Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 10

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ISA Reform: Will it boost the London Stock Exchange (LSE)?

For a while now, debate has raged over how to revive the fortunes of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Since the 2008 financial crisis, the market has suffered a lack of investment, poor liquidity and low performance. This has produced a moribund financial market which has become unattractive to both investors and companies. Returns from the UK market lag international competitors, particularly the USA (see the chart).


Investment in the S&P 500 Index over the period would have produced annualised rates of return of 14.35%, more than double that from the FTSE 100 Index. Part of this underperformance is due to the industrial mix of the listed companies: low-growth energy and mining compared to the high-growth technology sectors in the USA. This has led to the perception that London is not a place for firms to list, particularly those in high-growth sectors.

In 2024, 88 companies choose to delist or transfer their primary listing elsewhere. Only 18 took their place. Several big companies from a range of industries, including Ashtead, Flutter and CRH have transferred their primary listing to New York or have plans to do so.

The new Labour government views stimulating higher levels of investment though the London market as an important element in its drive to boost productivity and growth in the UK. Recently, it has been reported that investment institutions have been lobbying the UK government to reduce significantly the tax-free allowance for Cash Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) as a way to encourage more of UK households’ savings to be channelled through the UK stock market.

Currently, UK savers can save up to £20 000 annually into ISAs without paying tax on the interest earned. This can be held solely in Cash ISAs, or in a combination of Cash plus Stocks and Shares ISAs. The tax-free instruments which were introduced by a Labour government in 1999 to encourage higher savings have proved immensely popular. Data from Paragon Bank indicate that over £350 billion are held in these accounts. However, under the new proposals, the amount which would be allowed to be saved as cash has been rumoured to be cut to £4000 per year, with the hope that some of it will be invested in the UK stock market.

The proposals have proved controversial, with high-profile figures voicing opposition. In this blog, we’ll analyse the reasons behind the proposal and discuss whether it will have the desired effect of stimulating higher levels of investment. We’ll also discuss other proposed policies for making the LSE a more effective channel for investment flows to boost economic growth.

Stock markets and the saving and investment channel

The main reason for the proposed ISA change is to encourage more investment in the UK stock market. By reducing the amount which can be saved in Cash ISAs, the government hopes to encourage savers to invest in Stocks and Shares ISAs instead, particularly ones linked to the UK market. This would increase the amount of finance capital in the market, thereby boosting its liquidity. This would then make it an attractive place for young, vibrant UK and foreign companies to list.

An active, liquid secondary market in shares is important to attract firms to list on stock exchanges by issuing shares to outside investors. Traditionally, this channel has been important to the growth and development of firms.

Existing savings in Cash ISAs are deposited with financial institutions such as banks and building societies. Through the credit-creation process such funds can be used to finance productive investment. In countries like the UK, lending by financial institutions is an important way that investment is financed, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. However, scale limits, regulatory restrictions and the need to diversify lending properly means that there are limits to the financing available for company investment through these institutions.

Capital markets like the LSE are intended to meet these larger-scale requirements. Financial claims, such as debt and equity, are divided into atomised instruments and sold to outside investors to fund investment and business growth.

Further, the desire for a capital injection to finance growth is not the only reason that firms seek stock market listings. Founders of companies may have a lot of wealth invested in the equity of their firms. Selling some of their equity to outside investors through a stock market listing is a way of diversifying their wealth. However, if they are to maximise the potential sale price, there must be an active, liquid secondary market to encourage investors to buy shares in the primary market.

Proponents of reform want to encourage a greater appetite for risk among UK investors, which will produce more savings being channelled through the LSE.

One issue is whether savers will respond in the way anticipated and channel more funds through the UK stock market. Many savers like the security of Cash ISAs. Such vehicles offer a low-risk/low-return combination, which savers like because the tax benefits boost returns. A survey by the Nottingham Building Society found that a substantial number of Cash ISA savers are concerned that the proposed changes could affect their ability to save for important financial goals, such as buying a house or building an emergency fund. Higher-risk Stocks and Shares ISAs are not suitable for such savings because of the potential to lose the initial amount invested. Many may not be prepared to do so and one-third suggested they would save less overall.

According to the survey, only 38% of Cash ISA holders said they would consider investing in Stocks and Shares ISAs if the Cash ISA allowance were reduced. It may be difficult to alter such risk-averse preferences given the average amount saved through ISAs and demographics. In 2022/23, the average amount subscribed to ISAs was £5000. This does not suggest that average households have a significant surplus of cash that they may want to investment at a high risk through the stock market. Indeed, many may want to have access to the cash at short notice and so are not prepared to forgo liquidity for the time needed to accrue the benefits of compounding which stock market investing produces.

Demographics may also play a role in this. Many of those who save more are now retired, or near retirement. They are less likely to see the appeal of compounding returns over long periods through investment in shares. Instead, with shorter investment horizons, they may only see the potential for losses associated with Stocks and Shares ISAs. Indeed, they will be starting to liquidate their long-term positions to draw income in retirement. Therefore, they may save less.

For others, who may be prepared to accept the additional risk, with the prospect of higher returns in the way that advocates of the reform hope for, the reduction in the Cash ISA allowance does not necessarily mean that they will invest in Stocks and Shares ISAs linked to the UK market. Since returns from the UK market have lagged international competitors, it may be that savers will channel their savings to those international markets, particularly in the USA, where the risk–return relationship has been more rewarding. Doing so has been made much easier and cheaper through a combination of economic forces including technological advances, regulatory changes and increased competition. This makes it much easier for UK savers to channel investment funds to wherever potential return is highest. At the moment, this is unlikely to be the UK, meaning that the anticipated boost to investment funds may not be as much as anticipated.

Critics of the proposal also question the motives of investment fund managers who have been lobbying government. They argue that the reforms will mean that many people who do now choose to save in Stocks and Shares ISAs will buy funds managed by fund managers who will receive fees for doing so. Critics argue that it is the prospect of higher fees which is the real motive behind the lobbying, not any desire to boost investment and growth.

What alternatives are available to boost the London Stock Exchange

The low valuations of LSE-listed companies compared to their international counterparts, particularly those in the USA, has discouraged growing firms from listing in London. To address this, there have been calls to enhance corporate governance standards and reduce regulatory burdens for listed companies.

This has already been recognised by the authorities. In 2024, UK regulators approved the biggest overhaul of rules regulating London-listed companies. The new listing rules will hand more power to company bosses to make decisions without shareholder votes. They will give companies more flexibility to adopt dual-class share structures used by founders and venture capital firms to give themselves stronger voting rights than other investors. This is particularly popular for founders who want to diversify their wealth without sacrificing control and is used frequently by tech companies and venture capitalists when listing in the USA. Such reforms may attract more companies in high-growth sectors to list in London.

Tax policies which provide the right incentives to buy and sell shares could also encourage more investment in the LSE. For instance, the repeal in the mid-1990s of the preferential tax treatment of dividend income for UK pension funds and insurance companies is seen as a major factor in discouraging those institutions from investing more funds in the London market. Since tax on capital gains is only liable when they are realised, this reduces their present value versus the equivalent amount on dividends.

As the following table illustrates, given the significantly higher percentage of total returns derived from dividends in the LSE compared to other exchanges, the equal tax treatment of dividend and capital gains provides an incentive to seek jurisdictions where capital gains predominate. This is what UK pension funds have done. Data from the Office of National Statistics show that in 2024, 77% of UK occupational pensions equity investments were overseas.

Reinstating this tax benefit could stimulate greater demand for UK equity from this significant sector, boosting liquidity in the London market. Allied to this are proposals from the UK government to consolidate the fragmented UK pension industry to achieve greater scale economies in that channel for investment. This can reduce financing costs, boosting the marginal return from UK investments for these funds, encouraging greater investment in the UK market (ceteris paribus).

Further, the 2.5% stamp duty on share purchases has been viewed as another disincentive for both retail and institutional investors to engage in security trading on the London Stock Exchange. The duty, which is much higher than in peer economies, effectively raises the expected rate of return on UK equites which depresses perceptions of their values and prices. Its removal may raise trading volumes, improving the liquidity of the market and be offset by increased tax revenues in the future. However, the Treasury suggests that the removal of stamp duty is doubtful, since it would create a significant hole in the UK government’s budget.

Ultimately, many of these reforms may have limited impact on investment. Efforts to boost confidence in the stock market will depend on improving the overall economic environment in the UK. Therefore, it will be the wider policies promoting growth in general which will increase the rates of return offered by London-listed firms and be more significant to attracting capital to London.

However, many of these are controversial themselves, such as relaxing laws around planning permissions and addressing business uncertainties around post-Brexit trading arrangements with the European Union. These broader economic measures could help make the UK generally, and the LSE specifically, more appealing to both domestic and international investors.

Conclusion

The UK government’s proposal to reduce the Cash ISA allowance is part of a broader strategy to boost investment in the stock market and stimulate economic growth. While this change could lead to more capital being directed towards productive investments, it also poses challenges for savers who like the security and simplicity of Cash ISAs.

The ultimate impact will depend on how savers respond to these changes. The potential reduction in overall savings rates could counteract some of the intended benefits. Further, the extent to which they are prepared to channel their savings into UK-listed companies will be important. If many seek higher returns elsewhere, the impact on the UK stock market may be limited. In any case, policies to address the problems of the UK stock market will only work if the wider issues associated with UK productivity and growth are addressed.

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Questions

  1. Explain how banks use cash ISAs to finance investment through credit creation.
  2. What do stock markets offer which may boost investment and economic growth?
  3. What are the issues with the London Stock Exchange which is making it unattractive for raising finance?
  4. How is the rumoured ISA reform intended to help address these issues?
  5. Analyse the extent to which it will do so.
  6. How might some of the broader reforms proposed by the UK government influence rate of return on UK equities and attract capital?
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Investment set to fall as business is baffled by Trump

Economic growth is closely linked to investment. In the short term, there is a demand-side effect: higher investment, by increasing aggregate demand, creates a multiplier effect. GDP rises and unemployment falls. Over the longer term, higher net investment causes a supply-side effect: industrial capacity and potential output rise. This will be from both the greater quantity of capital and, if new investment incorporates superior technology, from a greater productivity of capital.

One of the biggest determinants of investment is certainty about the future: certainty allows businesses to plan investment. Uncertainty, by contrast, is likely to dampen investment. Investment is for future output and if the future is unknown, why undertake costly investment? After all, the cost of investment is generally recouped over several months or year, not immediately. Uncertainty thus increases the risks of investment.

There is currently great uncertainty in the USA and its trading partners. The frequent changes in policy by President Trump are causing a fall in confidence and consequently a fall in investment. The past few weeks have seen large cuts in US government expenditure as his administration seeks to dismantle the current structure of government. The businesses supplying federal agencies thus face great uncertainty about future contracts. Laid-off workers will be forced to cut their spending, which will have knock-on effect on business, who will cut employment and investment as the multiplier and accelerator work through.

There are also worries that the economic chaos caused by President Trump’s frequent policy changes will cause inflation to rise. Higher inflation will prompt the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. This, in turn, will increase the cost of borrowing for investment.

Tariff uncertainty

Perhaps the biggest uncertainty for business concerns the imposition of tariffs. Many US businesses rely on imports of raw materials, components, equipment, etc. Imposing tariffs on imports raises business costs. But this will vary from firm to firm, depending on the proportion of their inputs that are imported. And even when the inputs are from other US companies, those companies may rely on imports and thus be forced to raise prices to their customers. And if, in retaliation, other countries impose tariffs on US goods, this will affect US exporters and discourage them from investing.

For many multinational companies, whether based in the USA or elsewhere, supply chains involve many countries. New tariffs will force them to rethink which suppliers to use and where to locate production. The resulting uncertainty can cause them to delay or cancel investments.

Uncertainty has also been caused by the frequent changes in the planned level of tariffs. With the Trump administration using tariffs as a threat to get trading partners to change policy, the threatened tariff rates have varied depending on how trading partners have responded. There has also been uncertainty on just how the tariff policy will be implemented, making it more difficult for businesses to estimate the effect on them.

Then there are serious issues for the longer term. Other countries will be less willing to sign trade deals with the USA if they will not be honoured. Countries may increasingly look to diverting trade from the USA to other countries.

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Articles

Data

Questions

  1. Find out what tariffs have been proposed, imposed and changed since Donald Trump came to office on 20 January 2025.
  2. In what scenario might US investment be stimulated by Donald Trump’s policies?
  3. What countries’ economies have gained or are set to gain from Donald Trump’s policies?
  4. What is the USMCA agreement? Do Donald Trump’s policies break this agreement?
  5. Find out and explain what has happened to the US stock market since January 2025. How do share prices affect business investment?
  6. Which sector’s shares have risen and which have fallen?
  7. Using the Data link above, find out what has been happening to the US Policy Uncertainty Index since Donald Trump was elected and explain particular spikes in the index. Is this mirrored in the global Policy Uncertainty Index?
  8. Are changes in the Policy Uncertainty Index mirrored in the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) and the CBOE Volatility Index: VIX?
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Stress testing shadow banking: new channels but the same old risks

On the 29 November, the Bank of England published the results of its latest stress test of the UK financial system. Annual stress testing was introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It models the ability of the financial system to withstand severe macroeconomic and financial market conditions. Typically, the focus has been on testing the resilience of the banking system.

This year’s was the first system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). This recognises the growing significance of ‘shadow banking’. Shadow banking involves borrowing and lending involving non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Such institutions sit outside the regulatory cordons around banking but have become significant actors in the financial system.

However, this obscure part of the financial system poses systemic risks which are not clearly understood and from time to time require costly interventions. Examples include: problems in liability-driven investments (LDIs) for pension funds in September 2022; the money market liquidity crisis involving hedge funds in March 2020; the collapse of Long-term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 following the Russian Federation’s default (LTCM had significant holdings of Russian government bonds – see linked article on LTCM below).

The growing significance of shadow banking means that regulators have become increasingly concerned about the vulnerabilities in the financial system which arise from outside the traditional banking system.

In this blog we will explain stress-testing of the financial system and trace the rise in shadow banking which motivated the recent system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES). We will discuss the findings of the stress test, highlighting the systemic risks of shadow banking. Finally, we will discuss the implications for the regulation and supervision of the financial system.

What is stress testing?

Stress testing was introduced by the Bank of England after the financial crisis to assess the ability of the financial system to withstand severe economic and market scenarios.

In the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, the liquidity and capital buffers of many banks had been extremely thin. These were only able to withstand moderate economic shocks and moderate conditions and buckled under the stresses of the crisis.

Regulators argued that the buffers needed to become much more robust and be able to withstand rare but severe economic and market conditions. The stress testing analogy was derived from engineering, where parts are expected to work not just in benign conditions but also in extreme, hostile environments.

Since 2014, the Bank of England has conducted annual stress testing. Stress testing models the impact of adverse economic conditions on banks’ liquidity, profitability and capital. The results are used to set policy for individual banks (microprudential) and for the system as a whole (macroprudential). Stress test results have allowed the Bank to adjust the loss-absorbing capital that banks must hold to reduce their likelihood of failure.

The scope of the testing has expanded over time to incorporate insurers, central counterparties (financial institutions that provide clearing and settlement services between financial traders) and cyber security. The most recent scenario recognised the increasing significance of non-deposit taking financial institutions in channelling credit. Fifty City of London institutions modelled how a period of intense stress would ripple through the shadow banking sector.

The arcane world of shadow banking

Shadow banking refers to borrowing and lending which occurs outside the banking sector. Traditionally banking involves taking deposits and using these to finance lending.

Shadow banking involves non-deposit taking financial institutions (NBFIs) such as hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, private equity funds, as well as some activities of investment banks. These institutions channel funds in different ways from lenders to borrowers. Typically, they use funds from investors to buy securities through financial markets. The emergence and growth of shadow banking has been explained by changing regulation and innovation.

Its first significant period of expansion in the late 1980s was driven by financial innovation. Increased use of ‘disintermediation’ – the replacement of credit channels through banks with ones through markets – meant an increase in the assets invested through NBFIs.

Despite this process playing a major role in the expansion of housing credit in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, it was the significant bailouts that banks received that drew the attention of regulators, not the role of shadow banking. This led to more stringent liquidity and capital requirements for banks under the BASEL III international regulations.

This regulatory tightening limited banks’ ability to offer credit, which meant that much of this activity migrated to the shadow banking sector.

Data from the Bank of England show that the percentage of total assets held by NBFIs rose from 41% in 2007 to 49% in 2020. The chart illustrates the total financial assets held by non-bank financial institutions in the UK between 2019 Q4 and 2023 Q3 (click here for a PowerPoint). The amount held has growth by approximately a third in that time, from £4321bn to £6069bn, peaking at £6670bn in 2022 Q3.

The lack of regulatory oversight stems from the nature of the activities in the shadow banking sector. While NBFIs conduct maturity transformation, provide liquidity and help manage risk, unlike banks, they do not accept deposits and are not part of the payments system involving the general public.

Consequently, the consensus among regulators has been that their activities do not pose the same systemic risks as banking of the breakdown of the payments mechanism and associated collapse in business and consumer confidence. Therefore, NBFIs are not subject to conventional regulation and supervision involving liquidity and capital requirements.

However, as the scale of borrowing and lending running through the sector has grown, this argument has become less difficult to justify. There is a concern that ‘regulatory arbitrage’ is happening and that the systemic risks associated with shadow banking are being underestimated.

The familiar risks of shadow banking

The systemic consequences of liquidity and solvency problems in the shadow banking sector may not seem obvious. Much of their activities are arcane and technical. However, there are plenty of examples of instances where the problems of hedge funds or pension funds have caused systemic issues.

While the consequences are not the same as those involving banks, in that the payments mechanism is not directly affected, the risks are. Just like banks, these institutions are exposed to liquidity risks, credit default risks and counterparty risks. The concern is that they do not have the same levels of liquidity or capital buffers as banks to insulate them from the consequences of such risks. Therefore, it might not take much economic stress for one or more of these institutions to fail and, given the increasing significance and interconnectedness of these activities, impose significant costs on the rest of the financial system.

It was for this reason that the Bank of England conducted its first system-wide exploratory scenario to analyse the impact of economic and market stress on these institutions and assess the nature and extent of systemic risks which resulted. Fifty City of London institutions modelled how a period of intense stress would ripple through the non-bank sector.

The scenario involved rising geopolitical tensions which caused a sharp rise in risk aversion and a demand for higher expected rates of return as compensation. This produced sharp rises in both sovereign and corporate bond yields and matching sharp declines in asset prices (remember bond yield and prices have a negative relationship).

The scenario found that the position and behaviour of NBFIs amplified the shock. These institutions invest significantly in marketable financial securities and their liquidity and solvency are susceptible to such falling prices.

The sharp decline in asset prices triggered margin calls – payments to cover open loss positions in financial securities. In response to these demands, while some NBFIs’ internal risk and leverage measures were breached, others illustrated greater risk-aversion and took precautionary action. These institutions acted to deleverage, derisk and recapitalise. Given the interconnectedness of financial markets, the individual actions of institutions rippled across financial markets, causing problems in other segments.

The significant decline in asset prices led insurance companies and pension funds to seek to improve their liquidity and solvency position by liquidating positions in money market funds and hedge funds. This, in turn, required these funds to seek liquidity. Such institutions tend to rely a lot on the repo market (involving short-term sale and repurchase credit agreements) to provide liquidity to investors. This avoids them having to sell assets. This practice has echoes of the banking sectors use of the short-term wholesale markets in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis.

However, the SWES found that while banks were willing to take on some of the risk, their own concerns about liquidity and counterparty credit risk meant they did not offer sufficient short-term liquidity through the repo markets. If such funding dried up because of a higher risk perception, it could compromise the hedge funds’ ability to raise funds, requiring asset sales. This would amplify the shock to financial markets, driving prices of financial securities even lower.

The scenario concluded that the resulting heavy selling could seize up financial markets, particularly the UK sovereign and corporate bond markets, reducing the ability of companies to finance investment. This is a different type of credit crunch from 2008, which was restricted to banks – but a credit crunch, nonetheless.

At the same time, funds may make capital losses as they sell securities in the downturn. This creates solvency problems and the potential for failure.

In the SWES the institutions were often not able to anticipate how their counterparties, investors, or markets they operate in would behave in the stressed scenario, which echoes the experience of banks in 2007 and 2008 – a significant reason for the ‘crunch’ in banking credit was uncertainty about the creditworthiness of counterparties, meaning that banks were not prepared to lend to anybody.

Conclusion

Since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a tightening of the regulation and supervision of banks which has limited their ability to channel credit. This has produced an expansion in the shadow banking sector.

However, while the shadow banking sector has not been subject to the same regulation and supervision as banks, there are still potential systemic risks associated with its operations. There have been several examples of such risks in the shadow banking sector which have led regulators to pay more attention. These underpinned the 2024 system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES) conducted by the Bank of England.

The scenario showed the possible transmission mechanism through which problems for NBFIs can have broader consequences. The report nevertheless concluded that:

…the UK financial system was well-capitalised, maintained high levels of liquidity and that asset quality remained strong.

Therefore, the UK financial system was resilient enough to withstand problems in shadow banking.

Although the results of the exercise provide a ‘framework of future system-wide analysis which can be embedded in future market-wide surveillance,’ history indicates that risks tend to exist in obscure and arcane parts of the financial system and that these never tend to be fully appreciated until a crisis occurs. This then tends to involve significant costs for taxpayers.

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Bank of England documents and reports

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Questions

  1. Explain stress testing.
  2. What is shadow banking? Explain the factors driving the growth of credit in this part of the financial system.
  3. Compare and contrast the liquidity problems of banks with those of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
  4. Analyse how financial crises can heighten problems of asymmetric information in financial markets.
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France’s rising risk premium: converging with southern Europe

On 25 October 2024, Moody’s, one of the major credit ratings agencies, announced that it was downgrading France’s economic outlook to negative. This was its first downgrading of France since 2012. It followed a similar revision by Fitch’s, another ratings agency, on 11 October.

While Fitch’s announcement did not have a significant impact on the yields of French government bonds, expectations around Moody’s did. In the week preceding the announcement, the net increases in the yield on generic 10-year government debt was approximately 9 basis points (0.09 percentage points). On the day itself, the yield rose by approximately 5.6 basis points (0.056 percentage points).

The yield rose further throughout the rest of October, finishing nearly 0.25 percentage points above its level at the start of the month. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, these increases are part of a longer-term trend of rising yields for French government debt (click here for a PowerPoint).

The yield on 10-year French government debt began 2024 at 2.56% and had an upward trend for the first half of the year. The yield peaked at 3.34% on 1 July. It then fell back below 3% for a while. The negative economic outlook then pushed yields back above 3% and they finished October at 3.12%, half a percentage point above the level at the start of the year. This represents a significant increase in borrowing costs for the French government.

In this blog, we will explain why the changes in France’s economic outlook translate into increases in yields for French government bonds. We will also analyse why yields have increased and examine the prospects for the markets in French government bonds.

Pricing signals of bond yields

A bond is a tradable debt instrument issued by governments to finance budget deficits – the difference between tax receipts and spending. Like any financial instruments, investment in bonds involves a commitment of funds today in anticipation of interest payments through time as compensation, with a repayment of its redemption value on the date the bond matures.

Since the cash flows associated with holding a bond occur at different points in time, discounted cash flow analysis is used to determine its value. This gives the present value of the cash flows discounted at the appropriate expected rate of return. In equilibrium this will be equal to the bond’s market price, as the following equation shows.

Where:
    P = the equilibrium price of the bond
    C = cash coupon payments
    M = redemption value at maturity
    r = yield (expected rate of return in equilibrium.

Interest payments tend to be fixed at the time a bond is issued and reflect investors’ expected rate of return, expressed as the yield in bond markets. This is determined by prevailing interest rates and perceived risk. Over time, changes in interest rates and perceptions of risk will change the expected rate of return (yield), which will, in turn, change the present value of the cash flows, and hence fundamental value.

Prices move in response to changes in fundamental value and since this happens frequently, this means that prices change a lot. For bonds, as the coupon payments (C each year and the redemption price () are fixed, the only factor that can change is the expected rate of return (yield). This is reflected in the observed yield at each price.

If the expected rate of return rises, this increases the discount rate applied to future cash flows and reduces their present value. At the current price, the fixed coupon is not sufficient to compensate investors. So, investors sell the bonds and price falls until it reaches a point where the yield offered is equal to that required. The reverse happens if the expected rate of return falls.

The significant risk associated with bonds is credit default risk – the risk that the debt will not be repaid. The potential for credit default is a significant influence of the compensation investors require for holding debt instruments like bonds (ceteris paribus). An increase in expected credit default risk will increase the expected return (compensation). This will be reflected in a lower price and higher yield.

Normally, with the bonds issued by high-income countries, such as those in Europe and North America, the risk of default is extremely low. However, if a country’s annual deficits or accumulated debt increase to what markets consider to be unsustainable levels, the perceived risk of default may rise. Countries’ levels of risk are rated by international ratings agencies, such as Moody’s and Fitch. Investors pay a lot of attention to the information provided by such agencies.

Moody’s downgrade in its economic outlook for France from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ indicated weak economic performance and higher credit default risk. This revision rippled through bond markets as investors adjusted their views of the country’s economic risk. The rise in yields observed is a signal that bond investors perceive higher credit default risk associated with French government debt and are demanding a higher rates of return as compensation.

Why has France’s credit default risk premium risen now?

As we have seen, credit default risk is not normally considered a significant issue for sovereign borrowers like France. Some of the issue around perceived credit default risk for the French government relate to the size of the French government’s deficit and the projections for it. Following a spike in borrowing associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the annual government budget deficit and the overall level of debt as percentages of GDP have remained high. The annual deficit is projected to be 6% for 2024 and still 5% for 2025. The ratio of outstanding French government debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ballooned to 123% in 2020 and is still expected to be 115% by the end of 2025. France has been put on notice to reduce its debt towards the Eurozone limit of 60% of GDP.

Governments in France last achieved a balanced budget in 1974. They have run deficits ever since. Figure 2 illustrates the French government budget deficits from 1990 to 2023 (click here for a PowerPoint). The figure shows that France experienced deficits in the past similar to today’s. These, however, did not tend to worry bond markets too much.

So why are investors currently worried? This stems from France’s debt mountain and from concerns that the government will not be able to deal with it. Investors are concerned that both weak growth and increasingly volatile politics will thwart efforts to reduce debt levels.

Let’s take growth. Even by contemporary European standards, France’s growth prospects are anaemic. GDP is expected to grow by just 1.1% for 2024 and 1% for 2025. Both consumer and business confidence are low. None of this suggests a growth spurt soon which will boost the tax revenues of the French government sufficiently to address the deficit.

Further, political instability has grown due to the inconclusive parliamentary elections which Emmanuel Macron surprisingly called in July. No single political grouping has a majority and the President has appointed a Centrist Prime Minister, Michel Barnier (the former EU Brexit negotiator). His government is trying to pass a budget through the Assemblée Nationale involving a mixture of spending cuts and tax hikes which amount to savings of €60 billion ($66 billion). This is equivalent to 2% of GDP.

The parliamentary path of the budget bill is set to be torturous with both the left and right wing blocs in the Assemblée opposing most of the provisions. Debate in the Assemblée Nationale and Senate are expected to drag on into December, with the real prospect that the government may have to use presidential decree to pass the budget. Commentators argue that this will fuel further political chaos.

France looks more like Southern Europe

In the past, bond investors were more tolerant of France’s budget deficits. French government bonds were attractive options for investors wanting to hold euro-denominated bonds while avoiding riskier Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Since France has run persistent government deficits for a long time, it offered bond investors a more liquid market than more fiscally-parsimonious Northern European neighbours, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Consequently, France’s debt instruments offered a slight risk premium on the yields for those countries.

However, that has changed. France’s credit default risk premium is rising to levels comparable to its Southern neighbours. On 26 September 2024, the yield on generic French government 10-year debt rose above its Spanish equivalent for the first time since 2008.

As Figure 3 illustrates, this was the culmination of a trend evident throughout 2024, with the difference in yields between the two declining steadily (click here for a PowerPoint). At the start of the year, the yield on Spanish debt offered a 40 basis points premium over the French equivalent. By October, the yield on Spanish debt was consistently below that of French debt. All of this is due to bond investors’ rising expectations about France’s credit default risk. Now, France’s borrowing costs are not only above Spain, but also closer to those of Greece and Italy than of Germany.

Strikingly, Spain’s budget deficit was 3.5% in 2023 and is expected to narrow to 2.6% by 2025. The percentage of total debt to GDP is 104% and falling. Moreover, following Spain’s inconclusive election in 2023, the caretaker government put forward budgetary plans involving fiscal tightening without the need for legislation. This avoided the political wrangling France is facing.

For France, these developments raise the prospect of yields rising further as bond investors now see alternatives to French government debt in the form of Spain’s. This country have already undertaken the painful fiscal adjustments that France seems incapable of completing.

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Questions

  1. What is credit default risk?
  2. Explain why higher credit default risk is associated with higher yields on France’s government debt.
  3. Why would low economic growth worsen the government’s budget deficit?
  4. Why would political instability increase credit default risk?
  5. What has happened to investors’ perceptions of the risk associated with French government debt relative to Spain’s?
  6. How has this manifested itself in the relative yields of the two countries’ government debt?