In this blog we show how we can apply fiscal metrics to assess the UK government’s fiscal stance. This captures the extent to which fiscal policy contributes to the level of economic activity in the economy.
Changes in the fiscal stance can then be used to estimate the extent to which discretionary fiscal policy measures represent a tightening or loosening of policy. We can measure the size and direction of fiscal impulses arising from changes in the government’s budgetary position.
Such an analysis is timely given the Autumn Budget presented by Rachel Reeves on 30 October 2024. This was the first Labour budget in 14 years and the first ever to be presented by a female Chancellor of the Exchequer.
We conclude by considering the forecast profile of expenditures and revenues for the next few years and the new fiscal rules announced by the Chancellor.
The fiscal stance
At its most simple, the fiscal stance measures the extent to which fiscal policy increases or decreases demand, thereby influencing growth and inflation (see Box 1.F, page 28, Autumn Budget 2024: see link below).
The fiscal stance is commonly estimated by measures of pubic-sector borrowing. To understand this, we can refer to the circular flow of income model. In this model, excesses of government spending (an injection) over taxation receipts (a withdrawal or leakage) represent a net injection into the circular flow and hence positively affect the level of aggregate demand for national output, all other things being equal.
A commonly used measure of borrowing in assessing the fiscal stance of the is the primary deficit. Unlike public-sector net borrowing, which is simply the excess of the sector’s spending over its receipts (largely taxation), the primary deficit subtracts net interest costs. It therefore excludes the interest payments on outstanding public-sector debts (and interest income earned on financial assets). The primary deficit can therefore be written as public-sector borrowing less net interest payments.
As discussed in our blog Fiscal impulses in November 2023, the primary deficit captures whether the public sector is able to afford its present fiscal choices by abstracting from debt-serving costs that reflect past fiscal choices. In this way, the primary deficit is a preferable measure to net borrowing both in assessing the impact on economic activity, i.e. the fiscal stance, and in assessing whether today’s fiscal choices will require government to issue additional debt.
Chart 1 shows public-sector net borrowing and the primary balance as shares of GDP for the UK since financial year 1975/76 (click here for a PowerPoint). The data are from the latest Public Finances Databank published by the Office for Budget Responsibility, published on the day of the Autumn Budget in October (see Data links below).
Over the period 1975/6 to 2023/24, public-sector net borrowing and the primary deficit had averaged 3.8% and 1.3% of GDP respectively. In the financial year 2023/24, they were 4.5% and 1.5% (they had been as high as 15.1% and 14.1% in 2020/21 as a result of COVID support measures). In 2024/25 net borrowing and the primary deficit are forecast to be 4.5% and 1.6% respectively. By 2027/28, while net borrowing is forecast to be 2.3% of GDP, there is forecast to be a primary surplus of 0.7% of GDP.
The Autumn Budget lays out plans for higher tax revenues to contribute two-thirds of the overall reduction in the primary deficit over the forecast period (up to 2029/30), while spending decisions contribute the remaining third.
The largest tax-raising measure is an increase in the employer rate of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) by 1.2 percentage points to 15% from April 2025. This will be levied on employee wages above a Secondary Threshold of £5000, reduced from £9100, which will increase in line with CPI inflation each year from April 2028. (See John’s blog, Raising the minimum wage: its effects on poverty and employment, for an analysis on the effects of this change.) This measure, allowing for other changes to the operation of employer NICs, is expected to raise £122 billion over the forecast period. This amounts to over two-thirds of the additional tax take from the taxation measures taken in the Budget.
Chart 2 shows both net borrowing and the primary deficit after being cyclically-adjusted (click here for a PowerPoint). This process adjusts these fiscal indicators to account for those parts of spending and taxation that are affected by the position of the economy in the business cycle. These are those parts that act as automatic stabilisers helping, as the name suggests, to stabilise the economy.
The process of cyclical adjustment leads to estimates of receipts and expenditures as if the economy were operating at its potential output level and hence with no output gap. The act of cyclically adjusting the primary deficit, which is our preferred measure of the fiscal stance, allows us to assess better the public sector’s fiscal stance.
Over the period from 1975/6 up to and including 2023/24, the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (CAPD) averaged 1.1% of potential GDP. In 2024/25 the CAPD is forecast to be 1.5% of potential GDP. It then moves to a surplus of 0.5% by 2027/28. It therefore mirrors the path of the unadjusted primary deficit.
Measuring the fiscal impulse
To assess even more clearly the extent to which the fiscal stance is changing, we can use the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to measure a fiscal impulse. This captures the magnitude of change in discretionary fiscal policy.
The term should not be confused with fiscal multipliers which measure the impact of fiscal changes on outcomes, such as real GDP and employment. Instead, we are interested in the size of the impulse that the economy is being subject to. Specifically, we are measuring discretionary fiscal policy changes that result in structural changes in the government budget and which, therefore, allow an assessment of how much, if at all, a country’s fiscal stance has tightened or loosened.
The size of the fiscal impulse is measured by the year-on-year percentage point change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit (CAPD) as a percentage of potential GDP. A larger deficit or a smaller surplus indicates a fiscal loosening. This is consistent with a positive fiscal impulse. On the other hand, a smaller deficit or a larger surplus indicates a fiscal tightening. This is consistent with a negative fiscal impulse.
Chart 3 shows the magnitude of UK fiscal impulses since the mid-1970s (Click here for a PowerPoint file). The scale of the fiscal interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included the COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and Job Retention Scheme (‘furlough’), stand out sharply. In 2020 the CAPD to potential output ratio rose from 1.7 to 14.4%. This represents a positive fiscal impulse of 12.4% of GDP.
This was followed in 2021 by a tightening of the fiscal stance, with a negative fiscal impulse of 10.1% of GDP as the CAPD to potential output fell back to 4.0%. Subsequent tightening was tempered by policy measures to limit the impact on the private sector of the cost-of-living crisis, including the Energy Price Guarantee and Energy Bills Support Scheme.
For comparison, the fiscal response to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 saw a cumulative positive fiscal impulse of 5.6% of GDP. While smaller in comparison to the discretionary fiscal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it nonetheless represented a sizeable loosening of the fiscal stance.
Chart 4 focuses on the implied fiscal impulse for the forecast period up to 2029/30 (click here for a PowerPoint). The period is notable for a negative fiscal impulse each year. Across the period as a whole, this there is a cumulative negative fiscal impulse of 2.6% of GDP. Most of the ‘heavy-lifting’ of the fiscal consolidation occurs in the three financial years from 2025/26 during which there is a cumulative negative impulse of 2.0% of GDP.
Looking forward
To conclude, we consider the implications for the projected profiles of public-sector spending, receipts and liabilities over the forecast period up to 2029/30.
Chart 5 plots data since the mid-1950s (click here for a PowerPoint). It shows the size of total public-sector spending (also known as ‘total managed expenditures’), taxation receipts (sometimes referred as the ‘tax burden’) and total public-sector receipts as shares of GDP. This last one includes additional receipts, such as interest payments on financial assets and income generated by public corporations, as well as taxation receipts.
The OBR forecasts that in real terms (i.e. after adjustment for inflation), public-sector spending will increase on average over the period from 2025/26 to 2029/30 by 1.4% per year, but with total receipts due to rise more quickly at 2.5% per year and taxation receipts by 2.8% per year. The implications of this, as discussed in the OBR’s October 1014 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (see link below), are that:
the size of the state is forecast to settle at 44% of GDP by the end of the decade, almost 5 percentage points higher than before the pandemic” while additional tax revenues will “push the tax take to a historic high of 38% of GDP by 2029-30
Finally, the government has committed to two key rules: a stability rule and an investment rule.
The stability rule. This states that the current budget must be in surplus by 2029/30 or, once 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period, it will be in balance or surplus every third year of the rolling forecast period thereafter. The current budget refers to the difference between receipts and expenditures other than capital expenditures. In effect, it captures the ability of government to meet day-to-day spending and is intended to ensure that over the medium term any borrowing is solely for investment. It is important to note that ‘balance’ is defined in a range of between a deficit and surplus of no more than 0.5% of GDP.
The stability rule replaces the borrowing rule of the previous government that public net borrowing, therefore inclusive of investment expenditures, was not to exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.
The investment rule. The government is planning to increase investment. In order to do this in a financially sustainable way, the investment rule states that public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) or net financial debt for short, is falling as a share GDP by 2029/30, until 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period. PSNFL should then fall by the third year of the rolling forecast period. PSNFL is a broader measure of the sector’s balance sheet than public-sector net debt (PSND), which was targeted under the previous government and which was required to fall by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.
The new target, as well as now extending to the Bank of England, ‘nets off’ not just liquid liabilities (i.e. cash in the bank and foreign exchange reserves) but also financial assets such as shares and money owed to it, including expected student loan repayments. While liabilities are broader too, including for example, the local government pension scheme, the impact is expected to reduce the new liabilities target by £236 billion or 8.2 percentage points of GDP in 2024/25. The hope is that both rules can support what the Budget Report labels a ‘step change in investment’.
As Chart 6 shows, public investment as a share of GDP has not exceeded 6% this century and during the 2010s averaged only 4.4% (click here for a PowerPoint). The forecast has it rising above 5% for a time, but easing to 4.8% by end of the period.
This suggests more progress will be needed if the UK is to experience a significant and enduring increase in public investment. Of course, this needs to be set in the context of the wider public finances and is illustrative of the choices facing fiscal policymakers across the globe after the often violent shocks that have rocked economies and impacted on the state of the public finances in recent years.
Articles
Official documents
Data
Questions
- Explain what is meant by the following fiscal terms:
(a) Structural deficit,
(b) Automatic stabilisers,
(c) Discretionary fiscal policy,
(d) Public-sector net borrowing,
(e) Primary deficit,
(f) Current budget balance,
(g) Public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL).
- Explain the difference between a fiscal impulse and a fiscal multiplier.
- In designing fiscal rules what issues might policymakers need to consider?
- What are key differences between the fiscal rules of the previous Conservative government and the new Labour government in the UK? What economic arguments would you make for and against the ‘old’ and ‘new’ fiscal rules?
- What is meant by the ‘sustainability’ of the public finances? What factors might impact on their sustainability?
In his blog, The bond roller coaster, John looks at the pricing of government bonds and details how, in recent times, governments wishing to borrow by issuing new bonds are having to offer higher coupon rates to attract investors. The interest rate hikes by central banks in response to global-wide inflationary pressures have therefore spilt over into bond markets. Though this evidences the ‘pass through’ of central bank interest rate increases to the general structure of interest rates, it does, however, pose significant costs for governments as they seek to finance future budgetary deficits or refinance existing debts coming up to maturity.
The Autumn Statement in the UK is scheduled to be made on 22 November. This, as well as providing an update on the economy and the public finances, is likely to include a number of fiscal proposals. It is thus timely to remind ourselves of the size of recent discretionary fiscal measures and their potential impact on the sustainability of the public finances. In this first of two blogs, we consider the former: the magnitude of recent discretionary fiscal policy changes.
First, it is important to define what we mean by discretionary fiscal policy. It refers to deliberate changes in government spending or taxation. This needs to be distinguished from the concept of automatic stabilisers, which relate to those parts of government budgets that automatically result in an increase (decrease) of spending or a decrease (increase) in tax payments when the economy slows (quickens).
The suitability of discretionary fiscal policy measures depends on the objectives they trying to fulfil. Discretionary measures can be implemented, for example, to affect levels of public-service provision, the distribution of income, levels of aggregate demand or to affect longer-term growth of aggregate supply. As we shall see in this blog, some of the large recent interventions have been conducted primarily to support and stabilise economic activity in the face of heightened economic volatility.
Discretionary fiscal measures in the UK are usually announced in annual Budget statements in the House of Commons. These are normally in March, but discretionary fiscal changes can be made in the Autumn Statement too. The Autumn Statement of October 2022, for example, took on significant importance as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jeremy Hunt, tried to present a ‘safe pair hands’ following the fallout and market turbulence in response to the fiscal statement by the former Chancellor, Kwasi Kwarteng, on 23 September that year.
The fiscal impulse
The large-scale economic turbulence of recent years associated first with the global financial crisis of 2007–9 and then with the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis, has seen governments respond with significant discretionary fiscal measures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, examples of fiscal interventions in the UK included the COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), grants for retail, hospitality and leisure businesses, the COVID-19 Job Retention Scheme (better known as the furlough scheme) and the Self-Employed Income Support Scheme.
The size of discretionary fiscal interventions can be measured by the fiscal impulse. This captures the magnitude of change in discretionary fiscal policy and thus the size of the stimulus. The concept is not to be confused with fiscal multipliers, which measure the impact of fiscal changes on economic outcomes, such as real national income and employment.
By measuring fiscal impulses, we can analyse the extent to which a country’s fiscal stance has tightened, loosened, or remained unchanged. In other words, we are attempting to capture discretionary fiscal policy changes that result in structural changes in the government budget and, therefore, in structural changes in spending and/or taxation.
To measure structural changes in the public-sector’s budgetary position, we calculate changes in structural budget balances.
A budget balance is simply the difference between receipts (largely taxation) and spending. A budget surplus occurs when receipts are greater than spending, while a deficit (sometimes referred to as net borrowing) occurs if spending is greater than receipts.
A structural budget balance cyclically-adjusts receipts and spending and hence adjusts for the position of the economy in the business cycle. In doing so, it has the effect of adjusting both receipts and spending for the effect of automatic stabilisers. Another way of thinking about this is to ask what the balance between receipts and spending would be if the economy were operating at its potential output. A deterioration in a structural budget balance infers a rise in the structural deficit or fall in the structural surplus. This indicates a loosening of the fiscal stance. An improvement in the structural budget balance, by contrast, indicates a tightening.
The size of UK fiscal impulses
A frequently-used measure of the fiscal impulse involves the change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit.
A primary deficit captures the extent to which the receipts of the public sector fall short of its spending, excluding its spending on debt interest payments. It essentially captures whether the public sector is able to afford its ‘new’ fiscal choices from its receipts; it excludes debt-servicing costs, which can be thought of as reflecting fiscal choices of the past. By using a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit we are able to isolate more accurately the size of discretionary policy changes. Chart 1 shows the UK’s actual and cyclically-adjusted primary deficit as a share of GDP since 1975, which have averaged 1.3 and 1.1 per cent of GDP respectively. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
The size of the fiscal impulse is measured by the year-on-year percentage point change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit as a percentage of potential GDP. A larger deficit or a smaller surplus indicates a fiscal loosening (a positive fiscal impulse), while a smaller deficit or a larger surplus indicates a fiscal tightening (a negative fiscal impulse).
Chart 2 shows the magnitude of UK fiscal impulses since 1980. It captures very starkly the extent of the loosening of the fiscal stance in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) In 2020 the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to potential output ratio rose from 1.67 to 14.04 per cent. This represents a positive fiscal impulse of 12.4 per cent of GDP.
A tightening of fiscal policy followed the waning of the pandemic. 2021 saw a negative fiscal impulse of 10.1 per cent of GDP. Subsequent tightening was tempered by policy measures to limit the impact on the private sector of the cost-of-living crisis, including the Energy Price Guarantee and Energy Bills Support Scheme.
In comparison, the fiscal response to the global financial crisis led to a cumulative increase in the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to potential GDP ratio from 2007 to 2009 of 5.0 percentage points. Hence, the financial crisis saw a positive fiscal impulse of 5 per cent of GDP. While smaller in comparison to the discretionary fiscal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was, nonetheless, a sizeable loosening of the fiscal stance.
Sustainability and well-being of the public finances
The recent fiscal interventions have implications for the financial well-being of the public-sector. Not least, the financing of the positive fiscal impulses has led to a substantial growth in the accumulated size of the public-sector debt stock. At the end of 2006/7 the public-sector net debt stock was 35 per cent of GDP; at the end of the current financial year, 2023/24, it is expected to be 103 per cent.
As we saw at the outset, in an environment of rising interest rates, the increase in the public-sector debt to GDP ratio creates significant additional costs for government, a situation that is made more difficult for government not only by the current flatlining of economic activity, but by the low underlying rate of economic growth seen since the financial crisis. The combination of higher interest rates and lower economic growth has adverse implications for the sustainability of the public finances and the ability of the public sector to absorb the effects of future economic crises.
Articles
- Autumn Statement 2023: When is it and how will it affect me?
BBC News (16/11/23)
- What is the Autumn Statement?
House of Commons Library (13/11/23)
- Putting the fiscal toothpaste back into the tube: It’s time to normalise the euro area fiscal stance in 2024
VoxEU, Niels Thygesen, Roel Beetsma, Massimo Bordignon, Xavier Debrun, Mateusz Szczurek, Martin Larch, Matthias Busse, Mateja Gabrijelcic, Laszlo Jankovics and Janis Malzubris (30/6/23)
- Euro zone should tighten fiscal policy in 2024 to curb inflation, European Fiscal Board says
Reuters, Jan Strupczewski (28/6/23)
- Hutchins Center Fiscal Impact Measure: Federal, State and Local Fiscal Policy and the Economy
Brookings, Eli Asdourian, Louise Sheiner, and Lorae Stojanovic (27/10/23)
Report
- IFS Green Budget
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson and Ben Zaranko (eds) (October 2023)
Data
Questions
- Explain what is meant by the following fiscal terms: (a) structural deficit; (b) automatic stabilisers; (c) discretionary fiscal policy; (d) primary deficit.
- What is the difference between current and capital public expenditures? Give some examples of each.
- Consider the following two examples of public expenditure: grants from government paid to the private sector for the installation of energy-efficient boilers, and welfare payments to unemployed people. How are these expenditures classified in the public finances and what fiscal objectives do you think they meet?
- Which of the following statements about the primary balance is FALSE?
(a) In the presence of debt interest payments a primary deficit will be smaller than a budget deficit.
(b) In the presence of debt interest payments a primary surplus will be smaller than a budget surplus.
(c) The primary balance differs from the budget balance by the size of debt interest payments.
(d) None of the above.
- Explain the difference between a fiscal impulse and a fiscal multiplier.
- Why is low economic growth likely to affect the sustainability of the public finances? What other factors could also matter?
The French economy is flatlining. It has just recorded the second quarter of zero economic growth, with growth averaging just 0.02% over the past 12 months. What is more, the budget deficit is rising, not falling. In April this year, the French finance minister said that the deficit would fall from 4.3% in 2013 to 3.8% in 2014 and to the eurozone ceiling of 3% in 2015. He is now predicting that it will rise this year to 4.4% and not reach the 3% target until 2017.
The deficit is rising because a flatlining economy is not generating sufficient tax revenues. What is more, expenditure on unemployment benefits and other social protection is rising as unemployment has risen, now standing at a record 10.3%.
And it is not just the current economic situation that is poor; the outlook is poor too. The confidence of French companies is low and falling, and investment plans are muted. President Hollande has pledged to cut payroll taxes to help firms, but so far this has not encouraged firms to invest more.
So what can the French government do? And what can the EU as a whole do to help revive not just the French economy but most of the rest of the eurozone, which is also suffering from zero, or near zero, growth?
There are two quite different sets of remedies being proposed.
The first comes from the German government and increasingly from the French government too. This is to stick to the austerity plans: to get the deficit down; to reduce the size of government in order to prevent crowding out; and to institute market-orientated supply-side policies that are business friendly, such as reducing business regulation. Business leaders in France, who generally back this approach, have called for reducing the number of public holidays and scrapping the maximum 35-hour working week. They are also seeking reduced business taxes, financed by reducing various benefits.
Increasingly President Hollande is moving towards a more business-friendly set of policies. Under his government’s ‘Responsibility Pact’, a €40 billion package of tax breaks for business will be financed through €50 billion of cuts in public spending. To carry through these policies he has appointed an ex-investment banker, Emmanuel Macron, as economy minister. He replaces Arnaud Montebourg, who roundly criticised government austerity policy and called for policies to boost aggregate demand.
This brings us to the alternative set of remedies. These focus on stimulating aggregate demand through greater infrastructure investment and cutting taxes more generally (not just for business). The central argument is that growth must come first and that this will then generate the tax revenues and reductions in unemployment that will then allow the deficit to be brought down. Only when economic growth is firmly established should measures be taken to cut government expenditure in an attempt to reduce the structural deficit.
There are also compromise policies being proposed from the centre. These include measures to stimulate aggregate demand, mainly through tax cuts, accompanied by supply-side policies, whether market orientated or interventionist.
As Europe continues to struggle to achieve recovery, so the debate is getting harsher. Monetary policy alone may not be sufficient to bring recovery. Although the ECB has taken a number of measures to stimulate demand, so far they have been to little avail. As long as business confidence remains low, making increased liquidity available to banks at interest rates close to zero will not make banks more willing to lend to business, or businesses more willing to borrow. Calls for an end, or at least a temporary halt, to austerity are thus getting louder. At the same time, calls for sticking to austerity and tackling excessive government spending are also getting louder.
Articles
Hollande entrusts French economy to ex-banker Macron Reuters, Ingrid Melander and Jean-Baptiste Vey (26/8/14)
France’s new Minister of the Economy Emmanuel Macron described by left-wingers as a ‘copy-and-paste Tony Blair’ Independent, John Lichfield (28/8/14)
Merkel praises France’s economic reform plans after Berlin talks with PM Valls Deutsche Welle (22/9/14)
French economy flat-lines as business activity falters Reuters, Leigh Thomas (23/9/14)
French public finances: Rétropédalage The Economist (13/9/14)
French employer group urges ‘shock therapy’ for economy Reuters (24/9/14)
Last chance to save France: loosen 35-hour week and cut public holidays, say bosses The Telegraph (24/9/14)
‘Sick’ France’s economy is stricken by unemployment ‘fever’ The Telegraph (17/9/14)
France’s economics ills worsen but all remedies appear unpalatable The Observer, Larry Elliott and Anne Penketh (31/8/14)
The Fall of France The New York Times, Paul Krugman (28/8/14)
Why Europe is terrified of deflation Salon, Paul Ames (20/9/14)
Europe’s Greater Depression is worse than the 1930s The Washington Post, Matt O’Brien (14/8/14)
Worse than the 1930s: Europe’s recession is really a depression The Washington Post, Matt O’Brien (20/8/14)
Eurozone business growth slows in September, PMI survey finds BBC News (23/9/14)
Europe must ‘boost demand’ to revive economy, US warns BBC News (21/9/14)
Valls says France would never ask Germany to solve its problems Reuters, Annika Breidthardt and Michelle Martin (23/9/14)
The euro-zone economy: Asset-backed indolence The Economist (11/9/14)
Data
Annual macro-economic database (AMECO) Economic and Financial Affairs DG, European Commission
Business and Consumer Surveys Times Series Economic and Financial Affairs DG, European Commission
StatExtracts OECD
Statistics database European Central Bank
Questions
- What types of supply-side reforms would be consistent with the German government’s vision of solving Europe’s low growth problem?
- How could a Keynesian policy of reflation be consistent with getting France’s deficit down to the 3% of GDP limit as specified in the Stability and Growth Pact (see)?
- What is meant by (a) financial crowding out and (b) resource crowding out? Would reflationary fiscal policy in France lead to either form of crowding out? How would it be affected by the monetary stance of the ECB?
- Give examples of market-orientated and interventionist supply-side policies.
- What is meant by the terms ‘cyclical budget deficit’ and ‘structural budget deficit’. Could demand-side policy affect the structural deficit?
- Using the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Surveys find our what has happened to business and consumer confidence in France over the past few months.
- How important is business and consumer confidence in determining economic growth in (a) the short term and (b) the long term?
The Autumn Statement, delivered annually by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in late November or early December, is rather like a second Budget. In his statement, the Chancellor presents new forecasts for the UK economy by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) and announces various policy changes in the light of the forecasts.
So what does this OBR say? Its headline reads, “Government borrowing revised higher as weaker economy hits revenues” and this is followed by the statement:
The OBR has revised up its forecasts for public-sector borrowing over the next five years, as a weaker outlook for the economy reduces tax revenues. As a result, the Government no longer seems likely to achieve its target of reducing public-sector net debt in 2015–16.
The chart shows OBR forecasts for public-sector net borrowing made in June 2010 (its first forecast after the OBR was formed by the Coalition government), in March 2012 and in December 2012. The current forecast clearly shows borrowing set to decline more slowly than in the earlier forecasts. Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart. (Note that the effects of transferring the pension assets of the Royal Mail to the Treasury and the effects of not paying interest to the Bank of England on government bonds purchased under quantitative easing programmes have not been included in order to make the three forecasts consistent.)
So with a weaker economy and slower recovery than previously forecast, what are George Osborne’s options? He and his colleagues, along with various economists, argue for sticking to Plan A. This means continuing with austerity measures in order to get the public-sector deficit down. But with government borrowing having fallen more slowly than forecast, this means further government expenditure cuts, such as reductions in benefits, cuts in grants to local authorities and reductions in pensions relief. Even so, achieving his two targets – (1) eliminating the cyclically adjusted current (as opposed to capital) budget deficit by 2015/16 (the so-called ‘fiscal mandate’), and (2) public-sector debt falling as a proportion of GDP by 2015/16 – will both be missed. They were extended by a year in the Budget last March. They have now been extended by a further year to 2017/18.
The opposition and many other economists argue that Plan A has failed. Austerity has prevented the economy from growing and has thus meant a slower reduction in the deficit as tax revenues have not grown nearly as much as hoped for. A more expansionary policy would allow the deficit to be reduced more quickly, especially if extra government expenditure were focused on infrastructure and other capital spending.
It could be argued that George Osborne’s Autumn Statement moves some way in this direction – a Plan A+. He is making deeper cuts in welfare and government departmental spending in order to divert monies into capital spending. For example, there will be £1bn of extra expenditure on roads; £1bn extra on schools; £270m on FE colleges; and £600m extra for scientific research. Also, by extending the period of austerity to 2017/18, this has meant that he has not had to make even deeper cuts. What is more, he is increasing income tax allowances and cutting the rate of corporation tax by 1% more than originally planned and scrapping the planned 3p per litre rise in road fuel duty. He hopes to make up any lost tax revenue from these measures by HMRC clamping down on tax evasion.
But by sticking to his broad austerity strategy, and with many parts of the global economy having weakened, it looks as if the UK economy is in for several more years of sluggish growth. Winter is going to be long.
Webcasts and Podcasts
Autumn Statement: George Osborne scraps 3p fuel duty rise BBC News, Carole Walker (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement: OBR says deficit ‘shrinking more slowly’ BBC News, Robert Chote (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement: Headlines from George Osborne’s speech BBC News, Andrew Neil (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement: Flanders, Robinson and Peston reactio BBC News, Stephanie Flanders, Nick Robinson and Robert Peston (5/12/12)
Boosting the British Budget CNN, Jim Boulden (5/12/12)
Autumn statement 2012: key points – video analysis The Guardian, Larry Elliott, Jill Treanor, Patrick Collinson and Damian Carrington (5/12/12)
Articles
Autumn Statement 2012: the full speech The Telegraph (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement: Benefit squeeze as economy slows BBC News (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement: At-a-glance summary of key points BBC News (5/12/12/)
Austerity to last until 2018, admits George Osborne Independent, Oliver Wright
Autumn statement: George Osborne reveals benefits cut Channel 4 News (5/12/12/)
Autumn Statement 2012: Cut welfare, create jobs – a very Tory statement The Telegraph, Damian Reece (5/12/12)
Autumn statement 2012: economy weaker than expected, Osborne says The Guardian, Heather Stewart (5/12/12)
Analysis: Even the ‘autumn’ bit seemed optimistic BBC News, Chris Mason (5/12/12)
George Osborne’s autumn statement 2012: reaction The Guardian, Julia Kollewe (5/12/12)
Candid Osborne avoids political risk Financial Times, Janan Ganesh (5/12/12)
Autumn statement: Why George Osborne’s Budget won’t be a game changer The Telegraph, Allister Heath (4/12/12/)
Autumn statement 2012: expert verdict The Guardian, Richard Murphy, Dominic Raab, Ann Pettifor, Gavin Kelly, Prateek Buch and Mark Serwotka (5/12/12/)
The alternative autumn statement Channel 4 News (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement 2012: man cannot live by deficit reduction alone The Telegraph, Roger Bootle (5/12/12)
Autumn statement: cuts are just a sideshow The Guardian, John Redwood (5/12/12)
What does the Autumn Statement mean for business? Economia, David Mellor (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement Reaction: UK AAA ‘safe for today’ Investment Week (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement: A wintry statement of reality BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (4/12/12)
What has changed? BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (6/12/12)
UK warned on debt ‘credibility’ over AAA rating BBC News (5/12/12)
Data
Autumn statement 2012 in charts The Guardian, Simon Rogers (5/12/12/)
Who suffers most from Britain’s austerity? How the figures stack up The Guardian, Tom Clark (5/12/12)
Economic and fiscal outlook charts and tables – December 2012 OBR (5/12/12)
Economic and fiscal outlook supplementary economy tables – December 2012 OBR (5/12/12)
Forecasts for the UK economy HM-Treasury
OBR, Treasury and IFS links
Economic and fiscal outlook – December 2012 OBR (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement 2012 HM Treasury (5/12/12)
Autumn Statement 2012 IFS
Questions
- Distinguish between ‘stocks’ and ‘flows’. Define (a) public-sector net borrowing (PSNB) and (b) the public-sector net debt (PSND) and explain whether each one is a stock or a flow.
- Summarise the measures announced by George Osborne in his Autumn Statement.
- What are his arguments for not adopting a more expansionary fiscal policy?
- Assess his arguments.
- What is meant by the ‘output gap’? What are the OBR’s forecasts about the output gap and what are the implications?
- How has quantitative easing affected PSNB and PSND?
- Distinguish between the cyclical and structural deficit. What implications does this distinction have for fiscal policy?
There seems to be consensus among most politicians on both sides of the Atlantic that there needs to be a reduction in government deficits and debt as a proportion of GDP. But there is considerable debate as to how such reductions should be achieved.
Conservatives, Republicans and centre right parties in Europe, such as Greece’s Νεα Διμοκρατια (New Democracy) party, believe that there should be tough policies to reduce government expenditure and that the deficit should be reduced relatively quickly in order to retain the confidence of markets.
Politicians on the centre left, including Labour, many Democrats in the USA and centre-left parties in Europe, such as François Hollande’s Socialists, argue that the austerity policies pursued by centre-right governments have led to a decline in growth, which makes it harder to reduce the current deficit.
Then there is debate about what is happening to the structural deficit – the deficit that would remain at a zero output gap. Politicians on the centre right argue that their austerity policies are leading to a rapid reduction in the structural deficit. This, combined with the supply-side policies they claim they are implementing, will allow growth to be resumed more quickly and will increase the long-term growth rate (i.e. the growth in potential output).
Politicians on the centre left argue that deep cuts, by reducing short-term growth (even making it negative in some cases, such as the UK), are discouraging investment and construction. This in turn will lower the growth in potential output and make it harder to reduce the structural deficit.
The following podcast and articles consider these arguments – arguments that are often badly put by politicians, who often use ‘questionable’ economics to justify their party line.
Podcast
A grand economic experiment (also at) More or Less: BBC Radio 4 (first part), Tim Harford (4/5/12) (Programme details)
Articles
The fine art of squeezing: Britain vs America BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (4/5/12)
The Slippery Structural Deficit Wall Street Journal (blog), Matthew Dalton (11/5/12)
The right kinds of austerity policy Financial Times (1/5/12)
We can fix up the old status quo to get out of this mess The Olympian, David Brooks (11/5/12)
Europe’s austerity drive is a misdiagnosis of its problems Gulf News, Joseph Stiglitz (13/5/12)
How Nick Clegg got it wrong on debt Guardian, Polly Curtis (9/5/12)
Ten Reasons Wall Street Should Be (Very) Worried About The U.S. Debt Forbes, Bruce Upbin (4/5/12)
Questions
- Distinguish between the structural and cyclical budget deficit.
- Explain the distinction between stocks and flows. Which of the following are stocks and which are flows: (a) public-sector deficit; (b) public-sector debt; (c) public-sector net cash requirement; (d) debt reduction; (e) a bank’s balance sheet?
- Under what circumstances will a reduction in the public-sector deficit lead to: (a) a reduction in the public-sector debt (total); (b) a reduction in the public-sector debt as a proportion of GDP?
- How would you decide what is the desirable level of the public-sector deficit: (a) in the short run; (b) in the long run?
- Explain and comment on the following statement from the Stephanie Flanders article: “What is clear is that America has been able to ‘cut its debt (sic) further and faster’ than Britain – but this has not been the result of any closet commitment to austerity. Quite the opposite.”
