Coffee prices have been soaring in recent months. This applies to the prices of both coffee beans on international markets, coffee in supermarkets and coffee in coffee shops. In this blog we examine the causes and what is likely to happen over the coming months.
As we shall see, demand and supply analysis provides a powerful explanation of what has been happening in the various sectors of the industry and the likely future path of prices.
The coffee industry
The cultivating, processing and retailing of coffee is big business. It is the second most widely traded commodity after oil and around 2.5 billion cups are consumed worldwide on a daily basis. In the UK nearly 100 million cups of coffee a day are drunk, with coffee consumers spending around £4 billion per year on sit-down and takeaway coffees and on coffee bought in supermarkets and other shops for making at home. The average takeaway coffee costs around £3.40 per cup with speciality coffees costing more.
Global production in the coffee year 2023/24 was 178 million 60 kg bags (10.7 million tonnes) and the annual income of the whole sector exceeds $200 billion. Around 25 million farmers spread across 50 countries harvest coffee. The majority of these farms are small and family run. Some 100 million families worldwide depend on coffee for their living.
Brazil is by far the biggest producer and accounts for nearly 40% of the market. A good or poor harvest in Brazil can have a significant impact on prices. Vietnam and Columbia are the second and third biggest producers respectively and, with Brazil, account for over 60% of global production.
Coffee prices are extremely volatile – more so than production, which does, nevertheless, fluctuate with the harvest. Figure 1 shows global coffee production and prices since 1996. The price is the International Coffee Organization’s composite indicator price (I-CIP) in US cents per pound (lb). It is a weighted average of four prices: Colombian milds (Arabica), Other milds (Arabica), Brazilian naturals (mainly Arabica) and Robusta. Production is measured in 60 kilo bags.
Case Study 2.3 on the student website for Economics 11th edition, looks at the various events that caused the fluctuations in prices and supply illustrated in Figure 1 (click here for a PowerPoint). In this blog we focus on recent events.
Why are coffee prices rising?
In early October 2023, the ICO composite indicator price (I-CIP), was $1.46 per lb. By 28 August, it had reached $2.54 – a rise of 74%. Colombian milds (high-quality Arabica) had risen from $1.79 per lb to $2.78 – a rise of 55%. Robusta coffee is normally cheaper than Arabica. It is mainly used in instant coffee and for espressos. As the price of Arabica rose, so there was some substitution, with Robusta coffees being added to blends. But as this process took place, so the gap between the Arabica and Robusta prices narrowed. Robusta prices rose from $1.14 in early October 2023 to £2.36 in late August – a rise of 107%. These prices are illustrated in Figure 2 (click here for a PowerPoint).
This dramatic rise in prices is the result of a number of factors.
Supply-side factors. The first is poor harvests, which will affect future supply. Frosts in Brazil have affected Arabica production. Also, droughts – partly the result of climate change – have affected harvests in major Robusta-producing countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. With the extra demand from the substitution for Arabica, this has pushed up Robusta prices as shown in Figure 2. Another supply-side issue concerns the increasingly vulnerability of coffee crops to diseases, such as coffee rust, and pests. Both reduce yields and quality.
As prices have risen, so this has led to speculative buying of coffee futures by hedge funds and coffee companies. This has driven up futures prices, which will then have a knock-on effect on spot (current) prices as roasters attempt to build coffee stocks to beat the higher prices.
There have also been supply-chain problems. Attacks on shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have forced ships to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Again, this has particularly affected the supply of Robusta, largely grown in Asia and East Africa.
New EU regulation banning the import of coffee grown in areas of cleared rainforest will further reduce supply when it comes into force in 2025, or at least divert it away from the EU – a major coffee-consuming region.
Demand-side factors. On the demand side, the rise of the coffee culture and a switch in demand from tea to coffee has led to a steady growth in demand. Growth in the coffee culture has been particularly high in Asian markets as rapid urbanistion, a growing middle class and changing lifestyles drive greater coffee consumption and greater use of coffee shops. This has more than offset a slight decline in coffee shop sales in the USA. In the UK, the number of coffee shops has risen steadily. In 2023, there were 3000 cafés, coffee chains and other venues serving coffee, of which 9885 were branded coffee shop outlets, such as Costa, Caffè Nero and Starbucks. Sales in such coffee chains rose by 11.9% in 2023. Similar patterns can be observed in other countries, all helping to drive a rise in demand.
But although demand for coffee in coffee shops is growing, the rise in the price of coffee beans should have only a modest effect on the price of a cup of coffee. The cost of coffee beans purchased by a coffee shop accounts for only around 10% of the price of a cup. To take account of the costs to the supplier (roasting, distribution costs, overheads, etc), this price paid by the coffee shop/chain is some 5 times the cost of unroasted coffee beans on international markets. In other words, the international price of coffee beans accounts for only around 2% of the cost of a cup of coffee in a coffee shop.
Higher coffee-shop prices are thus mainly the result of other factors. These include roasting and other supplier costs, rising wages, rents, business rates, other ingredients such as milk and sugar, coffee machines, takeaway cups, heating, lighting, repairs and maintenance and profit. The high inflation over the past two years, with several of these costs being particularly affected, has been the major driver of price increases in coffee shops.
The future
The rise in demand and prices over the years has led to an increase in supply as more coffee bushes are planted. As Figure 1 shows, world supply increased from 87 million in 1995/6 to 178 million 60 kilo bags in 2023/4 – a rise of 105%. The current high prices may stimulate farmers to plant more. But as it can take four years for coffee plants to reach maturity, it may take time for supply to respond. Later on, a glut might even develop! This would be a case of the famous cobweb model (see Case Study 3.13 on the Essentials of Economics 9th edition student website).
Nevertheless, climate change is making coffee production more vulnerable and demand is likely to continue to outstrip supply. Much of the land currently used to produce Arabica will no longer be suitable in a couple of decades. New strains of bean may be developed that are more hardy, such as variants of the more robust Robusta beans. Whether this will allow supply to keep up with demand remains to be seen.
Articles
- Even more expensive coffee prices are brewing, but there are some good reasons why
The Conversation, Jonathan Morris (31/7/24)
- Coffee is becoming a luxury, and there’s no escaping it
AccuWeather, Erika Tulfo (1/8/24)
- Coffee prices will rise even higher, says Giuseppe Lavazza
The Guardian, Jonathan Yeboah (9/7/24)
- Coffee prices set to rise even higher, warns Italian roaster Lavazza
Financial Times, Susannah Savage (9/7/24)
- Soaring coffee prices force roasters to add lower-cost beans to blends
Financial Times, Susannah Savage (24/8/24)
- Soaring coffee prices foretell a financial grind
Reuters, Robert Cyran (31/8/24)
- Projected Coffee Price Increase Due to Supply Shortages and Rising Demand
ISN Magazine: International Supermarket News (14/8/24)
- Coffee Market Report
International Coffee Organization (July 2024)
- Strengthening global robusta production: an update
World Coffee Research: News (4/12/23)
- Houthi rebels and the EU make your coffee more expensive
Politico, Carlo Martuscelli (13/8/24)
Data
Questions
- Use a demand and supply diagram to compare the coffee market in August 2024 with that in October 2023.
- How is the price elasticity of demand relevant to determining the size of price fluctuations in response to fluctuations in the supply of coffee? Demonstrate this with a supply and demand diagram.
- How has speculation affected coffee prices?
- What are ‘coffee futures’? How do futures prices relate to spot prices?
- What is likely to happen to coffee prices in the coming months? Explain.
- Why have Robusta prices risen by a larger percentage than Arabica prices? Is this trend likely to continue?
- Look at the price of Colombian Arabica coffee in your local supermarket. Work out what the price would be per lb and convert it to US dollars. How does this retail price compare with the current international price for Colombian milds and what accounts for the difference? (For current information on Colombian milds, see the third data link above.)
- Distinguish between the fixed and variable costs of an independent coffee shop. How should the coffee shop set its prices in relation to these costs and to demand?
A common practice of international investors is to take part in the so-called ‘carry trade’. This involves taking advantage of nominal interest rate differences between countries. For example, assume that interest rates are low in Japan and high in the USA. It is thus profitable to borrow yen in Japan at the low interest rate, exchange it into US dollars and deposit the money at the higher interest rate available in the USA. If there is no change in the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen, the investor makes a profit equal to the difference in the interest rates.
Rather than depositing the money in a US bank account, an alternative is to purchase US bonds or other assets in the USA, where the return is again higher than that in Japan.
If, however, interest-rate differentials narrow, there is the possibility of the carry trade ‘unwinding’. Not only may the carry trade prove unprofitable (or less so), but investors may withdraw their deposits and pay back the loans. This, as we shall, can have adverse consequences on exchange rates.
The problem of an unwinding of the carry trade is not new. It worsened the underlying problems of the financial crisis in 2008. The question today is whether history is about to repeat itself with a new round of unwinding of the carry trade threatening economic growth and recovery around the world.
We start by looking at what happened in 2008.
The carry trade and the 2008 financial crisis
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, current account deficit countries, such as the UK, USA and Australia, typically had relatively high interest rates, while current account surplus countries such as Japan and Switzerland had relatively low ones. Figure 1 shows central bank interest rates from 2005 to the current day (click here for a PowerPoint).
The carry trade saw investors borrowing money in Japan and Switzerland, exchanging it on the foreign exchange market, with the currency then deposited in the UK, USA and Australia. Hundreds of billions worth of dollars were involved in this carry trade.
If, however, the higher interest rates in the UK and other deficit countries were simply to compensate investors for the risk of currency depreciation, then there would be no excessive inflow of finance. The benefit of the higher interest rate would be offset by a depreciating currency. But the carry trade had the effect of making deficit currencies appreciate, thereby further boosting the carry trade by speculation of further exchange rate rises.
Thus the currencies of deficit countries appreciated, making their goods less competitive and worsening their current account deficit. Between 1996 and 2006, the average current account deficits as a percentage of GDP for Australia, the USA and the UK were close to 4½, 4 and 2, respectively. Between January 1996 and December 2006, the broad-based real exchange rate index of the Australian dollar appreciated by 17%, of the US dollar by 4% and of sterling by some 23%.
Currencies of surplus countries depreciated, making their goods more competitive and further boosting their current account surpluses. For example, between 2004 and 2006 the average current account surpluses as a percentage of GDP for Japan and Switzerland were 3½ and 13, respectively. Their short-term interest rates averaged a mere 0.1% and 1.0% respectively (compared with 3.4%, 4.7% and 5.7% for the USA, the UK and Australia). Yet between January 2004 and December 2006, the real exchange rate index of the yen depreciated by 21%, while that of the Swiss franc depreciated by 6%.
With the credit crunch of 2007/8, the carry trade unwound. Much of the money deposited in the USA had been in highly risky assets, such as sub-prime mortgages. Investors scrambled to sell their assets in the USA, UK and the EU. Loans from Japan and Switzerland were repaid and these countries, seen as ‘safe havens’, attracted deposits. The currencies of deficit countries, such as the UK and USA, began to depreciate and those of surplus countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, began to appreciate. Between September 2007 and September 2008, the real exchange rate indices of the US dollar and sterling depreciated by 2% and 13% respectively; the yen and the Swiss franc appreciated by 3% and 2¾%.
This represented a ‘double whammy’ for Japanese exporters. Not only did its currency appreciate, making its exports more expensive in dollars, euros, pounds, etc., but the global recession saw consumers around the world buying less. As a result, the Japanese economy suffered the worst recession of the G7 economies.
The carry trade in recent months
Since 2016, there has been a re-emergence of the carry trade as the Fed began raising interest rates while the Bank of Japan kept rates at the ultra low level of –0.1% (see Figure 1). The process slowed down when the USA lowered interest rates in 2020 in response to the pandemic and fears of recession. But when the USA, the EU and the UK began raising rates at the beginning of 2022 in response to global inflationary pressures, while Japan kept its main rate at –0.1%, so the carry trade resumed in earnest. Cross-border loans originating in Japan (not all of it from the carry trade) had risen to ¥157tn ($1tn) by March 2024 – a rise of 21% from 2021.
The process boosted US stock markets and contributed to the dollar appreciating against the yen (see Figure 2: click here for a PowerPoint).
Although this depreciation of the yen helped Japanese exports, it also led to rising prices. Japanese inflation rose steadily throughout 2022. In the 12 months to January 2022 the inflation rate was 0.5% (having been negative from October 2020 to August 2021). By January 2023, the annual rate had risen to 4.3% – a rate not seen since 1981. The Bank of Japan was cautious about raising interest rates to suppress this inflation, however, for fear of damaging growth and causing the exchange rate to appreciate and thereby damaging exports. Indeed, quarterly economic growth fell from 1.3% in 2023 Q1 to –1.0% in 2023 Q3.
But then, with growth rebounding and the yen depreciating further, in March 2024 the Bank of Japan decided to raise its key rate from –0.1% to 0.1%. This initially had the effect of stabilising the exchange rate. But then with the yen depreciating further and inflation rising from 2.5% to 2.8% in May and staying at this level in June, the Bank of Japan increased the key rate again at the end of July – this time to 0.25% – and there were expectations that there would be another rise before the end of the year.
At the same time, there were expectations that the Fed would soon lower its main rate (the Federal Funds Rate) from its level of 5.33%. The ECB and the Bank of England had already begun lowering their main rates in response to lower inflation. The carry trade rapidly unwound. Investors sold US, EU and UK assets and began repaying yen loans.
The result was a rapid appreciation of the yen as Figure 3 shows (click here for a PowerPoint). Between 31 July (the date the Bank of Japan raised interest rates the second time) and 5 August, the dollar depreciated against the yen from ¥150.4 to ¥142.7. In other words, the value of 100 yen appreciated from $0.66 to $0.70 – an appreciation of the yen of 6.1%.
Fears about the unwinding of the carry trade led to falls in stock markets around the world. Not only were investors selling shares to pay back the loans, but fears of the continuing process put further downward pressure on shares. From 31 July to 5 August, the US S&P 500 fell by 6.1% and the tech-heavy Nasdaq by 8.0%.
As far as the Tokyo stock market was concerned, the appreciation of the yen sparked fears that the large Japanese export sector would be damaged. Investors rushed to sell shares. Between 31 July and 5 August, the Nikkei 225 (the main Japanese stock market index) fell by 19.5% – its biggest short-term fall ever (see Figure 4: click here for a PowerPoint).
Although the yen has since depreciated slightly (a rise in the yen/dollar rate) and stock markets have recovered somewhat, expectations of many investors are that the unwinding of the yen carry trade has some way to go. This could result in a further appreciation of the yen from current levels of around ¥100 = $0.67 to around $0.86 in a couple of years’ time.
There are also fears about the carry trade in the Chinese currency, the yuan. Some $500 billion of foreign currency holdings have been acquired with yuan since 2022. As with the Japanese carry trade, this has been encouraged by low Chinese interest rates and a depreciating yuan. Not only are Chinese companies investing abroad, but foreign companies operating in China have been using their yuan earnings from their Chinese operations to invest abroad rather than in China. The Chinese carry trade, however, has been restricted by the limited convertibility of the yuan. If the Chinese carry trade begins to unwind when the Chinese economy begins to recover and interest rates begin to rise, the effect will probably be more limited than with the yen.
Articles
- A popular trading strategy just blew up in investors’ faces
CNN, Allison Morrow (7/8/24)
- The big ‘carry trade’ unwind is far from over, strategists warn
CNBC, Sam Meredith (13/8/24)
- Unwinding of yen ‘carry trade’ still threatens markets, say analysts
Financial Times, Leo Lewis and David Keohane (7/8/24)
- The yen carry trade sell-off marks a step change in the business cycle
Financial Times, John Plender (10/8/24)
- Forbes Money Markets Global Markets React To The Japanese Yen Carry Trade Unwind
Forbes, Frank Holmes (12/8/24)
- 7 unwinding carry trades that crashed the markets
Alt21 (26/1/23)
- A carry crash also kicked off the global financial crisis 17 years ago — here’s why it’s unlikely to get as bad this time
The Conversation, Charles Read (9/8/24)
- What is the Chinese yuan carry trade and how is it different from the yen’s?
Reuters, Winni Zhou and Summer Zhen (13/8/24)
- Carry Trade That Blew Up Markets Is Attracting Hedge Funds Again
Yahoo Finance/Bloomberg, David Finnerty and Ruth Carson (16/8/24)
- Currency Carry Trades 101
Investopedia, Kathy Lien (9/8/24)
- Carry Trades Torpedoed The Market. They’re Still Everywhere.
Finimize, Stéphane Renevier (13/8/24)
Questions
- What factors drive the currency carry trade?
- Is the carry trade a form of arbitrage?
- Find out and explain what has happened to the Japanese yen since this blog was written.
- Find out and explain some other examples of carry trades.
- Why are expectations so important in determining the extent and timing of the unwinding of carry trades?
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been investigating road fuel pricing in the UK. In July 2022, it launched a study into the development of the road-fuel market over recent years. The final report of this study was published in July 2023 and covered the refining, wholesale and retail elements of the market.
In the retail part of the market, the CMA noted some potential causes for concern: retailer fuel margins had increased; there were geographical variations in pricing; filling stations with fewer competitors tended to charge higher prices; retail prices tended to rise rapidly when oil prices increased but fell slowly when oil prices fell (known as ‘rocket and feather’ pricing patterns); motorway service stations charged considerably higher prices than supermarkets or other filling stations.
In response to these findings, the CMA has been publishing an interim report every four months. These reports give average pump prices and margins. They also give relative average pump prices between different types of retailer, and between each of the supermarkets.
The latest interim report was published on 26 July 2024. It reiterated the finding of the 2023 report that the fuel market has become less competitive since 2019. What is more, it continues to be so. In particular, the range of retail prices and the level of retail margins remain high compared to historic levels. The interim report estimates that ‘the increase in retailers’ fuel margins compared to 2019 resulted in increased fuel costs for drivers in 2023 of over £1.6bn’.
Price leadership
Road fuel retailing is an oligopoly, with the major companies being the big supermarkets, the retail arms of oil companies (such as Shell, BP, Esso and Texaco, operating their own filling stations) and a few large specialist companies, such as the Motor Fuel Group (MFG), the EG Group and Rontec, whose filling stations sell one or other of the main brands. But although it is an oligopoly producing a homogeneous product, it is not a cartel (unlike OPEC). Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of tacit collusion in the market with price competition limited to certain rules of behaviour in particular locations. A familiar one is setting prices ending in .9 of a penny (e.g. 142.9p), with the acceptance by competitors that Applegreen will set it ending at .8 of a penny and Asda at .7 of a penny.
One of the main forms of tacit collusion in areas where there are several filling stations is that of price leadership. Asda, and in some areas Morrisons, have been price leaders, setting the lowest price for that area, with other filling stations setting the price at or slightly above that level (e.g. 0.2p, 1.2p or 2.2p higher). Indeed, other major retailers, such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Esso and Shell took a relatively passive approach to pricing, unwilling to undercut Asda and accept lower profit margins.
Things changed after 2019. Asda chose to increase its profit margins. In 2022 it did this by reducing prices more slowly than would previously have been the case as wholesale prices fell. In other words, it used price feathering. Other big retailers might have been expected to use the opportunity to undercut Asda. Instead, they decided to increase their own margins by following a similar pricing path. The result was a 6 pence per litre increase in the average supermarket fuel margin from 2019 to 2022.
More recently, Asda has increased its margins more than other major retailers, making it no longer the price leader. The effect has been to put less pressure on other retailers to trim their now higher profit margins.
Remedies
The 2023 CMA report made two specific recommendations to deal with this rise in profit margins.
The first was that the CMA should be given a statutory monitoring function over the fuel market to ‘hold the industry to account’. In May this year, legislation was passed to this effect. This requires the CMA to monitor the industry and report anti-competitive practice to the government.
The second was to introduce a new statutory ‘open data real-time fuel finder scheme’. This would give motorists access to live, station-by-station fuel prices.
Several major retailers already contribute to a voluntary price data sharing scheme. However, this covers only around 40% of UK forecourts. According to the CMA, it ‘falls well short of the comprehensive, real-time, station-by station data needed to empower motorists and drive competition’. The CMA has thus called on the new Labour government to introduce legislation to make its recommended system compulsory. This, it is hoped, would make the retail fuel market much more competitive by improving consumer information about prices at alternative filling stations in their area.
Articles
CMA reports
Questions
- What forms can tacit collusion take?
- Why are fuel prices at motorway service stations so much higher than in towns? What is the relevance of the price elasticity of demand to the answer?
- What are the main findings of the CMA’s July 2024 Interim Report
- What is meant by rocket and feather pricing?
- What recommendations does the CMA make for increasing competition in the retail road fuel market?
- Find out how competitive retail fuel pricing is in two other developed countries. Why are they more or less competitive than the UK?
Global long-term economic growth has slowed dramatically since the financial crisis of 2007–8. This can be illustrated by comparing the two 20-year periods 1988 to 2007 and 2009 to 2028 (where IMF forecasts are used for 2024 to 2028: see WEO Database under the Data link below). Over the two periods, average annual world growth fell from 3.8% to 3.1%. In advanced countries it fell from 2.9% to 1.6% and in developing countries from 4.8% to 4.3%. In the UK it fell from 2.4% to 1.2%, in the USA from 3.1% to 1.8% and in Japan from 1.9% to 0.5%.
In the UK, labour productivity growth in the production industries was 6.85% per annum from 1998 to 2006. If this growth rate had been maintained, productivity would have been 204% higher by the end of 2023 than it actually was. This is shown in the chart (click here for a PowerPoint).
The key driver of long-term economic growth is labour productivity, which can best be measured by real GDP per hour worked. This depends on three things: the amount of capital per worker, the productivity of this capital and the efficiency of workers themselves – the latter two giving total factor productivity (TFP). Productivity growth has slowed, and with it the long-term rate of economic growth.
If we are measuring growth in output per head of the population, as opposed to simple growth in output, then another important factor is the proportion of the population that works. With ageing populations, many countries are facing an increase in the proportion of people not working. In most countries, these demographic pressures are likely to increase.
A major determinant of long-term economic growth and productivity is investment. Investment has been badly affected by crises, such as the financial crisis and COVID, and by geopolitical tensions, such as the war in Ukraine and tensions between the USA and China and potential trade wars. It has also been adversely affected by government attempts to deal with rising debt caused by interventions following the financial crisis and COVID. The fiscal squeeze and, more recently higher interest rates, have dampened short-term growth and discouraged investment, thereby dampening long-term growth.
Another factor adversely affecting productivity has been a lower growth of allocative efficiency. Competition in many industries has declined as the rate of new firms entering and exiting markets has slowed. The result has been an increase in concentration and a growth in supernormal profits.
In the UK’s case, growth prospects have also been damaged by Brexit. According to Bank of England and OBR estimates, Brexit has reduced productivity by around 4% (see the blog: The costs of Brexit: a clearer picture). For many companies in the UK, Brexit has hugely increased the administrative burdens of trading with the EU. It has also reduced investment and led to a slower growth in the capital stock.
The UK’s poor productivity growth over many yeas is examined in the blog The UK’s poor productivity record.
Boosting productivity
So, how could productivity be increased and what policies could help the process?
Artificial intelligence. One important driver of productivity growth is technological advance. The rapid advance in AI and its adoption across much of industry is likely to have a dramatic effect on working practices and output. Estimates by the IMF suggest that some 40% of jobs globally and 60% in advanced countries could be affected – some replaced and others complemented and enhanced by AI. The opportunities for raising incomes are huge, but so too are the dangers of displacing workers and deepening inequality, as some higher-paid jobs are enhanced by AI, while many lower paid jobs are little affected and other jobs disappear.
AI is also likely to increase returns to capital. This may help to drive investment and further boost economic growth. However, the increased returns to capital are also likely to exacerbate inequality.
To guard against the growth of market power and its abuse, competition policies may need strengthening to ensure that the benefits of AI are widely spread and that new entrants are encouraged. Also training and retraining opportunities to allow workers to embrace AI and increase their mobility will need to be provided.
Training. And it is not just training in the use of AI that is important. Training generally is a key ingredient in encouraging productivity growth. In the UK, there has been a decline in investment in adult education and training, with a 70% reduction since the early 2000s in the number of adults undertaking publicly-funded training, and with average spending on training by employers decreasing by 27% per trainee since 2011. The Institute for Fiscal Studies identifies five main policy levers to address this: “public funding of qualifications and skills programmes, loans to learners, training subsidies, taxation of training and the regulation of training” (see link in articles below).
Competition. Another factor likely to enhance productivity is competition, both internationally and within countries. Removing trade restrictions could boost productivity growth; erecting barriers to protect inefficient domestic industry would reduce it.
Investment. Policies to encourage investment are also key to productivity growth. Private-sector investment can be encouraged by tax incentives. For example, in the UK the Annual Investment Allowance allows businesses to claim 100% of the cost of plant and machinery up to £1m in the year it is incurred. However, for tax relief to produce significant effects on investment, companies need to believe that the policy will stay and not be changed as economic circumstances or governments change.
Public-sector investment is also key. Good road and rail infrastructure and public transport are vital in encouraging private investment and labour mobility. And investment in health, education and training are a key part in encouraging the development of human capital. Many countries, the UK included, cut back on public-sector capital investment after the financial crisis and this has had a dampening effect on economic growth.
Regional policy. External economies of scale could be encouraged by setting up development areas in various regions. Particular industries could be attracted to specific areas, where local skilled workers, managerial expertise and shared infrastructure can benefit all the firms in the industry. These ‘agglomeration economies’ have been very limited in the UK compared with many other countries with much stronger regional economies.
Changing the aims and governance of firms. A change in corporate structure and governance could also help to drive investment and productivity. According to research by the think tank, Demos (see the B Lab UK article and the second report below), if legislation required companies to consider the social, economic and environmental impact of their business alongside profitability, this could have a dramatic effect on productivity. If businesses were required to be ‘purpose-led’, considering the interests of all their stakeholders, this supply-side reform could dramatically increase growth and well-being.
Such stakeholder-governed businesses currently outperform their peers with higher levels of investment, innovation, product development and output. They also have higher levels of staff engagement and satisfaction.
Articles
- World Must Prioritize Productivity Reforms to Revive Medium-Term Growth
IMF Blog, Nan Li and Diaa Noureldin (10/4/24)
- Why has productivity slowed down?
Oxford Martin School News, Ian Goldin, Pantelis Koutroumpis, François Lafond and Julian Winkler (18/3/24)
- How can the UK revive its ailing productivity?
Economics Observatory, Michelle Kilfoyle (14/3/24)
- With the UK creeping out of recession, here’s an economist’s brief guide to improving productivity
The Conversation, Nigel Driffield (13/3/24)
- UK economy nearly a third smaller thanks to ‘catastrophically bad’ productivity slowdown
City A.M., Chris Dorrell (12/3/24)
- Can AI help solve the UK’s public sector productivity puzzle?
City A.M., Chris Dorrell (11/3/24)
- AI Will Transform the Global Economy. Let’s Make Sure it Benefits Humanity
IMF Blog, Kristalina Georgieva (14/1/24)
- Productivity and Investment: Time to Manage the Project of Renewal
NIESR, Paul Fisher (12/3/24)
- Productivity trends using key national accounts indicators
Eurostat (15/3/24)
- New report says change to company law could add £149bn to the UK economy
B Lab UK (28/11/23)
- Investment in training and skills: Green Budget Chapter 9
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Imran Tahir (12/10/23)
Reports
Data
Questions
- Why has global productivity growth been lower since 2008 than before 2008?
- Why has the UK’s productivity growth been lower than many other advanced economies?
- How does the short-run macroeconomic environment affect long-term growth?
- Find out why Japan’s productivity growth has been so poor compared with other countries.
- What are likely to be the most effective means of increasing productivity growth?
- How may demand management policies affect the supply side of the economy?
- How may the adoption of an ESG framework by companies for setting objectives affect productivity growth?
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is proposing to launch a formal Market Investigation into anti-competitive practices in the UK’s £2bn veterinary industry (for pets rather than farm animals or horses). This follows a preliminary investigation which received 56 000 responses from pet owners and vet professionals. These responses reported huge rises in bills for treatment and medicines and corresponding rises in the cost of pet insurance.
At the same time there has been a large increase in concentration in the industry. In 2013, independent vet practices accounted for 89% of the market; today, they account for only around 40%. Over the past 10 years, some 1500 of the UK’s 5000 vet practices had been acquired by six of the largest corporate groups. In many parts of the country, competition is weak; in others, it is non-existent, with just one of these large companies having a monopoly of veterinary services.
This market power has given rise to a number of issues. The CMA identifies the following:
- Of those practices checked, over 80% had no pricing information online, even for the most basic services. This makes is hard for pet owners to make decisions on treatment.
- Pet owners potentially overpay for medicines, many of which can be bought online or over the counter in pharmacies at much lower prices, with the pet owners merely needing to know the correct dosage. When medicines require a prescription, often it is not made clear to the owners that they can take a prescription elsewhere, and owners end up paying high prices to buy medicines directly from the vet practice.
- Even when there are several vet practices in a local area, they are often owned by the same company and hence there is no price competition. The corporate group often retains the original independent name when it acquires the practice and thus is is not clear to pet owners that ownership has changed. They may think there is local competition when there is not.
Often the corporate group provides the out-of-hours service, which tends to charge very high prices for emergency services. If there is initially an independent out-of-hours service provider, it may be driven out of business by the corporate owner of day-time services only referring pet owners to its own out-of-hours service.- The corporate owners may similarly provide other services, such as specialist referral centres, diagnostic labs, animal hospitals and crematoria. By referring pets only to those services owned by itself, this crowds out independents and provides a barrier to the entry of new independents into these parts of the industry.
- Large corporate groups have the incentive to act in ways which may further reduce competition and choice and drive up their profits. They may, for example, invest in advanced equipment, allowing them to provide more sophisticated but high-cost treatment. Simpler, lower-cost treatments may not be offered to pet owners.
- The higher prices in the industry have led to large rises in the cost of pet insurance. These higher insurance costs are made worse by vets steering owners with pet insurance to choosing more expensive treatments for their pets than those without insurance. The Association of British Insurers notes that there has been a large rise in claims attributable to an increasing provision of higher-cost treatments.
- The industry suffers from acute staff shortages, which cuts down on the availability of services and allows practices to push up prices.
- Regulation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is weak in the area of competition and pricing.
The CMA’s formal investigation will examine the structure of the veterinary industry and the behaviour of the firms in the industry. As the CMA states:
In a well-functioning market, we would expect a range of suppliers to be able to inform consumers of their services and, in turn, consumers would act on the information they receive.
Market failures in the veterinary industry
The CMA’s concerns suggest that the market is not sufficiently competitive, with vet companies holding significant market power. This leads to higher prices for a range of vet services. However, the CMA’s analysis suggests that market failures in the industry extend beyond the simple question of market power and lack of competition.
A crucial market failure is asymmetry of information. The veterinary companies have much better information than pet owners. This is a classic principal–agent problem. The agent, in this case the vet (or vet company), has much better information than the principal, in this case the pet owner. This information can be used to the interests of the vet company, with pet owners being persuaded to purchase more extensive and expensive treatments than they might otherwise choose if they were better informed.
The principal–agent problem also arises in the context of the dependant nature of pets. They are the ones receiving the treatment and, in this context, are the principals. Their owners are the ones acquiring the treatment for them and hence are the pets’ agents. The question is whether the owners will always do the best thing for their pets. This raises philosophical questions of animal rights and whether owners should be required to protect the interests of their pets.
Another information issue is the short-term perspective of many pet owners. They may purchase a young and healthy pet and assume that it will remain so. However, as the pet gets older, it is likely to face increasing health issues, with correspondingly increasing vet bills. But many owners do not consider such future bills when they purchase the pet. They suffer from what behavioural economists call ‘irrational exuberance’. Such exuberance may also occur when the owner of a sick pet is offered expensive treatment. They may over-optimistically assume that the treatment will be totally successful and that their pet will not need further treatment.
Vets cite another information asymmetry. This concerns the costs they face in providing treatment. Many owners are unaware of these costs – costs that include rent, business rates, heating and lighting, staff costs, equipment costs, consumables (such as syringes, dressings, surgical gowns, antiseptic and gloves), VAT, and so on. Many of these costs have risen substantially in recent months and are reflected in the prices pet owners are charged. With people experiencing free health care for themselves from the NHS (or other national provider), this may make them feel that the price of pet health care is excessive.
Then there is the issue of inequality. Pets provide great benefits to many owners and contribute to owners’ well-being. If people on low incomes cannot afford high vet bills, they may either have to forgo having a pet, with the benefits it brings, or incur high vet bills that they ill afford or simply go without treatment for their pets.
Finally, there are the external costs that arise when people abandon their pets with various health conditions. This has been a growing problem, with many people buying pets during lockdown when they worked from home, only to abandon them later when they have had to go back to the office or other workplace. The costs of treating or putting down such pets are born by charities or local authorities.
The CMA is consulting on its proposal to begin a formal Market Investigation. This closes on 11 April. If, in the light of its consultation, the Market Investigation goes ahead, the CMA will later report on its findings and may require the veterinary industry to adopt various measures. These could require vet groups to provide better information to owners, including what lower-cost treatments are available. But given the oligopolistic nature of the industry, it is unlikely to lead to significant reductions in vets bills.
Articles
- UK competition watchdog plans probe into veterinary market
Financial Times, Suzi Ring and Oliver Ralph (12/3/24)
Vet prices: Investigation over concerns pet owners are being overchargedSky News (12/3/24)
- UK watchdog plans formal investigation into vet pricing
The Guardian, Kalyeena Makortoff (12/3/24)
- ‘Eye-watering’ vet bills at chain-owned surgeries prompt UK watchdog review
The Guardian, Kalyeena Makortoff (7/9/23)
- Warning pet owners could be overpaying for medicine
BBC News, Lora Jones & Jim Connolly (12/3/24)
- I own a vet practice, owners complain about the spiralling costs of treatments, but I only make 5 -10% profit – here’s our expenditure breakdown
Mail Online, Alanah Khosla (14/3/24)
- Vets bills around the world: As big-name veterinary practices come under pressure for charging pet owners ‘eyewatering’ care costs, how do fees in Britain compare to other countries?
Mail Online, Rory Tingle, Dan Grennan and Katherine Lawton (13/3/24)
CMA documents
Questions
- How would you establish whether there is an abuse of market power in the veterinary industry?
- Explain what is meant by the principal–agent problem. Give some other examples both in economic and non-economic relationships.
- What market advantages do large vet companies have over independent vet practices?
- How might pet insurance lead to (a) adverse selection; (b) moral hazard? Explain. How might (i) insurance companies and (ii) vets help to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard?
- Find out what powers the CMA has to enforce its rulings.
- Search for vet prices and compare the prices charged by at least three vet practices. How would you account for the differences or similarities in prices?