Donald Trump is keen to lower US interest rates substantially and rapidly in order to provide a boost to the US economy. He is also keen to reduce the cost of living for US citizens and sees lower interest rates as a means of reducing the burden of debt servicing for both consumers and firms alike.
But interest rates are set by the US central bank, the Federal Reserve (the ‘Fed’), which is formally independent from government. This independence is seen as important for providing stability to the US economy and removing monetary policy from short-term political pressures to cut interest rates. Succumbing to political pressures would be likely to create uncertainty and damage long-term stability and growth.
Yet President Trump is pushing the Fed to lower interest rates rapidly and despite three cuts in a row of 0.25 percentage points in the last part of 2025 (see chart below), he thinks this as too little and is annoyed by suggestions that the Fed is unlikely to lower rates again for a while. He has put great pressure on Jerome Powell, the Fed Chair, to go further and faster and has threatened to replace him before his term expires in May this year. He has also made clear that he is likely to appoint someone more willing to cutting rates.
The Federal Reserve headquarters in Washington is currently being renovated. The nine-year project is costing $2.5 billion and is due to be completed next year. President Trump has declared that the project’s costs are excessive and unnecessary.
On 11 January, Federal prosecutors confirmed that they were opening a criminal investigation into Powell, accusing him of lying to Congress in his June 2025 testimony regarding the scope and costs of the renovations.
Powell responded by posting a video in which he claimed that the real reason that he was being threatened with criminal charges was not because of the renovations but because the Fed had ignored President Trump’s pressure and had set interest rates:
based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the President. This is about whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions – or whether, instead, monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation.
The Fed’s mandate
The Federal Reserve Board decides on monetary policy and then the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decides how to carry it out. It decides on interest rates and asset sales or purchases. The FOMC meets eight times a year.
The Fed is independent of both the President and Congress, and its Chair is generally regarded as having great power in determining the country’s economic policy.
Since 1977, the Fed’s statutory mandate has been to promote the goals of stable prices and maximum employment. Because of the reference to both prices and employment, the mandate is commonly referred to as a ‘dual mandate’. Its inflation target is 2 per cent over the long run with ‘well anchored’ inflationary expectations.
The dual mandate is unlike that of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and most other central banks, which all have a single key mandate of achieving a target of a 2 per cent annual rate of consumer price inflation over a particular time period.
With a dual mandate, the two objectives may well conflict from time to time. Moreover, changes in monetary policy affect these objectives with a lag and potentially over different time horizons. Hence, an assessment may have to be made of which is the most pressing problem. This does give some leeway in setting interest rates somewhat lower than if there were a single inflation-rate target. Nevertheless, the assessment is in terms of how best to achieve the mandate and not to meet current political goals.
Statement by former Fed Chairs and Governors
On 12 January, three former Chairs of the Federal Reserve (Janet Yellen, Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan), four former Treasury Secretaries (Timothy Geithner, Jacob Lew, Henry Paulson and Robert Rubin) and seven other top former economic officials issued the following statement (see Substack link in the Articles section below):
The Federal Reserve’s independence and the public’s perception of that independence are critical for economic performance, including achieving the goals Congress has set for the Federal Reserve of stable prices, maximum employment, and moderate long-term interest rates. The reported criminal inquiry into Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell is an unprecedented attempt to use prosecutorial attacks to undermine that independence. This is how monetary policy is made in emerging markets with weak institutions, with highly negative consequences for inflation and the functioning of their economies more broadly. It has no place in the United States whose greatest strength is the rule of law, which is at the foundation of our economic success.
Response of investors
What will happen to the dollar, US bond prices, share prices and US inflation, and what will happen to investment, depends on how people respond to the threat to the Fed’s independence. Initially, there was little response from markets, with investors probably concluding that President Trump is unlikely to be able to sway FOMC members. What is more, several Republican lawmakers have begun criticising the Trump administration’s criminal investigation, making it harder for the President to influence Fed decisions.
Even if Powell is replaced, either in the short term or in May, by a chair keen to pursue the Trump agenda, that chair will still be just one of twelve voting members of the FOMC.
Seven are appointed by the President, but serve for staggered 14-year terms. Four have been appointed by President Trump, but the other three were appointed by President Biden, although one – Lisa Cook – is being indicted by the Supreme Court for mortgage fraud, with the hearing scheduled for January 21. She claims that this is a trumped-up charge to provide grounds for removing her from the Fed. If she is removed, President Trump could appoint a replacement minded to cut rates.
The other five members include the President of the New York Fed and four of the eleven other regional Fed Presidents serving in rotation. These four are generally hawkish and would oppose early rate cuts.
Thus it is unlikely that President Trump will succeed in pushing the Fed to lower interest rates earlier than they would have done. For that reason, markets have remained relatively sanguine.
Nevertheless, Donald Trump’s actions could well cause investors to become more worried. Will he try to find other ways to undermine the Fed? Will his actions over Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland and Iran, let alone his policies towards Ukraine and Russia and towards Israel and Gaza, heighten global uncertainty? Will his actions towards Venezuela and his desire to take over Greenland embolden China to attempt to annex Taiwan, and Russia to continue to resist plans to end the war in Ukraine or to make stronger demands?
Such developments could cause investor confidence to wane and for stock markets to fall. Time will tell. I think we need a crystal ball!
Videos
Articles
- Federal prosecutors open criminal investigation into the Fed and Jerome Powell
CNN, Bryan Mena (11/1/26)
- The Fed just gave a rare look at its $2.5 billion renovation — right before Trump’s tour
CNN, Bryan Mena (24/7/25)
- ‘A bone-headed move’: Trump’s shocking battle with Powell could badly backfire
CNN, Matt Egan (12/1/26)
- Why Powell is fighting back against Trump: The US economy is at stake
CNN, Bryan Mena (13/1/26)
- Fed chair Powell hits out at ‘unprecedented’ probe by US justice department
BBC News, Ana Faguy and Osmond Chia (12/1/26)
- Justice department opens investigation into Jerome Powell as Trump ramps up campaign against Federal Reserve
The Guardian, Callum Jones (12/1/26)
- Some Republicans speak out against DoJ investigation into Fed chair
The Guardian, Joseph Gedeon (12/1/26)
- Trump’s attempts to influence Fed risk 1970s-style inflation and global backlash
The Guardian, Richard Partington (12/1/26)
- Statement on the Federal Reserve
Substack, 14 signatories (12/1/26)
- Yellen says Powell probe ‘extremely chilling’ for Fed independence, market should be concerned
CNBC, Jeff Cox (12/1/26)
- Global central bankers unite in defense of Fed Chair Jerome Powell
CNBC, Holly Ellyatt (13/1/26)
- Trump attacks Powell again amid Fed independence fears: ‘That jerk will be gone soon’
CNBC, Kevin Breuninger (13/1/26)
- Former Fed chairs condemn criminal investigation into Jerome Powell
BBC News, Danielle Kaye (12/1/26)
- Fed: Towards a very divided Fed in the coming months and quarters
CPR AM, Bastien Drut (28/11/25)
- Treasury Yields Diverge as Powell Probe Rekindles Fed Independence Risk
Investing.com, Khasay Hashimov (12/1/26)
- Instant View: Investors react as Trump-Fed feud escalates
Reuters (12/1/26)
- Fighting the Fed, Trump tries credit easing by decree
Reuters, Mike Dolan (13/1/26)
- Trump’s attacks on the Federal Reserve risk fuelling US inflation and ending dollar dominance
The Conversation, Emre Tarim (13/1/26)
Questions
- What are the arguments for central bank independence?
- What are the arguments for control of monetary policy by the central government?
- Assess the above arguments.
- Find out what has happened to interest rates, the US stock market and the dollar since this blog was written.
- How do the fiscal decisions by government affect monetary policy?
- Compare the benefits of the dual mandate system of the Fed with those of the single mandate of the Bank of England and ECB.
With businesses increasing their use of AI, this is likely to have significant effects on employment. But how will this affect the distribution of income, both within countries and between countries?
In some ways, AI is likely to increase inequality within countries as it displaces low-skilled workers and enhances the productivity of higher-skilled workers. In other ways, it could reduce inequality by allowing lower-skilled workers to increase their productivity, while displacing some higher-skilled workers and managers through the increased adoption of automated processes.
The effect of AI on the distribution of income between countries will depend crucially on its accessibility. If it is widely available to low-income countries, it could significantly enhance the productivity of small businesses and workers in such countries and help to reduce the income gap with the richer world. If the gains in such countries, however, are largely experienced by multinational companies, whether in mines and plantations, or in labour-intensive industries, such as garment production, few of the gains may accrue to workers and global inequality may increase.
Redistribution within a country
The deployment of AI may result in labour displacement. AI is likely to replace both manual and white-collar jobs that involve straightforward and repetitive tasks. These include: routine clerical work, such as data entry, filing and scheduling; paralegal work, contract drafting and legal research; consulting, business research and market analysis; accounting and bookkeeping; financial trading; proofreading, copy mark-up and translation; graphic design; machine operation; warehouse work, where AI-enabled warehouse robots do many receiving, sorting, stacking, retrieval, carrying and loading tasks (e.g. Amazon’s Sequoia robotic system); basic coding or document sifting; market research and advertising design; call-centre work, such as enquiry handling, sales, telemarketing and customer service; hospitality reception; sales cashiers in supermarkets and stores; analysis of health data and diagnosis. Such jobs can all be performed by AI assistants, AI assisted robots or chat bots.
Women are likely to be disproportionately affected because they perform a higher share of the administrative and service roles most exposed to AI.
Workers displaced by AI may find that they can find employment only in lower-paid jobs. Examples include direct customer-facing roles, such as bar staff, shop assistants, hairdressers and nail and beauty consultants.
Such job displacement by AI is likely to redistribute income from relatively low-skilled labour to capital: a redistribution from wages to profits. This will tend to lead to greater inequality.
AI is also likely to lead to a redistribution of income towards certain types of high-skilled labour that are difficult to replace with AI but which could be enhanced by it. Take the case of skilled traders, such as plumbers, electricians and carpenters. They might be able to use AI in their work to enhance their productivity, through diagnosis, planning, problem-solving, measurement, etc. but the AI would not displace them. Instead, it could increase their incomes by allowing them to do their work more efficiently or effectively and thus increase their output per hour and enhance their hourly reward. Another example is architecture, where AI can automate repetitive tasks and open up new design possibilities, allowing architects to focus on creativity, flexibility, aesthetics, empathy with clients and ethical decision-making.
An important distinction is between disembodied and embodied AI investment. Disembodied AI investment could include AI ‘assistants’, such as ChatGPT and other software that can be used in existing jobs to enhance productivity. Such investment can usually be rolled out relatively quickly. Although the extra productivity may allow some reduction in the number of workers, disembodied AI investment is likely to be less disruptive than embodied AI investment. The latter includes robotics and automation, where workers are replaced by machines. This would require more investment and may be slower to be adopted.
Then there are jobs that will be created by AI. These include prompt engineers, who develop questions and prompt techniques to optimise AI output; health tech experts, who help organisations implement new medical AI products; AI educators, who train people in the uses of AI in the workplace; ethics advisors, who help companies ensure that their uses of AI are aligned with their values, responsibilities and goals; and cybersecurity experts who put systems in place to prevent AI stealing sensitive information. Such jobs may be relatively highly paid.
In other cases, the gains from AI in employment are likely to accrue mainly to the consumer, with probably little change in the incomes of the workers themselves. This is particularly the case in parts of the public sector where wages/salaries are only very loosely related to productivity and where a large part of the work involves providing a personal service. For example, health professionals’ productivity could be enhanced by AI, which could allow faster and more accurate diagnosis, more efficient monitoring and greater accuracy in surgery. The main gainers would be the patients, with probably little change in the incomes of the health professionals themselves. Teachers’ productivity could be improved by allowing more rapid and efficient marking, preparation of materials and record keeping, allowing more time to be spent with students. Again, the main gainers would be the students, with little change in teachers’ incomes. Other jobs in this category include social workers, therapists, solicitors and barristers, HR specialists, senior managers and musicians.
Thus there is likely to be a distribution away from lower-skilled workers to both capital and higher-skilled workers who can use AI, to people who work in new jobs created by AI and to the consumers of certain services.
AI will accelerate productivity growth and, with it, GDP growth, but will probably displace workers faster than new roles emerge. This is likely to increase inequality and be a major challenge for society. Can the labour market adapt? Could the effects be modified if people moved to a four- or three-day week? Will governments introduce statutory limits to weekly working hours? Will training and education adapt to the new demands of employers?
Redistribution between countries
AI threatens to widen the global rich–poor divide. It will give wealthier nations a productivity and innovation edge, which could displace low-skilled jobs in low-income nations. Labour-intensive production could be replaced by automated production, with the capital owned by the multinational companies of just a few countries, such as the USA and China, which between them account for 40% of global corporate AI R&D spending. For some companies, it would make sense to relocate production to rich countries, or certain wealthier developing countries, with better digital infrastructure, advanced data systems and more reliable power supply.
For other companies, however, production might still be based in low-income countries to take advantage of low-cost local materials. But there would still be a redistribution from wages in such countries to the profits of multinationals.
But it is not just in manufacturing where low-income countries are vulnerable to the integration of AI. Several countries, such as India, the Philippines, Mexico and Egypt have seen considerable investment in call centres and IT services for business process outsourcing and customer services. AI now poses a threat to employment in this industry as it has the potential to replace large numbers of workers.
AI-related job losses could exacerbate unemployment and deepen poverty in poorer countries, which, with limited resources, limited training and underdeveloped social protection systems, are less equipped to absorb economic and social shocks. This will further widen the global divide. In the case of embodied AI investment, it may only be possible in low-income countries through multinational investment and could displace many traditional jobs, with much of the benefit going in additional multinational profit.
But it is not all bad news for low-income countries. AI-driven innovations in healthcare, education, and agriculture, if adopted in poor countries, can make a significant contribution to raising living standards and can slow, or even reverse, the widening gap between rich and poor nations. Some of the greatest potential is in small-scale agriculture. Smallholders can boost crop yields though precision farming powered by AI; AI tools can help farmers buy seeds, fertilisers and animals and sell their produce at optimum times and prices; AI-enabled education tools can help farmers learn new techniques.
Articles
- New Skills and AI Are Reshaping the Future of Work
IMF Blog, Kristalina Georgieva (14/1/26)
- Generative AI: degenerative for jobs?
Bank Underground, Bank of England blog, Edward Egan (22/1/26)
- Artificial intelligence (AI) and employment
UK Parliament Research Briefing Lydia Harriss and Sam Money-Kyrle (23/12/25)
- Is Your Job AI-Proof? What to Know About AI Taking Over Jobs
Built In, Matthew Urwin (27/8/25)
- AI likely to displace jobs, says Bank of England governor
BBC News, Michael Race (19/12/25)
- These Jobs Will Fall First as AI Takes Over the Workplace
Forbes, Jack Kelly (30/4/25)
- Disrupted or displaced? How AI is shaking up jobs
exec-appointments.com, Anjli Raval (9/7/25)
- Navigate the economic risks and challenges of generative AI
EY-Parthenon, Lydia Boussour (25/6/24)
- AI Isn’t Increasing Inequality; It’s Revealing the Gaps We Haven’t Wanted to See
HR News, Mark Abbott (18/12/25)
- AI promises efficiency, but it’s also amplifying labour inequality
The Conversation, Mehnaz Rafi (3/12/25)
- 10 Jobs AI Will Replace in 2025
Live Career, Marta Bongilaj (29/12/25)
- From steam to Silicon: Why inequality persists
Aik News HD (Pakistan), Ahmed Fawad Farooq (27/12/25)
- Rethinking AI’s role in income inequality
PwC: The Leadership Agenda (4/9/25)
- How Europe Can Capture the AI Growth Dividend
IMF Blog, Florian Misch, Ben Park, Carlo Pizzinelli and Galen Sher (20/11/25)
- The Next Great Divergence
UNDP: Asia and the Pacific (2/12/25)
- AI risks sparking a new era of divergence as development gaps between countries widen, UNDP report finds
UNDP Press Release (2/12/25)
- AI threatens to widen inequality among states: UN
Aljazeera (2/12/25)
- AI risks deepening inequality, says head of world’s largest SWF
Financial Times, James Fontanella-Khan and Sun Yu (23/11/25)
- Three Reasons Why AI May Widen Global Inequality
Center for Global Development, Philip Schellekens and David Skilling (17/10/24)
- AI Will Transform the Global Economy. Let’s Make Sure It Benefits Humanity
IMF Blog, Kristalina Georgieva (14/1/24)
- AI’s $4.8 trillion future: UN Trade and Development alerts on divides, urges action
UNCTAD Press Release (7/4/25)
- AI could affect 40% of jobs and widen inequality between nations, UN warns
CNBC, Dylan Butts (4/4/25)
Questions
- What types of job are most vulnerable to AI?
- How will AI change the comparative advantage of low-income countries and what effect will it be likely to have on the pattern of global trade?
- Assess alternative policies that governments in high-income countries can adopt to offset the growth in inequality caused by the increasing use of AI.
- What policies can governments in low-income countries or aid agencies adopt to offset the growth in inequality within low-income countries and between high- and low-income countries?
- How might the growth of AI affect your own approach to career development?
- Is AI likely to increase or decrease economic power? Explain.
The productivity gap between the UK and its main competitors is significant. In 2024, compared to the UK, output per hour worked was 10.0% higher in France, 19.8% higher in Germany and 41.1% higher in the USA. These percentages are in purchasing-power parity terms: in other words, they reflect the purchasing power of the respective currencies – the pound, the euro and the US dollar.
GDP per hour worked (in PPP terms) is normally regarded as the best measure of labour productivity. An alternative measure is GDP per worker, but this does not take into account the length of the working year. Using this measure, the gap with the USA is even higher as workers in the USA work longer hours and have fewer days holiday per year than in the UK.
The productivity gap is not a new phenomenon. It has been substantial and growing over the past 20 years. (The exception was in 2020 during lockdowns when many of the least productive sectors, such as hospitality, were forced to close temporarily.)
The productivity gap is shown in the two figures. Both figures show labour productivity for the UK, France, Germany and the USA from 1995 to 2024.
Figure 1 shows output (GDP) per hour, measured in US dollars in PPP terms.
Figure 2 shows output (GDP) per hour relative to the UK, with the UK set at 100. The gap narrowed somewhat up to the early 2000s, but since then has widened.
Low UK productivity has been a source of concern for UK governments and business for many years. Not only does it constrain the growth in living standards, it also make the UK less attractive as a source of inward investment and less competitive internationally.
Part of the reason for low UK productivity compared to that in other countries is a low level of investment. As a proportion of GDP, the UK has persistently had the lowest, or almost the lowest, level of investment of its major competitors. This is illustrated in Table 1.

It is generally recognised by government, business and economists that if the economy is to be successful, the productivity gap must be closed. But there is no ‘quick fix’. The policies necessary to achieve increased productivity are long term. There is also a recognition that the productivity problem is a multi-faceted one and that to deal with it requires policy initiatives on a broad front: initiatives that encompass institutional changes as well as adjustments in policy.
So what can be done to improve productivity and how can this be achieved at the micro as well as the macro level?
Improving productivity: things that government can do
Encouraging investment. Over the years, UK governments have increased investment allowances, enabling firms to offset the cost of investment against pre-tax profit, thereby reducing their tax liability. For example, in the UK, companies can offset a multiple of research and development costs against corporation tax. The rate of relief for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) allows companies that work in science and technology to deduct an extra 86% of their qualifying expenditure from their trading profit in addition to the normal 100% deduction: i.e. a total of 186% deduction. Meanwhile, since April 2016, larger companies have been able to claim a R&D expenditure credit, initially worth 11 per cent of R&D expenditures, then 12 per cent from 2018 and 13 per cent from 2020. This was then raised to 20 per cent from 2023.
Strengthening competition. A number of studies have revealed that, with increasing market share, business productivity growth slows. As a result, government policy sought to strengthen competition policy. The Competition Act 1998, which came into force in March 2000, and the Enterprise Act of 2002, enhanced the powers of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (a predecessor to the Competition and Markets Authority) in respect to dealing with anti-competitive practices. It was given the ability to impose large fines on firms which had been found guilty of exploiting a dominant market position. Today, one of the strategic goals of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the aim of ‘extending competition frontiers’ in order to improve the way competition works.
Encouraging an enterprise culture. The creation of an enterprise culture is seen as a crucial factor not only to encourage innovation but also to stimulate technological progress. Innovation and technological progress are crucial to sustaining growth and raising living standards. The UK government launched the Small Business Service in April 2000, later renamed Business and Industry. Its role is to co-ordinate small-business policy within government and liaise with business, providing advice and information. However, according to the OECD, there remains considerable scope for increasing the level of government support for entrepreneurship in the UK.
Improving productivity: things that organisations can do
In the podcast from the BBC’s The Bottom Line series, titled ‘Productivity: How Can British Business Work Smarter’ (see link below), Evan Davis and guests discuss what productivity really looks like in practice – from offices and factories, to call centres and operating theatres.’ The episode identifies a number of ways in which labour productivity can be improved. These include:
- People could work harder;
- Workers could be better trained and more skilled and thus able to produce more per hour;
- Capital could be increased so that workers have more equipment or tools to enable them to produce more, or there could be greater automation, releasing labour to work on other tasks;
- Workplaces could be arranged more efficiently so that less time is spent moving from task to task;
- Systems could put in place to ensure that tasks are done correctly the first time and that time is not wasted having to repeat them or put them right;
- Workers could be better incentivised to work efficiently, whether through direct pay or promotion prospects, or by increasing job satisfaction or by management being better attuned to what motivates workers and makes them feel valued;
- Firms could move to higher-value products, so that workers produce a greater value of output per hour.
The three contributors to the programme discuss various initiatives in their organisations (an electronics manufacturer, NHS foundation trusts and a provider of office services to other organisations).
They also discuss the role that AI plays, or could play, in doing otherwise time-consuming tasks, such as recording and paying invoices and record keeping in offices; writing grants or producing policy documents; analysing X-ray results in hospitals and performing preliminary diagnoses when patients present with various symptoms; recording conversations/consultations and then sorting, summarising and transcribing them; building AI capabilities into machines or robots to enable them to respond to different specifications or circumstances; software development where AI writes the code. Often, there is a shortage of time for workers to do more creative things. AI can help release more time by doing a lot of the mundane tasks or allowing people to do them much quicker.
There are huge possibilities for increasing labour productivity at an organisational level. The successful organisations will be those that can grasp these possibilities – and in many cases they will be incentivised to so so as it will improve their profitability or other outcomes.
Podcast
Articles
- Steeper UK productivity cut of more than £20bn makes tax rises more likely
The Guardian, Kalyeena Makortoff, Phillip Inman and Richard Partington (28/10/25)
- Reeves could face £20bn Budget hole as UK productivity downgraded
BBC News, Faisal Islam (27/10/25)
- To boost UK productivity, ordinary workers must bear more of the tax burden
Financial Times, Anatole Kaletsky (1/11/25)
- Neither China nor Japan – now it is the United States that adopts the brutal 9-9-6 model that redefines productivity and attrition
UnionRayo, Laura M. (1/11/25)
- ‘The money machine is misfiring’: City blames Brexit for UK’s £20bn productivity headache
The Guardian, Richard Partington (31/10/25)
- Organisations can achieve greater productivity and employee engagement with improved performance management, new research finds
WTW Press Release (29/10/25)
- Why does lower productivity mean tax rises are more likely?
BBC Verify, Ben Chu (4/11/25)
- Why is technology not making us more productive?
BBC News, Jonty Bloom (24/7/23)
Data
Questions
- In what different ways can productivity be measured? What is the most appropriate measure for assessing the effect of productivity on (a) GDP and (b) human welfare generally?
- Why has the UK had a lower level of labour productivity than France, Germany and the USA for many years? What can UK governments do to help close this gap?
- Find out how Japanese labour productivity has compared with that in the UK over the past 30 years and explain your findings.
- Research an organisation of your choice to find out ways in which labour productivity could be increased.
- Identify various ways in which AI can improve productivity. Will organisations be incentivised to adopt them?
- Has Brexit affected UK labour productivity and, if so, how and why?
The UK’s poor record on productivity since the 2008 financial crisis is well documented, not least in this blog series. Output per worker has flatlined over the 17 years since the crisis. As was noted in the blog, The UK’s poor productivity record, low UK productivity is caused by a number of factors, including the lack of investment in training, the poor motivation of many workers and the feeling of being overworked, short-termism among politicians and management, and generally poor management practices.
One of the most significant issues identified by analysts and commentators is the lack of investment in physical capital, both by private companies and by the government in infrastructure. Gross fixed capital formation (a measure of investment) has been much lower in the UK compared to international competitors.
From Figure 1 it can be observed that, since the mid-1990s, the UK has consistently had lower investment as a percentage of GDP compared to other significant developed market economies. The cumulative effect of this gap has contributed to lower productivity and lower economic growth.
Interestingly, since the financial crisis, UK firms have had high profitability and associated high cash holdings. This suggests that firms have had a lot of financial resources to reinvest. However, data from the OECD suggests that reinvestment rates in the UK, typically 40–50% of profit, are much lower than in many other OECD countries. In the USA the rate is 50%, in Germany 60–70% and in Japan 70%+. There is much greater emphasis in the UK on returning funds to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks. However, the reinvestment of much of this cash within firms could have gone some way to addressing the UK’s investment gap – but, it hasn’t been done.
Analysis by the OECD suggest that, while the cost of financing investment has declined since the financial crisis, the gap between this and the hurdle rate used to appraise investments has widened. Between 2010 and 2021 the difference nearly doubled to 4%. This increase in the hurdle rate can be related to increases in the expected rate of return by UK companies and their investors.
In this blog we will analyse (re)investment decisions by firms, discussing how increases in the expected rate of return in the UK raise the hurdle rate used to appraise investments. This reduces the incentive to engage in long-term investment. We also discuss policy prescriptions to improve reinvestment rates in the UK.
Investment and the expected rate of return
Investment involves the commitment of funds today to reap rewards in the future. This includes spending on tangible and intangible resources to improve the productive capacity of firms. Firms must decide whether the commitment of funds is worthwhile. To do so, economic theory suggests that they need to consider the compensation required by their provider of finance – namely, investors.
What rewards do investors require to keep their funds invested with the firm?
When conducting investment appraisal, firms compare the estimated rate of return from an investment with the minimum return investors are prepared to receive (termed the ‘expected return’). Normally this is expressed as a percentage of the initial outlay. Firms have to offer returns to investors which are equal to or greater than the minimum expected return – the return that is sufficient to keep funds invested in the firm. Therefore, returns above this minimum expected level are termed ‘excess returns’.
When firms conduct appraisals of potential investments, be it in tangible or intangible capital, they need to take into account the fact that net benefits, expressed as cash flows, will accrue over the life of the investment, not all at once. To do this, they use discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. This converts future values of the net benefits to their present value. This is expressed as follows:

Where:
NPV = Net present value (discounted net cash flows);
K = Capital outlay (incurred at the present time);
C = Net cash flows (occur through the life of the investment project);
r = Minimum expected rate of return.
In this scenario, the investment involves an initial cash outlay (K), followed in subsequent periods by net cash inflows each period over the life of the investment, which in this case is 25 years. All the cash flows are discounted back to the present so that they can be compared at the same point in time.
The discount rate (r) used in appraisals to determine the present value of net cash flows is determined by the minimum expected return demanded by investors. If at that hurdle rate there are positive net cash flows (+NPV), the investment is worthwhile and should be pursued. Conversely, if at that hurdle rate there are negative net cash flows (–NPV), the investment is not worthwhile and should not be pursued.
According to economic theory, if a firm cannot find any investment projects that produce a positive NPV, and therefore satisfy the minimum expected return, it should return funds to shareholders through dividends or share buybacks so that they can invest the finance more productively.
Firm-level data from the OECD suggest that UK firms have had higher profits and this has been associated with increased cash holdings. But, due to the higher hurdle rate, less investment is perceived to be viable and thus firms distribute more of their profits through dividends and share buybacks. These payouts represent lost potential investment and cumulatively produce a significant dent in the potential output of the UK economy.
Why are expected rates of return higher in the UK?
This higher minimum rate of expected return can be explained by factors influencing its determinants; opportunity cost and risk/uncertainty.
Higher opportunity cost. Opportunity cost relates to the rate of return offered by alternatives. Investors and, by implication firms, will have to consider the rate of return offered by alternative investment opportunities. Typically, investors have focused on interest rates as a measure of opportunity cost. Higher interest rates raise the opportunity cost of an investment and increase the minimum expected rate of return (and vice versa with lower interest rates).
However, it is not interest rates that have increased the opportunity cost, and hence the minimum expected rate of return associated with investment, in the UK since the financial crisis. For most of the period since 2008, interest rates have been extremely low, sitting at below 1%, only rising significantly during the post-pandemic inflationary surge in 2022. This indicates that this source of opportunity cost for the commitment of business investment has been extremely low.
However, there may be alternative sources of opportunity cost which are pushing up the expected rate of return. UK investors are not restricted to investing in the UK and can move their funds between international markets determined by the rate of return offered. The following table illustrates the returns (in terms of percentage stock market index gain) from investing in a sample of UK, US, French and German stock markets between August 2010 and August 2025.

When expressed in sterling, returns offered by UK-listed companies are lower across the whole period and in most of the five-yearly sub-periods. Indeed, the annual equivalent rate of return (AER) for the FTSE 100 index across the whole period is less than half that of the S&P 500. The index offered a paltry annual return of 2.57% between 2015 and 2020, while the US index offered a return of 16.48%. Both the French and German indices offered higher rates of return, in the latter part of the period particularly. This represents a higher opportunity cost for UK investors and may have increased their expectations about the return they require for UK investments.
Greater perceived risk/uncertainty. Expected rates of return are also determined by perceptions of risk and uncertainty – the compensation investors need to bear the perceived risk associated with an investment. Investors are risk averse. They demand higher expected return as compensation for higher perceived risk. Higher levels of risk aversion increase the expected rate of return and related investment hurdle rates.
There has been much discussion of increased uncertainty and risk aversion among global investors and firms (see the blogs Rising global uncertainty and its effects, World Uncertainty Index, The Chancellor’s fiscal dilemma and Investment set to fall as business is baffled by Trump). The COVID-19 pandemic, inflation shocks, the war in Ukraine, events across the Middle East and the trade policies adopted by the USA in 2025 have combined to produce a very uncertain business environment.
While these have been relatively recent factors influencing world-wide business uncertainty, perceptions of risk and uncertainty concerning the UK economy seem to be longer established. To measure policy-related economic uncertainty in the UK, Baker, Bloom and Davis at www.PolicyUncertainty.com construct an index based on the content analysis of newspaper articles mentioning terms reflecting policy uncertainty.
Figure 2 illustrates the monthly index from 1998 to July 2025. The series is normalised to standard deviation 1 prior to 2011 and then summed across papers, by month. Then, the series is normalised to mean 100 prior to 2011.
Some of the notable spikes in uncertainty in the UK since 2008 have been labelled. Beginning with the global financial crisis, investors and firms became much more uncertain. This was exacerbated by a series of economic shocks that hit the economy, one of which, the narrow vote to leave the European Union in 2016, was specific to the UK. This led to political turmoil and protracted negotiations over the terms of the trade deal after the UK left. This uncertainty has been exacerbated recently by the series of global shocks highlighted above and also the budget uncertainty of Liz Truss’s short-lived premiership and now the growing pressure to reduce government borrowing.
While spikes in uncertainty occurred before the financial crises, the average level of uncertainty, as measured by the index, has been much higher since the crisis. From 1998 to 2008, the average value was 89. Since 2008, the average value has been 163. Since the Brexit vote, the average value has been 185. This indicates a much higher perception of risk and uncertainty over the past 15 year and this translates into higher minimum expected return as compensation. Consequently, this makes many long-term investment projects less viable because of higher hurdle rates. This produces less productive investment in capital, contributing significantly to lower productivity.
Policy proposals
There has been much debate in the UK about promoting greater long-term investment. Reforms have been proposed to improve public participation in long-term investment through the stock market. To boost investment, this would require the investing public to be prepared to accept lower expected returns for a given level of risk or accept higher risk for a given level of returns.
Evidence suggests that the appetite for this may be very low. UK savers tend to favour less risky and more liquid cash deposits. It may be difficult to encourage them to accept higher levels of risk. In any case, even if they did, many may invest outside the UK where the risk-return trade-off is more favourable.
Over the past 10 years, policy uncertainty has played a significant role in deterring investment. So, if there is greater continuity, this may then promote higher levels of investment.
The Labour government has proposed policies which aim to share or reduce the risk/uncertainty around long-term investment for UK businesses. For instance, a National Wealth Fund (NWF) has been established to finance strategic investment in areas such as clean energy, gigafactories and carbon capture. Unfortunately, the Fund is financed by borrowing through financial markets and the amount expected to be committed over the life of the current Parliament is only £29 billion, assuming that private capital matches public commitments in the ratio expected. It is questionable whether the Fund’s commitment will be sufficient to attract private capital.
Alternatively, Invest 2035 is a proposal to create a stable, long-term policy environment for business investment. It aims to establish an Industrial Strategy Council for policy continuity and to tackle issues like improving infrastructure, reducing energy costs and addressing skills gaps. Unfortunately, even if there is some attempt at domestic policy stability, the benefits may be more than offset by perceptions around global uncertainty, which may mean that UK investors’ minimum expected rates of return remain high and long-term investment low for the foreseeable future.
Articles
Data
Questions
- Use the marginal efficiency of capital framework to illustrate the ‘lost’ investment spending in the UK due to the investment hurdle rate being higher than the cost of capital.
- Explain the arbitrage process which produces the differences in valuations of UK securities and foreign ones due to differences in the expected rate of return.
- Sketch an indifference curve for a risk-averse investor, treating expected return and risk as two characteristics of a financial instrument.
- How does higher uncertainty affect the slope of an indifference curve for such an investor? How does this affect their investment hurdle rate?
- Analyse the extent to which the proposed polices can reduce the investment hurdle rate for UK companies and encourage greater levels of investment.
In a blog in October 2024, we looked at global uncertainty and how it can be captured in a World Uncertainty Index. The blog stated that ‘We continue to live through incredibly turbulent times. In the past decade or so we have experienced a global financial crisis, a global health emergency, seen the UK’s departure from the European Union, and witnessed increasing levels of geopolitical tension and conflict’.
Since then, Donald Trump has been elected for a second term and has introduced sweeping tariffs. What is more, the tariffs announced on so-called ‘Liberation Day‘ have not remained fixed, but have fluctuated with negotiations and threatened retaliation. The resulting uncertainty makes it very hard for businesses to plan and many have been unwilling to commit to investment decisions. The uncertainty has been compounded by geopolitical events, such as the continuing war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza and the June 13 Israeli attack on Iran.
The World Uncertainty Index (WUI) tracks uncertainty around the world by applying a form of text mining known as ‘term frequency’ to the country reports produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The words searched for are ‘uncertain’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘uncertainties’ and the number of times they occur as percentage of the total words is recorded. To produce the WUI this figure is then multiplied by 1m. A higher WUI number indicates a greater level of uncertainty.
The monthly global average WUI is shown in Chart 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). It is based on 71 countries. Since 2008 the WUI has averaged a little over 23 000: i.e. 2.3 per cent of the text in EIU reports contains the word ‘uncertainty’ or a close variant. In May 2025, it was almost 79 000 – the highest since the index was first complied in 2008. The previous highest was in March 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 outbreak, when the index rose to just over 56 000.
The second chart shows the World Trade Uncertainty Index (WTUI), published on the same site as the WUI (click here for a PowerPoint). The method adopted in its construction therefore mirrors that for the WUI but counts the number of times in EIU country reports ‘uncertainty’ is mentioned within proximity to a word related to trade, such as ‘protectionism’, ‘NAFTA’, ‘tariff’, ‘trade’, ‘UNCTAD’ or ‘WTO.’
The chart shows that in May 2025, the WTUI had risen to just over 23 000 – the second highest since December 2019, when President Trump imposed a new round of tariffs on Chinese imports and announced that he would restore steel tariffs on Brazil and Argentina. Since 2008, the WTUI has averaged just 2228.
It remains to be seen whether more stability in trade relations and geopolitics will allow WUI and WUTI to decline once more, or whether greater instability will simply lead to greater uncertainty, with damaging consequences for investment and also for consumption and employment.
Articles
- IMF World Economic Outlook: economic uncertainty is now higher than it ever was during COVID
The Conversation, Sergi Basco (23/4/25)
- Economic uncertainty hits new high
McKinsey, Sven Smit et al. (29/5/25)
- Trade tensions and rising uncertainty drag global economy towards recession
UNCTAD News (25/4/25)
- IMF Warns Global Economic Uncertainty Surpasses Pandemic Levels
The Global Treasurer (24/4/25)
- Britons ‘hoarding cash amid economic uncertainty and fear of outages’
The Guardian, Phillip Inman (10/6/25)
- America’s Brexit Phase
Foreign Affairs, Jonathan Haskel and Matthew J. Slaughter (10/6/25)
- Goldman Sachs’ CEO on the ‘Big, Beautiful Bill,’ Trump’s Tariffs and Economic Volatility
Politico, Sam Sutton (13/6/25)
- The Countries Where Economic Uncertainty Is Rising Fastest
24/7 Wall St., Evan Comen (9/6/25)
- Trump’s tariffs have finally kicked in, so what happens next?
The Conversation, Maha Rafi Atal (8/8/25)
Uncertainty Indices
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘text mining’. What are its strengths and weaknesses in assessing business, consumer and trade uncertainty?
- Explain how the UK Monthly EPU Index is derived.
- Why has uncertainty increased so dramatically since the start of 2025?
- Compare indices based on text mining with confidence indices.
- Plot consumer and business/industry confidence indicators for the past 24 months, using EC data. Do they correspond with the WUI?
- How may uncertainty affect consumers’ decisions?