We know two things about economic growth in a developed economy like the UK: it is positive over the longer term, but highly volatile in the short term. We can refer to these two facts as the twin characteristics of growth. The volatility of growth sees occasional recessions, i.e. two or more consecutive quarters of declining output. Since 1973, the UK has experienced six recessions.
Here we consider in a little more detail the growth numbers for the UK from the latest Quarterly National Accounts, focusing on the depth and duration of these six recessions. How do they compare?
The latest figures on British economic growth show that the UK economy grew by 0.9 per cent in the third quarter of 2012. However, when compared with the third quarter of 2011, output was essentially unchanged. This means that the annual rate of growth was zero. Perhaps even more telling is that output (real GDP) in Q3 2012 was still 3.0 per cent below its Q1 2008 level.
The chart helps to put the recent output numbers into an historical context. It shows both the quarter-to-quarter changes in real GDP (right-hand axis) and the level of output as measured by GDP at constant 2009 prices (left-hand axis). It captures nicely the twin characteristics of growth. Since 1970, the average rate of growth each quarter has been 0.6 per cent. This is equivalent to an average rate of growth of 2.35 per cent per year. The chart also allows us to pin-point periods of recessions.
One way of comparing recessions is to compare their ‘2 Ds’: depth and duration. The table shows the number of quarters each of the six recessions since 1973 lasted. It also shows how much smaller the economy was by the end of each recession. In other words, it shows the depth of each recession as measured by the percentage reduction in output (real GDP).
British recessions
Duration (quarters)
Depth (output lost, %)
1973Q3–74Q1
3
3.25
1975Q2–75Q3
2
1.76
1980Q1–81Q1
5
4.63
1990Q3–91Q3
5
2.93
2008Q2–09Q2
5
6.28
2011Q4–12Q2
3
0.90
We can see that three of the recessions lasted for five quarters. In the case of the recessions starting in 1975 and 2011 they occurred very shortly after a previous recession. Hence, we observe two so-called double-dip recessions.
The table reveals that the deepest recession by some distance was that in the late 2000s. As a result of this recession, UK output declined by 6.3 per cent. As the recent GDP numbers show, the UK has yet to recover the ‘lost output’ that followed the financial crisis.
Although every recession is different (for example in terms of length and magnitude), they do tend to have a few things in common. The focus of this blog is on consumer income and how it is affected in the aftermath of (or even during) a recession. According to data from the ONS, real national income per head has fallen by more than 13% since the start of 2008.
This latest data from the Office of National Statistics shows that in the aftermath of the 2008 recession, UK incomes have fallen by much more than they did in the 2 previous recessions experienced in the UK (click here for a PowerPoint of the chart). We would normally expect consumer incomes to fall during and possibly directly after a recession, as national output falls and confidence tends to be and remain low. However, the crucial thing to consider with falling consumer incomes is how it affects purchasing power. If my income is cut by 50%, but prices fall by 80%, then I’m actually better off in terms of my purchasing power.
The data from the ONS is all about purchasing power and shows how UK consumer incomes have fallen at the same time as inflation having been relatively high. It is the combination of these two variables that has been ‘eating into the value of the cash that people were earning’. Comparing the incomes in the four years after the 2008 recession with similar periods following the early 1980s and 1990s recession, the ONS has shown that this most recent recession had a much larger effect on consumer well-being. Part of this may be due to the rapid growth in incomes prior to the start of the credit crunch.
It’s not just the working population that has seen their incomes fall since 2008 – the retired population has also seen a decline in income and according to a report from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, it is the wealthiest portion of older households that have taken the largest hit since 2007. According to the IFS, the average person over 50 has experienced a fall in their gross wealth of about 10%, or close to £60,000. Of course for these older households, the concern is whether they will be able to make up this lost wealth before they retire. The concern for everyone is how long until incomes and purchasing power increase back to pre-crisis levels. The following articles consider this latest data on economic well-being and the impact the recession has had.
Why is net national income per head said to be the best measure of economic well-being?
Why is it so important to take into account inflation when measuring wellbeing?
What explanation can be given for the larger fall in consumer incomes following the 2008 recession relative to the previous 2 recessions?
According to data from the IFS, the richest portion of older households have suffered the most in terms of lost wealth. Why is this the case?
What is meant by purchasing power?
GDP has fallen by about 7%, whereas national income per head, taking inflation into account is down by over 13%. What is the explanation for these 2 different figures?
How can recessions differ from each other? Think about the length, the magnitude of each.
Is GDP a good measure of economic well-being? Are there any other ways we can measure it?
The following podcast from the BBC Radio 4’s series, A Point of View is by John Gray, emeritus professor of European thought at the LSE and author of False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism. In the podcast, he considers whether Marx, the great 19th century thinker, was right to predict the demise of capitalism.
Marx’s picture of the end of capitalism and the stages of society that would succeed it have been dismissed by most academics and commentators as quite false. Marx predicted that as capitalist economies became increasingly unstable and unequal, so workers would rise up in revolution. What would follow would be a socialist state in which the means of production would be collectively owned and output and distribution would be planned. As socialist economies became wealthier and life was perceived to be fairer, so the need for state control would diminish. Eventually the state would wither away and the ultimate stage of communism would be reached, where there would sufficient resources to reward everyone according to their needs.
Two of the key criticisms of Marx’s analysis are: (a) capitalism was overthrown in only a few countries and (b) in the countries that did adopt central planning, such as the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the state did not wither away; instead, they reverted to capitalism.
But whilst Marx’s analysis of a post-capitalist world may have been flawed, his analysis of the weaknesses and tensions of capitalism have been prophetically correct in many regards. As John Gray says:
It’s not just capitalism’s endemic instability that he understood, though in this regard he was far more perceptive than most economists in his day and ours.
More profoundly, Marx understood how capitalism destroys its own social base – the middle-class way of life. The Marxist terminology of bourgeois and proletarian has an archaic ring.
But when he argued that capitalism would plunge the middle classes into something like the precarious existence of the hard-pressed workers of his time, Marx anticipated a change in the way we live that we’re only now struggling to cope with.
Listen to the podcast and try to assess whether we are witnessing a 21st century version of Marx’s 19th century vision.
Why, according to Marx, do capitalist societies contain the seeds of their own destruction? What role would the middle classes play in this?
Why does capitalism transform everything it touches?
Explain what is meant by ‘creative destruction’.
How would Marxists respond to the criticisms of their analysis that the middle classes have got proportionately bigger and that, with the advent of the minimum wage, even the poorest workers are protected?
To what extent has the experience of the developed world since the banking crisis of 2007/8 lent weight to the Marxist analysis?
John Gray says that “Today there is no haven of security.” What does he mean by this and is there an answer within capitalism?
And here’s a hard question to finish with: if capitalism does contain the seeds of its own destruction, what will succeed it? Will it be something other than capitalism and, if so, what? Or will it be a new variety of capitalism and, if so, what will it look like?
The government is sticking to its deficit reduction plan. But with worries about a lack of economic recovery, or even a double dip recession, some economists are calling for a Plan B. They back up their arguments by referring to the lack of consumer confidence, falling real incomes and rising commodity prices. Without a slowing down in cuts and tax rises, the lack of aggregate demand, they claim, will prevent a recovery.
The government maintains that sticking to the cuts and tax rises helps maintain international confidence and thereby helps to keep interest rates low. Also, it argues, if the economy does slow down, then automatic stabilisers will come into play. Finally, even though fiscal policy is tight, monetary policy is relatively loose, with historically low interest rates.
But will there be enough confidence to sustain a recovery? Economists are clearly divided. But at least the IMF seems to think so. In its latest assessment of the UK economy, although it has cut the growth forecast for 2011 from 2% to 1.5%, that is still a positive figure and thus represents a recovery, albeit a rather fragile one.
Explain what is likely to happen to each of the components of aggregate demand.
Is monetary policy loose enough? How could it be made looser, given that Bank rate is at the historically low level of 0.5% and could barely go any lower?
What are automatic fiscal stablisers and how are they likely to affect aggregate demand if growth falters? What impact would this have on the public-sector deficit?
What is meant by the ‘inventory cycle’? How did this impact on growth in 2010 and the first part of 2011?
What is likely to happen to inflation in the coming months and why? How is this likely to impact on economic growth?
Referring to the economists’ letter (the first link above), what do you think they mean by “a green new deal and a focus on targeted industrial policy” and how would this affect economic growth?
Periodically, the BBC hosts debates on major global topics. The following links are to the January 2011 debate on the state of the world economy and on what policies governments and central banks should pursue.
Should governments be boosting aggregate demand by raising government expenditure and cutting taxes in order to stimulate growth and plan to bring down deficits over the long term once growth is established? Or should they embark on tough fiscal consolidation now by cutting government expenditure and/or raising taxes in order to stimulate confidence by international financiers, thereby keeping long-term interest rates down and creating the foundations for sustainable economic growth? The debate considers these two very different policy approaches.
The participants in the debate are Joseph Stiglitz (Professor of Economics, Columbia University), Christina Romer (Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley and Adviser to Barack Obama (2009–10)), George Papaconstantinou (Finance Minister of Greece), Dominique Strauss-Khan (Managing Director, IMF) and Zhou Xiaochuan (Governor, Chinese Central Bank). The debate is in five separate webcasts.
What are the arguments for maintaining economic stimulus, at least for the time being? What are the relative merits of fiscal and monetary stimulus? Explain whether such policies are consistent with Keynesian polcies.
What are the arguments for tough fiscal consolidation? Explain whether such policies are consistent with new classical policies.
How successful have US policies been in stimulating the US economy?
What role can China play in the recovery and long-term growth of the global economy and are there any imbalances that need correcting?
Why might countries’ domestic policies result in currency wars? Is currency realignment necessary for sustained global growth?
How important are consumer and business confidence to short-term recovery and long-term growth and to what extent do government policies respond to swings in confidence?