Business and consumer confidence are high. Unemployment is falling.
- Peak: This is the point at which the economy reaches its maximum output, but growth has ceased (or slowed). At this stage, inflationary pressures peak as the economy presses against potential output. This tends to result in tighter monetary policy (higher interest rates).
- Slowdown: The higher interest rates raise the cost of borrowing and reduce consumption and investment spending. Consumption and incomes both slow or fall. (Figure 1 illustrates the severe case of falling GDP (negative growth) in this stage.) Unemployment starts rising.
- Trough: This is the lowest point of the cycle, where economic activity bottoms out and the economy begins to recover. This can be associated with slow but still rising national income (a soft landing) or national income that has fallen (a hard landing, as shown in Figure 1).
While business cycles are common enough to enable such characterisation of their temporal pattern, their length and magnitude are variable and this produces great uncertainty, particularly when cycles approach peaks and troughs.
As an economy’s cycle approaches a trough, such as US economy’s over the past few months, uncertainty is exacerbated. The high interest rates used to tackle inflation will have increased borrowing costs for businesses and consumers. Access to credit may have become more restricted. Profit margins are reduced, especially for industrial sectors sensitive to the business cycle, reducing expected cash flows.
The combination of these factors can increase the risk of a recession, producing greater volatility in financial markets. This manifests itself in increased risk aversion among investors.
Utility theory suggests that, in general, investors will exhibit loss aversion. This means that they do not like bearing risk, fearing that the return from an investment may be less than expected. In such circumstances, investors need to be compensated for bearing risk. This is normally expressed in terms of expected financial return. To bear more risk, investors require higher levels of return as compensation.
As perceptions of risk change through the business cycle, so this will change the return investors will require from the financial instruments they hold. Perceived higher risk raises the return investors will require as compensation. Conversely, lower perceived risk decreases the return investors expect as compensation.
Investors’ expected rate of return is manifested in the discount rate that they use to value the anticipated cash flows from financial instruments in discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. Equation 1 is the algebraic expression of the present-value discounted series of cash flows for financial instruments:
Where:
V = present value
C = anticipated cash flows in each of time periods 1, 2, 3, etc.
r = expected rate of return
For fixed-income debt securities, the cash flow is constant, while for equity securities (shares), expectations regarding cash flows can change.
Slowing economies and risk aversion
In a slowing economy, with great uncertainty about the scale and timing of the bottom of the cycle, investors become more risk averse about the prospects of firms. This this leads to higher risk premia for financial instruments sensitive to a slowdown in economic activity.
This translates into a higher expected return and higher discount rate used in the valuation of these instruments (r in equation 1). This produces decreases in perceived value, decreased demand and decreased prices for these financial instruments. This can be observed in the market dynamics for these instruments.
First, there may be a ‘flight to safety’. Investors attach a higher risk premium to risker financial instruments, such as equities, and seek a ‘safe-haven’ for their wealth. Therefore, we should observe a reorientation from more risky to less risky assets. Demand for equities falls, while demand for safer assets, such as government bonds and gold, rises.
There is some evidence for this behaviour as uncertainty about the US economic outlook has increased. Gold, long seen as a hedge against market decline, is at record highs. US Government bond prices have risen too.
To analyse whether this may be a flight to safety, I analysed the correlation between the daily US government bond price (5-year Treasury Bill) and share prices represented by the two more significant stock market indices in the USA: the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite. I did this for two different time periods. Table 1 shows the results. Panel (a) shows the correlation coefficients for the period between 1 May 2024 and 31 July 2024; Panel (b) shows the correlation coefficients for the period between 1 August 2024 and 9 September 2024.
In the period between May and July 2024, the 5-year Treasury Bill and share price indices had significantly positive correlations. When share prices rose, the Treasury Bill’s price rose; when share prices fell, the bill’s price fell. During that period, expectations about falling interest rates dominated valuations and that effected the valuations of all financial instruments in the same way – lower expected interest rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding instruments and reduces the expected rates of return. Hence, the discount rate applied to cash flows is reduced, and present value rises. The opposite happens when macroeconomic indicators suggest that interest rates will stay high (ceteris paribus).
As the summer proceeded, worries about a ‘hard landing’ began to concern investors. A weak jobs report in early August particularly exercised markets, producing a ‘flight to safety’. Greater risk aversion among investors meant that they expect a higher return from equities. This reduced perceived value, reducing demand and price (ceteris paribus). To insulate themselves from higher risk, investors bought safer assets, like government bonds, thereby pushing up their prices. This behaviour was consistent with the significant negative correlation observed between US government debt prices and the S&P 500 and Nasdaq indices in Panel (b).
Another signal of increased risk aversion among investors is ‘sector rotation’ in their equity portfolios. Increased risk aversion among investors will lead them to divest from ‘cyclical’ companies. Such companies are in industrial sectors which are more sensitive to the changing economic conditions across the business cycle – consumer discretionary and communication services sectors, for example. To reduce their exposure to risk, investors will switch to ‘defensive’ sectors – those less sensitive to the business cycle. Examples include consumer staples and utility sectors.
Cyclical sectors will suffer a greater adverse impact on their cash flows and risk in a slowing economy. Consequently, investors expect higher return as compensation. This reduces the value of those shares. Demand for them falls, depressing their price. In contrast, defensive sectors will be valued more. They will see an increase in demand and price. This sector rotation seems to have happened in August (2024). Figure 2 shows the percentage change between 1 August and 9 September 2024 in the S&P 500 index and four sector indices, comprising companies from the communication services, consumer discretionary, consumer staples and utilities sectors.
Overall, the S&P 500 index was slightly higher, as shown by the first bar in the chart. However, while the cyclical sectors experienced decreases in their share prices, particularly communication services, the defensive companies experienced large price increases – nearly 3% for utilities and over 6% for consumer staples.
Conclusion
Economies experience repeated sequences of expansion and contraction in economic activity over time. At the moment, the US economy is approaching the end of its current slowing phase. Increased uncertainty is a common feature of late-cycle economies and this manifests itself in heightened risk aversion among investors. This produces certain dynamics which have been observable in US debt and equity markets. This includes a ‘flight to safety’, with investors divesting risky financial instruments in favour of safer ones, such as US government debt securities and gold. Also, investors have been reorientating their equity portfolios away from cyclicals and towards defensive securities.
Articles
- America’s recession signals are flashing red. Don’t believe them
The Economist (22/8/24)
- The most well-known recession indicator stopped flashing red, but now another one is going off
CNN, Elisabeth Buchwald (13/9/24)
- World’s largest economy will still achieve soft landing despite rising unemployment, most analysts believe
Financial Times, Claire Jones, Delphine Strauss and Martha Muir (6/8/24)
- We’re officially on slowdown watch
Financial Times, Robert Armstrong and Aiden Reiter (30/8/24)
- Anatomy of a rout
Financial Times, Robert Armstrong and Aiden Reiter (6/8/24)
- Reasons why investors need to prepare for a US recession
Financial Times, Peter Berezin (5/9/24)
- Business Cycle: What It Is, How to Measure It, and Its 4 Phases
Investopedia, Lakshman Achuthan (6/6/24)
- Risk Averse: What It Means, Investment Choices, and Strategies
Investopedia, James Chen (5/8/24)
Data
Questions
- What is risk aversion? Sketch an indifference curve for a risk-averse investor, treating expected return and risk as two-characteristics of a financial instrument.
- Show what happens to the slope of the indifference curve if the investor becomes more risk averse.
- Using demand and supply analysis, illustrate and explain the impact of a flight to safety on the market for (i) company shares and (ii) US government Treasury Bills.
- Use economic theory to explain why the consumer discretionary sector may be more sensitive than the consumer staples sector to varying incomes across the economic cycle.
- Research the point of the economic cycle that the US economy has reached as you read this blog. What is the relationship between bond and equity prices? Which sectors have performed best in the stock market?
On Saturday 31 August, tickets for the much-heralded Oasis reunion tour went on sale through the official retailer, Ticketmaster. When the company sells tickets, the acts or their promoters can choose whether to use a static pricing system, where each type of ticket is sold at a set price until they have all been sold. Or they can use a dynamic pricing system (‘in-demand’ or ‘platinum’ tickets, as Ticketmaster calls them), where there is a starting price quoted, but where prices then rise according to demand. The higher the demand, the more the price is driven up. Acts or their promoters have the option of choosing an upper limit to the price.
Dynamic pricing
The Oasis tickets were sold under the dynamic pricing system, a system previously used for Harry Styles, Bruce Springsteen, Coldplay and Blackpink concerts, but one rejected by Taylor Swift for her recent Eras tour. Standing tickets for the Oasis concert with a face value of around £135 were quickly being sold for over £350. There were long online queues, with the prices rising as people slowly moved up the queue. When they reached the front, they had to decide quickly whether to pay the much higher price. Some people later suffered from buyer’s remorse, when they realised that in the pressure of the moment, they had paid more than they could afford.
Dynamic pricing is when prices change with market conditions: rising at times when demand exceeds supply and falling when supply exceeds demand. It is sometimes referred to as ‘surge pricing’ to reflect situations when price surges in times of excess demand.
Dynamic pricing is a form of price discrimination. It is an imperfect form of first-degree price discrimination, which is defined as people being charged the maximum price they are willing to pay for a product. Pricing in an eBay auction comes close to first-degree price discrimination. With dynamic pricing in the ticket market, some people may indeed pay the maximum, but others earlier in the queue will be lucky and pay less than their maximum.
Ticketmaster justifies the system of dynamic pricing, saying that it gives ‘fans fair and safe access to the tickets, while enabling artists and other people involved in staging live events to price tickets closer to their true market value’. The company argues that if the price is below the market value, a secondary market will then drive ticket prices up. Ticket touts will purchase large amounts of tickets, often using bots to access the official site and then resell them at highly inflated prices on sites such as Viagogo and Stubhub, where ticket prices for popular acts can sell for well over £1000. The day after Oasis tickets went on sale, Viagogo had seats priced at up to £26 000 each!
Oasis and Ticketmaster have tried to stamp out the unofficial secondary market by stating that only tickets bought through the official retailers (Ticketmaster, Gigsandtours and SeeTickets) will be valid. If fans want to resell a ticket – perhaps because they find they can no longer go – they can resell them on the official secondary market though Ticketmaster’s Fan-to-Fan site or Twickets. These official secondary sites allow holders of unwanted tickets to sell them for anything up to the original face value, but no more. Buyers pay a 12% handling fee. It remains to be seen whether this can be enforced with genuine tickets resold on the secondary market.
Examples of dynamic pricing
Dynamic pricing is not a new pricing strategy. It has been used for many years in the transport, e-commerce and hospitality sectors. Airlines, for example, have a pricing model whereby as a flight fills up, so the prices of the seats rise. If you book a seat on a budget airline a long time in advance, you may be able to get it at a very low price. If, on the other hand, you want a seat at the last minute, you may well have to pay a very high price. The price reflects the strength of demand and its price elasticity. The business traveller who needs to travel the next day for a meeting will have a very low price sensitivity and may well be prepared to pay a very high price indeed. Airlines also learn from past behaviour and so some popular routes will start at a higher price. A similar system of dynamic pricing is used with advance train tickets, with the price rising as trains get booked up.
The dynamic pricing system used by airlines and train companies is similar, but not identical, to first-degree price discrimination. The figure below illustrates first-degree price discrimination by showing a company setting the price for a particular product.
Assume initially that it sets a single profit-maximising price. This would be a price of P1, at an output of Q1, where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC). (We assume for simplicity that average and marginal costs are constant.) Total profit will be area 1: i.e. the blue area ((P1 – AC) × Q1). Area 2 represents consumer surplus, with all those consumers who would have been prepared to pay a price above P1, only having to pay P1.
Now assume that the firm uses first-degree price discrimination, selling each unit of the product at the maximum price each consumer is willing to pay. Starting with the consumer only willing to pay a price of P2, the price will go on rising up along the demand with each additional consumer being charged a higher price up to the price where the demand curve meets the vertical axis. In such a case, the firm’s profit would be not just the blue area, but also the green areas 2 and 3. Note that there is no consumer surplus as area 2 is now part of the additional profit to the firm.
Although dynamic pricing by airlines is similar to this model of first-degree price discrimination, in practice some people will be paying less than they would be willing to pay and the price goes up in stages, not continuously with each new sale of a ticket. Thus, compared with a fixed price per seat, the additional profit will be less than areas 2 + 3, but total profit will still be considerably greater than area 1 alone. Note also that there is a maximum quantity of seats (Qmax), represented by a full flight. The airline would hope that demand and its pricing model are such that Qmax is less than Q2.
Dynamic pricing also applies in the hospitality sector, as hotels raise the prices for rooms according to demand, with prices at peak times often being considerably higher than off-season prices. Rather then pre-setting prices for particular seasons, dates or weekends/weekdays, many hotels, especially chains and booking agents, adjust prices dynamically as demand changes. Airbnb offers property owners what it calls ‘Smart Pricing’, where nightly prices change automatically with demand.
Another example is Uber, which uses dynamic pricing to balance demand and supply location by location. In times of peak demand on any route, the company’s algorithm will raise the price. This will encourage people to delay travelling if they can or use alternative means of transport. It will also encourage more Uber drivers to come to that area. In times of low demand, the price will fall. This will encourage more people to use the service (rather than regular taxis or buses) and discourage drivers from working in that area.
Where dynamic pricing varies with the time or date when the purchase is made, it is sometimes referred to as inter-temporal pricing. It is a form of second-degree price discrimination, which is where a firm offers consumers a range of different pricing options for the same or similar products.
Another example of dynamic pricing, which is closer to first-degree price discrimination is the use of sophisticated algorithms and AI by Amazon, allowing it to update the prices of millions of products many times a day according to market conditions. Another is eBay auctions, where the price rises as the end date is reached, according to the willingness to pay of the bidders.
Attitudes to dynamic pricing
Consumers have grown accustomed to dynamic pricing in many industries. People generally accept the pricing model of budget airlines, for example. What makes it acceptable is that most people feel that they can take advantage of early low-priced seats and can compare the current prices on different flights and airlines when making their travel plans. Pricing is transparent. With the Oasis concert, however, there wasn’t the same degree of price transparency. Many people were surprised and dismayed to find that when they got to the front of the online queue, the price had risen dramatically.
People are familiar of dynamic pricing in the context of price cuts to shift unsold stock. Supermarkets putting stickers on products saying ‘reduced for quick sale’ is an example. Another is seasonal sales. What is less acceptable to many consumers is firms putting up prices when demand is high. They see it a profiteering. Many supermarkets are introducing electronic shelf labels (ESLs), where prices can be changed remotely as demand changes. Consumers may react badly to this if they see the prices going up. The supermarket, however, may find it a very convenient way of reducing prices to shift stock – something consumers are hardly likely to complain about.
Returning to the Oasis tour, the UK government responded to the outrage of fans as ticket prices soared. Culture Secretary, Lisa Nandy, announced that the government will investigate how surge pricing for concert tickets is used by official retailers, such as Ticketmaster. This will be part of a planned review of ticket sales that seeks to establish a fairer and more transparent system of pricing.
The problem is that, with some fans being prepared to pay very high prices indeed to see particular acts and with demand considerably exceeding supply at prices that fans would consider reasonable, some way needs to be found of rationing demand. If it is not price, then it will inevitably involve some form of queuing or rationing system, with the danger that this encourages touts and vastly inflated prices on the secondary market.
Perhaps a lesson can be drawn from the Glastonbury Festival, where prices are fixed, people queue online and where security systems are in place to prevent secondary sales by ticket touts. The 2024 price was set at £355 + a £5 booking fee and purchasers were required to register with personal details and a photo, which was checked on admission.
Update
On 5 September, the CMA announced that it was launching an investigation into Ticketmaster over the Oasis concert sales. Its concerns centred on ‘whether buyers were given clear and timely information, and whether consumer protection law was breached’. This followed complaints by fans that (i) they were not given clear and timely information beforehand that the tickets involved dynamic pricing and warned about the possible prices they might have to pay and (ii) on reaching the front of the queue they were put under pressure to buy tickets within a short period of time.
Meanwhile, band member stated that they were unaware that dynamic pricing would be used and that the decision to use the system was made by their management.
Videos
Articles
- Oasis ticket sales – everything you need to know about reunion
BBC News (27/8/24)
- Ticketmaster demand-based pricing system criticised
BBC News, Annabel Rackham (10/10/22)
- I loved Oasis – until I saw Ticketmaster’s dynamic pricing
Metro, Issy Packer (2/9/24)
- A supersonic swindle: my £1,423 Oasis Ticketmaster hell
The Guardian, Josh Halliday (1/9/24)
- Bands urged to oppose dynamic pricing of concert tickets after Oasis ‘fiasco’
The Guardian, Josh Halliday and Rob Davies (1/9/24)
- Oasis tickets: what is dynamic pricing and why is it used for live music?
The Guardian, Rob Davies (1/9/24)
- Viagogo defends reselling Oasis tickets for thousands of pounds as ‘legal’
City A.M. (31/8/24)
- Oasis fans face ‘eye-watering’ resale ticket prices
i News, Adam Sherwin (30/8/240
- Would you really pay €500 for an Oasis ticket?
RTE Brainstorm, Emma Howard (3/9/24)
- When ‘dynamic pricing’ works – and when it doesn’t
Investors’ Chronicle, Hermione Taylor (11/12/23)
- The pros, cons and misconceptions of dynamic pricing for retailers
Computer Weekly, Glynn Davis (20/6/24)
- Dynamic Pricing (Taylor’s Version)
Linkedin, Economic Insight (10/7/23)
- Dynamic pricing: successful companies that use this pricing strategy
PriceTweakers, Simon Gomez (25/5/24)
- Five lessons for businesses investigating dynamic pricing
FT Strategies
- Inflated Oasis ticket prices ‘depressing’ – government promises review of dynamic pricing
Sky News (2/9/24)
- Lisa Nandy hits out at ‘incredibly depressing’ Oasis ticket sale and orders probe into surge pricing
Independent, Archie Mitchell (2/9/24)
- Oasis ticket row: How Ticketmaster’s owner has grip on UK live music scene
BBC News, Chi Chi Izundu and James Stewart (4/9/24)
- CMA launches investigation into Ticketmaster over Oasis concert sales
CMA Press Release (5/9/24)
- Revealed: the touts offering Oasis tickets for thousands on resale sites
The Guardian, Rob Davies, Hannah Al-Othman and Tiago Rogero (7/9/24)
Questions
- What is the difference between dynamic pricing and surge pricing?
- What is buyer’s remorse? How could dynamic pricing be used while minimising the likelihood of buyer’s remorse?
- Distinguish between first-degree, second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Do the various forms of dynamic pricing correspond to one or more of these three types?
- Distinguish between consumer and producer surplus. How may dynamic pricing lead to a reduction in consumer surplus and an increase in producer surplus?
- Should Ticketmaster sell tickets on the same basis as tickets for the Glastonbury Festival?
- Is Oasis a monopoly? What are the ticket pricing implications?
- Are there any industries where firms would not benefit from dynamic pricing? Explain.
- What are the arguments for and against allowing tickets to be sold on the secondary market for whatever price they will fetch?
- How powerful is Ticketmaster in the primary and secondary ticket markets?
Coffee prices have been soaring in recent months. This applies to the prices of both coffee beans on international markets, coffee in supermarkets and coffee in coffee shops. In this blog we examine the causes and what is likely to happen over the coming months.
As we shall see, demand and supply analysis provides a powerful explanation of what has been happening in the various sectors of the industry and the likely future path of prices.
The coffee industry
The cultivating, processing and retailing of coffee is big business. It is the second most widely traded commodity after oil and around 2.5 billion cups are consumed worldwide on a daily basis. In the UK nearly 100 million cups of coffee a day are drunk, with coffee consumers spending around £4 billion per year on sit-down and takeaway coffees and on coffee bought in supermarkets and other shops for making at home. The average takeaway coffee costs around £3.40 per cup with speciality coffees costing more.
Global production in the coffee year 2023/24 was 178 million 60 kg bags (10.7 million tonnes) and the annual income of the whole sector exceeds $200 billion. Around 25 million farmers spread across 50 countries harvest coffee. The majority of these farms are small and family run. Some 100 million families worldwide depend on coffee for their living.
Brazil is by far the biggest producer and accounts for nearly 40% of the market. A good or poor harvest in Brazil can have a significant impact on prices. Vietnam and Columbia are the second and third biggest producers respectively and, with Brazil, account for over 60% of global production.
Coffee prices are extremely volatile – more so than production, which does, nevertheless, fluctuate with the harvest. Figure 1 shows global coffee production and prices since 1996. The price is the International Coffee Organization’s composite indicator price (I-CIP) in US cents per pound (lb). It is a weighted average of four prices: Colombian milds (Arabica), Other milds (Arabica), Brazilian naturals (mainly Arabica) and Robusta. Production is measured in 60 kilo bags.
Case Study 2.3 on the student website for Economics 11th edition, looks at the various events that caused the fluctuations in prices and supply illustrated in Figure 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). In this blog we focus on recent events.
Why are coffee prices rising?
In early October 2023, the ICO composite indicator price (I-CIP), was $1.46 per lb. By 28 August, it had reached $2.54 – a rise of 74%. Colombian milds (high-quality Arabica) had risen from $1.79 per lb to $2.78 – a rise of 55%. Robusta coffee is normally cheaper than Arabica. It is mainly used in instant coffee and for espressos. As the price of Arabica rose, so there was some substitution, with Robusta coffees being added to blends. But as this process took place, so the gap between the Arabica and Robusta prices narrowed. Robusta prices rose from $1.14 in early October 2023 to £2.36 in late August – a rise of 107%. These prices are illustrated in Figure 2 (click here for a PowerPoint).
This dramatic rise in prices is the result of a number of factors.
Supply-side factors. The first is poor harvests, which will affect future supply. Frosts in Brazil have affected Arabica production. Also, droughts – partly the result of climate change – have affected harvests in major Robusta-producing countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. With the extra demand from the substitution for Arabica, this has pushed up Robusta prices as shown in Figure 2. Another supply-side issue concerns the increasingly vulnerability of coffee crops to diseases, such as coffee rust, and pests. Both reduce yields and quality.
As prices have risen, so this has led to speculative buying of coffee futures by hedge funds and coffee companies. This has driven up futures prices, which will then have a knock-on effect on spot (current) prices as roasters attempt to build coffee stocks to beat the higher prices.
There have also been supply-chain problems. Attacks on shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have forced ships to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Again, this has particularly affected the supply of Robusta, largely grown in Asia and East Africa.
New EU regulation banning the import of coffee grown in areas of cleared rainforest will further reduce supply when it comes into force in 2025, or at least divert it away from the EU – a major coffee-consuming region.
Demand-side factors. On the demand side, the rise of the coffee culture and a switch in demand from tea to coffee has led to a steady growth in demand. Growth in the coffee culture has been particularly high in Asian markets as rapid urbanistion, a growing middle class and changing lifestyles drive greater coffee consumption and greater use of coffee shops. This has more than offset a slight decline in coffee shop sales in the USA. In the UK, the number of coffee shops has risen steadily. In 2023, there were 3000 cafés, coffee chains and other venues serving coffee, of which 9885 were branded coffee shop outlets, such as Costa, Caffè Nero and Starbucks. Sales in such coffee chains rose by 11.9% in 2023. Similar patterns can be observed in other countries, all helping to drive a rise in demand.
But although demand for coffee in coffee shops is growing, the rise in the price of coffee beans should have only a modest effect on the price of a cup of coffee. The cost of coffee beans purchased by a coffee shop accounts for only around 10% of the price of a cup. To take account of the costs to the supplier (roasting, distribution costs, overheads, etc), this price paid by the coffee shop/chain is some 5 times the cost of unroasted coffee beans on international markets. In other words, the international price of coffee beans accounts for only around 2% of the cost of a cup of coffee in a coffee shop.
Higher coffee-shop prices are thus mainly the result of other factors. These include roasting and other supplier costs, rising wages, rents, business rates, other ingredients such as milk and sugar, coffee machines, takeaway cups, heating, lighting, repairs and maintenance and profit. The high inflation over the past two years, with several of these costs being particularly affected, has been the major driver of price increases in coffee shops.
The future
The rise in demand and prices over the years has led to an increase in supply as more coffee bushes are planted. As Figure 1 shows, world supply increased from 87 million in 1995/6 to 178 million 60 kilo bags in 2023/4 – a rise of 105%. The current high prices may stimulate farmers to plant more. But as it can take four years for coffee plants to reach maturity, it may take time for supply to respond. Later on, a glut might even develop! This would be a case of the famous cobweb model (see Case Study 3.13 on the Essentials of Economics 9th edition student website).
Nevertheless, climate change is making coffee production more vulnerable and demand is likely to continue to outstrip supply. Much of the land currently used to produce Arabica will no longer be suitable in a couple of decades. New strains of bean may be developed that are more hardy, such as variants of the more robust Robusta beans. Whether this will allow supply to keep up with demand remains to be seen.
Articles
- Even more expensive coffee prices are brewing, but there are some good reasons why
The Conversation, Jonathan Morris (31/7/24)
- Coffee is becoming a luxury, and there’s no escaping it
AccuWeather, Erika Tulfo (1/8/24)
- Coffee prices will rise even higher, says Giuseppe Lavazza
The Guardian, Jonathan Yeboah (9/7/24)
- Coffee prices set to rise even higher, warns Italian roaster Lavazza
Financial Times, Susannah Savage (9/7/24)
- Soaring coffee prices force roasters to add lower-cost beans to blends
Financial Times, Susannah Savage (24/8/24)
- Soaring coffee prices foretell a financial grind
Reuters, Robert Cyran (31/8/24)
- Projected Coffee Price Increase Due to Supply Shortages and Rising Demand
ISN Magazine: International Supermarket News (14/8/24)
- Coffee Market Report
International Coffee Organization (July 2024)
- Strengthening global robusta production: an update
World Coffee Research: News (4/12/23)
- Houthi rebels and the EU make your coffee more expensive
Politico, Carlo Martuscelli (13/8/24)
Data
Questions
- Use a demand and supply diagram to compare the coffee market in August 2024 with that in October 2023.
- How is the price elasticity of demand relevant to determining the size of price fluctuations in response to fluctuations in the supply of coffee? Demonstrate this with a supply and demand diagram.
- How has speculation affected coffee prices?
- What are ‘coffee futures’? How do futures prices relate to spot prices?
- What is likely to happen to coffee prices in the coming months? Explain.
- Why have Robusta prices risen by a larger percentage than Arabica prices? Is this trend likely to continue?
- Look at the price of Colombian Arabica coffee in your local supermarket. Work out what the price would be per lb and convert it to US dollars. How does this retail price compare with the current international price for Colombian milds and what accounts for the difference? (For current information on Colombian milds, see the third data link above.)
- Distinguish between the fixed and variable costs of an independent coffee shop. How should the coffee shop set its prices in relation to these costs and to demand?
A common practice of international investors is to take part in the so-called ‘carry trade’. This involves taking advantage of nominal interest rate differences between countries. For example, assume that interest rates are low in Japan and high in the USA. It is thus profitable to borrow yen in Japan at the low interest rate, exchange it into US dollars and deposit the money at the higher interest rate available in the USA. If there is no change in the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen, the investor makes a profit equal to the difference in the interest rates.
Rather than depositing the money in a US bank account, an alternative is to purchase US bonds or other assets in the USA, where the return is again higher than that in Japan.
If, however, interest-rate differentials narrow, there is the possibility of the carry trade ‘unwinding’. Not only may the carry trade prove unprofitable (or less so), but investors may withdraw their deposits and pay back the loans. This, as we shall, can have adverse consequences on exchange rates.
The problem of an unwinding of the carry trade is not new. It worsened the underlying problems of the financial crisis in 2008. The question today is whether history is about to repeat itself with a new round of unwinding of the carry trade threatening economic growth and recovery around the world.
We start by looking at what happened in 2008.
The carry trade and the 2008 financial crisis
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, current account deficit countries, such as the UK, USA and Australia, typically had relatively high interest rates, while current account surplus countries such as Japan and Switzerland had relatively low ones. Figure 1 shows central bank interest rates from 2005 to the current day (click here for a PowerPoint).
The carry trade saw investors borrowing money in Japan and Switzerland, exchanging it on the foreign exchange market, with the currency then deposited in the UK, USA and Australia. Hundreds of billions worth of dollars were involved in this carry trade.
If, however, the higher interest rates in the UK and other deficit countries were simply to compensate investors for the risk of currency depreciation, then there would be no excessive inflow of finance. The benefit of the higher interest rate would be offset by a depreciating currency. But the carry trade had the effect of making deficit currencies appreciate, thereby further boosting the carry trade by speculation of further exchange rate rises.
Thus the currencies of deficit countries appreciated, making their goods less competitive and worsening their current account deficit. Between 1996 and 2006, the average current account deficits as a percentage of GDP for Australia, the USA and the UK were close to 4½, 4 and 2, respectively. Between January 1996 and December 2006, the broad-based real exchange rate index of the Australian dollar appreciated by 17%, of the US dollar by 4% and of sterling by some 23%.
Currencies of surplus countries depreciated, making their goods more competitive and further boosting their current account surpluses. For example, between 2004 and 2006 the average current account surpluses as a percentage of GDP for Japan and Switzerland were 3½ and 13, respectively. Their short-term interest rates averaged a mere 0.1% and 1.0% respectively (compared with 3.4%, 4.7% and 5.7% for the USA, the UK and Australia). Yet between January 2004 and December 2006, the real exchange rate index of the yen depreciated by 21%, while that of the Swiss franc depreciated by 6%.
With the credit crunch of 2007/8, the carry trade unwound. Much of the money deposited in the USA had been in highly risky assets, such as sub-prime mortgages. Investors scrambled to sell their assets in the USA, UK and the EU. Loans from Japan and Switzerland were repaid and these countries, seen as ‘safe havens’, attracted deposits. The currencies of deficit countries, such as the UK and USA, began to depreciate and those of surplus countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, began to appreciate. Between September 2007 and September 2008, the real exchange rate indices of the US dollar and sterling depreciated by 2% and 13% respectively; the yen and the Swiss franc appreciated by 3% and 2¾%.
This represented a ‘double whammy’ for Japanese exporters. Not only did its currency appreciate, making its exports more expensive in dollars, euros, pounds, etc., but the global recession saw consumers around the world buying less. As a result, the Japanese economy suffered the worst recession of the G7 economies.
The carry trade in recent months
Since 2016, there has been a re-emergence of the carry trade as the Fed began raising interest rates while the Bank of Japan kept rates at the ultra low level of –0.1% (see Figure 1). The process slowed down when the USA lowered interest rates in 2020 in response to the pandemic and fears of recession. But when the USA, the EU and the UK began raising rates at the beginning of 2022 in response to global inflationary pressures, while Japan kept its main rate at –0.1%, so the carry trade resumed in earnest. Cross-border loans originating in Japan (not all of it from the carry trade) had risen to ¥157tn ($1tn) by March 2024 – a rise of 21% from 2021.
The process boosted US stock markets and contributed to the dollar appreciating against the yen (see Figure 2: click here for a PowerPoint).
Although this depreciation of the yen helped Japanese exports, it also led to rising prices. Japanese inflation rose steadily throughout 2022. In the 12 months to January 2022 the inflation rate was 0.5% (having been negative from October 2020 to August 2021). By January 2023, the annual rate had risen to 4.3% – a rate not seen since 1981. The Bank of Japan was cautious about raising interest rates to suppress this inflation, however, for fear of damaging growth and causing the exchange rate to appreciate and thereby damaging exports. Indeed, quarterly economic growth fell from 1.3% in 2023 Q1 to –1.0% in 2023 Q3.
But then, with growth rebounding and the yen depreciating further, in March 2024 the Bank of Japan decided to raise its key rate from –0.1% to 0.1%. This initially had the effect of stabilising the exchange rate. But then with the yen depreciating further and inflation rising from 2.5% to 2.8% in May and staying at this level in June, the Bank of Japan increased the key rate again at the end of July – this time to 0.25% – and there were expectations that there would be another rise before the end of the year.
At the same time, there were expectations that the Fed would soon lower its main rate (the Federal Funds Rate) from its level of 5.33%. The ECB and the Bank of England had already begun lowering their main rates in response to lower inflation. The carry trade rapidly unwound. Investors sold US, EU and UK assets and began repaying yen loans.
The result was a rapid appreciation of the yen as Figure 3 shows (click here for a PowerPoint). Between 31 July (the date the Bank of Japan raised interest rates the second time) and 5 August, the dollar depreciated against the yen from ¥150.4 to ¥142.7. In other words, the value of 100 yen appreciated from $0.66 to $0.70 – an appreciation of the yen of 6.1%.
Fears about the unwinding of the carry trade led to falls in stock markets around the world. Not only were investors selling shares to pay back the loans, but fears of the continuing process put further downward pressure on shares. From 31 July to 5 August, the US S&P 500 fell by 6.1% and the tech-heavy Nasdaq by 8.0%.
As far as the Tokyo stock market was concerned, the appreciation of the yen sparked fears that the large Japanese export sector would be damaged. Investors rushed to sell shares. Between 31 July and 5 August, the Nikkei 225 (the main Japanese stock market index) fell by 19.5% – its biggest short-term fall ever (see Figure 4: click here for a PowerPoint).
Although the yen has since depreciated slightly (a rise in the yen/dollar rate) and stock markets have recovered somewhat, expectations of many investors are that the unwinding of the yen carry trade has some way to go. This could result in a further appreciation of the yen from current levels of around ¥100 = $0.67 to around $0.86 in a couple of years’ time.
There are also fears about the carry trade in the Chinese currency, the yuan. Some $500 billion of foreign currency holdings have been acquired with yuan since 2022. As with the Japanese carry trade, this has been encouraged by low Chinese interest rates and a depreciating yuan. Not only are Chinese companies investing abroad, but foreign companies operating in China have been using their yuan earnings from their Chinese operations to invest abroad rather than in China. The Chinese carry trade, however, has been restricted by the limited convertibility of the yuan. If the Chinese carry trade begins to unwind when the Chinese economy begins to recover and interest rates begin to rise, the effect will probably be more limited than with the yen.
Articles
- A popular trading strategy just blew up in investors’ faces
CNN, Allison Morrow (7/8/24)
- The big ‘carry trade’ unwind is far from over, strategists warn
CNBC, Sam Meredith (13/8/24)
- Unwinding of yen ‘carry trade’ still threatens markets, say analysts
Financial Times, Leo Lewis and David Keohane (7/8/24)
- The yen carry trade sell-off marks a step change in the business cycle
Financial Times, John Plender (10/8/24)
- Forbes Money Markets Global Markets React To The Japanese Yen Carry Trade Unwind
Forbes, Frank Holmes (12/8/24)
- 7 unwinding carry trades that crashed the markets
Alt21 (26/1/23)
- A carry crash also kicked off the global financial crisis 17 years ago — here’s why it’s unlikely to get as bad this time
The Conversation, Charles Read (9/8/24)
- What is the Chinese yuan carry trade and how is it different from the yen’s?
Reuters, Winni Zhou and Summer Zhen (13/8/24)
- Carry Trade That Blew Up Markets Is Attracting Hedge Funds Again
Yahoo Finance/Bloomberg, David Finnerty and Ruth Carson (16/8/24)
- Currency Carry Trades 101
Investopedia, Kathy Lien (9/8/24)
- Carry Trades Torpedoed The Market. They’re Still Everywhere.
Finimize, Stéphane Renevier (13/8/24)
Questions
- What factors drive the currency carry trade?
- Is the carry trade a form of arbitrage?
- Find out and explain what has happened to the Japanese yen since this blog was written.
- Find out and explain some other examples of carry trades.
- Why are expectations so important in determining the extent and timing of the unwinding of carry trades?