On the 29 November, the Bank of England published the results of its latest stress test of the UK financial system. Annual stress testing was introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It models the ability of the financial system to withstand severe macroeconomic and financial market conditions. Typically, the focus has been on testing the resilience of the banking system.
This year’s was the first system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). This recognises the growing significance of ‘shadow banking’. Shadow banking involves borrowing and lending involving non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Such institutions sit outside the regulatory cordons around banking but have become significant actors in the financial system.
However, this obscure part of the financial system poses systemic risks which are not clearly understood and from time to time require costly interventions. Examples include: problems in liability-driven investments (LDIs) for pension funds in September 2022; the money market liquidity crisis involving hedge funds in March 2020; the collapse of Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 following the Russian Federation’s default (LTCM had significant holdings of Russian government bonds – see linked article on LTCM below).
The growing significance of shadow banking means that regulators have become increasingly concerned about the vulnerabilities in the financial system which arise from outside the traditional banking system.
In this blog we will explain stress-testing of the financial system and trace the rise in shadow banking which motivated the recent system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). We will discuss the findings of the stress test, highlighting the systemic risks of shadow banking. Finally, we will discuss the implications for the regulation and supervision of the financial system.
What is stress testing?
Stress testing was introduced by the Bank of England after the financial crisis to assess the ability of the financial system to withstand severe economic and market scenarios.
In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, the liquidity and capital buffers of many banks had been extremely thin. These were only able to withstand moderate economic shocks and moderate conditions and buckled under the stresses of the crisis.
Regulators argued that the buffers needed to become much more robust and be able to withstand rare but severe economic and market conditions. The stress testing analogy was derived from engineering, where parts are expected to work not just in benign conditions but also in extreme, hostile environments.
Since 2014, the Bank of England has conducted annual stress testing. Stress testing models the impact of adverse economic conditions on banks’ liquidity, profitability and capital. The results are used to set policy for individual banks (microprudential) and for the system as a whole (macroprudential). Stress test results have allowed the Bank to adjust the loss-absorbing capital that banks must hold to reduce their likelihood of failure.
The scope of the testing has expanded over time to incorporate insurers, central counterparties (financial institutions that provide clearing and settlement services between financial traders) and cyber security. The most recent scenario recognised the increasing significance of non-deposit taking financial institutions in channelling credit. Fifty City of London institutions modelled how a period of intense stress would ripple through the shadow banking sector.
The arcane world of shadow banking
Shadow banking refers to borrowing and lending which occurs outside the banking sector. Traditionally banking involves taking deposits and using these to finance lending.
Shadow banking involves non-deposit taking financial institutions (NBFIs) such as hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, private equity funds, as well as some activities of investment banks. These institutions channel funds in different ways from lenders to borrowers. Typically, they use funds from investors to buy securities through financial markets. The emergence and growth of shadow banking has been explained by changing regulation and innovation.
Its first significant period of expansion in the late 1980s was driven by financial innovation. Increased use of ‘disintermediation’ – the replacement of credit channels through banks with ones through markets – meant an increase in the assets invested through NBFIs.
Despite this process playing a major role in the expansion of housing credit in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, it was the significant bailouts that banks received that drew the attention of regulators, not the role of shadow banking. This led to more stringent liquidity and capital requirements for banks under the BASEL III international regulations.
This regulatory tightening limited banks’ ability to offer credit, which meant that much of this activity migrated to the shadow banking sector.
Data from the Bank of England show that the percentage of total assets held by NBFIs rose from 41% in 2007 to 49% in 2020. The chart illustrates the total financial assets held by non-bank financial institutions in the UK between 2019 Q4 and 2023 Q3 (click here for a PowerPoint). The amount held has growth by approximately a third in that time, from £4321bn to £6069bn, peaking at £6670bn in 2022 Q3.
The lack of regulatory oversight stems from the nature of the activities in the shadow banking sector. While NBFIs conduct maturity transformation, provide liquidity and help manage risk, unlike banks, they do not accept deposits and are not part of the payments system involving the general public.
Consequently, the consensus among regulators has been that their activities do not pose the same systemic risks as banking of the breakdown of the payments mechanism and associated collapse in business and consumer confidence. Therefore, NBFIs are not subject to conventional regulation and supervision involving liquidity and capital requirements.
However, as the scale of borrowing and lending running through the sector has grown, this argument has become less difficult to justify. There is a concern that ‘regulatory arbitrage’ is happening and that the systemic risks associated with shadow banking are being underestimated.
The familiar risks of shadow banking
The systemic consequences of liquidity and solvency problems in the shadow banking sector may not seem obvious. Much of their activities are arcane and technical. However, there are plenty of examples of instances where the problems of hedge funds or pension funds have caused systemic issues.
While the consequences are not the same as those involving banks, in that the payments mechanism is not directly affected, the risks are. Just like banks, these institutions are exposed to liquidity risks, credit default risks and counterparty risks. The concern is that they do not have the same levels of liquidity or capital buffers as banks to insulate them from the consequences of such risks. Therefore, it might not take much economic stress for one or more of these institutions to fail and, given the increasing significance and interconnectedness of these activities, impose significant costs on the rest of the financial system.
It was for this reason that the Bank of England conducted its first system-wide exploratory scenario to analyse the impact of economic and market stress on these institutions and assess the nature and extent of systemic risks which resulted. Fifty City of London institutions modelled how a period of intense stress would ripple through the non-bank sector.
The scenario involved rising geopolitical tensions which caused a sharp rise in risk aversion and a demand for higher expected rates of return as compensation. This produced sharp rises in both sovereign and corporate bond yields and matching sharp declines in asset prices (remember bond yield and prices have a negative relationship).
The scenario found that the position and behaviour of NBFIs amplified the shock. These institutions invest significantly in marketable financial securities and their liquidity and solvency are susceptible to such falling prices.
The sharp decline in asset prices triggered margin calls – payments to cover open loss positions in financial securities. In response to these demands, while some NBFIs’ internal risk and leverage measures were breached, others illustrated greater risk-aversion and took precautionary action. These institutions acted to deleverage, derisk and recapitalise. Given the interconnectedness of financial markets, the individual actions of institutions rippled across financial markets, causing problems in other segments.
The significant decline in asset prices led insurance companies and pension funds to seek to improve their liquidity and solvency position by liquidating positions in money market funds and hedge funds. This, in turn, required these funds to seek liquidity. Such institutions tend to rely a lot on the repo market (involving short-term sale and repurchase credit agreements) to provide liquidity to investors. This avoids them having to sell assets. This practice has echoes of the banking sectors use of the short-term wholesale markets in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis.
However, the SWES found that while banks were willing to take on some of the risk, their own concerns about liquidity and counterparty credit risk meant they did not offer sufficient short-term liquidity through the repo markets. If such funding dried up because of a higher risk perception, it could compromise the hedge funds’ ability to raise funds, requiring asset sales. This would amplify the shock to financial markets, driving prices of financial securities even lower.
The scenario concluded that the resulting heavy selling could seize up financial markets, particularly the UK sovereign and corporate bond markets, reducing the ability of companies to finance investment. This is a different type of credit crunch from 2008, which was restricted to banks – but a credit crunch, nonetheless.
At the same time, funds may make capital losses as they sell securities in the downturn. This creates solvency problems and the potential for failure.
In the SWES the institutions were often not able to anticipate how their counterparties, investors, or markets they operate in would behave in the stressed scenario, which echoes the experience of banks in 2007 and 2008 – a significant reason for the ‘crunch’ in banking credit was uncertainty about the creditworthiness of counterparties, meaning that banks were not prepared to lend to anybody.
Conclusion
Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a tightening of the regulation and supervision of banks which has limited their ability to channel credit. This has produced an expansion in the shadow banking sector.
However, while the shadow banking sector has not been subject to the same regulation and supervision as banks, there are still potential systemic risks associated with its operations. There have been several examples of such risks in the shadow banking sector which have led regulators to pay more attention. These underpinned the 2024 system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) conducted by the Bank of England.
The scenario showed the possible transmission mechanism through which problems for NBFIs can have broader consequences. The report nevertheless concluded that:
…the UK financial system was well-capitalised, maintained high levels of liquidity and that asset quality remained strong.
Therefore, the UK financial system was resilient enough to withstand problems in shadow banking.
Although the results of the exercise provide a ‘framework of future system-wide analysis which can be embedded in future market-wide surveillance,’ history indicates that risks tend to exist in obscure and arcane parts of the financial system and that these never tend to be fully appreciated until a crisis occurs. This then tends to involve significant costs for taxpayers.
Articles
- Bank of England warns of risks from non-banks in future markets crisis
Financial Times from MSN, Martin Arnold (29/11/24)
- BoE finds non-bank financial firms pose wider risks in crisis periods
Reuters, Lawrence White (2/12/24)
- Finance Firms Beyond Banks Not Ready For Crisis, BOE Warns
Bloomberg from Yahoo finance, Laura Noonan and Greg Ritchie (29/11/24)
- Shadow Banking System: Definition, Examples, and How It Works
Investopedia, Michael Bromberg (18/10/24)
- US Treasuries: the lessons from March’s market meltdown
Financial Times, Colby Smith and Robin Wigglesworth (29/7/20)
- LDI: the better mousetrap that almost broke the UK
FT Alphaville, Alexandra Scaggs and Louis Ashworth (29/9/22)
- Long-Term Capital Management
CFA Institute, Ron Rimkus (18/4/16)
- Neil Woodford: the continuing fallout of a scandal
Financial Times, Owen Walker (19/3/21)
Bank of England documents and reports
Data
Questions
- Explain stress testing.
- What is shadow banking? Explain the factors driving the growth of credit in this part of the financial system.
- Compare and contrast the liquidity problems of banks with those of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
- Analyse how financial crises can heighten problems of asymmetric information in financial markets.
In this blog we show how we can apply fiscal metrics to assess the UK government’s fiscal stance. This captures the extent to which fiscal policy contributes to the level of economic activity in the economy.
Changes in the fiscal stance can then be used to estimate the extent to which discretionary fiscal policy measures represent a tightening or loosening of policy. We can measure the size and direction of fiscal impulses arising from changes in the government’s budgetary position.
Such an analysis is timely given the Autumn Budget presented by Rachel Reeves on 30 October 2024. This was the first Labour budget in 14 years and the first ever to be presented by a female Chancellor of the Exchequer.
We conclude by considering the forecast profile of expenditures and revenues for the next few years and the new fiscal rules announced by the Chancellor.
The fiscal stance
At its most simple, the fiscal stance measures the extent to which fiscal policy increases or decreases demand, thereby influencing growth and inflation (see Box 1.F, page 28, Autumn Budget 2024: see link below).
The fiscal stance is commonly estimated by measures of pubic-sector borrowing. To understand this, we can refer to the circular flow of income model. In this model, excesses of government spending (an injection) over taxation receipts (a withdrawal or leakage) represent a net injection into the circular flow and hence positively affect the level of aggregate demand for national output, all other things being equal.
A commonly used measure of borrowing in assessing the fiscal stance of the is the primary deficit. Unlike public-sector net borrowing, which is simply the excess of the sector’s spending over its receipts (largely taxation), the primary deficit subtracts net interest costs. It therefore excludes the interest payments on outstanding public-sector debts (and interest income earned on financial assets). The primary deficit can therefore be written as public-sector borrowing less net interest payments.
As discussed in our blog Fiscal impulses in November 2023, the primary deficit captures whether the public sector is able to afford its present fiscal choices by abstracting from debt-serving costs that reflect past fiscal choices. In this way, the primary deficit is a preferable measure to net borrowing both in assessing the impact on economic activity, i.e. the fiscal stance, and in assessing whether today’s fiscal choices will require government to issue additional debt.
Chart 1 shows public-sector net borrowing and the primary balance as shares of GDP for the UK since financial year 1975/76 (click here for a PowerPoint). The data are from the latest Public Finances Databank published by the Office for Budget Responsibility, published on the day of the Autumn Budget in October (see Data links below).
Over the period 1975/6 to 2023/24, public-sector net borrowing and the primary deficit had averaged 3.8% and 1.3% of GDP respectively. In the financial year 2023/24, they were 4.5% and 1.5% (they had been as high as 15.1% and 14.1% in 2020/21 as a result of COVID support measures). In 2024/25 net borrowing and the primary deficit are forecast to be 4.5% and 1.6% respectively. By 2027/28, while net borrowing is forecast to be 2.3% of GDP, there is forecast to be a primary surplus of 0.7% of GDP.
The Autumn Budget lays out plans for higher tax revenues to contribute two-thirds of the overall reduction in the primary deficit over the forecast period (up to 2029/30), while spending decisions contribute the remaining third.
The largest tax-raising measure is an increase in the employer rate of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) by 1.2 percentage points to 15% from April 2025. This will be levied on employee wages above a Secondary Threshold of £5000, reduced from £9100, which will increase in line with CPI inflation each year from April 2028. (See John’s blog, Raising the minimum wage: its effects on poverty and employment, for an analysis on the effects of this change.) This measure, allowing for other changes to the operation of employer NICs, is expected to raise £122 billion over the forecast period. This amounts to over two-thirds of the additional tax take from the taxation measures taken in the Budget.
Chart 2 shows both net borrowing and the primary deficit after being cyclically-adjusted (click here for a PowerPoint). This process adjusts these fiscal indicators to account for those parts of spending and taxation that are affected by the position of the economy in the business cycle. These are those parts that act as automatic stabilisers helping, as the name suggests, to stabilise the economy.
The process of cyclical adjustment leads to estimates of receipts and expenditures as if the economy were operating at its potential output level and hence with no output gap. The act of cyclically adjusting the primary deficit, which is our preferred measure of the fiscal stance, allows us to assess better the public sector’s fiscal stance.
Over the period from 1975/6 up to and including 2023/24, the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (CAPD) averaged 1.1% of potential GDP. In 2024/25 the CAPD is forecast to be 1.5% of potential GDP. It then moves to a surplus of 0.5% by 2027/28. It therefore mirrors the path of the unadjusted primary deficit.
Measuring the fiscal impulse
To assess even more clearly the extent to which the fiscal stance is changing, we can use the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to measure a fiscal impulse. This captures the magnitude of change in discretionary fiscal policy.
The term should not be confused with fiscal multipliers which measure the impact of fiscal changes on outcomes, such as real GDP and employment. Instead, we are interested in the size of the impulse that the economy is being subject to. Specifically, we are measuring discretionary fiscal policy changes that result in structural changes in the government budget and which, therefore, allow an assessment of how much, if at all, a country’s fiscal stance has tightened or loosened.
The size of the fiscal impulse is measured by the year-on-year percentage point change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit (CAPD) as a percentage of potential GDP. A larger deficit or a smaller surplus indicates a fiscal loosening. This is consistent with a positive fiscal impulse. On the other hand, a smaller deficit or a larger surplus indicates a fiscal tightening. This is consistent with a negative fiscal impulse.
Chart 3 shows the magnitude of UK fiscal impulses since the mid-1970s (Click here for a PowerPoint file). The scale of the fiscal interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included the COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and Job Retention Scheme (‘furlough’), stand out sharply. In 2020 the CAPD to potential output ratio rose from 1.7 to 14.4%. This represents a positive fiscal impulse of 12.4% of GDP.
This was followed in 2021 by a tightening of the fiscal stance, with a negative fiscal impulse of 10.1% of GDP as the CAPD to potential output fell back to 4.0%. Subsequent tightening was tempered by policy measures to limit the impact on the private sector of the cost-of-living crisis, including the Energy Price Guarantee and Energy Bills Support Scheme.
For comparison, the fiscal response to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 saw a cumulative positive fiscal impulse of 5.6% of GDP. While smaller in comparison to the discretionary fiscal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it nonetheless represented a sizeable loosening of the fiscal stance.
Chart 4 focuses on the implied fiscal impulse for the forecast period up to 2029/30 (click here for a PowerPoint). The period is notable for a negative fiscal impulse each year. Across the period as a whole, this there is a cumulative negative fiscal impulse of 2.6% of GDP. Most of the ‘heavy-lifting’ of the fiscal consolidation occurs in the three financial years from 2025/26 during which there is a cumulative negative impulse of 2.0% of GDP.
Looking forward
To conclude, we consider the implications for the projected profiles of public-sector spending, receipts and liabilities over the forecast period up to 2029/30.
Chart 5 plots data since the mid-1950s (click here for a PowerPoint). It shows the size of total public-sector spending (also known as ‘total managed expenditures’), taxation receipts (sometimes referred as the ‘tax burden’) and total public-sector receipts as shares of GDP. This last one includes additional receipts, such as interest payments on financial assets and income generated by public corporations, as well as taxation receipts.
The OBR forecasts that in real terms (i.e. after adjustment for inflation), public-sector spending will increase on average over the period from 2025/26 to 2029/30 by 1.4% per year, but with total receipts due to rise more quickly at 2.5% per year and taxation receipts by 2.8% per year. The implications of this, as discussed in the OBR’s October 1014 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (see link below), are that:
the size of the state is forecast to settle at 44% of GDP by the end of the decade, almost 5 percentage points higher than before the pandemic” while additional tax revenues will “push the tax take to a historic high of 38% of GDP by 2029-30
Finally, the government has committed to two key rules: a stability rule and an investment rule.
The stability rule. This states that the current budget must be in surplus by 2029/30 or, once 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period, it will be in balance or surplus every third year of the rolling forecast period thereafter. The current budget refers to the difference between receipts and expenditures other than capital expenditures. In effect, it captures the ability of government to meet day-to-day spending and is intended to ensure that over the medium term any borrowing is solely for investment. It is important to note that ‘balance’ is defined in a range of between a deficit and surplus of no more than 0.5% of GDP.
The stability rule replaces the borrowing rule of the previous government that public net borrowing, therefore inclusive of investment expenditures, was not to exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.
The investment rule. The government is planning to increase investment. In order to do this in a financially sustainable way, the investment rule states that public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) or net financial debt for short, is falling as a share GDP by 2029/30, until 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period. PSNFL should then fall by the third year of the rolling forecast period. PSNFL is a broader measure of the sector’s balance sheet than public-sector net debt (PSND), which was targeted under the previous government and which was required to fall by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.
The new target, as well as now extending to the Bank of England, ‘nets off’ not just liquid liabilities (i.e. cash in the bank and foreign exchange reserves) but also financial assets such as shares and money owed to it, including expected student loan repayments. While liabilities are broader too, including for example, the local government pension scheme, the impact is expected to reduce the new liabilities target by £236 billion or 8.2 percentage points of GDP in 2024/25. The hope is that both rules can support what the Budget Report labels a ‘step change in investment’.
As Chart 6 shows, public investment as a share of GDP has not exceeded 6% this century and during the 2010s averaged only 4.4% (click here for a PowerPoint). The forecast has it rising above 5% for a time, but easing to 4.8% by end of the period.
This suggests more progress will be needed if the UK is to experience a significant and enduring increase in public investment. Of course, this needs to be set in the context of the wider public finances and is illustrative of the choices facing fiscal policymakers across the globe after the often violent shocks that have rocked economies and impacted on the state of the public finances in recent years.
Articles
Official documents
Data
Questions
- Explain what is meant by the following fiscal terms:
(a) Structural deficit,
(b) Automatic stabilisers,
(c) Discretionary fiscal policy,
(d) Public-sector net borrowing,
(e) Primary deficit,
(f) Current budget balance,
(g) Public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL).
- Explain the difference between a fiscal impulse and a fiscal multiplier.
- In designing fiscal rules what issues might policymakers need to consider?
- What are key differences between the fiscal rules of the previous Conservative government and the new Labour government in the UK? What economic arguments would you make for and against the ‘old’ and ‘new’ fiscal rules?
- What is meant by the ‘sustainability’ of the public finances? What factors might impact on their sustainability?
On 25 October 2024, Moody’s, one of the major credit ratings agencies, announced that it was downgrading France’s economic outlook to negative. This was its first downgrading of France since 2012. It followed a similar revision by Fitch’s, another ratings agency, on 11 October.
While Fitch’s announcement did not have a significant impact on the yields of French government bonds, expectations around Moody’s did. In the week preceding the announcement, the net increases in the yield on generic 10-year government debt was approximately 9 basis points (0.09 percentage points). On the day itself, the yield rose by approximately 5.6 basis points (0.056 percentage points).
The yield rose further throughout the rest of October, finishing nearly 0.25 percentage points above its level at the start of the month. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, these increases are part of a longer-term trend of rising yields for French government debt (click here for a PowerPoint).
The yield on 10-year French government debt began 2024 at 2.56% and had an upward trend for the first half of the year. The yield peaked at 3.34% on 1 July. It then fell back below 3% for a while. The negative economic outlook then pushed yields back above 3% and they finished October at 3.12%, half a percentage point above the level at the start of the year. This represents a significant increase in borrowing costs for the French government.
In this blog, we will explain why the changes in France’s economic outlook translate into increases in yields for French government bonds. We will also analyse why yields have increased and examine the prospects for the markets in French government bonds.
Pricing signals of bond yields
A bond is a tradable debt instrument issued by governments to finance budget deficits – the difference between tax receipts and spending. Like any financial instruments, investment in bonds involves a commitment of funds today in anticipation of interest payments through time as compensation, with a repayment of its redemption value on the date the bond matures.
Since the cash flows associated with holding a bond occur at different points in time, discounted cash flow analysis is used to determine its value. This gives the present value of the cash flows discounted at the appropriate expected rate of return. In equilibrium this will be equal to the bond’s market price, as the following equation shows.
Where:
P = the equilibrium price of the bond
C = cash coupon payments
M = redemption value at maturity
r = yield (expected rate of return in equilibrium.
Interest payments tend to be fixed at the time a bond is issued and reflect investors’ expected rate of return, expressed as the yield in bond markets. This is determined by prevailing interest rates and perceived risk. Over time, changes in interest rates and perceptions of risk will change the expected rate of return (yield), which will, in turn, change the present value of the cash flows, and hence fundamental value.
Prices move in response to changes in fundamental value and since this happens frequently, this means that prices change a lot. For bonds, as the coupon payments (C each year and the redemption price () are fixed, the only factor that can change is the expected rate of return (yield). This is reflected in the observed yield at each price.
If the expected rate of return rises, this increases the discount rate applied to future cash flows and reduces their present value. At the current price, the fixed coupon is not sufficient to compensate investors. So, investors sell the bonds and price falls until it reaches a point where the yield offered is equal to that required. The reverse happens if the expected rate of return falls.
The significant risk associated with bonds is credit default risk – the risk that the debt will not be repaid. The potential for credit default is a significant influence of the compensation investors require for holding debt instruments like bonds (ceteris paribus). An increase in expected credit default risk will increase the expected return (compensation). This will be reflected in a lower price and higher yield.
Normally, with the bonds issued by high-income countries, such as those in Europe and North America, the risk of default is extremely low. However, if a country’s annual deficits or accumulated debt increase to what markets consider to be unsustainable levels, the perceived risk of default may rise. Countries’ levels of risk are rated by international ratings agencies, such as Moody’s and Fitch. Investors pay a lot of attention to the information provided by such agencies.
Moody’s downgrade in its economic outlook for France from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ indicated weak economic performance and higher credit default risk. This revision rippled through bond markets as investors adjusted their views of the country’s economic risk. The rise in yields observed is a signal that bond investors perceive higher credit default risk associated with French government debt and are demanding a higher rates of return as compensation.
Why has France’s credit default risk premium risen now?
As we have seen, credit default risk is not normally considered a significant issue for sovereign borrowers like France. Some of the issue around perceived credit default risk for the French government relate to the size of the French government’s deficit and the projections for it. Following a spike in borrowing associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the annual government budget deficit and the overall level of debt as percentages of GDP have remained high. The annual deficit is projected to be 6% for 2024 and still 5% for 2025. The ratio of outstanding French government debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ballooned to 123% in 2020 and is still expected to be 115% by the end of 2025. France has been put on notice to reduce its debt towards the Eurozone limit of 60% of GDP.
Governments in France last achieved a balanced budget in 1974. They have run deficits ever since. Figure 2 illustrates the French government budget deficits from 1990 to 2023 (click here for a PowerPoint). The figure shows that France experienced deficits in the past similar to today’s. These, however, did not tend to worry bond markets too much.
So why are investors currently worried? This stems from France’s debt mountain and from concerns that the government will not be able to deal with it. Investors are concerned that both weak growth and increasingly volatile politics will thwart efforts to reduce debt levels.
Let’s take growth. Even by contemporary European standards, France’s growth prospects are anaemic. GDP is expected to grow by just 1.1% for 2024 and 1% for 2025. Both consumer and business confidence are low. None of this suggests a growth spurt soon which will boost the tax revenues of the French government sufficiently to address the deficit.
Further, political instability has grown due to the inconclusive parliamentary elections which Emmanuel Macron surprisingly called in July. No single political grouping has a majority and the President has appointed a Centrist Prime Minister, Michel Barnier (the former EU Brexit negotiator). His government is trying to pass a budget through the Assemblée Nationale involving a mixture of spending cuts and tax hikes which amount to savings of €60 billion ($66 billion). This is equivalent to 2% of GDP.
The parliamentary path of the budget bill is set to be torturous with both the left and right wing blocs in the Assemblée opposing most of the provisions. Debate in the Assemblée Nationale and Senate are expected to drag on into December, with the real prospect that the government may have to use presidential decree to pass the budget. Commentators argue that this will fuel further political chaos.
France looks more like Southern Europe
In the past, bond investors were more tolerant of France’s budget deficits. French government bonds were attractive options for investors wanting to hold euro-denominated bonds while avoiding riskier Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Since France has run persistent government deficits for a long time, it offered bond investors a more liquid market than more fiscally-parsimonious Northern European neighbours, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Consequently, France’s debt instruments offered a slight risk premium on the yields for those countries.
However, that has changed. France’s credit default risk premium is rising to levels comparable to its Southern neighbours. On 26 September 2024, the yield on generic French government 10-year debt rose above its Spanish equivalent for the first time since 2008.
As Figure 3 illustrates, this was the culmination of a trend evident throughout 2024, with the difference in yields between the two declining steadily (click here for a PowerPoint). At the start of the year, the yield on Spanish debt offered a 40 basis points premium over the French equivalent. By October, the yield on Spanish debt was consistently below that of French debt. All of this is due to bond investors’ rising expectations about France’s credit default risk. Now, France’s borrowing costs are not only above Spain, but also closer to those of Greece and Italy than of Germany.
Strikingly, Spain’s budget deficit was 3.5% in 2023 and is expected to narrow to 2.6% by 2025. The percentage of total debt to GDP is 104% and falling. Moreover, following Spain’s inconclusive election in 2023, the caretaker government put forward budgetary plans involving fiscal tightening without the need for legislation. This avoided the political wrangling France is facing.
For France, these developments raise the prospect of yields rising further as bond investors now see alternatives to French government debt in the form of Spain’s. This country have already undertaken the painful fiscal adjustments that France seems incapable of completing.
Articles
Data
Questions
- What is credit default risk?
- Explain why higher credit default risk is associated with higher yields on France’s government debt.
- Why would low economic growth worsen the government’s budget deficit?
- Why would political instability increase credit default risk?
- What has happened to investors’ perceptions of the risk associated with French government debt relative to Spain’s?
- How has this manifested itself in the relative yields of the two countries’ government debt?
The first Budget of the new UK Labour government was announced on 30 October 2024. It contained a number of measures that will help to tackle inequality. These include extra spending on health and education. This will benefit households on lower incomes the most as a percentage of net income. Increases in tax, by contrast, will be paid predominantly by those on higher incomes. The Chart opposite (taken from the Budget Report) illustrates this. It shows that the poorest 10% will benefit from the largest percentage gain, while the richest 10% will be the only decile that loses.
But one of the major ways of tackling inequality and poverty was raising the minimum wage. The so-called ‘National Living Wage (NLW)’, paid to those aged 21 and over, will rise in April by 6.7% – from £11.44 to £12.41 per hour. The minimum wage paid to those aged 18 to 20 will rise 16.3% from £8.60 to £10.00 and for 16 and 17 year-olds and apprentices it will rise £18% from £6.40 to £7.55.
It has been an objective of governments for several years to relate the minimum wage to the median wage. In 2015, the Conservative Government set a target of raising the minimum wage rate to 60 per cent of median hourly earnings by 2020. When that target was hit a new one was set to reach two-thirds of median hourly earnings by 2024.
The Labour government has set a new remit for the minimum wage (NLW). There are two floors. The first is the previously agreed one, that the NLW should be at least two-thirds of median hourly earnings; the second is that it should fully compensate for cost of living rises and for expected inflation up to March 2026. The new rate of £12.41 will meet both criteria. According to the Low Pay Commission, ‘Wages have risen faster than inflation over the past 12 months, and are forecast to continue to do so up to March 2026’. This makes the first floor the dominant one: meeting the first floor automatically meets the second.
How effective is the minimum wage in reducing poverty and inequality?
Figure 1 shows the growth in minimum wage rates since their introduction in 1999. The figures are real figures (i.e. after taking into account CPI inflation) and are expressed as an index, with 1999 = 100. The chart also shows the growth in real median hourly pay. (Click here for a Powerpoint.)
As you can see, the growth in real minimum wage rates has considerably exceeded the growth in real median hourly pay. This has had a substantial effect on raising the incomes of the poorest workers and thereby has helped to reduce poverty and inequality.
The UK minimum wage compares relatively favourably with other high-income economies. Figure 2 shows minimum wage rates in 12 high-income countries in 2023 – the latest year for which data are available. (Click here for a PowerPoint.) The red bars (striped) show hourly minimum wage rates in US dollars at purchasing-power parity (PPP) rates. PPP rates correct current exchange rates to reflect the purchasing power of each country’s currency. The blue bars (plain) show minimum wage rates as a percentage of the median wage rate. In 2023 the UK had the fourth highest minimum wage of the 12 countries on this measure (59.6%). As we have seen above, the 2025 rate is expected to be 2/3 of the median rate.
Minimum wages are just one mechanism for reducing poverty and inequality. Others include the use of the tax and benefit system to redistribute incomes. The direct provision of services, such as health, education and housing at affordable rents can make a significant difference and, as we have seen, have been a major focus of the October 2024 Budget.
The government has been criticised, however, for not removing the two-child limit to extra benefits in Universal Credit (introduced in 2017). The cap clearly disadvantages poor families with more than two children. What is more, for workers on Universal Credit, more than half of the gains from the higher minimum wages will lost because they will result in lower benefit entitlement. Also the freeze in (nominal) personal income tax allowances will mean more poor people will pay tax even with no rise in real incomes.
Effects on employment: analysis
A worry about raising the minimum wage rate is that it could reduce employment in firms already paying the minimum wage and thus facing a wage rise.
In the case of a firm operating in competitive labour and goods markets, the demand for low-skilled workers is relatively wage sensitive. Any rise in wage rates, and hence prices, by this firm alone would lead to a large fall in sales and hence in employment.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 (click here for a PowerPoint). Assume that the minimum wage is initially the equilibrium wage rate We. Now assume that the minimum wage is raised to Wmin. This will cause a surplus of labour (i.e. unemployment) of Q3 – Q2. Labour supply rises from Q1 to Q3 and the demand for labour falls from Q1 to Q2.
But, given that all firms face the minimum wage, individual employers are more able to pass on higher wages in higher prices, knowing that their competitors are doing the same. The quantity of labour demanded in any given market will not fall so much – the demand is less wage elastic; and the quantity of labour supplied in any given market will rise less – the supply is less wage elastic. Any unemployment will be less than that illustrated in Figure 3. If, at the same time, the economy expands so that the demand-for-labour curve shifts to the right, there may be no unemployment at all.
When employers have a degree of monopsony power, it is not even certain that they would want to reduce employment. This is illustrated in Figure 4: click here for a PowerPoint (you can skip this section if you are not familiar with the analysis).
Assume initially that there is no minimum wage. The supply of labour to the monopsony employer is given by curve SL1, which is also the average cost of labour ACL1. A higher employment by the firm will drive up the wage; a lower employment will drive it down. This gives a marginal cost of labour curve of MCL1. Profit-maximising employment will be Q1, where the marginal cost of labour equals the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL). The wage, given by the SL1 (=ACL1) line will be W1.
Now assume that there is a minimum wage. Assume also that the initial minimum wage is at or below W1. The profit-maximising employment is thus Q1 at a wage rate of W1.
The minimum wage can be be raised as high as W2 and the firm will still want to employ as many workers as at W1. The point is that the firm can no longer drive down the wage rate by employing fewer workers, and so the ACL1 curve becomes horizontal at the new minimum wage and hence will be the same as the MCL curve (MCL2 = ACL2). Profit-maximising employment will be where the MRPL curve equals this horizontal MCL curve. The incentive to cut its workforce, therefore, has been removed.
Again, if we extend the analysis to the whole economy, a rise in the minimum wage will be partly passed on in higher prices or stimulate employers to increase labour productivity. The effect will be to shift the (MRPL) curve upwards to the right, thereby allowing the firm to pass on higher wages and reducing any incentive to reduce employment.
Effects on employment: evidence
There is little evidence that raising the minimum wage in stages will create unemployment, although it may cause some redeployment. In the Low Pay Commission’s 2019 report, 20 years of the National Minimum Wage (see link below), it stated that since 2000 it had commissioned more than 30 research projects looking at the NMW’s effects on hours and employment and had found no strong evidence of negative effects. Employers had adjusted to minimum wages in various ways. These included reducing profits, increasing prices and restructuring their business and workforce.
Along with our commissioned work, other economists have examined the employment effects of the NMW in the UK and have for the most part found no impact. This is consistent with international evidence suggesting that carefully set minimum wages do not have noticeable employment effects. While some jobs may be lost following a minimum wage increase, increasing employment elsewhere offsets this. (p.20)
There is general agreement, however, that a very large increase in minimum wages will impact on employment. This, however, should not be relevant to the rise in the NLW from £11.44 to £12.41 per hour in April 2025, which represents a real rise of around 4.5%. This at worst should have only a modest effect on employment and could be offset by economic growth.
What, however, has concerned commentators more is the rise in employers’ National Insurance contributions (NICs) that were announced in the Budget. In April 2025, the rate will increase from 13.8% to 15%. Employers’ NICs are paid for each employee on all wages above a certain annual threshold. This threshold will fall in April from £9100 to £5000. So the cost to an employer of an employee earning £38 000 per annum in 2024/25 would be £38 000 + ((£38 000 – £9100) × 0.138) = £41 988.20. For the year 2025/26 it will rise to £38 000 + ((£38 000 – £5000) × 0.15) = £42 950. This is a rise of 2.29%. (Note that £38 000 will be approximately the median wage in 2025/26.)
However, for employees on the new minimum wage, the percentage rise in employer NICs will be somewhat higher. A person on the new NLW of £12.41, working 40 hours per week and 52 weeks per year (assuming paid holidays), will earn an annual wage of £25 812.80. Under the old employer NIC rates, the employer would have paid (£25 812.80 + (£25 812.80 – £9100) × 0.138) = £28 119.17. For the year 2025/26, it will rise to £25 812.80 + ((£25 812.80 – £5000) × 0.15) = £28 934.72. This is a rise of 2.90%.
This larger percentage rise in employers’ wage costs for people on minimum wages than those on median wages, when combined with the rise in the NLW, could have an impact on the employment of those on minimum wages. Whether it does or not will depend on how rapid growth is and how much employers can absorb the extra costs through greater productivity and/or passing on the costs to their customers.
Articles
- National Living Wage to increase to £12.21 in April 2025
Low Pay Commission, Press Release (29/10/24)
- Rachel Reeves hands low-paid a £1,400 boost as minimum wage to rise by 6.7%
Independent, Archie Mitchell and Millie Cooke (31/10/24)
- Minimum wage to rise to £12.21 an hour next year
BBC News, Michael Race (29/10/24)
- What Labour’s first budget means for wages, taxes, business, the NHS and plans to grow the economy – experts explain
The Conversation, Rachel Scarfe et al. (30/10/24)
- The two-child limit: poverty, incentives and cost
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Eduin Latimer and Tom Waters (17/6/24)
UK Government reports and information
Data
Questions
- How is the October 2024 Budget likely to affect the distribution of income?
- What are the benefits and limitations of statutory minimum wages in reducing (a) poverty and (b) inequality?
- Under what circumstances will a rise in the minimum wage lead or not lead to an increase in unemployment?
- Find out what is meant by the UK Real Living Wage (RLW) and distinguish it from the UK National Living Wage (NLW). Why is the RLW higher?
- Why is the median wage rather than the mean wage used in setting the NLW?
The UK government announced on 14 October 2024 in a ministerial statement that it intended to raise the threshold for the ring-fencing (separation) of retail and investment banking activities of large UK-based banks. These banks are known as ‘systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)’, which are currently defined as those with more than £25bn of core retail deposits. Under the new regulations, the threshold would rise from £25bn to £35bn.
Ring-fencing is the separation of one set of banking services from another. This separation can be geographical or functional. The UK adopted the latter approach, where ring-fencing is the separation of core retail banking services, such as taking deposits, making payments and granting loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from investment banking and international operations. The intention of ring-fencing was to prevent contagion – to protect essential retail banking services from the risks involved in investment banking activities.
Reducing regulation to increase competition
Raising the limit is intended to facilitate greater competition in the retail banking sector. In recent years, US banks, such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs, have been expanding their depositor base in the UK under their respective brands – Chase UK and Marcus.
These relatively small UK subsidiaries were not ring-fenced from their wider investment banking operations as their retail deposits were under (but not far under) the £25bn limit. However, this restricted their ability to increase market share further without bearing the additional regulatory burden associated with ring-fencing that much larger incumbents face. Raising the threshold would allow them to expand to the higher limit without the regulatory burden.
The proposals are part of a broader package of reforms aimed at reducing the regulatory burden on UK-based banks. The hope is that this will stimulate greater lending to SMEs to boost investment and productivity.
The proposals also include a new ‘secondary’ threshold. This will exempt banks providing primarily retail banking services from the rules governing the provision of investment banking accounts. This exemption will apply as long as their investment banking is less than 10% of their tier 1 capital. (Tier 1 capital is currently the buffer which banks are required to retain in case of a crisis.) The changes were the outcome of a review conducted in 2022 but had not been implemented by the previous government.
The announcement has sparked a debate about ring-fencing, with some commentators calling for it to be removed altogether. Therefore, it is timely to revisit the rationale for ring-fencing. This blog examines what ring-fencing is and why it was introduced, and explains the associated economic costs and benefits.
Why was ring-fencing introduced?
Ring-fencing was recommended by the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) in 2011 (see link below) and implemented through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013. The proposed separation of core retail banking services from investment banking were intended to address issues in banks which arose during the global financial crisis and which required substantial taxpayer bailouts. (See the 2011 blog, Taking the gambling out of high street banking (update).)
Following deregulation and liberalisation of financial services in the 1980s, many UK banks had extended their operations so that they combined domestic retail operations with substantial investment and international operations. The intention was to open up all dimensions of financial services to greater competition and allow banks to exploit economies of scope between retail and investment banking.
However, the risks associated with these services are very different but, in the period before the financial crisis, were provided alongside one another within banking groups.
One significant risk which was not fully recognised at the time was contagion – problems in one dimension of a bank’s activity could severely compromise its ability to provide services in other areas. This is what happened during the financial crisis. Many of the UK banks’ investment operations had made significant investments in off-balance sheet securitised debt instruments – CDOs being the most famous example. (See the 2018 blog, Lehman Brothers: have we learned the lessons 10 years on?.)
When that market crashed in 2007, several UK-based banks incurred significant losses, as did other banks around the world. Given their thin equity buffers and the inability to borrow due to a credit crunch, such banks found it impossible to bear these losses.
The UK government had to step in to save these institutions from failing. If it had not, there would have been significant economic and social costs associated with their inability to provide core retail banking functions. (See the 2017 blog, Ten years on.)
The Independent Commission proposed that ‘the risks inevitably associated with banking have to sit somewhere, and it should not be with taxpayers. Nor do ordinary depositors have the incentive (given deposit insurance to guard against runs) or the practical ability to monitor or bear those risks’ (p.9). Unstructured banks, with no separation of retail from investment activities, increase the potential for both of these stakeholder groups to bear the risks of investment banking.
Structural separation of retail and investment banking addresses this problem. First, separation should make it easier and less costly to resolve problems for banks that get into trouble, avoiding the need for taxpayer bailouts. Second, structural separation should help to insulate retail banking from external financial shocks, ensuring that customer deposits and essential banking services are protected.
Problems of ring-fencing
Ring-fencing has been subject to criticism, however, which has led to calls for it to be scrapped.
It must be noted that most of the criticism comes from banks themselves. They state that it required significant operational restructuring by UK banks subject to the regulatory framework which was complex and costly.
In addition, segregating activities can lead to inefficiencies, as banks may not be able to take full advantage of economies of scope between investment and retail banking. Furthermore, ring-fencing could lead to a misallocation of capital, where resources are trapped in one part of the bank and cannot be used to invest in other areas, potentially increasing the risks of the specific areas.
Assessing the new proposals
It is argued that the increased threshold proposed by the authorities may put UK institutions at a competitive disadvantage to outside entrants that are building market share from a low base. Smaller entrants do not have to engage in the costly restructuring that the larger UK incumbents have. They can exploit scope economies and capital mobility within their international businesses to cross-subsidise their retail services in the UK which incumbents with larger deposit-bases are not able to.
However, the UK market for retail banking has significant barriers to entry. Following the acquisition of Virgin Money by Nationwide, only six banking groups in the UK meet the current threshold (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, NatWest Group, Santander UK and TSB). Indeed, all of those have deposits well above the proposed £35bn threshold. Consequently, raising the threshold should not add significant compliance and efficiency costs, while the potential benefits of greater competition for depositors and SMEs could be a substantial boost to investment and productivity. Furthermore, if the new US entrants do suffer problems, it will not be UK taxpayers who will be liable.
Have we been here before?
In many ways, ring-fencing is a throwback to a previous age of regulation.
One of the most famous Acts of Congress relating to finance and financial markets in the USA is the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The Act was passed in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street crash and the onset of the Great Depression in the USA. That witnessed significant bank failures across the country and problems were traced back to significant losses made by banks in their lending to investors during the speculative frenzy that preceded the stock market crash of 1929.
To prevent a repeat of the contagion and ensure financial stability, Glass-Steagall legislated to separate retail banks and investment banks.
In the UK, such separation had long existed due to the historical restrictions placed on investment banks operating in the City of London. In the late 20th century, the arguments for separation became outweighed by arguments for the liberalisation of markets to improve efficiency and competition in financial services. Banking was increasingly deregulated and separation disappeared as retail banks increasingly engaged in investment activities.
That cycle of deregulation reached its nadir in 2007 with the international financial crisis. The need to bail out banks made it clear that the supposed synergies between investment and retail banking were no compensation for the high costs of contagion in the financial system.
Regulators must be wary of calls for the removal of ring-fencing. Sir John Vickers (chairman of the independent commission on banking) highlighted the need to protect depositors, and more importantly taxpayers, from risks in banking. It is the banks that should bear the risks and manage them accordingly. Ultimately, it is up to the banks to do that better.
Articles
Bank annual reports
Access these annual reports to check the deposit base of these UK banks:
Information
Report
- Final Report: Recommendations
The Independent Commission on Banking, Sir John Vickers (Chair), Clare Spottiswoode, Martin Taylor, Bill Winters and Martin Wolf (September 2011)
Questions
- How did the structure of UK banks cause contagion risk in the period before the global financial crisis?
- How does ring-fencing aim to address this and protect depositors and taxpayers?
- Use the links to the annual reports of the covered banks to assess the extent of deposits held by the institutions in 2023. How far above the proposed buffer do the banks sit?
- Use your answer to 3) and economic concepts to analyse the impact on competition in the UK market for retail deposits of raising the threshold.
- What are the risks for financial stability of raising the threshold?