Tag: quantitative easing

In 2008 and 2009, as the global recession deepened, so governments around the world turned to Keynesian policies. Aggregate demand had to be boosted. This meant a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal stimulus packages were adopted, combining increased government expenditure and cuts in taxes. On the monetary policy front, central banks cut interest rates to virtually zero and expanded the money supply in bouts of quantitative easing.

The global recession turned out not to be a deep as many had feared and the Keynesian policies were hailed by many as a success.

But how the tide is turning! The combination of the recession (which reduced tax revenues and increased welfare spending) and the stimulus packages played havoc with public finances. Deficits soared. These deficits had to be financed, and increasingly credit agencies and others were asking how sustainable such deficits were over the longer term. These worries have been compounded by the perilous state of the public finances in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Hungary. The focus has thus turned to cuts. In fact there is now an international ‘competition’ as to which country can wear the hairiest hair shirt. The new Coalition government in the UK, for example, is busy preparing the general public for deep cuts to come.

We are now seeing a re-emergence of new classical views that increased deficits, far from stimulating the economy and resulting in faster growth, largely crowd out private expenditure. To prevent this crowding out and restore confidence in financial markets, deficits must be rapidly cut, thereby allowing finance to be diverted to the private sector.

But if the contribution to aggregate demand of the public sector is to be reduced, and if consumption, the largest component of aggregate demand, is also reduced as households try to reduce their reliance on borrowing, where is the necessary rise in aggregate demand to come from? We are left with investment and net exports – the remaining two components of aggregate demand, where AD = C + G + I + (X – M).

But will firms want to invest if deficit reduction results in higher taxes, higher unemployment and less spending by the government on construction, equipment and many other private-sector goods and services. Won’t firms, fearing a decline in consumer demand, and possibly a ‘double-dip recession’, hold off from investing? As for export growth, this depends very much on growth in the rest of the world. If the rest of the world is busy making cuts too, then export growth may be very limited.

The G20, meeting in Korea on 4 June, wrestled with this problem. But the mood had definitely turned. Leaders seemed much more concerned about deficit reduction than maintaining the fiscal stimulus.

The following articles look at the arguments between Keynesians and new classicists. The disagreements between their authors reflect the disagreements between economists and between politicians about the timing and extent of cuts.

Articles

Time to plan for post-Keynesian era Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs (7/6/10)
The Keynesian Endpoint CNBC Guest Blog, Tony Crescenzi (7/6/10)
Keynes, Recovered Boston Review, Jonathan Kirshner (May/June 2010)
How Keynes, not mining, saved us from recession Sydney Morning Herald, Ross Gittins (7/6/10)
The verdict on Keynes Asia Times, Martin Hutchinson (2/6/10)
The G20 Has Officially Voted For Global Depression Business Insider, Marshall Auerback (7/6/10)
Deficit disorder: the Keynes solution New Statesman, Robert Skidelsky (17/5/10)
Hawks v doves: economists square up over Osborne’s cuts Guardian, Phillip Inman (14/6/10)

Reports and data

OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, May 2010 (see)
Economics: Growth rising faster than expected but risks increasing too, says OECD Economic Outlook OECD (26/5/10)
Economy: responses must reflect governments’ views of national situations OECD (26/5/10)
Editorial and summary of projections OECD (26/5/10)
General assessment of the macroeconomic situation OECD (26/5/10)
Statistical Annex to OECD Economic Outlook No. 87 OECD (10/6/10)

Communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Busan, Republic of Korea G20 (5/6/10)

Questions

  1. Summarise the arguments for and against making rapid cuts in public-sector deficits.
  2. What forms can crowding out take? Under what circumstances will a rise in public-sector deficits (a) cause and (b) not cause crowding out?
  3. Assess the policy measures being proposed by the G20.
  4. How important is confidence for the success of (a) fiscal stimulus packages and (b) deficit reduction policies in boosting economic growth?

In the UK, we have an inflation target of 2% and it’s the Bank of England’s job to use monetary policy, in particular interest rates, to keep inflation within 1 percentage point of its target. However, with rising commodity prices and the onset of recession back in 2008, interest rates had another objective: to prevent or at least lessen the recession. Bank Rate fell to 0.5% and there it has remained in a bid to encourage investment, discourage saving and increase consumption, as a means of stimulating the economy.

However, at such a low rate, interest rates are not acting as a brake on inflation, which is now well above target. This rise in inflation, has been largely brought about by cost-push factors, such as the restoration of the 17.5% VAT (up from the temporary 15%), higher oil and commodity prices, and a fall in the exchange rate. But part of the reason might be found in the increase in money supply that resulted from quantitative easing.

There are concerns that the UK may lose its credibility on inflation if action isn’t taken. The OECD has advised the Bank of England to raise Bank Rate to 3.5% by the end of 2011. The following articles consider this issue.

Articles

Time to worry about inflation? BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (28/5/10)
UK must not fall for the false promise of higher inflation Telegraph, Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England (4/6/10)

Reports and documents
General Assessment of the Macroeconomic Situation OECD Economic Outlook, No. 87 Chapter 1 (see especially pages 53–4) (May 2010)
United Kingdom – Country Summary OECD Economic Outlook, No. 87 (May 2010)
Statistical Annex OECD Economic Outlook, No. 87 (available 10/6/10)
Inflation Report portal Bank of England (see May 2010)

Questions

  1. Explain the relationship between interest rates and inflation. Why have such low interest rates caused inflation to increase?
  2. In 2008, the UK moved into recession, but was also suffering from inflation. This was unusual, as AD/AS analysis suggests that when aggregate demand falls, growth will fall, but so will prices. What can explain the low growth and inflation we saw in 2008?
  3. What is the difference between real and nominal GDP?
  4. What are the causes of the current high inflation and what solutions are available and viable?
  5. Why are expectations of inflation so important and how might they influence the Bank of England’s plans for interest rates?
  6. Do you think the OECD should have advised the Bank of England? Will there be any adverse effects internationally if the UK doesn’t heed the OECD’s advice?
  7. Is the OECD’s assessment of the UK in the above Country Summary consistent with its view on UK interest rates contained in pages 53 and 54 in the first OECD link?

In the past few days, the euro has been under immense speculative pressure. The trigger for this has been the growing concern about whether Greece would be able to force through austerity measures and cut its huge deficit and debt. Also there has been the concern that much of Greece’s debt is in the form of relatively short-term bonds, many of which are coming up for maturity and thus have to be replaced by new bonds. For example, on 19 May, Greece needs to repay €8.5 billion of maturing bonds. But with Greek bonds having been given a ‘junk’ status by one of the three global rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s, Greece would find it difficult to raise the finance and would have to pay very high interest on bonds it did manage to sell – all of which would compound the problem of the deficit.

Also there have been deep concerns about a possible domino effect. If Greece’s debt is perceived to be unsustainable at 13.5% of GDP (in 2009), then speculators are likely to turn their attention to other countries in the eurozone with large deficits: countries such as Portugal (9.4%), Ireland (14.3%) and Spain (11.2%). With such worries, people were asking whether the euro would survive without massive international support, both from within and outside the eurozone. At the beginning of 2010, the euro was trading at $1.444. By 7 May, it was trading at $1.265, a depreciation of 12.4% (see the Bank of England’s Statistical Interactive Database – interest & exchange rates data

If the euro were in trouble, then shock waves would go around the world. Worries about such contagion have already been seen in plummeting stock markets. Between 16 April and 7 May, the FTSE100 index in London fell from 5834 to 5045 (a fall of 13.5%). In New York, the Dow Jones index fell by 8.6% over the same period and in Tokyo, the Nikkei fell by 7.6%. By 5 May, these declines were gathering pace as worries mounted.

Crisis talks took place over the weekend of the 8/9 May between European finance ministers and, to the surprise of many, a major package of measures was announced. This involves setting aside €750bn to support the eurozone. The package had two major elements: (a) €60bn from EU funds (to which all 27 EU countries contribute) to be used for loans to eurozone countries in trouble; (b) a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)’), which would be funded partly by eurozone countries which would provide €440bn and partly by the IMF which would provide a further €250bn. The SPV would be used to give loans or loan guarantees to eurozone countries, such as Greece, which were having difficulty in raising finance because of worries by investors. The effect would also be to support the euro through a return of confidence in the single currency.

In addition to these measures, the European Central Bank announced that it would embark on a ‘Securities Markets Programme’ involving the purchase of government bonds issued by eurozone countries in difficulties. According to the ECB, it would be used to:

.. conduct interventions in the euro area public and private debt securities markets to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments which are dysfunctional. The objective of this programme is to address the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism.

Does this amount to quantitative easing, as conducted by the US Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England? The intention is that it would not do so, as the ECB would remove liquidity from other areas of the market to balance the increased liquidity provided to countries in difficulties. This would be achived by selling securities of stronger eurozone countries, such as Germany and France.

In order to sterilise the impact of the above interventions, specific operations will be conducted to re-absorb the liquidity injected through the Securities Markets Programme. This will ensure that the monetary policy stance will not be affected.

So will the measures solve the problems? Or are they merely a means of buying time while the much tougher problem is addressed: that of getting deficits down?

Webcasts and podcasts
Rescue plan bolsters the euro BBC News, Gavin Hewitt (10/5/10)
The EU rescue plan explained Financial Times, Chris Giles, Emily Cadman, Helen Warrell and Steve Bernard (10/5/10)
Peston: ‘Crisis is not over’ BBC Today Programme (10/5/10)
Greece ‘will get into even more deep water’ BBC Today Programme (11/5/10)

Articles
EU ministers offer 750bn-euro plan to support currency (including video) BBC News (10/5/10)
EU sets up crisis fund to protect euro from market ‘wolves’ Independent, Vanessa Mock (10/5/10)
Euro strikes back with biggest gamble in its 11-year history Guardian, Ian Traynor (10/5/10)
Debt crisis: £645bn rescue package for euro reassures markets … for now Guardian, Ian Traynor (10/5/10)
The E.U.’s $950 Billion Rescue: Just the Beginning Time, Leo Cendrowicz (10/5/10)
Eurozone bail-out (portal) Financial Times
Bailout does not address Europe’s deep-rooted woes: Experts moneycontrol.com (11/5/10)
An ever-closer Union? BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (10/5/10)
Eurozone crisis is ‘postponed’ BBC News blogs: Peston’s Picks, Robert Peston (10/5/10)
Multi-billion euro rescue buys time but no solution BBC News, Lucy Hooker (11/5/10)
No going back The Economist (13/5/10)
It is not Greece that worries EURO: It is China that teeters on a collapse Investing Contrarian, Shaily (11/5/10)

Data and official sources
For deficit and debt data see sections 16.3 and 18.1 in:
Ameco Online European Commision, Economic and Financial Affairs DG
For the ECB statement see:
10 May 2010 – ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets ECB Press Release

Questions

  1. Why should the measures announced by the European finance ministers help to support the euro in the short term?
  2. Why should the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme not result in quantitative easing?
  3. Explain what is meant by sterlisation in the context of open market operations.
  4. What will determine whether the measures are a long-term success?
  5. Explain why there may be a moral hazard in coming to the rescue of ailing economies in the eurozone. How might such a moral hazard be minimised?
  6. Why should concerns about Greece lead to stock market declines around the world?
  7. What is the significance of China in the current context?

Since March 2009, the Bank of England has engaged in a process of quantitative easing (QE). Over the period to January 2010 the Bank of England injected £200 billion of new money into the economy by purchasing assets from the private sector, mainly government bonds. The assets were purchased with new money, which enters the economy as credits to the accounts of those selling the assets to the Bank of England. This increase in narrow money (the monetary base) is then able to form the basis of credit creation, allowing broad money (M4) to increase by a multiple of the increased monetary base. In other words, injecting £200 billion allows M4 to increase by considerably more.

But just how much more will M4 rise? How big is the money multiplier? This depends on the demand for loans from banks, which in turn depends on the confidence of business and households. With the recovery only just beginning, demand is still very dampened. Credit creation also depends on the willingess of banks to lend. But this too has been dampened by banks’ desire to increase liquidity and expand their capital base in the wake of the credit crunch.

Not surprisingly, the growth in M4 has been sluggish. Between March and Decmber 2009, narrow money (notes, coin and banks’ reserve balances in the Bank of England) grew from £91bn to £203bn (an increase of 123%). M4, however, grew from £2011bn to £2048bn: an increase of only 1.8%. In fact, in December it fell back from £2069bn in November.

Despite the continued sluggishness of the economy, at its February meeting the Bank of England announced an end to further quantitiative easing – at least for the time being. Although Bank Rate would be kept on hold at 0.5%, there would be no further injections of money. Part of the reason for this is that there is still considerable scope for a growth in broad money on the basis of the narrow money already created. If QE were to continue, there could be excessive broad money in a few months’ time and that could push inflation well above target. As it is, rising costs have already pushed inflation above the 2% target (see Too much of a push from costs but no pull from demand).

So will this be an end to quantitative easing? The following articles explore the question.

Bank of England halts quantitative easing Guardian, Ashley Seager (4/2/10)
Bank calls time on quantitative easing (including video) Telegraph, Edmund Conway (5/2/10)
Bank of England’s time-out for quantitative easing plan BBC News (4/2/10)
Shifting goalposts keep final score in question Financial Times, Chris Giles and Jessica Winch (5/2/10)
Bank halts QE at £200bn despite ‘sluggish’ recovery Independent, Sean O’Grady (5/2/10)
Easy does it: No further QE BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (4/2/10)
Leading article: Easing off – but only for now Independent (5/2/10)
Not easy Times Online (5/2/10)
Quantitative easing: What the economists say Guardian (4/2/10)

Questions

  1. Explain how quantitative easing works?
  2. What determines the rate of growth of M4?
  3. Why has the Bank of England decided to call a halt to quantiative easing – at least for the time being?
  4. What is the transmission mechanism whereby an increase in the monetary base affects real GDP?
  5. What role does the exchange rate play in the transmission mechanism?
  6. Why is it difficult to predict the effect of an increase in the monetary base on real GDP?
  7. What will determine whether or not the Bank of England will raise interest rates in a few months’ time?

It’s not just the roads in the UK that were frozen, as the Bank of England unsurprisingly decided to keep interest rates frozen at 0.5%. Furthermore, many economists do not expect to see interest rates increase for some time. Roger Bootle has predicted that rates could stay low for up to 5 years and this will contribute to a continuing weak pound and spell further trouble for importers and their customers.

The Bank of England also left its money-creation programme of ‘quantitative easing’ unchanged, but next month it will have to decide whether to extend quantitative easing beyond the limits of £200 billion that it set back in November.

Whilst we are supposedly beginning our economic recovery – with 2009 quarter 4 figures showing the first rise in output since the first quarter of 2008 – its strength remains questionable. Indeed, the rise in output in the last three months of 2009 was a mere 0.1%. So how important are interest rates in helping to sustain the recovery? Can they really pull us out of the recession by remaining at just 0.5%? Read the articles below which look at freezing interest rates and quantitative easing.

FTSE unaffected by interest rate decision In the News (7/1/10)
Freeze on UK interest rates BBC News (7/1/10)
Bank of England may raise interest rates as soon as March, leading economist predicts Telegraph (7/1/10)
Interest rates and quantitative easing on hold Guardian, Larry Elliott (7/1/10)
Bank of England extends quantitative easing by £25bn – but is it enough? Guardian, Larry Elliott (5/11/10)
Questions for QE BBC News blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (7/1/10)
Interest rates could stay low for 5 years, says Bootle BBC News (7/1/10)

Questions

  1. How do low interest rates contribute to a weak pound? How does this affect exporters and importers?
  2. What is quantitative easing? Should the QE programme be extended? What are the arguments for and against this in terms of economic recovery and public debt?
  3. How much of an impact do you think the recession will have on government policy over the next few months?
  4. Explain the transmission mechanisms by which changes in interest rates affect the goods market.
  5. If the Bank of England were not independent, what do you think would be happening to interest rates?