Tag: credit creation

Seven years ago (on 5 March 2009), the Bank of England reduced interest rates to a record low of 0.5%. This was in response to a deepening recession. It mirrored action taken by other central banks across the world as they all sought to stimulate their economies, which were reeling from the financial crisis.

Record low interest rates, combined with expansionary fiscal policy, were hoped to be enough to restore rates of growth to levels experienced before the crisis. But they weren’t. One by one countries increased narrow money through bouts of quantitative easing.

But as worries grew about higher government deficits, brought about by the expansionary fiscal policies and by falling tax receipts as incomes and spending fell, so fiscal policy became progressively tighter. Thus more and more emphasis was put on monetary policy as the means of stimulating aggregate demand and boosting economic growth.

Ultra low interest rates and QE were no longer a short-term measure. They persisted as growth rates remained sluggish. The problem was that the higher narrow money supply was not leading to the hoped-for credit creation and growth in consumption and investment. The extra money was being used for buying assets, such as shares and houses, not being spent on goods, services, plant and equipment. The money multiplier fell dramatically in many countries (see chart 1 for the case of the UK: click here for a PowerPoint) and there was virtually no growth in credit creation. Broad money in the UK (M4) has actually fallen since 2008 (see chart 2: click here for a PowerPoint), as it has in various other countries.

Additional monetary measures were put in place, including various schemes to provide money to banks for direct lending to companies or individuals. Central banks increasingly resorted to zero or negative interest rates paid to banks for deposits: see the blog posts Down down deeper and down, or a new Status Quo? and When a piggy bank pays a better rate. But still bank lending has stubbornly failed to take off.

Some indication that the ’emergency’ was coming to an end occurred in December 2015 when the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 0.25 percentage points. However, many commentators felt that that was too soon, especially in the light of slowing Chinese economic growth. Indeed, the Chinese authorities themselves have been engaging in a large scale QE programme and other measures to arrest this fall in growth.

Although it cut interest rates in 2009 (to 1% by May 2009), the ECB was more cautious than other central banks in the first few years after 2008 and even raised interest rates in 2011 (to 1.5% by July of that year). However, more recently it has been more aggressive in its monetary policy. It has progressively cut interest rates (see chart 3: click here for a PowerPoint) and announced in January 2015 that it was introducing a programme of QE, involving €60 billion of asset purchases for at least 18 months from March 2015. In December 2015, it announced that it would extend this programme for another six months.

The latest move by the ECB was on March 10, when it took three further sets of measures to boost the flagging eurozone economy. It cut interest rates, including cutting the deposit rate paid to banks from –0.3% to –0.4% and the main refinancing rate from –0.05% to –0%; it increased its monthly quantitative easing from €60 billion to €80 billion; and it announced unlimited four-year loans to banks at near-zero interest rates.

It would seem that the emergency continues!

Articles

QE, inflation and the BoE’s unreliable boyfriend: seven years of record low rates The Guardian, Katie Allen (5/3/16)
The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy by Mervyn King – review The Observer, John Kampfner (14/3/16)
How ‘negative interest rates’ marked the end of central bank dominance The Telegraph, Peter Spence (21/2/16)
ECB stimulus surprise sends stock markets sliding BBC News (10/3/16)
5 Takeaways From the ECB Meeting The Wall Street Journal, Paul Hannon (10/3/16)
ECB cuts interest rates to zero amid fears of fresh economic crash The Guardian, Katie Allen and Jill Treanor (10/3/16)
Economists mixed on ECB stimulus CNBC, Elizabeth Schulze (10/3/16)
ECB’s Draghi plays his last card to stave off deflation The Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (10/3/16)
ECB cuts rates to new low and expands QE Financial Times, Claire Jones (10/3/16)
Is QE a saviour, necessary evil or the road to perdition? The Telegraph, Roger Bootle (20/3/16)

ECB materials
Monetary policy decisions ECB Press Release (10/3/16)
Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A) ECB Press Conference, Mario Draghi and Vítor Constâncio (10/3/16)
ECB Press Conference webcast ECB, Mario Draghi

Questions

  1. What are meant by narrow and broad money?
  2. What is the relationship between narrow and broad money? What determines the amount that broad money will increase when narrow money increases?
  3. Explain what is meant by (a) the credit multiplier and (b) the money multiplier.
  4. Explain how the process of quantitative easing is supposed to result in an increase in aggregate demand. How reliable is this mechanism?
  5. Find out and explain what happened to the euro/dollar exchange rate when Mario Draghi made the announcement of the ECB’s monetary measures on 10 March.
  6. Is there a conflict for central banks between trying to strengthen banks’ liquidity and reserves and trying to stimulate bank lending? Explain.
  7. Why are “the ECB’s policies likely to destroy half of Germany’s 1500 savings and co-operative banks over the next five years”? (See the Telegraph article.
  8. What are the disadvantages of quantitative easing?
  9. What are the arguments for and against backing up monetary policy with expansionary fiscal policy? Consider different forms that this fiscal policy might take.

Following the recession of 2008/9, the UK has engaged in four rounds of quantitative easing (QE) – the process whereby the central bank increases the money supply by purchasing government bonds, and possibly other assets, on the open market from various institutions. The final round was announced in July 2012, bringing the total assets purchased to £375bn. As yet, however, there are no plans for quantitative tightening – the process of the Bank of England selling some of these assets, thereby reducing money supply.

The aim of QE has been to stimulate aggregate demand. Critics claim, however, that the effect on spending has been limited, since the money has not gone directly to consumers but rather to the institutions selling the assets, who have used much of the money to buy shares, bonds and other assets. Nevertheless, with banks having to strengthen their capital base following the financial crisis, QE has helped then to achieve this without having to make even bigger reductions in lending.

The Bank of England now reckons that the recovery is sufficiently established and there is, therefore, no need for further QE.

This is also the judgement of the Federal Reserve about the US economy, which experienced annual growth of 3.5% in the third quarter of 2014. The IMF predicts that US growth will be around 3% for the next three years.

The Fed has had three rounds of QE since the financial crisis, but in October 2014 called an end to the process. Since the start of this year, it has been gradually reducing the amount it injects each month from $85bn to $15bn. The total bond purchases over the past five years have been some $3.6tn, bringing the Fed’s balance sheet to nearly $4.5tn.

But as QE comes to an end in the USA, Japan is expanding its programme. On 31 October, the Bank of Japan announced that it would increase its asset purchases from ¥60-70tn per year to ¥80tn (£440bn). The Japanese government and central bank are determined to boost economic growth in Japan and escape the two decades of deflation and stagnation. The Tokyo stock market rose by some 8% in the week following the announcement and the yen fell by more than 5% against the dollar.

And the European Central Bank, which has not used full QE up to now, looks as if it is moving in that direction. In October, it began a programme of buying asset-backed securities (ABSs) and covered bonds (CBs). These are both private-sector securities: ABSs are claims against non-financial companies in the eurozone and CBs are issued by eurozone banks and other financial institutions.

It now looks as if the ECB might take the final step of purchasing government bonds. This is probably what is implied by ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement after the 6 November meeting of the ECB that the ground was being prepared for “further measures to be implemented, if needed”.

But has QE been as successful as its proponents would claim? Is it the solution now to a languishing eurozone economy? The following articles look at these questions.

Fed calls time on QE in the US – charts and analysis The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (29/10/14)
Quantitative easing: giving cash to the public would have been more effective The Guardian, Larry Elliott (29/10/14)
End of QE is whimper not bang BBC News, Robert Peston (29/10/14)
Federal Reserve ends QE The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (29/10/14)
Bank of Japan to inject 80 trillion yen into its economy The Guardian, Angela Monaghan and Graeme Wearden (31/10/14)
Every man for himself The Economist, Buttonwood column (8/11/14)
Why Japan Surprised the World with its Quantitative Easing Announcement Townhall, Nicholas Vardy (7/11/14)
Bank of Japan QE “Treat” Is a Massive Global Trick Money Morning, Shah Gilani (31/10/14)
ECB stimulus may lack desired scale, QE an option – sources Reuters, Paul Carrel and John O’Donnell (27/10/14)
ECB door remains open to quantitative easing despite doubts over impact Reuters, Eva Taylor and Paul Taylor (9/11/14)
ECB could pump €1tn into eurozone in fresh round of quantitative easing The Guardian,
Angela Monaghan and Phillip Inman (6/11/14)
Ben Bernanke: Quantitative easing will be difficult for the ECB CNBC, Jeff Cox (5/11/14)
Not All QE Is Created Equal as U.S. Outpunches ECB-BOJ Bloomberg, Simon Kennedy (6/11/14)
A QE proposal for Europe’s crisis The Economist, Yanis Varoufakis (7/11/14)
UK, Japan and 1% inflation BBC News, Linda Yueh (12/11/14)
Greenspan Sees Turmoil Ahead As QE Market Boost Unwinds Bloomberg TV, Gillian Tett interviews Alan Greenspan (29/10/14)

Questions

  1. What is the transmission mechanism between central bank purchases of assets and aggregate demand?
  2. Under what circumstances might the effect of a given amount of QE on aggregate demand be relatively small?
  3. What dangers are associated with QE?
  4. What determines the likely effect on inflation of QE?
  5. What has been the effect of QE in developed countries on the economies of developing countries? Has this been desirable for the global economy?
  6. Have businesses benefited from QE? If so, how? If not, why not?
  7. What has been the effect of QE on the housing market (a) in the USA; (b) in the UK?
  8. Why has QE not been ‘proper’ money creation?
  9. What effect has QE had on credit creation? How and why has it differed between the USA and UK?
  10. Why did the announcement of further QE by the Bank of Japan lead to a depreciation of the yen? What effect is this depreciation likely to have?

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8, the international banking regulatory body, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, sought to ensure that the global banking system would be much safer in future. This would require that banks had (a) sufficient capital; (b) sufficient liquidity to meet the demands of customers.

The Basel III rules set new requirements for capital adequacy ratios, to be phased in by 2019. But what about liquidity ratios? The initial proposals of the Basel Committee were that banks should have sufficient liquid assets to be able to withstand for at least 30 days an intense liquidity crisis (such as that which led to the run on Northern Rock in 2007). Liquid assets were defined as cash, reserves in the central bank and government bonds. This new ‘liquidity coverage ratio’ would begin in 2015.

These proposals, however, have met with considerable resistance from bankers, who claim that higher liquidity requirements will reduce their ability to lend and reduce the money multiplier. This would make it more difficult for countries to pull out of recession.

In response, the Basel Committee has published a revised set of liquidity requirements. The new liquidity coverage ratio, instead of being introduced in full in 2015, will be phased in over four years from 2015 to 2019. Also the definition of liquid assets has been significantly expanded to include highly rated equities, company bonds and mortgage-backed securities.

This loosening of the liquidity requirements has been well received by banks. But, as some of the commentators point out in the articles, it is some of these assets that proved to be wholly illiquid in 2007/8!

Articles

Banks Win 4-Year Delay as Basel Liquidity Rule Loosened BloombergJim Brunsden, Giles Broom & Ben Moshinsky (7/1/13)
Banks win victory over new Basel liquidity rules Independent, Ben Chu (7/1/13)
Banks win concessions and time on liquidity rules The Guardian, Dan Milmo (7/1/13)
Basel liquidity agreement boosts bank shares BBC News (7/1/13)
Banks agree minimum liquidity rules BBC News, Robert Peston (67/1/13)

The agreement
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision endorses revised liquidity standard for banks BIS Press Release (6/1/13)
Summary description of the LCR BIS (6/1/13)
Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools BIS (6/1/13)
Introductory remarks from GHOS Chairman Mervyn King and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Chairman Stefan Ingves (Transcript) BIS (6/1/13)

Questions

  1. What is meant by ‘liquid assets’?
  2. How does the liquidity of assets depend on the state of the economy?
  3. What is the relationship between the liquidity ratio and the money multiplier?
  4. Does the size of the money multiplier depend solely on the liquidity ratio that banks are required to hold?
  5. Distinguish between capital adequacy and liquidity.
  6. What has been the effect of quantitative easing on banks’ liquidity ratios?

With economic growth in the UK stalling and growing alarm about the state of the world economy, the Bank of England has announced a second round of quantitative easing (QE2). This will involve the Bank buying an extra £75 billion of government bonds (gilts) in the market over the following four months. This is over and above the nearly £200 billion of assets, mainly gilts, purchased in the first round of quantitative easing in 2009/10. The purchase will release extra (narrow) money into the economy. Hopefully, this will then allow more credit to be created and the money multiplier to come into play, thereby increasing broad money by a multiple of the £75 billion.

In his letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer seeking permission for QE2, the Governor stated:

In the United Kingdom, the path of output has been affected by a number of temporary factors, but the available indicators suggest that the underlying rate of growth has also moderated. The squeeze on households’ real incomes and the fiscal consolidation are likely to continue to weigh on domestic spending, while the strains in bank funding markets may also inhibit the availability of credit to consumers and businesses. While the stimulatory monetary stance and the present level of sterling should help to support demand, the weaker outlook for, and the increased downside risks to, output growth mean that the margin of slack in the economy is likely to be greater and more persistent than previously expected.

… The deterioration in the outlook has made it more likely that inflation will undershoot the 2% target in the medium term. In the light of that shift in the balance of risks, and in order to keep inflation on track to meet the target over the medium term, the Committee judged that it was necessary to inject further monetary stimulus into the economy.

But will increasing the money supply lead to increased aggregate demand, or will the money simply sit in banks, thereby increasing their liquidity ratio, but not resulting in any significant increase in spending? In other words, in the equation MV = PY, will the rise in M simply result in a fall in V with little effect on PY? And even if it does lead to a rise in PY, will it be real national income (Y) that rises, or will the rise in MV simply be absorbed in higher prices (P)?

According to a recent article published in the Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin, The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact, the £200 billion of asset purchases under QE1 led to a rise in real GDP of about 2%. If QE2 has the same proportionate effect, real GDP could be expected to rise by about 0.75%. But some commentators argue that things are different this time and that the effect could be much smaller. The following articles examine what is likely to happen. They also look at one of the side-effects of the policy – the reduction in the value of pensions as the policy drives down long-term gilt yields and long-term interest rates generally.

Articles
Bank of England launches second round of QE Interactive Investor, Sarah Modlock (6/10/11)
Britain in grip of worst ever financial crisis, Bank of England governor fears Guardian, Larry Elliott and Katie Allen (6/10/11)
Interview with a Governor BBC News, Stephanie Flanders interviews Mervyn King (6/10/11)
The meaning of QE2 BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (6/10/11)
Bank of England’s MPC united over quantitative easing BBC News (19/10/11)
Bank of England’s QE2 may reach £500bn, economists warn The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (6/10/11)
‘Shock and awe’ may be QE’s biggest asset The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (6/10/11)
Quantitative easing by the Bank of England: printing more money won’t work this time The Telegraph, Andrew Lilico (6/10/11)
BOE launches QE2 with 75 billion pound boost Reuters, various commentators (6/10/11)
Shock and awe from Bank of England Financial Times, Chris Giles (6/10/11)
More QE: Full reaction Guardian, various commentators (6/10/11)
Quantitative easing warning over pension schemes Guardian, Jill Insley (6/10/11)
Pension schemes warn of QE2 Titanic disaster Mindful money (6/10/11)
Calm down Mervyn – this so-called global recession is really not that bad Independent, Hamish McRae (9/10/11)

Bank of England publications
Asset Purchase Facility: Gilt Purchases Bank of England Market Notice (6/10/11)
Governor’s ITN interview (6/10/11)
Bank of England Maintains Bank Rate at 0.5% and Increases Size of Asset Purchase Programme by £75 billion to £275 billion Bank of England News Release (6/10/11)
Quantitative Easing – How it Works
Governor’s letter to the Chancellor (6/10/11)
Chancellor’s reply to the Governor (6/10/11)
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting, 5 and 6 October 2011 (19/10/11)
Inflation Report
Quarterly Bulletin (2011, Q3)

Questions

  1. Explain how quantitative easing works.
  2. What is likely to determine its effectiveness in stimulating the economy?
  3. Why does the Bank of England prefer to inject new money into the economy by purchasing gilts rather than by some other means that might directly help small business?
  4. Explain how QE2 is likely to affect pensions.
  5. What will determine whether QE2 will be inflationary?
  6. Why is the perception of the likely effectiveness of QE2 one of the key determinants of its actual effectiveness?

By measuring the size and growth of the money supply we can begin to assess the appetite for saving, spending, and borrowing by households and firms and the appetite amongst banks and building societies to supply credit. In this blog we use figures released by the Bank of England in Monetary and Financial Statistics (Bankstats) to begin such an assessment. But, of course, the very first problem we face is measuring the money supply: just what should be include in a measure of money?

One measure of money supply is known as M4. It is a broad measure of money reflecting our need to use money to make transactions, but also our desire to hold money as a store of wealth. According to the Bank of England’s figures the amount of M4 money at the end of October was £2.19 trillion. To put this into some context, the GDP figure for 2009 was £1.4 trillion, so the amount of M4 is equivalent to about 1½ times GDP.

What M4 measures is the stock of notes and coins and sterling-denominated deposits held by households, firms (non-financial corporations or NFCs) and other financial corporations (OFCs), such as insurance companies and pension funds. These groups are collectively referred to as the non-bank private sector or sometimes as the M4 private sector. As well as the deposits that most of us are familiar with, such as sight and time deposits, sterling-denominated deposits also include other less well known, but liquid financial products, such as repos (sale and repurchase agreements) and CDs (certificates of deposit). Repos are essentially secured loans, usually fairly short-term, where individuals or organisations can sell some of their financial assets, such as government debt, to banks in return for cash. Certificates of deposit are a form of time deposit where certificates are issued by banks to customers for usually large deposits for a fixed term.

The Bank of England’s figures also allow us to analyse the actual holdings of M4 by households, private non-financial corporations and other financial corporations. Consequently, we can analyse the source of these particular liabilities. Of the £2.19 trillion of M4 money at the end of October, 42% was attributable to OFCs, 11% to PNFCs and 47% to households. Interestingly, the average shares over the past 10 years have been 28% OFCs, 14% NFCs and 58% households. Therefore, there has been a shift in the share of banks’ M4 liabilities away from households and towards other financial corporations (OFCs).

So why the change in the composition of Sterling M4 liabilities held by the banking system? Part of the answer may well be attributable to Quantitative Easing (QE): the Bank of England’s £200 billion purchase of financial assets. It appears that a large part of this asset-purchase strategy has resulted in other financial corporations (OFCs) – our insurance companies and pension funds – exchanging assets like government bonds for cheques from the Bank of England. Of course, these cheques are deposited with commercial banks and the banks are then credited with funds from the Bank of England. A crucial question is whether these deposits have facilitated additional lending to households and firms and so created credit.

A major ‘counterpart’ to the private sector sterling liabilities that comprise M4 is sterling lending by banks to the non-bank private sector. Of particular interest, is lending to that bit of the private sector comprised by households and private non-financial corporations. The latest Bank of England figures show that in October net lending to households (including unincorporated businesses and non-profit making institutions) was £1.5 billion. This compares with a 10-year monthly average of close to £3.9 billion. Meanwhile, net lending to private non-financial corporations in October, which over the past 10 years has averaged just over £2.1 billion per month, was -£2.2 billion. The negative figure for PNFCs indicates that more debt was being repaid by firms to banks than was being borrowed.

The net lending figures indicate that lending by banks to households and firms remains incredibly subdued. This is not to say that QE has in any way failed since one cannot directly compare the current situation with that which would have resulted in the absence of QE. Rather, we note that the additional deposits created by QE do not appear to have fuelled large amounts of additional credit and, in turn, further deposits fuelling further credit. The limited amount of credit creation for households and private non-financial corporations helps to explain the relatively slow growth in the stock of M4 held by households and PNFCs. While the stock of M4 increased by 6% in the year to October from £2.06 trillion last year, the stock held by households and PNFCs grew by around 2½%.

It is of course difficult to fully appreciate the extent to which the subdued lending numbers reflect restricted bank lending despite QE, or the desire for households and firms to improve their respective financial positions. One could argue that both are a symptom of the same thing: the desire for banks, households and firms alike to be less susceptible to debt. Clearly, these balance sheet effects will continue to have a large impact on the economy’s activity levels.

Articles

Business loans and mortgage approvals falls Financial Times, Norma Cohen (29/11/10)
UK mortgage approvals fall, M4 at record low on yr – BOE MarketNews.Com (29/11/10
Drop in mortgage approval levels The Herald, Mark Williamson (29/11/10)
Mortgage approvals dip to eight-month low Independent, Sean O’Grady (30/11/10)
Mortgage approvals fall to six month low BBC News (29/11/10)
Gross lending up £1 billion in October Mortgage Introducer, Sarah Davidson (29/11/10)

Data

M4 statistics are available from the Bank of England’s statistics publication, Monetary and Financial Statistics (Bankstats) (See Tables in Section A.)

Questions

  1. What do you understand by a narrow and a broad measure of the money supply? Which of these describes the M4 measure? Explain your answer.
  2. What other liabilities do you think might be included on the balance sheet of the UK’s banking system which are not included in M4?
  3. What do you understand by credit creation? Explain how the exchange by OFCs (e.g. insurance companies and pension funds) of government debt for cheques from the Bank of England could facilitate credit creation?
  4. What factors can affect the extent of credit creation by banks? How might these have affected the ability of QE to get banks lending again.
  5. What is meant by net lending? And, what does a negative net lending figure show?
  6. What do you understand by ‘balance sheet effects’? Illustrate with respect to households, firms and banks.