Category: Economics: Ch 22

The gold market has become one of the most talked-about commodity markets in 2025, with prices reaching record highs. This is largely due to increased demand from investors, who see gold as a ‘safe haven’ during times of economic and political uncertainty. Central banks are also buying more gold as a way to reduce their reliance on currencies like the US dollar. With many analysts predicting prices could reach over $4000 per ounce in the next year, the gold market is showcasing how supply and demand, confidence, and global events can all influence a commodity market.

The commodities market is where basic agricultural products, raw materials and metals, such as gold, are bought and sold, often in large quantities and across global exchanges. Commodities are typically traded either in their physical form (like gold bars) at current market prices (spot prices) or through financial contracts, where investors buy or sell in futures markets. These are where a price is agreed today to buy or sell on a specific future date.

As with other commodities, the price of gold is determined by supply and demand. Demand for gold typically rises during times of economic uncertainty as investors want a safer store of value. This results in an increase in its price. Supply and demand, and hence price, also respond to other factors, including interest rates, currency movements, economic growth and growth prospects, and geopolitical events.

Record high prices

This year, the gold market has seen a remarkable rally, with the price of gold hitting a record high. Demand for the precious metal has resulted in spot prices surging over 35% to date (see the chart: click here for a PowerPoint). Rising prices earlier this year have been attributed to the US President, Donald Trump, announcing wide-ranging tariffs which have upset global trade. On 2 September, the spot gold price hit $3508.50 per ounce, continuing its upwards trend.

The price has also been lifted by expectations that the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) will cut its key interest rate, making gold an even more attractive prospect for investors. If the Federal Reserve cuts interest rates, the price of gold usually increases. This is because gold does not pay any interest or yield, so when interest rates are high, investors can earn better returns from alternatives, such as savings accounts or bonds. However, when interest rates fall, those returns become less attractive, making gold relatively more appealing.

Lower interest rates also tend to weaken the US dollar, which makes gold cheaper for foreign buyers, increasing global demand. Since gold is priced in dollars, a weaker dollar usually leads to higher gold prices.

Additionally, interest rate cuts are often a response to economic problems or uncertainty. As gold is viewed as a safer asset for investors during times of economic uncertainty, investors will typically increase their demand.

Unlike the market for currencies or shares, gold doesn’t rely on the performance of a government or company. This makes it attractive when people are worried about things like inflation, recession, war or stock market crashes. Gold is thus seen as a ‘safe haven’.

Gold and the Federal Reserve

The rise in the price of gold by more than a third this year can be linked to the US election last year, according to the director of research at BullionVault (see the BBC article below). Attitudes of the Trump administration towards the Federal Reserve have created concerns among investors. Fears that the US administration could erode the independence of the world’s most important central bank have fuelled the latest flows into the metal, which is traditionally viewed as a hedge against inflation.

According to the BBC article, Derren Nathan from Hargreaves Lansdown claims that it is Trump’s ‘attempts to undermine the independence of the Federal Reserve Bank’ that were ‘driving renewed interest in safe haven assets, including gold’. Investors are concerned that a politicised Fed would be more inclined to cut interest rates than would otherwise be the case, sending long-term inflation expectations higher.

This could lead to fears that future interest rates would then be pushed higher. This would increase the yields on longer-term government bonds by pushing down their price, as investors demand higher compensation for the increased risk of higher future interest rates reducing the value of their fixed-rate investments. This would force the US Treasury to pay higher interest on new bonds, making it more expensive to service US government debt.

Expected price rises for 2026

As we saw above, it is predicted that the price of gold will rise to $4000 per ounce next year. However, if the market sees investors move away from dollar assets, such as US Treasuries, the price increases would be even higher. Daan Struyven, co-head of global commodities research at Goldman Sachs explains ‘If 1 per cent of the privately owned US Treasury market were to flow to gold, the gold price would rise to nearly $5000 per troy ounce’ (see Financial Times article below).

If the Federal Reserve does come under political pressure, it could affect the stability of the US economy and beyond. When gold prices rise sharply, demand usually falls in countries like China and India, which are the world’s largest buyers of gold jewellery. However, in 2025, this trend has changed. Instead of reducing their gold purchases, people in these countries have started buying investment gold, such as bars and coins, showing a shift in consumer behaviour from jewellery to investment assets.

At the same time, global events are also influencing the gold market. Suki Cooper, a metals analyst at Standard Chartered, said that events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have added to political uncertainty, which tends to increase demand for gold as a safe-haven asset. She also highlighted how changes in international trade policies have disrupted supply chains and contributed to higher inflation, both of which have made gold more attractive to investors. Additionally, a weaker US dollar earlier in the year made gold cheaper for buyers using other currencies, which boosted global demand even further.

Conclusion

Although the gold market is expected to remain strong over the next six months, some uncertainty remains. Many analysts predict that gold prices will stay high or even increase further, especially if interest rates in the US are cut as expected. Continued global instability, is also likely to keep demand for gold as a safe haven high. At the same time, if inflation stays elevated or trade disruptions continue, more investors may turn to gold to protect their wealth.

However, if economic conditions stabilise or interest rates rise again, gold demand could fall slightly, leading to a potential dip in prices. Overall, the outlook for gold remains positive, but sensitive to changes in global economic and political events.

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Questions

  1. What factors influence the price of a commodity such as gold on the global market?
  2. Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate what has been happening to the gold price in recent months.
  3. Find out what has been happening to silver prices. Are the explanations for the price changes the same as for gold?
  4. Why might investors choose to buy gold during times of economic or political uncertainty?
  5. How will changes in interest rates affect both the demand for and the price of gold?
  6. What are the possible consequences of rising gold prices for countries like India and China, where there is a traditionally high demand for gold jewellery?
  7. How do global events impact commodity markets? Use gold as an example in your answer.

The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, will present her annual Budget in late autumn. It will involve some hard economic and political choices. The government would like to spend more money on improving public services but has pledged not to raise taxes ‘on working people’, which is interpreted as not raising the rates of income tax, national insurance for employees and the self-employed, and VAT. What is more, government borrowing is forecast by the OBR to be £118 billion, or nearly 4.0% of GDP, for the the year 2025/26. This is a fall from the 5.1% in 2024/25 and is well below the 15.0% in 2020/21 during the pandemic. But it is significantly above the 2.1% in 2018/19.

The government has pledged to stick to its two fiscal rules. The first is that the day-to-day, or ‘current’, budget (i.e. excluding investment) should be in surplus or in deficit of no more than 0.5 per cent of GDP by 2029/30 (or the third year of the rolling forecast period from the 2026/27 Budget). This allows investment to be funded by borrowing. The second rule is that public-sector net debt, which includes public-sector debt plus pension liabilities minus equity, loans and other financial assets, should be falling by 2029/30 (or the third year of the rolling forecast period from the 2026/27 Budget). The current budget deficit (i.e. excluding borrowing for investment) was forecast by the OBR in March to be 1.2% of GDP for 2025/26 (see Chart 1) and to be a surplus of 0.3% in 2029/30 (£9.9 billion). (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The OBR’s March forecasts, therefore, were that the rules would be met with current policies and that the average rate of economic growth would be 1.8% over the next four years.

However, there would be very little room for manoeuvre, and with global political and economic uncertainty, including the effects of tariffs, climate change on harvests and the continuing war in Ukraine, the rate of economic growth might be well below 1.8%.

The March forecasts were based on the assumption that inflation would fall and hence that the Bank of England would reduce interest rates. Global pressure on inflation, however, might result in inflation continuing to be above the Bank of England’s target of 2%. This would mean that interest rates would be slow to fall – if at all. This would dampen growth and make it more expensive for the government to service the public-sector debt, thus making it harder to reduce the public-sector deficit.

A forecast earlier this month by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) (see link below and Chart 2) reflects these problems and paints a gloomier picture than the OBR’s March forecast. The NIESR forecasts that GDP will grow by only 1.3 per cent in 2025, 1.2 per cent in 2026, 1.1% in 2027 and 1.0% in 2028, with the average for 2025 to 2023 being 1.13%. This is the result of high levels of business uncertainty and the effects of tariffs on exports. With no change in policy, the current deficit would be £41.2 billion in the 2029/30 financial year. Inflation would fall somewhat, but would stick at around 2.7% from 2028 to 2030. Net debt would be rising in 2029/30 &ndash but only slightly, from 98.7% to 99.0%. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

So what are the policy options open to the government for dealing with a forecast current budget deficit of £41.2 billion (1.17% of GDP)? There are only three broad options.

Increase borrowing

One approach would be to scrap the fiscal rules and accept increased borrowing – at least temporarily. This would avoid tax increases or expenditure cuts. By running a larger budget deficit, this Keynesian approach would also have the effect of increasing aggregate demand and, other things being equal, could lead to a multiplied rise in national income. This in turn would lead to higher tax revenues and thereby result in a smaller increase in borrowing.

There are two big problems with this approach, however.

The first is that it would, over time, increase the public-sector debt and would involve having to spend more each year on servicing that debt. This would leave less tax revenue for current spending or investment. It would also involve having to pay higher interest rates to encourage people to buy the additional new government bonds necessary to finance the increased deficit.

The second problem is that the Chancellor has said that she will stick to the fiscal rules. If she scraps them, if only temporarily, she runs the risk of losing the confidence of investors. This could lead to a run on the pound and even higher interest rates. This was a problem under the short-lived Liz Truss government when the ‘mini’ Budget of September 2022 made unfunded pledges to cut taxes. There was a run on the pound and the Bank of England had to make emergency gilt purchases.

One possibility that might be more acceptable to markets would be to rewrite the investment rule. There could be a requirement on government to invest a certain proportion of GDP (say, 3%) and fund it by borrowing. The supply-side benefits could be faster growth in potential output and higher tax revenue over the longer term, allowing the current deficit rule to be met.

Cut government expenditure

Politicians, especially in opposition, frequently claim that the solution is to cut out public-sector waste. This would allow public expenditure to be cut without cutting services. This, however, is harder than it might seem. There have been frequent efficiency drives in the public sector, but from 1919 to 2023 public-sector productivity fell by an average of 0.97% per year.

Causes include: chronic underinvestment in capital, resulting in outdated equipment and IT systems and crumbling estates; decades of underfunding that have left public services with crumbling estates, outdated equipment and insufficient IT systems; inconsistent, short-term government policy, with frequent changes in government priorities; bureaucratic systems relying on multiple legacy IT systems; workforce challenges, especially in health and social care, with high staff turnover, recruitment difficulties, and a lack of experienced staff.

The current government has launched a Public Sector Productivity Programme. This is a a cross-government initiative to improve productivity across public services. Departments are required to develop productivity plans to invest in schemes designed to achieve cost savings and improve outcomes in areas such as the NHS, police, and justice system. A £1.8 billion fund was announced in March 2024, to support public-sector productivity improvements and digital transformation. Part of this is to be invested in digital services and AI to improve efficiency. According to the ONS, total public-service productivity in the UK grew by 1.0% in the year to Q1 2025; healthcare productivity grew 2.7% over the same period. It remains to be seen whether this growth in productivity will be maintained. Pressure from the public, however, will mean that any gains are likely to be in terms of improved services rather than reduced government expenditure.

Increase taxes

This is always a controversial area. People want better public services but also reduced taxes – at least for themselves! Nevertheless, it is an option seriously being considered by the government. However, if it wants to avoid raising the rates of income tax, national insurance for employees and the self-employed, and VAT, its options are limited. It has also to consider the political ramifications of taking unpopular tax-raising measures. The following are possibilities:

Continue the freeze on income tax bands. They are currently frozen until April 2028. The extra revenue from extending the freeze until April 2030 would be around £7 billion. Although this may be politically more palatable than raising the rate of income tax, the revenue raised will be well short of the amount required and thus other measures will be required. Although some £40 billion will have been raised up to 2028 (which has already been factored in), as inflation falls, so the fiscal drag effect will fall: nominal incomes will need to rise less to achieve any given rise in real incomes.

Cutting tax relief for pensions. Currently, people get income tax relief at their marginal rate on pension contributions made by themselves and their employer up to £60 000 per year or 100% of their earnings, whichever is smaller. When people draw on their pension savings, they pay income tax at their marginal rate, even if the size of their savings has grown from capital gains, interest or dividends. Reducing the limits or restricting relief to the basic rate of tax could make a substantial contribution to increasing government revenue. In 2023/24, pension contribution relief cost the government £52 billion. Restricting relief to the basic rate or cutting the annual limit would make the relief less regressive. In such a case, when people draw on their pension savings, the income tax rate could be limited to the basic rate to avoid double taxation.

Raising the rate of inheritance tax (IHT) or reducing the threshold. Currently, estates worth more than £325 000 are taxed at a marginal rate of 40%. The threshold is frozen until 2029/30 and thus additional revenue will be received by the government as asset prices increase. If the rate is raised above 40%, perhaps in bands, or the threshold were lowered, then this will earn additional revenue. However, the amount will be relatively small compared to the predicted current deficit in 2029/30 of £41 billion. Total IHT revenue in 2022/23 was only 6.7 billion. Also, it is politically dangerous as people could claim that the government was penalising people who had saved in order to help the next generation, who are struggling with high rents or mortgages.

Increased taxes on business. The main rate of corporation tax was raised from 19% to 25% in April 2023 and the employers’ national insurance rate was raised from 13.8% to 15% and the threshold reduced from £9100 to £5000 per year in April 2025. There is little or no scope for raising business taxes without having significant disincentive effects on investment and employment. Also, there is the danger that raising rates might prompt companies to relocate abroad.

Raise fuel and/or other duties. Fuel duties raise approximately £24 billion. They are set to decline gradually with the shift to EVs and more fuel-efficient internal combustion engines. Fuel duty remained unchanged at 57.95p per litre from 2011 to 2022 and then was ‘temporarily’ cut to 52.95p. The rate of 52.95p is set to remain until at least 2026. There is clearly scope here to raise it, if only by the rate of inflation each year. Again, the main problem is a political one that drivers and the motor lobby generally will complain. Other duties include alcohol, tobacco/cigarettes/vaping, high-sugar beverages and gambling. Again, there is scope for raising these. There are two problems here. The first is that these duties are regressive, falling more heavily on poorer people. The second is that high duties can encourage illegal trade in these products.

Raising one of the three major taxes: income tax, employees’ national insurance and VAT. This will involve reneging on the government’s election promises. But perhaps it’s better to bite the bullet and do it sooner rather than later. Six European countries have VAT rates of 21%, three of 22%, three of 23%, two of 24%, four of 25%, one of 25.5% and one of 27%. Each one percentage point rise would raise about 9 billion. A one percentage point rise across all UK income tax rates would raise around £5.8 billion. As far as employees’ national insurance rates are concerned, the Conservative government reduced the main rate twice from 12% to 10% in January 2024 and from 10% to 8% in April 2024. The government could argue that raising it back to, say, 10% would still leave it lower than previously. A rise to 10% would raise around £11 billion.

Conclusion

The choices for the Chancellor are not easy. As the NIESR’s Economic Outlook puts it:

Simply put, the Chancellor cannot simultaneously meet her fiscal rules, fulfil spending commitments, and uphold manifesto promises to avoid tax rises for working people. At least one of these will need to be dropped – she faces an impossible trilemma.

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Questions

  1. Which of the options would you choose and why?
  2. Should the government introduce a wealth tax on people with wealth above, say, £2 million? If so, should it be a once-only tax or an annual tax?
  3. Research another country’s fiscal position and assess the choices their finance minister took.
  4. Look at a previous UK Budget from a few years ago and the forecasts on which the Budget decisions were made (search Budget [year] on the GOV.UK website). How accurate did the forecasts turn out to be? If the Chancellor then had known what would actually happen in the future, would their decisions have been any different and, if so, in what ways?
  5. Should fiscal decisions be based on forecasts for three of four years hence when those forecasts are likely to be unreliable?
  6. Should fiscal and monetary policy decisions be made totally separately from each other?

For a while now, debate has raged over how to revive the fortunes of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Since the 2008 financial crisis, the market has suffered a lack of investment, poor liquidity and low performance. This has produced a moribund financial market which has become unattractive to both investors and companies. Returns from the UK market lag international competitors, particularly the USA (see the chart).


Investment in the S&P 500 Index over the period would have produced annualised rates of return of 14.35%, more than double that from the FTSE 100 Index. Part of this underperformance is due to the industrial mix of the listed companies: low-growth energy and mining compared to the high-growth technology sectors in the USA. This has led to the perception that London is not a place for firms to list, particularly those in high-growth sectors.

In 2024, 88 companies choose to delist or transfer their primary listing elsewhere. Only 18 took their place. Several big companies from a range of industries, including Ashtead, Flutter and CRH have transferred their primary listing to New York or have plans to do so.

The new Labour government views stimulating higher levels of investment though the London market as an important element in its drive to boost productivity and growth in the UK. Recently, it has been reported that investment institutions have been lobbying the UK government to reduce significantly the tax-free allowance for Cash Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) as a way to encourage more of UK households’ savings to be channelled through the UK stock market.

Currently, UK savers can save up to £20 000 annually into ISAs without paying tax on the interest earned. This can be held solely in Cash ISAs, or in a combination of Cash plus Stocks and Shares ISAs. The tax-free instruments which were introduced by a Labour government in 1999 to encourage higher savings have proved immensely popular. Data from Paragon Bank indicate that over £350 billion are held in these accounts. However, under the new proposals, the amount which would be allowed to be saved as cash has been rumoured to be cut to £4000 per year, with the hope that some of it will be invested in the UK stock market.

The proposals have proved controversial, with high-profile figures voicing opposition. In this blog, we’ll analyse the reasons behind the proposal and discuss whether it will have the desired effect of stimulating higher levels of investment. We’ll also discuss other proposed policies for making the LSE a more effective channel for investment flows to boost economic growth.

Stock markets and the saving and investment channel

The main reason for the proposed ISA change is to encourage more investment in the UK stock market. By reducing the amount which can be saved in Cash ISAs, the government hopes to encourage savers to invest in Stocks and Shares ISAs instead, particularly ones linked to the UK market. This would increase the amount of finance capital in the market, thereby boosting its liquidity. This would then make it an attractive place for young, vibrant UK and foreign companies to list.

An active, liquid secondary market in shares is important to attract firms to list on stock exchanges by issuing shares to outside investors. Traditionally, this channel has been important to the growth and development of firms.

Existing savings in Cash ISAs are deposited with financial institutions such as banks and building societies. Through the credit-creation process such funds can be used to finance productive investment. In countries like the UK, lending by financial institutions is an important way that investment is financed, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. However, scale limits, regulatory restrictions and the need to diversify lending properly means that there are limits to the financing available for company investment through these institutions.

Capital markets like the LSE are intended to meet these larger-scale requirements. Financial claims, such as debt and equity, are divided into atomised instruments and sold to outside investors to fund investment and business growth.

Further, the desire for a capital injection to finance growth is not the only reason that firms seek stock market listings. Founders of companies may have a lot of wealth invested in the equity of their firms. Selling some of their equity to outside investors through a stock market listing is a way of diversifying their wealth. However, if they are to maximise the potential sale price, there must be an active, liquid secondary market to encourage investors to buy shares in the primary market.

Proponents of reform want to encourage a greater appetite for risk among UK investors, which will produce more savings being channelled through the LSE.

One issue is whether savers will respond in the way anticipated and channel more funds through the UK stock market. Many savers like the security of Cash ISAs. Such vehicles offer a low-risk/low-return combination, which savers like because the tax benefits boost returns. A survey by the Nottingham Building Society found that a substantial number of Cash ISA savers are concerned that the proposed changes could affect their ability to save for important financial goals, such as buying a house or building an emergency fund. Higher-risk Stocks and Shares ISAs are not suitable for such savings because of the potential to lose the initial amount invested. Many may not be prepared to do so and one-third suggested they would save less overall.

According to the survey, only 38% of Cash ISA holders said they would consider investing in Stocks and Shares ISAs if the Cash ISA allowance were reduced. It may be difficult to alter such risk-averse preferences given the average amount saved through ISAs and demographics. In 2022/23, the average amount subscribed to ISAs was £5000. This does not suggest that average households have a significant surplus of cash that they may want to investment at a high risk through the stock market. Indeed, many may want to have access to the cash at short notice and so are not prepared to forgo liquidity for the time needed to accrue the benefits of compounding which stock market investing produces.

Demographics may also play a role in this. Many of those who save more are now retired, or near retirement. They are less likely to see the appeal of compounding returns over long periods through investment in shares. Instead, with shorter investment horizons, they may only see the potential for losses associated with Stocks and Shares ISAs. Indeed, they will be starting to liquidate their long-term positions to draw income in retirement. Therefore, they may save less.

For others, who may be prepared to accept the additional risk, with the prospect of higher returns in the way that advocates of the reform hope for, the reduction in the Cash ISA allowance does not necessarily mean that they will invest in Stocks and Shares ISAs linked to the UK market. Since returns from the UK market have lagged international competitors, it may be that savers will channel their savings to those international markets, particularly in the USA, where the risk–return relationship has been more rewarding. Doing so has been made much easier and cheaper through a combination of economic forces including technological advances, regulatory changes and increased competition. This makes it much easier for UK savers to channel investment funds to wherever potential return is highest. At the moment, this is unlikely to be the UK, meaning that the anticipated boost to investment funds may not be as much as anticipated.

Critics of the proposal also question the motives of investment fund managers who have been lobbying government. They argue that the reforms will mean that many people who do now choose to save in Stocks and Shares ISAs will buy funds managed by fund managers who will receive fees for doing so. Critics argue that it is the prospect of higher fees which is the real motive behind the lobbying, not any desire to boost investment and growth.

What alternatives are available to boost the London Stock Exchange

The low valuations of LSE-listed companies compared to their international counterparts, particularly those in the USA, has discouraged growing firms from listing in London. To address this, there have been calls to enhance corporate governance standards and reduce regulatory burdens for listed companies.

This has already been recognised by the authorities. In 2024, UK regulators approved the biggest overhaul of rules regulating London-listed companies. The new listing rules will hand more power to company bosses to make decisions without shareholder votes. They will give companies more flexibility to adopt dual-class share structures used by founders and venture capital firms to give themselves stronger voting rights than other investors. This is particularly popular for founders who want to diversify their wealth without sacrificing control and is used frequently by tech companies and venture capitalists when listing in the USA. Such reforms may attract more companies in high-growth sectors to list in London.

Tax policies which provide the right incentives to buy and sell shares could also encourage more investment in the LSE. For instance, the repeal in the mid-1990s of the preferential tax treatment of dividend income for UK pension funds and insurance companies is seen as a major factor in discouraging those institutions from investing more funds in the London market. Since tax on capital gains is only liable when they are realised, this reduces their present value versus the equivalent amount on dividends.

As the following table illustrates, given the significantly higher percentage of total returns derived from dividends in the LSE compared to other exchanges, the equal tax treatment of dividend and capital gains provides an incentive to seek jurisdictions where capital gains predominate. This is what UK pension funds have done. Data from the Office of National Statistics show that in 2024, 77% of UK occupational pensions equity investments were overseas.

Reinstating this tax benefit could stimulate greater demand for UK equity from this significant sector, boosting liquidity in the London market. Allied to this are proposals from the UK government to consolidate the fragmented UK pension industry to achieve greater scale economies in that channel for investment. This can reduce financing costs, boosting the marginal return from UK investments for these funds, encouraging greater investment in the UK market (ceteris paribus).

Further, the 2.5% stamp duty on share purchases has been viewed as another disincentive for both retail and institutional investors to engage in security trading on the London Stock Exchange. The duty, which is much higher than in peer economies, effectively raises the expected rate of return on UK equites which depresses perceptions of their values and prices. Its removal may raise trading volumes, improving the liquidity of the market and be offset by increased tax revenues in the future. However, the Treasury suggests that the removal of stamp duty is doubtful, since it would create a significant hole in the UK government’s budget.

Ultimately, many of these reforms may have limited impact on investment. Efforts to boost confidence in the stock market will depend on improving the overall economic environment in the UK. Therefore, it will be the wider policies promoting growth in general which will increase the rates of return offered by London-listed firms and be more significant to attracting capital to London.

However, many of these are controversial themselves, such as relaxing laws around planning permissions and addressing business uncertainties around post-Brexit trading arrangements with the European Union. These broader economic measures could help make the UK generally, and the LSE specifically, more appealing to both domestic and international investors.

Conclusion

The UK government’s proposal to reduce the Cash ISA allowance is part of a broader strategy to boost investment in the stock market and stimulate economic growth. While this change could lead to more capital being directed towards productive investments, it also poses challenges for savers who like the security and simplicity of Cash ISAs.

The ultimate impact will depend on how savers respond to these changes. The potential reduction in overall savings rates could counteract some of the intended benefits. Further, the extent to which they are prepared to channel their savings into UK-listed companies will be important. If many seek higher returns elsewhere, the impact on the UK stock market may be limited. In any case, policies to address the problems of the UK stock market will only work if the wider issues associated with UK productivity and growth are addressed.

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Data

Questions

  1. Explain how banks use cash ISAs to finance investment through credit creation.
  2. What do stock markets offer which may boost investment and economic growth?
  3. What are the issues with the London Stock Exchange which is making it unattractive for raising finance?
  4. How is the rumoured ISA reform intended to help address these issues?
  5. Analyse the extent to which it will do so.
  6. How might some of the broader reforms proposed by the UK government influence rate of return on UK equities and attract capital?

On the 29 November, the Bank of England published the results of its latest stress test of the UK financial system. Annual stress testing was introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It models the ability of the financial system to withstand severe macroeconomic and financial market conditions. Typically, the focus has been on testing the resilience of the banking system.

This year’s was the first system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). This recognises the growing significance of ‘shadow banking’. Shadow banking involves borrowing and lending involving non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Such institutions sit outside the regulatory cordons around banking but have become significant actors in the financial system.

However, this obscure part of the financial system poses systemic risks which are not clearly understood and from time to time require costly interventions. Examples include: problems in liability-driven investments (LDIs) for pension funds in September 2022; the money market liquidity crisis involving hedge funds in March 2020; the collapse of Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 following the Russian Federation’s default (LTCM had significant holdings of Russian government bonds – see linked article on LTCM below).

The growing significance of shadow banking means that regulators have become increasingly concerned about the vulnerabilities in the financial system which arise from outside the traditional banking system.

In this blog we will explain stress-testing of the financial system and trace the rise in shadow banking which motivated the recent system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). We will discuss the findings of the stress test, highlighting the systemic risks of shadow banking. Finally, we will discuss the implications for the regulation and supervision of the financial system.

What is stress testing?

Stress testing was introduced by the Bank of England after the financial crisis to assess the ability of the financial system to withstand severe economic and market scenarios.

In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, the liquidity and capital buffers of many banks had been extremely thin. These were only able to withstand moderate economic shocks and moderate conditions and buckled under the stresses of the crisis.

Regulators argued that the buffers needed to become much more robust and be able to withstand rare but severe economic and market conditions. The stress testing analogy was derived from engineering, where parts are expected to work not just in benign conditions but also in extreme, hostile environments.

Since 2014, the Bank of England has conducted annual stress testing. Stress testing models the impact of adverse economic conditions on banks’ liquidity, profitability and capital. The results are used to set policy for individual banks (microprudential) and for the system as a whole (macroprudential). Stress test results have allowed the Bank to adjust the loss-absorbing capital that banks must hold to reduce their likelihood of failure.

The scope of the testing has expanded over time to incorporate insurers, central counterparties (financial institutions that provide clearing and settlement services between financial traders) and cyber security. The most recent scenario recognised the increasing significance of non-deposit taking financial institutions in channelling credit. Fifty City of London institutions modelled how a period of intense stress would ripple through the shadow banking sector.

The arcane world of shadow banking

Shadow banking refers to borrowing and lending which occurs outside the banking sector. Traditionally banking involves taking deposits and using these to finance lending.

Shadow banking involves non-deposit taking financial institutions (NBFIs) such as hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, private equity funds, as well as some activities of investment banks. These institutions channel funds in different ways from lenders to borrowers. Typically, they use funds from investors to buy securities through financial markets. The emergence and growth of shadow banking has been explained by changing regulation and innovation.

Its first significant period of expansion in the late 1980s was driven by financial innovation. Increased use of ‘disintermediation’ – the replacement of credit channels through banks with ones through markets – meant an increase in the assets invested through NBFIs.

Despite this process playing a major role in the expansion of housing credit in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, it was the significant bailouts that banks received that drew the attention of regulators, not the role of shadow banking. This led to more stringent liquidity and capital requirements for banks under the BASEL III international regulations.

This regulatory tightening limited banks’ ability to offer credit, which meant that much of this activity migrated to the shadow banking sector.

Data from the Bank of England show that the percentage of total assets held by NBFIs rose from 41% in 2007 to 49% in 2020. The chart illustrates the total financial assets held by non-bank financial institutions in the UK between 2019 Q4 and 2023 Q3 (click here for a PowerPoint). The amount held has growth by approximately a third in that time, from £4321bn to £6069bn, peaking at £6670bn in 2022 Q3.

The lack of regulatory oversight stems from the nature of the activities in the shadow banking sector. While NBFIs conduct maturity transformation, provide liquidity and help manage risk, unlike banks, they do not accept deposits and are not part of the payments system involving the general public.

Consequently, the consensus among regulators has been that their activities do not pose the same systemic risks as banking of the breakdown of the payments mechanism and associated collapse in business and consumer confidence. Therefore, NBFIs are not subject to conventional regulation and supervision involving liquidity and capital requirements.

However, as the scale of borrowing and lending running through the sector has grown, this argument has become less difficult to justify. There is a concern that ‘regulatory arbitrage’ is happening and that the systemic risks associated with shadow banking are being underestimated.

The familiar risks of shadow banking

The systemic consequences of liquidity and solvency problems in the shadow banking sector may not seem obvious. Much of their activities are arcane and technical. However, there are plenty of examples of instances where the problems of hedge funds or pension funds have caused systemic issues.

While the consequences are not the same as those involving banks, in that the payments mechanism is not directly affected, the risks are. Just like banks, these institutions are exposed to liquidity risks, credit default risks and counterparty risks. The concern is that they do not have the same levels of liquidity or capital buffers as banks to insulate them from the consequences of such risks. Therefore, it might not take much economic stress for one or more of these institutions to fail and, given the increasing significance and interconnectedness of these activities, impose significant costs on the rest of the financial system.

It was for this reason that the Bank of England conducted its first system-wide exploratory scenario to analyse the impact of economic and market stress on these institutions and assess the nature and extent of systemic risks which resulted. Fifty City of London institutions modelled how a period of intense stress would ripple through the non-bank sector.

The scenario involved rising geopolitical tensions which caused a sharp rise in risk aversion and a demand for higher expected rates of return as compensation. This produced sharp rises in both sovereign and corporate bond yields and matching sharp declines in asset prices (remember bond yield and prices have a negative relationship).

The scenario found that the position and behaviour of NBFIs amplified the shock. These institutions invest significantly in marketable financial securities and their liquidity and solvency are susceptible to such falling prices.

The sharp decline in asset prices triggered margin calls – payments to cover open loss positions in financial securities. In response to these demands, while some NBFIs’ internal risk and leverage measures were breached, others illustrated greater risk-aversion and took precautionary action. These institutions acted to deleverage, derisk and recapitalise. Given the interconnectedness of financial markets, the individual actions of institutions rippled across financial markets, causing problems in other segments.

The significant decline in asset prices led insurance companies and pension funds to seek to improve their liquidity and solvency position by liquidating positions in money market funds and hedge funds. This, in turn, required these funds to seek liquidity. Such institutions tend to rely a lot on the repo market (involving short-term sale and repurchase credit agreements) to provide liquidity to investors. This avoids them having to sell assets. This practice has echoes of the banking sectors use of the short-term wholesale markets in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis.

However, the SWES found that while banks were willing to take on some of the risk, their own concerns about liquidity and counterparty credit risk meant they did not offer sufficient short-term liquidity through the repo markets. If such funding dried up because of a higher risk perception, it could compromise the hedge funds’ ability to raise funds, requiring asset sales. This would amplify the shock to financial markets, driving prices of financial securities even lower.

The scenario concluded that the resulting heavy selling could seize up financial markets, particularly the UK sovereign and corporate bond markets, reducing the ability of companies to finance investment. This is a different type of credit crunch from 2008, which was restricted to banks – but a credit crunch, nonetheless.

At the same time, funds may make capital losses as they sell securities in the downturn. This creates solvency problems and the potential for failure.

In the SWES the institutions were often not able to anticipate how their counterparties, investors, or markets they operate in would behave in the stressed scenario, which echoes the experience of banks in 2007 and 2008 – a significant reason for the ‘crunch’ in banking credit was uncertainty about the creditworthiness of counterparties, meaning that banks were not prepared to lend to anybody.

Conclusion

Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a tightening of the regulation and supervision of banks which has limited their ability to channel credit. This has produced an expansion in the shadow banking sector.

However, while the shadow banking sector has not been subject to the same regulation and supervision as banks, there are still potential systemic risks associated with its operations. There have been several examples of such risks in the shadow banking sector which have led regulators to pay more attention. These underpinned the 2024 system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) conducted by the Bank of England.

The scenario showed the possible transmission mechanism through which problems for NBFIs can have broader consequences. The report nevertheless concluded that:

…the UK financial system was well-capitalised, maintained high levels of liquidity and that asset quality remained strong.

Therefore, the UK financial system was resilient enough to withstand problems in shadow banking.

Although the results of the exercise provide a ‘framework of future system-wide analysis which can be embedded in future market-wide surveillance,’ history indicates that risks tend to exist in obscure and arcane parts of the financial system and that these never tend to be fully appreciated until a crisis occurs. This then tends to involve significant costs for taxpayers.

Articles

Bank of England documents and reports

Data

Questions

  1. Explain stress testing.
  2. What is shadow banking? Explain the factors driving the growth of credit in this part of the financial system.
  3. Compare and contrast the liquidity problems of banks with those of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
  4. Analyse how financial crises can heighten problems of asymmetric information in financial markets.

In this blog we show how we can apply fiscal metrics to assess the UK government’s fiscal stance. This captures the extent to which fiscal policy contributes to the level of economic activity in the economy.

Changes in the fiscal stance can then be used to estimate the extent to which discretionary fiscal policy measures represent a tightening or loosening of policy. We can measure the size and direction of fiscal impulses arising from changes in the government’s budgetary position.

Such an analysis is timely given the Autumn Budget presented by Rachel Reeves on 30 October 2024. This was the first Labour budget in 14 years and the first ever to be presented by a female Chancellor of the Exchequer.

We conclude by considering the forecast profile of expenditures and revenues for the next few years and the new fiscal rules announced by the Chancellor.

The fiscal stance

At its most simple, the fiscal stance measures the extent to which fiscal policy increases or decreases demand, thereby influencing growth and inflation (see Box 1.F, page 28, Autumn Budget 2024: see link below).

The fiscal stance is commonly estimated by measures of pubic-sector borrowing. To understand this, we can refer to the circular flow of income model. In this model, excesses of government spending (an injection) over taxation receipts (a withdrawal or leakage) represent a net injection into the circular flow and hence positively affect the level of aggregate demand for national output, all other things being equal.

A commonly used measure of borrowing in assessing the fiscal stance of the is the primary deficit. Unlike public-sector net borrowing, which is simply the excess of the sector’s spending over its receipts (largely taxation), the primary deficit subtracts net interest costs. It therefore excludes the interest payments on outstanding public-sector debts (and interest income earned on financial assets). The primary deficit can therefore be written as public-sector borrowing less net interest payments.

As discussed in our blog Fiscal impulses in November 2023, the primary deficit captures whether the public sector is able to afford its present fiscal choices by abstracting from debt-serving costs that reflect past fiscal choices. In this way, the primary deficit is a preferable measure to net borrowing both in assessing the impact on economic activity, i.e. the fiscal stance, and in assessing whether today’s fiscal choices will require government to issue additional debt.

Chart 1 shows public-sector net borrowing and the primary balance as shares of GDP for the UK since financial year 1975/76 (click here for a PowerPoint). The data are from the latest Public Finances Databank published by the Office for Budget Responsibility, published on the day of the Autumn Budget in October (see Data links below).

Over the period 1975/6 to 2023/24, public-sector net borrowing and the primary deficit had averaged 3.8% and 1.3% of GDP respectively. In the financial year 2023/24, they were 4.5% and 1.5% (they had been as high as 15.1% and 14.1% in 2020/21 as a result of COVID support measures). In 2024/25 net borrowing and the primary deficit are forecast to be 4.5% and 1.6% respectively. By 2027/28, while net borrowing is forecast to be 2.3% of GDP, there is forecast to be a primary surplus of 0.7% of GDP.

The Autumn Budget lays out plans for higher tax revenues to contribute two-thirds of the overall reduction in the primary deficit over the forecast period (up to 2029/30), while spending decisions contribute the remaining third.

The largest tax-raising measure is an increase in the employer rate of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) by 1.2 percentage points to 15% from April 2025. This will be levied on employee wages above a Secondary Threshold of £5000, reduced from £9100, which will increase in line with CPI inflation each year from April 2028. (See John’s blog, Raising the minimum wage: its effects on poverty and employment, for an analysis on the effects of this change.) This measure, allowing for other changes to the operation of employer NICs, is expected to raise £122 billion over the forecast period. This amounts to over two-thirds of the additional tax take from the taxation measures taken in the Budget.

Chart 2 shows both net borrowing and the primary deficit after being cyclically-adjusted (click here for a PowerPoint). This process adjusts these fiscal indicators to account for those parts of spending and taxation that are affected by the position of the economy in the business cycle. These are those parts that act as automatic stabilisers helping, as the name suggests, to stabilise the economy.

The process of cyclical adjustment leads to estimates of receipts and expenditures as if the economy were operating at its potential output level and hence with no output gap. The act of cyclically adjusting the primary deficit, which is our preferred measure of the fiscal stance, allows us to assess better the public sector’s fiscal stance.

Over the period from 1975/6 up to and including 2023/24, the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (CAPD) averaged 1.1% of GDP. In 2024/25 the CAPD is forecast to be 1.5% of GDP. It then moves to a surplus of 0.5% by 2027/28. It therefore mirrors the path of the unadjusted primary deficit.

Measuring the fiscal impulse

To assess even more clearly the extent to which the fiscal stance is changing, we can use the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to measure a fiscal impulse. This captures the magnitude of change in discretionary fiscal policy.

The term should not be confused with fiscal multipliers which measure the impact of fiscal changes on outcomes, such as real GDP and employment. Instead, we are interested in the size of the impulse that the economy is being subject to. Specifically, we are measuring discretionary fiscal policy changes that result in structural changes in the government budget and which, therefore, allow an assessment of how much, if at all, a country’s fiscal stance has tightened or loosened.

The size of the fiscal impulse is measured by the year-on-year percentage point change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit (CAPD) as a percentage of GDP. A larger deficit or a smaller surplus indicates a fiscal loosening. This is consistent with a positive fiscal impulse. On the other hand, a smaller deficit or a larger surplus indicates a fiscal tightening. This is consistent with a negative fiscal impulse.

Chart 3 shows the magnitude of UK fiscal impulses since the mid-1970s (Click here for a PowerPoint file). The scale of the fiscal interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included the COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and Job Retention Scheme (‘furlough’), stand out sharply. In 2020 the CAPD to output ratio rose from 1.7 to 14.4%. This represents a positive fiscal impulse of 12.4% of GDP.

This was followed in 2021 by a tightening of the fiscal stance, with a negative fiscal impulse of 10.1% of GDP as the CAPD to output fell back to 4.0%. Subsequent tightening was tempered by policy measures to limit the impact on the private sector of the cost-of-living crisis, including the Energy Price Guarantee and Energy Bills Support Scheme.

For comparison, the fiscal response to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 saw a cumulative positive fiscal impulse of 5.6% of GDP. While smaller in comparison to the discretionary fiscal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it nonetheless represented a sizeable loosening of the fiscal stance.

Chart 4 focuses on the implied fiscal impulse for the forecast period up to 2029/30 (click here for a PowerPoint). The period is notable for a negative fiscal impulse each year. Across the period as a whole, this there is a cumulative negative fiscal impulse of 2.6% of GDP. Most of the ‘heavy-lifting’ of the fiscal consolidation occurs in the three financial years from 2025/26 during which there is a cumulative negative impulse of 2.0% of GDP.

Looking forward

To conclude, we consider the implications for the projected profiles of public-sector spending, receipts and liabilities over the forecast period up to 2029/30.

Chart 5 plots data since the mid-1950s (click here for a PowerPoint). It shows the size of total public-sector spending (also known as ‘total managed expenditures’), taxation receipts (sometimes referred as the ‘tax burden’) and total public-sector receipts as shares of GDP. This last one includes additional receipts, such as interest payments on financial assets and income generated by public corporations, as well as taxation receipts.

The OBR forecasts that in real terms (i.e. after adjustment for inflation), public-sector spending will increase on average over the period from 2025/26 to 2029/30 by 1.4% per year, but with total receipts due to rise more quickly at 2.5% per year and taxation receipts by 2.8% per year. The implications of this, as discussed in the OBR’s October 1014 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (see link below), are that:

the size of the state is forecast to settle at 44% of GDP by the end of the decade, almost 5 percentage points higher than before the pandemic” while additional tax revenues will “push the tax take to a historic high of 38% of GDP by 2029-30

Finally, the government has committed to two key rules: a stability rule and an investment rule.

The stability rule. This states that the current budget must be in surplus by 2029/30 or, once 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period, it will be in balance or surplus every third year of the rolling forecast period thereafter. The current budget refers to the difference between receipts and expenditures other than capital expenditures. In effect, it captures the ability of government to meet day-to-day spending and is intended to ensure that over the medium term any borrowing is solely for investment. It is important to note that ‘balance’ is defined in a range of between a deficit and surplus of no more than 0.5% of GDP.

The stability rule replaces the borrowing rule of the previous government that public net borrowing, therefore inclusive of investment expenditures, was not to exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.

The investment rule. The government is planning to increase investment. In order to do this in a financially sustainable way, the investment rule states that public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) or net financial debt for short, is falling as a share GDP by 2029/30, until 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period. PSNFL should then fall by the third year of the rolling forecast period. PSNFL is a broader measure of the sector’s balance sheet than public-sector net debt (PSND), which was targeted under the previous government and which was required to fall by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.

The new target, as well as now extending to the Bank of England, ‘nets off’ not just liquid assets (i.e. cash in the bank and foreign exchange reserves) but also financial assets such as shares and money owed to it, including expected student loan repayments. While liabilities are broader too, including for example, the local government pension scheme, the impact is expected to reduce the new liabilities target by £236 billion or 8.2 percentage points of GDP in 2024/25. The hope is that both rules can support what the Budget Report labels a ‘step change in investment’.

As Chart 6 shows, public investment as a share of GDP has not exceeded 6% this century and during the 2010s averaged only 4.4% (click here for a PowerPoint). The forecast has it rising above 5% for a time, but easing to 4.8% by end of the period.

This suggests more progress will be needed if the UK is to experience a significant and enduring increase in public investment. Of course, this needs to be set in the context of the wider public finances and is illustrative of the choices facing fiscal policymakers across the globe after the often violent shocks that have rocked economies and impacted on the state of the public finances in recent years.

Articles

Official documents

Data

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by the following fiscal terms:
    (a) Structural deficit,
    (b) Automatic stabilisers,
    (c) Discretionary fiscal policy,
    (d) Public-sector net borrowing,
    (e) Primary deficit,
    (f) Current budget balance,
    (g) Public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL).
  2. Explain the difference between a fiscal impulse and a fiscal multiplier.
  3. In designing fiscal rules what issues might policymakers need to consider?
  4. What are key differences between the fiscal rules of the previous Conservative government and the new Labour government in the UK? What economic arguments would you make for and against the ‘old’ and ‘new’ fiscal rules?
  5. What is meant by the ‘sustainability’ of the public finances? What factors might impact on their sustainability?