In 2008 and 2009, as the global recession deepened, so governments around the world turned to Keynesian policies. Aggregate demand had to be boosted. This meant a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal stimulus packages were adopted, combining increased government expenditure and cuts in taxes. On the monetary policy front, central banks cut interest rates to virtually zero and expanded the money supply in bouts of quantitative easing.
The global recession turned out not to be a deep as many had feared and the Keynesian policies were hailed by many as a success.
But how the tide is turning! The combination of the recession (which reduced tax revenues and increased welfare spending) and the stimulus packages played havoc with public finances. Deficits soared. These deficits had to be financed, and increasingly credit agencies and others were asking how sustainable such deficits were over the longer term. These worries have been compounded by the perilous state of the public finances in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Hungary. The focus has thus turned to cuts. In fact there is now an international ‘competition’ as to which country can wear the hairiest hair shirt. The new Coalition government in the UK, for example, is busy preparing the general public for deep cuts to come.
We are now seeing a re-emergence of new classical views that increased deficits, far from stimulating the economy and resulting in faster growth, largely crowd out private expenditure. To prevent this crowding out and restore confidence in financial markets, deficits must be rapidly cut, thereby allowing finance to be diverted to the private sector.
But if the contribution to aggregate demand of the public sector is to be reduced, and if consumption, the largest component of aggregate demand, is also reduced as households try to reduce their reliance on borrowing, where is the necessary rise in aggregate demand to come from? We are left with investment and net exports – the remaining two components of aggregate demand, where AD = C + G + I + (X – M).
But will firms want to invest if deficit reduction results in higher taxes, higher unemployment and less spending by the government on construction, equipment and many other private-sector goods and services. Won’t firms, fearing a decline in consumer demand, and possibly a ‘double-dip recession’, hold off from investing? As for export growth, this depends very much on growth in the rest of the world. If the rest of the world is busy making cuts too, then export growth may be very limited.
The G20, meeting in Korea on 4 June, wrestled with this problem. But the mood had definitely turned. Leaders seemed much more concerned about deficit reduction than maintaining the fiscal stimulus.
The following articles look at the arguments between Keynesians and new classicists. The disagreements between their authors reflect the disagreements between economists and between politicians about the timing and extent of cuts.
Articles
Time to plan for post-Keynesian era Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs (7/6/10)
The Keynesian Endpoint CNBC Guest Blog, Tony Crescenzi (7/6/10)
Keynes, Recovered Boston Review, Jonathan Kirshner (May/June 2010)
How Keynes, not mining, saved us from recession Sydney Morning Herald, Ross Gittins (7/6/10)
The verdict on Keynes Asia Times, Martin Hutchinson (2/6/10)
The G20 Has Officially Voted For Global Depression Business Insider, Marshall Auerback (7/6/10)
Deficit disorder: the Keynes solution New Statesman, Robert Skidelsky (17/5/10)
Hawks v doves: economists square up over Osborne’s cuts Guardian, Phillip Inman (14/6/10)
Reports and data
OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, May 2010 (see)
Economics: Growth rising faster than expected but risks increasing too, says OECD Economic Outlook OECD (26/5/10)
Economy: responses must reflect governments’ views of national situations OECD (26/5/10)
Editorial and summary of projections OECD (26/5/10)
General assessment of the macroeconomic situation OECD (26/5/10)
Statistical Annex to OECD Economic Outlook No. 87 OECD (10/6/10)
Communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Busan, Republic of Korea G20 (5/6/10)
Questions
- Summarise the arguments for and against making rapid cuts in public-sector deficits.
- What forms can crowding out take? Under what circumstances will a rise in public-sector deficits (a) cause and (b) not cause crowding out?
- Assess the policy measures being proposed by the G20.
- How important is confidence for the success of (a) fiscal stimulus packages and (b) deficit reduction policies in boosting economic growth?
As the news from the Gulf of Mexico goes from very bad to even worse, so BP is increasingly coming under the international spotlight for its approach to risk management and safety. Was it sufficiently cautious? Could the accident on April 20 that killed 11 men and has been gushing some 800,000 gallons per day of crude oil into the sea have been averted? When the consequences of a pipe rupture are so catastrophic, is ‘catastrophic risk’ appropriately priced? As Tony Hayward, BP’s Chief Executive, told the Financial Times (see links below): “It was ‘an entirely fair criticism’ to say the company had not been fully prepared for a deep-water oil leak.”
One insight into BP’s approach to risk has come to light with the leaking of a 2002 memo from BP on how human life ought to be valued in any cost–benefit analysis of a project. As the Chicagoist summarises the memo:
A two page document prepared by risk managers in 2002 titled “Cost benefit analysis of three little pigs” shows the type of thinking BP put into risk assessment. The memo shows, in cartoonish fashion, that blast resistant trailers for BP’s workers weren’t necessary, because the cost was too high. In 2005, a refinery caught fire, killing 15 and injuring 170 people.
So how should catastrophic risk be taken into account? What does a company do when the probability of a disaster is extremely low and yet the costs of such a disaster, were it to occur, are extremely high?
BP’s Shocking Memo The Daily Beast, Rick Outzen (25/5/10)
Old BP document calculates worth of human life with “Three Little Pigs” diagram Yahoo News, Brett Michael Dykes (25/5/10)
Industry can cut accident risks, says BP chief Financial Times, Ed Crooks and Edward Luce (2/6/10)
BP ‘not prepared’ for deep-water spill Financial Times, Ed Crooks (2/6/10)
The BP Oil Spill’s Lessons for Regulation Project Syndicate, Kenneth Rogoff (1/6/10)
US oil firms ‘unprepared’ for major offshore disaster BBC News (15/6/10)
Questions
- What is meant by catastrophic risk?
- Why is it difficult to put an accurate valuation on outcomes with a very low probability of occurrence?
- Explain the table entitled “Cost benefit analysis of three little pigs” in the Rick Outzen blog.
- How should human life be valued?
- What value should be put on a serious injury (of a particular type)?
- Should BP (or any other company, for that matter) ever conduct operations that risk human life? Explain your answer.
- On what basis should BP have decided whether or not to install a $500,000 acoustic trigger that could have shut off the well when the blowout protector failed?
- How is the existence of environmental externalities relevant to BP’s decisions on safety?
Over the past 13 years of the Labour government, the incomes of the richest 1 per cent in the UK have grown substantially faster than that of other income groups, as they also did under the previous Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997. But, thanks to complex redistributive policies, including tax credits, the rise in relative poverty that occurred in the 1980s and 90s has been arrested. With the exception of the top 1 per cent, disposable income growth has been similar across the income groups.
As Larry Elliott, the Guardian’s Economics editor argues:
During the Thatcher-Major years, real incomes for the richest fifth of the population rose fastest, averaging growth of about 2.5% a year. The next richest quintile did a little less well, the middle 20% a bit less well still, and so on all the way down to the poorest 20% of the population, which saw the smallest real income gains of less than 1% a year.
Under Labour, the very high rewards secured by the top 1% of earners has obscured an even distribution of real income growth across the five quintiles.
The new coalition government maintains that anti-poverty policies have failed:
… Iain Duncan Smith, the work and pensions secretary, made a statement trashing Labour’s record: “Vast sums of money have been poured into the benefits system over the last decade in an attempt to address poverty, but today’s statistics clearly show that this approach has failed. Little progress has been made in tackling child poverty, society is more unequal than 50 years ago and there are more working age people living in poverty than ever before.
A new approach is needed which addresses the drivers behind poverty and actually improves the outcomes of the millions of adults and children trapped in poverty.”
The following articles explore what has been happening to inequality and poverty and look at the policies proposed by the coalition government. The data on inequality are also given, along with commentary on them by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
Articles
Labour’s poverty record may be flawed, but the damage was done by the Tories Guardian, Larry Elliott (24/5/10)
The distribution of income: For richer, for poorer Guardian editorial (24/5/10)
What the poverty figures show Guardian Joe Public blog, Julia Unwin (chief executive of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation) (21/5/10)
Data and reports
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 1994/95-2008/09 Department for Work and Pensions(19/5/10)
Households Below Average Income (pdf file) National Statistics, First Release (20/5/10)
Effects of taxes and benefits on household income Office for National Statistics (see also, especially Tables 26 and 27)
Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2010 Institute for Fiscal Studies
A range of poverty data The Poverty Site
Questions
- What has happened to the distribution of original, gross, disposable and post-tax income distribution (a) by percentage shares of quintile groups of income; (b) in terms of gini coefficients? (See the “Effects of taxes and benefits on household income” reference above.)
- Why is income inequality likely to increase unless strong redistributive policies are pursued by the government?
- What are ‘the drivers behind poverty’?
- To what extent is there a trade-off between economic growth and redistributing incomes from rich to poor?
- Why is it argued that in an increasingly interdependent world, senior executives have to be paid extremely high salaries and be given very large bonuses in order for a company to recruit sufficiently talented people and yet wages have to be kept low to allow goods to remain competitive?
- Why was income much more equally distributed in the 1960s and 70s than it is today?
- What redistributive policies is the new coalition government in the UK pursuing? What factors will determine their success?
With the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats now in power in the UK and with the Labour Party, having lost the election, being now in the midst of a leadership campaign, politicians from across the political spectrum are balming Gordon Brown for the ‘mess the country’s in’. The UK has a record budget deficit and debt, and is just emerging from a deep recession, when only a few years ago, Gordon Brown was claiming the end of boom and bust. But is the condition of the UK economy Mr Brown’s fault? Would it have been any better if others had been in charge, or if there had been even greater independence for the Bank of England of if there had been an Office of Budget Responsibility (see)?
The following podcast by Martin Wolf, chief economics commentator of the Financial Times, considers this question. He argues that:
Everybody would like to blame Gordon Brown for the financial crisis. But he was only acting in line with the national consensus on economic policy.
The economic legacy of Mr Brown FT podcasts, Martin Wolf (13/5/10)
The economic legacy of Mr Brown Financial Times, Martin Wolf (13/5/10)
Questions
- Explain what is meant by ‘the great moderation’.
- Should regulation of the banks be handed back to the Bank of England?
- Why may controlling inflation not necessarily result in stable economic growth? Is this a case of Goodhart’s Law?
- Why was the UK economy especially fragile during the banking crisis and its aftermath?
- What, according to Martin Wolf, was Mr Brown’s biggest mistake?
- Could a mistake be now being made by following the conventional wisdom that cutting the deficit is the solution to achieving sustained recovery?
The EU competition acuthorities have just fined ten producers of memory chips a total of €331 million for operating a cartel. One of the ten, Micron, will pay no fine because it blew the whistle on the other nine. They, in turn, have had their fines reduced by 10% for co-operating with the authorities. According to the EU Press Release:
The overall cartel was in operation between 1 July 1998 and 15 June 2002. It involved a network of contacts and sharing of secret information, mostly on a bilateral basis, through which they coordinated the price levels and quotations for DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memory), sold to major PC or server original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the EEA.
“This first settlement decision is another milestone in the Commission’s anti-cartel enforcement. By acknowledging their participation in a cartel the companies have allowed the Commission to bring this long-running investigation to a close and to free up resources to investigate other suspected cartels. As the procedure is applied to new cases it is expected to speed up investigations significantly”, said Commission Vice President and Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia.
Articles
Chipmakers to pay fines of €330m over cartel Financial Times, Nikki Tait (20/5/10)
Chipmakers fined by EU for price-fixing BBC News (19/5/10)
European Commission douments and findings
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels Europa Press Release (3/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels – frequently asked questions Europa Memo (30/6/08)
Antitrust: Commission fines DRAM producers € 331 million for price cartel; reaches first settlement in a cartel case Europa Press Release (19/5/10)
Antitrust: Commission adopts first cartel settlement decision – questions & answers Europa Memo (19/5/10)
Questions
- Explain how the new fast-track cartel settlement procedure works.
- Are the incentives built into the procedure appropriate for reducing oligopolistic collusion?
- Are the any reasons why the chip cartel might have been in consumers’ interests?
- Why does EU competition legislation apply in this case given than all but one of the companies are non-EU businesses?