On 10 March, the House of Representatives gave final approval to President Biden’s $1.9tr fiscal stimulus plan (the American Rescue Plan). Worth over 9% of GDP, this represents the third stage of an unparalleled boost to the US economy. In March 2020, President Trump secured congressional agreement for a $2.2tr package (the CARES Act). Then in December 2020, a bipartisan COVID relief bill, worth $902bn, was passed by Congress.
By comparison, the Obama package in 2009 in response to the impending recession following the financial crisis was $831bn (5.7% of GDP).
The American Rescue Plan
The Biden stimulus programme consists of a range of measures, the majority of which provide monetary support to individuals. These include a payment of $1400 per person for single people earning less than $75 000 and couples less than $150 000. These come on top of payments of $1200 in March 2020 and $600 in late December. In addition, the top-up to unemployment benefits of $300 per week agreed in December will now continue until September. Also, annual child tax credit will rise from $2000 annually to as much as $3600 and this benefit will be available in advance.
Other measures include $350bn in grants for local governments depending on their levels of unemployment and other needs; $50bn to improve COVID testing centres and $20bn to develop a national vaccination campaign; $170bn to schools and universities to help them reopen after lockdown; and grants to small businesses and specific grants to hard-hit sectors, such as hospitality, airlines, airports and rail companies.
Despite supporting the two earlier packages, no Republican representative or senator backed this latest package, arguing that it was not sufficiently focused. As a result, reaction to the package has been very much along partisan lines. Nevertheless, it is supported by some 90% of Democrat voters and 50% of Republican voters.
Is the stimulus the right amount?
Although the latest package is worth $1.9tr, aggregate demand will not expand by this amount, which will limit the size of the multiplier effect. The reason is that the benefits multiplier is less than the government expenditure multiplier as some of the extra money people receive will be saved or used to reduce debts.
With $3tr representing some 9% of GDP, this should easily fill the estimated negative output gap of between 2% and 3%, especially when multiplier effects are included. Also, with savings having increased during the recession to put them some 7% above normal, the additional amount saved may be quite small, and wealthier Americans may begin to reduce their savings and spend a larger proportion of their income.
So the problem might be one of excessive stimulus, which in normal times could result in crowding out by driving up interest rates and dampening investment. However, the Fed is still engaged in a programme of quantitative easing. Between mid-March 2020 and the end of March 2021, the Fed’s portfolio of securities held outright grew from $3.9tr to $7.2tr. What is more, many economists predict that inflation is unlikely to rise other than very slightly. If this is so, it should allow the package to be financed easily. Debt should not rise to unsustainable levels.
Other economists argue, however, that inflationary expectations are rising, reflected in bond yields, and this could drive actual inflation and force the Fed into the awkward dilemma of either raising interest rates, which could have a significant dampening effect, or further increasing money supply, potentially leading to greater inflationary problems in the future.
A lot will depend what happens to potential GDP. Will it rise over the medium term so that additional spending can be accommodated? If the rise in spending encourages an increase in investment, this should increase potential GDP. This will depend on business confidence, which may be boosted by the package or may be dampened by worries about inflation.
Additional packages to come
Potential GDP should also be boosted by two further packages that Biden plans to put to Congress.
The first is a $2.2tr infrastructure investment plan, known as the American Jobs Plan. This is a 10-year plan to invest public money in transport infrastructure (such as rebuilding 20 000 miles of road and repairing bridges), public transport, electric vehicles, green housing, schools, water supply, green power generation, modernising the power grid, broadband, R&D in fields such as AI, social care, job training and manufacturing. This will be largely funded through tax increases, such as gradually raising corporation tax from 21% to 28% (it had been cut from 35% to 21% by President Trump) and taxing global profits of US multinationals. However, the spending will generally precede the increased revenues and thus will raise aggregate demand in the initial years. Only after 15 years are revenues expected to exceed costs.
The second is a yet-to-be announced plan to increase spending on childcare, healthcare and education. This should be worth at least $1tr. This will probably be funded by tax increases on income, capital gains and property, aimed largely at wealthy individuals. Again, it is hoped that this will boost potential GDP, in this case by increasing labour productivity.
With earlier packages, the total increase in public spending will be over $8tr. This is discretionary fiscal policy writ large.
- Biden’s $1.9 trillion COVID-19 bill wins final approval in House
Reuters, Susan Cornwell and Makini Brice (10/3/21)
- Biden’s Covid stimulus plan: It costs $1.9tn but what’s in it?
BBC News, Natalie Sherman (6/3/21)
- Biden’s $1.9 Trillion Challenge: End the Coronavirus Crisis Faster
New York Times, Jim Tankersley and Sheryl Gay Stolberg (22/3/21)
- Joe Biden writes a cheque for America – and the rest of the world
The Observer, Phillip Inman (13/3/21)
- Spend or save: Will Biden’s stimulus cheques boost the economy?
Aljazeera, Cinnamon Janzer (9/3/21)
- After Biden stimulus, US economic growth could rival China’s for the first time in decades
CNN, Matt Egan (12/3/21)
- Larry Summers, who called out inflation fears with Biden’s $1.9 trillion COVID-19 relief package, says the US is seeing ‘least responsible’ macroeconomic policy in 40 years
Business Insider, John L. Dorman (21/3/21)
- With $1.9 Trillion in New Spending, America Is Headed for Financial Fragility
Barron’s, Leslie Lipschitz and Josh Felman (30/3/21)
- Biden unveils ‘once-in-a generation’ $2tn infrastructure investment plan
The Guardian, Lauren Gambino (31/3/21)
- Biden unveils $2tn infrastructure plan and big corporate tax rise
Financial Times, James Politi (31/3/21)
- The Observer view on Joe Biden’s audacious spending plans
The Observer, editorial (11/4/21)
- Draw a Keynesian cross diagram to show the effect of an increase in benefits when the economy is operating below potential GDP.
- What determines the size of the benefits multiplier?
- Explain what is meant by the output gap. How might the pandemic and accompanying emergency health measures have affected the size of the output gap?
- How are expectations relevant to the effectiveness of the stimulus measures?
- What is likely to determine the proportion of the $1400 stimulus cheques that people spend?
- Distinguish between resource crowding out and financial crowding out. Is the fiscal stimulus package likely to result in either form of crowding out and, if so, what will determine by how much?
- What is the current monetary policy of the Fed? How is it likely to impact on the effectiveness of the fiscal stimulus?
The BBC podcast linked below looks at the use of quantitative easing since 2009 and especially the most recent round since the onset of the pandemic.
Although QE was a major contributor to reducing the depth of the recession in 2009–10, it was barely used from 2013 to 2020 (except for a short period in late 2016/early 2017). The Coalition and Conservative governments were keen to get the deficit down. In justifying pay restraint and curbing government expenditure, Prime Ministers David Cameron and Theresa May both argued that there ‘was no magic money tree’.
But with the severely dampening effect of the lockdown measures from March 2020, the government embarked on a large round of expenditure, including the furlough scheme and support for businesses.
The resulting rise in the budget deficit was accompanied by a new round of QE from the beginning of April. The stock of assets purchased by the Bank of England rose from £445 billion (the approximate level it had been since March 2017) to £740 billion by December 2020 and is planned to reach £895 billion by the end of 2021.
So with the effective funding of the government’s deficits by the creation of new money, does this mean that there is indeed a ‘magic money tree’ or, indeed, a ‘magic money forest’? And if so, is it desirable? Is it simply stoking up problems for the future? Or will, as modern monetary theorists maintain, the extra money, if carefully spent, lead to faster growth and a reducing deficit, with low interest rates making it easy to service the debt?
The podcast explores these issues. There is then a longer list of questions than normal relating to the topics raised in the podcast.
- Which of the following are stocks and which are flows?
(c) The total amount people save each month
(d) The money held in savings accounts
(e) Public-sector net debt
(f) Public-sector net borrowing
(g) National income
(h) Injections into the circular flow of income
(i) Aggregate demand
- How do banks create money?
- What is the role of the Debt Management Office in the sale of gilts?
- Describe the birth of QE.
- Is raising asset prices the best means of stimulating the economy? What are the disadvantages of this form of monetary expansion?
- What are the possible exit routes from QE and what problems could occur from reducing the central bank’s stock of assets?
- Is the use of QE in the current Covid-19 crisis directly related to fiscal policy? Or is this use of monetary policy simply a means of hitting the inflation target?
- What are the disadvantages of having interest rates at ultra-low levels?
- Does it matter if the stock of government debt rises substantially if the gilts are at ultra-low fixed interest rates?
- What are the intergenerational effects of substantial QE? Does it depend on how debt is financed?
- How do the policy recommendations of modern monetary theorists differ from those of more conventional macroeconomists?
- In an era of ultra-low interest rates, does fiscal policy have a greater role to play than monetary policy?
On 25 November, the UK government published its Spending Review 2020. This gives details of estimated government expenditure for the current financial year, 2020/21, and plans for government expenditure and the likely totals for 2021/22.
The focus of the Review is specifically on the effects of and responses to the coronavirus pandemic. It does not consider the effects of Brexit, with or without a trade deal, or plans for taxation. The Review is based on forecasts by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). Because of the high degree of uncertainty over the spread of the disease and the timing and efficacy of vaccines, the OBR gives three forecast values for most variables – pessimistic, central and optimistic.
According to the central forecast, real GDP is set to decline by 11.3% in 2020, the largest one-year fall since the Great Frost of 1709. The economy is then set to ‘bounce back’ (somewhat), with GDP rising by 5.2% in 2021.
Unemployment will rise from 3.9% in 2019 to a peak of 7.5% in mid-2021, after the furlough scheme and other support for employers is withdrawn.
This blog focuses at the impact on government borrowing and debt and the implications for the future – both the funding of the debt and ways of reducing it.
Soaring government deficits and debt
Government expenditure during the pandemic has risen sharply through measures such as the furlough scheme, the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme and various business loans. This, combined with falling tax revenue, as incomes and consumer expenditure have declined, has led to a rise in public-sector net borrowing (PSNB) from 2.5% of GDP in 2019/20 to a central forecast of 19% for 2020/21 – the largest since World War II. By 2025/26 it is still forecast to be 3.9% of GDP. The figure has also been pushed up by a fall in nominal GDP for 2020/21 (the denominator) by nearly 7%. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the above chart.)
The high levels of PSNB are pushing up public-sector net debt (PSNB). This is forecast to rise from 85.5% of GDP in 2019/20 to 105.2% in 2020/21, peaking at 109.4% in 2023/24.
The exceptionally high deficit and debt levels will mean that the government misses by a very large margin its three borrowing and debt targets set out in the latest (Autumn 2016) ‘Charter for Budget Responsibility‘. These are:
- to reduce cyclically-adjusted public-sector net borrowing to below 2% of GDP by 2020/21;
- for public-sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be falling in 2020/21;
- for overall borrowing to be zero or in surplus by 2025/26.
But, as the Chancellor said in presenting the Review:
Our health emergency is not yet over. And our economic emergency has only just begun. So our immediate priority is to protect people’s lives and livelihoods.
Putting the public finances on a sustainable footing
Running a large budget deficit in an emergency is an essential policy for dealing with the massive decline in aggregate demand and for supporting those who have, or otherwise would have, lost their jobs. But what of the longer-term implications? What are the options for dealing with the high levels of debt?
1. Raising taxes. This tends to be the preferred approach of those on the left, who want to protect or improve public services. For them, the use of higher progressive taxes, such as income tax, or corporation tax or capital gains tax, are a means of funding such services and of providing support for those on lower incomes. There has been much discussion of the possibility of finding a way of taxing large tech companies, which are able to avoid taxes by declaring very low profits by diverting them to tax havens.
2. Cutting government expenditure. This is the traditional preference of those on the right, who prefer to cut the overall size of the state and thus allow for lower taxes. However, this is difficult to do without cutting vital services. Indeed, there is pressure to have higher government expenditure over the longer term to finance infrastructure investment – something supported by the Conservative government.
A downside of either of the above is that they squeeze aggregate demand and hence may slow the recovery. There was much discussion after the financial crisis over whether ‘austerity policies’ hindered the recovery and whether they created negative supply-side effects by dampening investment.
3. Accepting higher levels of debt into the longer term. This is a possible response as long as interest rates remain at record low levels. With depressed demand, loose monetary policy may be sustainable over a number of years. Quantitative easing depresses bond yields and makes it cheaper for governments to finance borrowing. Servicing high levels of debt may be quite affordable.
The problem is if inflation begins to rise. Even with lower aggregate demand, if aggregate supply has fallen faster because of bankruptcies and lack of investment, there may be upward pressure on prices. The Bank of England may have to raise interest rates, making it more expensive for the government to service its debts.
Another problem with not reducing the debt is that if another emergency occurs in the future, there will be less scope for further borrowing to support the economy.
4. Higher growth ‘deals’ with the deficit and reduces debt. In this scenario, austerity would be unnecessary. This is the ‘golden’ scenario – for the country to grow its way out of the problem. Higher output and incomes leads to higher tax revenues, and lower unemployment leads to lower expenditure on unemployment benefits. The crucial question is the relationship between aggregate demand and supply. For growth to be sustainable and shrink the debt/GDP ratio, aggregate demand must expand steadily in line with the growth in aggregate supply. The faster aggregate supply can grow, the faster can aggregate demand. In other words, the faster the growth in potential GDP, the faster can be the sustainable rate of growth of actual GDP and the faster can the debt/GDP ratio shrink.
One of the key issues is the degree of economic ‘scarring’ from the pandemic and the associated restrictions on economic activity. The bigger the decline in potential output from the closure of firms and the greater the deskilling of workers who have been laid off, the harder it will be for the economy to recover and the longer high deficits are likely to persist.
Another issue is the lack of labour productivity growth in the UK in recent years. If labour productivity does not increase, this will severely restrict the growth in potential output. Focusing on training and examining incentives, work practices and pay structures are necessary if productivity is to rise significantly. So too is finding ways to encourage firms to increase investment in new technologies.
Podcast and videos
- Initial reaction from IFS researchers on Spending Review 2020 and OBR forecasts
IFS Press Release, Paul Johnson, Carl Emmerson, Ben Zaranko, Tom Waters and Isabel Stockton (25/11/200
- Rishi Sunak is likely to increase spending – which means tax rises will follow
IFS, Newspaper Article, Paul Johnson (23/11/20)
- Economic and Fiscal Outlook Executive Summary
- UK’s Sunak says public finances are on ‘unsustainable’ path
Reuters, David Milliken (26/11/20)
- Rishi Sunak warns ‘economic emergency has only just begun’
BBC News, Szu Ping Chan (25/11/20)
- UK will need £27bn of spending cuts or tax rises, watchdog warns
The Guardian, Phillip Inman (25/11/20)
- What is tomorrow’s Spending Review all about?
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (24/11/20)
- Spending Review 2020: the experts react
The Conversation, Drew Woodhouse, Ernestine Gheyoh Ndzi, Jonquil Lowe, Anupam Nanda, Alex de Ruyter and Simon J. Smith (25/11/20)
- What is the significance of the relationship between the rate of economic growth and the rate of interest for financing public-sector debt over the longer term?
- What can the government do to encourage investment in the economy?
- Using OBR data, find out what has happened to the output gap over the past few years and what is forecast to happen to it over the next five years. Explain the significance of the figures.
- Distinguish between demand-side and supply-side policies. How would you characterise the policies to tackle public-sector net debt in terms of this distinction? Do the policies have a mixture of demand- and supply-side effects?
- Choose two other developed countries. Examine how their their public finances have been affected by the coronavirus pandemic and the policies they are adopting to tackle the economic effects of the pandemic.
With the imposition of a new lockdown in England from 5 November to 2 December and in Wales from 3 October to 9 November, and with strong restrictions in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the UK economy is set to return to negative growth – a W-shaped GDP growth curve.
With the closure of leisure facilities and non-essential shops in England and Wales, spending is likely to fall. Without support, many businesses would fail and potential output would fall. In terms of aggregate demand and supply, both would decline, as the diagram below illustrates. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)
The aggregate demand curve shifts from AD1 to AD2 as consumption and investment fall. Exports also fall as demand is hit by the pandemic in other countries. The fall in aggregate supply is represented partly by a movement along the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) as demand falls for businesses which remain open (such as transport services). Largely it is represented by a leftward shift in the curve from SRAS1 to SRAS2 as businesses such as non-essential shops and those in the hospitality and leisure sector are forced to close. What happens to the long-run supply curve depends on the extent to which businesses reopen when the lockdown and any other subsequent restrictions preventing their reopening are over. It also depends on the extent to which other firms spring up or existing firms grow to replace the business of those that have closed. The continuing rise in online retailing is an example.
With the prospect of falling GDP and rising unemployment, the UK government and the Bank of England have responded by giving a fiscal and monetary boost. We examine each in turn.
In March, the Chancellor introduced the furlough scheme, whereby employees temporarily laid off would receive 80% of their wages through a government grant to their employers. This scheme was due to end on 31 October, to be replaced by the less generous Job Support Scheme (see the blog, The new UK Job Support Scheme: how much will it slow the rise in unemployment?). However, the Chancellor first announced that the original furlough scheme would be extended until 2 December for England and then, on 5 November, to the end of March 2021 for the whole of the UK. He also announced that the self-employed income support grant would increase from 55% to 80% of average profits up to £7500.
In addition, the government announced cash grants of up to £3000 per month for businesses which are closed (worth more than £1 billion per month), extra money to local authorities to support businesses and an extension of existing loan schemes for business. Furthermore, the government is extending the scheme whereby people can claim a repayment ‘holiday’ for up to 6 months for mortgages, personal loans and car finance.
The government hopes that the boost to aggregate demand will help to slow, or even reverse, the predicted decline in GDP. What is more, by people being put on furlough rather than being laid off, it hopes to slow the rise in unemployment.
At the meeting of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee on 4 November, further expansionary monetary policy was announced. Rather than lowering Bank Rate from its current historically low rate of 0.1%, perhaps to a negative figure, it was decided to engage in further quantitative easing.
An additional £150 billion of government bonds will be purchased under the asset purchase facility (APF). This will bring the total vale of bonds purchased since the start of the pandemic to £450 billion (including £20 billion of corporate bonds) and to £895 billion since 2009 when QE was first introduced in response to the recession following the financial crisis of 2007–8.
The existing programme of asset purchases should be complete by the end of December this year. The Bank of England expects the additional £150 billion of purchases to begin in January 2021 and be completed within a year.
UK quantitative easing since the first round in March 2009 is shown in the chart above. The reserve liabilities represent the newly created money for the purchase of assets under the APF programme. (There are approximately £30 billion of other reserve liabilities outside the APF programme.) The grey area shows projected reserve liabilities to the end of the newly announced programme of purchases, by which time, as stated above, the total will be £895 billion. This, of course, assumes that the Bank does not announce any further QE, which it could well do if the recovery falters.
Justifying the decision, the MPC meeting’s minutes state that:
There are signs that consumer spending has softened across a range of high-frequency indicators, while investment intentions have remained weak. …The fall in activity over 2020 has reflected a decline in both demand and supply. Overall, there is judged to be a material amount of spare capacity in the economy.
How effective these fiscal and monetary policy measures will be in mitigating the effects of the Covid restrictions remains to be seen. A lot will depend on how successful the lockdown and other restrictions are in slowing the virus, how quickly a vaccine is developed and deployed, whether a Brexit deal is secured, and the confidence of both consumers, businesses and financial markets that the economy will bounce back in 2021. As the MPC’s minutes state:
The outlook for the economy remains unusually uncertain. It depends on the evolution of the pandemic and measures taken to protect public health, as well as the nature of, and transition to, the new trading arrangements between the European Union and the United Kingdom. It also depends on the responses of households, businesses and financial markets to these developments.
- Covid: Rishi Sunak to extend furlough scheme to end of March
BBC News (6/11/20)
- Furlough extended until March and self-employed support boosted again
MSE News, Callum Mason (6/11/20)
- Number on furlough in UK may double during England lockdown
The Guardian, Richard Partington (3/11/20)
- ‘We wouldn’t manage without it’: business owners on the furlough extension
The Guardian, Molly Blackall and Mattha Busby (6/11/20)
- Sunak’s abrupt turn on UK furlough scheme draws criticism from sceptics
Financial Times, Delphine Strauss (6/11/20)
- Coronavirus: Bank of England unleashes further £150bn of support for economy
Sky News, James Sillars (5/11/20)
- Bank of England boss pledges to do ‘everything we can’
BBC News, Szu Ping Chan (6/11/20)
- Savers are spared negative rates but the magic money tree delivers £150bn more QE: What the Bank of England’s charts tell us about the economy
This is Money, Simon Lambert (5/11/20)
- Covid-19 and the victory of quantitative easing
The Spectator, Bruce Anderson (26/10/20)
- Will the Bank of England’s reliance on quantitative easing work for the UK economy?
The Conversation, Ghulam Sorwar (9/11/20)
- With a W-shaped recession looming and debt piling up, the government should start issuing GDP-linked bonds
LSE British Politics and Policy blogs, Costas Milas (6/11/20)
- Illustrate the effects of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy on (a) a short-run aggregate supply and demand diagram; (b) a long-run aggregate supply and demand diagram.
- In the context of the fiscal and monetary policy measures examined in this blog, what will determine the amount that the curves shift?
- Illustrate on a Keynesian 45° line diagram the effects of (a) the lockdown and (b) the fiscal and monetary policy measures adopted by the government and Bank of England.
- If people move from full-time to part-time working, how is this reflected in the unemployment statistics? What is this type of unemployment called?
- How does quantitative easing through asset purchases work through the economy to affect output and employment? In other words, what is the transmission mechanism of the policy?
- What determines the effectiveness of quantitative easing?
- Under what circumstances will increasing the money supply affect (a) real output and (b) prices alone?
- Why might quantitative easing benefit the rich more than the poor?
- How could the government use quantitative easing to finance its budget deficit?
Back in June, we examined the macroeconomic forecasts of the three agencies, the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission, all of which publish forecasts every six months. The IMF has recently published its latest World Economic Outlook (WEO) and its accompanying database. Unlike the April WEO, which, given the huge uncertainty surrounding the pandemic and its economic effects, only forecast as far as 2021, the latest version forecasts as far ahead as 2025.
In essence the picture is similar to that painted in April. The IMF predicts a large-scale fall in GDP and rise in unemployment, government borrowing and government debt for 2020 (compared with 2019) across virtually all countries.
World real GDP is predicted to fall by 4.4%. For many countries the fall will be much steeper. In the UK, GDP is predicted to fall by 9.8%; in the eurozone, by 8.3%; in India, by 10.3%; in Italy, by 10.8%; in Spain, by 12.8%. There will then be somewhat of a ‘bounce back’ in GDP in 2021, but not to the levels of 2019. World real GDP is predicted to rise by 5.2% in 2021. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the growth chart.)
Unemployment will peak in some countries in 2020 and in others in 2021 depending on the speed of recovery from recession and the mobility of labour. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the unemployment chart.)
Inflation is set to fall from already low levels. Several countries are expected to see falling prices.
Government deficits (negative net lending) will be sharply higher in 2020 as a result of government measures to support workers and firms affected by lockdowns and falling demand. Governments will also receive reduced tax revenues. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the general government net lending chart.)
Government debt will consequently rise more rapidly. Deficits are predicted to fall in 2021 as economies recover and hence the rise in debt will slow down or in some cases, such as Germany, even fall. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the general government gross debt chart.)
After the rebound in 2021, global growth is then expected to slow to around 3.5% by 2025. This compares with an average of 3.8% from 2000 to 2019. Growth of advanced economies is expected to slow to 1.7%. It averaged 1.9% from 2000 to 2019. For emerging market and developing countries it is expected to slow to 4.7% from an average of 5.7% from 2000 to 2019. These figures suggest some longer-term scarring effects from the pandemic.
In the short term, the greatest uncertainty concerns the extent of the second wave, the measures put in place to contain the spread of the virus and the compensation provided by governments to businesses and workers. The WEO report was prepared when the second wave was only just beginning. It could well be that countries will experience a deeper recession in 2000 and into 2021 than predicted by the IMF.
This is recognised in the forecast.
The persistence of the shock remains uncertain and relates to factors inherently difficult to predict, including the path of the pandemic, the adjustment costs it imposes on the economy, the effectiveness of the economic policy response, and the evolution of financial sentiment.
With some businesses forced to close, others operating at reduced capacity because of social distancing in the workplace and with dampened demand, many countries may find output falling again. The extent will to a large extent depend on the levels of government support.
In the medium term, it is assumed that there will be a vaccine and that economies can begin functioning normally again. However, the report does recognise the long-term scarring effects caused by low levels of investment, deskilling and demotivation of the parts of the workforce, loss of capacity and disruptions to various supply chains.
The deep downturn this year will damage supply potential to varying degrees across economies. The impact will depend on various factors … including the extent of firm closures, exit of discouraged workers from the labour force, and resource mismatches (sectoral, occupational and geographic).
One of the greatest uncertainties in the medium term concerns the stance of fiscal and monetary policies. Will governments continue to run large deficits to support demand or will they attempt to reduce deficits by raising taxes and/or reducing benefits and/or cutting government current or capital expenditure?
Will central banks continue with large-scale quantitative easing and ultra-low or even negative interest rates? Will they use novel forms of monetary policy, such as directly funding government deficits with new money or providing money directly to citizens through a ‘helicopter’ scheme (see the 2016 blog, New UK monetary policy measures – somewhat short of the kitchen sink)?
Forecasting at the current time is fraught with uncertainty. However, reports such as the WEO are useful in identifying the various factors influencing the economy and how seriously they may impact on variables such as growth, unemployment and government deficits.
Report, speeches and data
- World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent
IMF, Report (October 2020)
- World Economic Outlook Databases
IMF (October 2020)
- “We Must Take the Right Actions Now!”—Opening Remarks for Annual Meetings Press Conference
IMF, Speech, Kristalina Georgieva, IMF Managing Director (14/10/20)
- Press Briefing: World Economic Outlook
IMF, Gita Gopinath, Chief Economist and Director of the Research Department, IMF; Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF; Malhar Shyam Nabar, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF; Moderator: Raphael Anspach, Senior Communications officer, Communications Department, IMF (13/10/20)
- Explain what is meant by ‘scarring effects’. Identify various ways in which the pandemic is likely to affect aggregate supply over the longer term.
- Consider the arguments for and against governments continuing to run large budget deficits over the next few years.
- What are the arguments for and against using ‘helicopter money’ in the current circumstances?
- On purely economic grounds, what are the arguments for imposing much stricter lockdowns when Covid-19 rates are rising rapidly?
- Chose two countries other than the UK, one industrialised and one developing. Consider what policies they are pursuing to achieve an optimal balance between limiting the spread of the virus and protecting the economy.