Tag: competition policy

Posted on

Bad Apple: App Store abuse of dominance leads to €1.8bn fine

High-tech firms, such as Google, Amazon, Meta and Apple, have increasingly been gaining the attention of competition authorities across the world, and not in a good way! Over the past few years, competition authorities in the UK, USA and Europe have all opened various cases against Apple, with particular focus on its App Store (see, for example, a blog post on this site from 2021 about the Epic v. Apple case in the USA).

The lead-up to the €1.8 billion fine issued by the European Commission (Europe’s competition regulator) on the 4th March 2024, began in 2019 when music streaming provider, Spotify, filed a complaint against Apple, after years of being bound by the ‘unfair’ App Store rules imposed by Apple.1

Apple’s App Store has traditionally served as the only platform through which application developers can distribute their apps to iOS users, and app developers have had no choice but to adhere to whatever rules are set by Apple. As iPhone and iPad users know, the App Store is the only way in which users can download apps to their iOS devices, establishing Apple’s App Store as a ‘gatekeeper’, as described in the European Commission’s (EC) press release expressing their initial concerns in April 2021.2 When it comes to music streaming apps, Apple not only serves as the exclusive platform for downloading these apps, but also has its own music streaming app, Apple Music, that competes with other music-streaming providers.

This means that Apple holds a dominant position in the market for the distribution of music streaming apps to iOS users through its App Store. Being a dominant firm is not necessarily a problem. However, firms which hold a dominant position do have a special responsibility not to abuse their position. The EC found that Apple was abusing its dominant position in this market, with particular concerns about the rules it imposed on music streaming app developers.

Apple requires that app developers use Apple’s own in-app purchase system. This means that users must make any in-app purchases or subscriptions to music streaming apps through Apple’s system, subsequently subjecting app developers to a 30% commission fee. The EC found that this often led app developers to pass on these costs to consumers through an increase in prices.

Although users could still purchase subscriptions outside of the app, which may be cheaper for users as these payments will not be subject to commission, the EC found that Apple limits the ability for app developers to inform users about these alternative methods. For example, Apple prevented app developers from including links within their apps to their websites, where users could purchase subscriptions. The implications of this extends beyond increased prices for consumers, potentially resulting in a degraded user experience as well.

These restrictions imposed by Apple are examples of what are known as ‘anti-steering provisions’, and it is this conduct that led the Commission to issue the fine for the abuse of a dominant market position.

Whilst this case has now been concluded, the spotlight is not off of Apple yet. The European Commission had required that all ‘gatekeepers’ must comply with their Digital Markets Act (DMA) by the 7 March 2024.3 One implication of this for Apple, is the requirement to allow third-party app stores on iOS devices.

Whilst Apple has agreed to this requirement, concerns have been raised about the accompanying measures which Apple will introduce. This includes varying terms for app developers based on whether or not they offer their app exclusively through Apple’s App Store. As outlined in a recent article,4 one implication is that app developers exceeding 1 million existing downloads through the Apple App Store will incur a fee of €0.50 per additional user if they opt to distribute their app also through a competing app store. This may act as a deterrent to popular app developers to offer their app through a competing store.

The success of a platform like an app store, relies greatly on generating ‘network effects’ – more users attract more developers, leading to more users, and so on. Therefore, not being able to offer some of the most popular apps would make it challenging for a new app store to compete effectively with Apple’s App Store.

Recently, Spotify, along with game developer Epic and others, have expressed various concerns about Apple’s compliance with the DMA in a letter to the EC.5 It will be interesting to see whether the EC is satisfied with Apple’s approach to comply with the requirements of the DMA.

References

  1. A Timeline: How we got here
    Time to Play Fair (Spotify) (updated March 2024)

  2. Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Apple on App Store rules for music streaming providers
    EC Press Release (30/4/21)

  3. The Digital Markets Act
    EC: Business, Economy, Euro DG

  4. Apple’s exclusionary app store scheme: An existential moment for the Digital Markets Act
    VOXEU, Jacques Crémer, Paul Heidhues, Monika Schnitzer and Fiona Scott Morton (6/3/24)

  5. A Letter to the European Commission on Apple’s Lack of DMA Compliance
    Time to Play Fair (Spotify) (1/3/24)

Articles

Questions

  1. Why might ‘anti-steering provisions’ that limit the ability of app developers to inform users of alternative purchasing methods be harmful to consumers?
  2. Why is the existence of Apple’s own music streaming service, Apple Music, particularly significant in the context of its role as the operator of the App Store?
  3. Reflect on the potential advantages and disadvantages of allowing third-party app stores on iOS devices, as mandated by the Digital Markets Act (DMA).
Posted on

Game over or game on? The Microsoft/Activision merger case concludes

In a recent blog post on this site about the Microsoft/ Activision Blizzard merger, the European Commission had just reached a decision to approve the merger subject to remedies, but the investigations in the USA and UK were still ongoing. Since then, the merger has been approved by competition authorities around the world, including in the USA and UK, and thus the merger has gone through.

However, there were some differences in the way the case unfolded under the regulation of these three competition authorities.

The European Commission’s (EC) decision

The European Commission (EC) was the first to give the merger the green light. The EC’s in-depth investigation revealed concerns about the market for the distribution of games via cloud game streaming services. In particular, the concern was related to the possibility that Microsoft might make Activision’s games exclusive to its own cloud game streaming service (Game Pass Ultimate) and restrict access from competing cloud game streaming providers.

The EC argued that this in turn could strengthen Microsoft’s position in the market for PC operating systems, as Microsoft may have an incentive to limit or reduce the quality of the streaming of Activision’s games on PC’s which do not use the Windows operating system.

Thus, while the merger was approved, this was subject to remedies. These remedies included 10-year licensing commitments from Microsoft, as outlined in the EC’s press release:

These licenses will ensure that gamers that have purchased one or more Activision games on a PC or console store, or that have subscribed to a multi-game subscription service that includes Activision games, have the right to stream those games with any cloud game streaming service of their choice and play them on any device using any operating system.

This type of remedy is called a behavioural remedy and often requires the merging firms to commit to taking particular actions post-merger. Unlike structural remedies (which may for example, require the merging firms to sell off an entire business unit), behavioural remedies often require monitoring and enforcement by competition authorities. The EC argued that the deal, with these behavioural remedies, could strengthen competition in the market for cloud gaming.

The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) decision

The FTC, in the USA, had similar concerns to those of the EC related to the cloud gaming market. These were outlined in the FTC’s press release:

[The deal] would enable Microsoft to suppress competitors to its Xbox gaming consoles and its rapidly growing subscription content and cloud-gaming business.

The FTC also argued that when Microsoft had previously acquired gaming content, it had made this content exclusive to Microsoft consoles. This could result in higher prices, and reduced quality, choice and innovation. To this end, the FTC appealed in an attempt to block the deal, but the Court ruled in favour of the deal going ahead.

During this time, Microsoft announced that it had committed to keeping Call of Duty on Sony’s PlayStation after the merger, and this likely contributed towards the court’s decision. Hence, the FTC was unsuccessful in its attempt to halt the merger.

The Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) decision

The final hurdle remaining for Microsoft, was the CMA’s approval. As outlined in a previous blog post on this site, the CMA’s phase 2 investigation revealed similar concerns about the supply of cloud gaming services (amongst concerns related to the market for the supply of console gaming services, which were later dispelled), and whilst Microsoft offered some commitments similar to those accepted by the EC, the CMA did not deem these to be sufficient to address its concerns and thus prohibited the merger.

The CMA’s published remedies guidance suggests that the regulator has a preference for structural remedies over behavioural remedies. One of the reasons for this is because of the requirement to monitor and enforce the commitments, and this therefore formed part of the CMA’s reasons for not accepting the remedies. Unsurprisingly, Microsoft appealed this decision to the UK’s Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT), probably partly driven by the fact that the EC accepted similar remedies to those rejected by the CMA. However, Microsoft and the CMA agreed that if the appeal was paused, Microsoft could propose a new deal.

The new deal: did the CMA make a U-turn?

In August 2023, Microsoft submitted a new restructured deal for the CMA to review. As described by the Chief Executive of the CMA, this deal was “substantially different from what was put on the table previously” and was therefore investigated as a separate merger case under the CMA’s phase 1 processes.

The new deal meant that Microsoft would no longer be purchasing the cloud streaming rights held by Activision. Instead, the cloud streaming rights would be sold to an independent third-party game publisher – Ubisoft. This means that Microsoft will not be in control of the cloud gaming rights for Activision’s gaming content (outside of the EEA), and therefore will not be able to restrict its competitors’ access to Activision’s games, which was one of the main concerns outlined by the CMA based on the initial merger proposal. The new deal also opens up the possibility that Activision’s games will be made available on cloud gaming services that run on a non-Windows operating system.

On 13 October, the CMA approved this deal, subject to the cloud gaming rights being sold to Ubisoft, and some subsequent commitments from Microsoft in relation to its relationship with Ubisoft post-merger, as outlined in the CMA’s final report. However, the Chief Executive of the CMA has emphasised that they are unhappy with the way that Microsoft dealt with negotiating the approval of the merger:

But businesses and their advisors should be in no doubt that the tactics employed by Microsoft are no way to engage with the CMA. Microsoft had the chance to restructure during our initial investigation but instead continued to insist on a package of measures that we told them simply wouldn’t work. Dragging out proceedings in this way only wastes time and money.

What’s next in big tech?

While the merger deal has now gone through, the FTC has recently re-opened its case against Microsoft, which will continue to unfold over the next couple of months until December when the case will appear in Court. This means it is possible that the FTC could attempt to undo the merger, though this would be challenging.

In the tech market more broadly, the CMA has recently launched a market investigation into cloud services. While the focus of this blog post was on cloud gaming, cloud services are now increasingly being used by many businesses. The CMA’s issues statement suggests that a key focus of its investigation will be on the ability for customers to switch between cloud service providers. Microsoft is one of the largest providers of cloud services in the UK, and therefore it is inevitable that it will be under scrutiny. Given all three regulators’ recent efforts to ‘crackdown’ on big tech, this is just one of a series of cases that will be interesting to see unfold.

Articles

Competition authorities documentation

Questions

  1. Discuss the effectiveness of behavioural remedies vs structural remedies for a merger.
  2. Why might the competition authorities have been concerned about the possibility of Microsoft making Activision’s games exclusive to its own cloud game streaming service? Is exclusive dealing always anti-competitive?
  3. Why was the transfer of the cloud game streaming rights to Ubisoft seen as a suitable remedy?
Posted on

Microsoft’s proposed takeover of Activision Blizzard: CMA’s final ruling.

Effects on competition in the console and cloud gaming markets

Many people in the games industry expected the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to approve Microsoft’s proposed takeover of the games business, Activision Blizzard. However, in its final report published on 26 April, the CMA stated that the takeover would result in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in the supply of cloud gaming services in the UK. It rejected a behavioural remedy proposed by Microsoft and concluded that the merger should be prohibited.

When analysing the potential impact of this merger, the CMA focused on the following three issues:

  1. How important is the availability of Activision Blizzard’s games for the competitiveness of Microsoft’s rivals in the console and cloud gaming market? If, following the merger, Microsoft used its control over Activision Blizzard to restrict the availability of the games, would this significantly harm the competitiveness of their rivals?
  2. If restricting the availability of the games did harm its rivals, would it be profitable for Microsoft to do so? Do the benefits outweigh the costs? The major benefit for Microsoft is the additional sales this generates as consumers switch to its products to gain access to Activision’s games. The major cost is the forgone sales of the games to their rivals in the console and cloud gaming market.
  3. If it is profitable for Microsoft to limit the availability of the games, would this policy lead to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in the console and cloud gaming market? To answer this question the CMA compared the level of competition that would be most likely to occur if the merger were to proceed with the level if the deal were prohibited? In other words, it needed to identify the counterfactual.

In response to the first issue, the CMA judged that restricting access to Activision Blizzard’s games post-merger would significantly harm the competitiveness of Microsoft’s rivals in both the console and cloud gaming markets. However, its judgment on the second issue differed between the two markets. Why was this? One key issue was the difference in the relative market power of Microsoft in cloud vs console gaming.

One common indicator used to analyse the market position of a business relative to its rivals is market share. Using data on revenues generated from the sales of hardware, associated games and subscription services, console gaming market shares in the UK for 2021 were as follows:

  • Sony (PlayStation): 40% – 50%
  • Microsoft (xBox): 30% – 40%
  • Nintendo (Switch): 10% – 20%

Given the important market position of the PlayStation, limiting the ability of its users to purchase Activision games would result in Microsoft forgoing significant sales and revenue. Detailed analysis of the data by the CMA, indicated that the costs outweighed the benefits and so Microsoft did not have a commercial incentive to limit the availability of the games in this market. Therefore, the CMA concluded that the merger would not result in a SLC in the console gaming market. This finding was discussed in more detail in a blog on this website in March 2023.

The CMA judged that Microsoft had a much stronger position in the market for cloud gaming.

Cloud gaming services

Cloud gaming offers consumers a new way of playing graphically complex games. In this sector of the market, the games run on remote servers/data centres and then stream over the internet to the user’s device. The great advantage with this approach is that it enables consumers to play games on less powerful hardware devices such as smartphones, tablets, smart televisions, and standard PCs. Although the market is currently quite small it, has grown significantly over the past couple of years. Some people argue that it has the potential to make a dramatic change to the gaming market in the same way that businesses such as Netflix and Spotify have transformed the film, TV, and music industries.

It is more difficult to judge the relative market position of firms in a new and dynamic market, where things can change very quickly. The use of market share data is less informative but can still offer some insights. To estimate market shares in cloud gaming, the CMA used data on the number of monthly active users (MAUs). The figures for paid services in the UK for 2022 were as follows:

  • xCloud (Microsoft): 70% – 80%
  • PlayStation Cloud Gaming (Sony): 20% – 30%
  • Boosteroid: 0 – 5%
  • Nvidia GFN: 0 – 5%

Data suggest that Microsoft has a much stronger position in this market than in console gaming. There is also evidence that its market position is becoming more dominant. The same market shares for xCloud and PlayStation Gaming in 2021 were 40% – 50% and 50% – 60% respectively.

Given some of the limitations of using market-share data in a new and dynamic market, the CMA analysed other information about the sector to assess Microsoft’s market position. The investigation identified three key factors that could give Microsoft a significant cost advantage over its rivals: cloud infrastructure, the Windows operating system and access to a wide variety of games.

  1. Infrastructure: Microsoft’s ownership of Azure, a major cloud computing platform, could give it a significant cost advantage over its rivals in the future. A rival firm would need to develop it own cloud infrastructure or purchase these services from a third-party supplier.
  2. The Windows operating system: Given that far more games are developed for Windows as opposed to other operating systems, using Windows on a cloud infrastructure system gives a supplier access to large number of games. As it already owns Windows, Microsoft will be able to supply the operating system to its own cloud gaming service at little additional cost whereas its rivals will have to pay a license fee.
  3. Access to a wide range of games: Microsoft already owns twenty-four development studios that produce some very successful games such as Minecraft and Halo. It also has commercial relationships with other third-party developers who produce games for the Xbox console. This gives Microsoft another advantage over many of its rivals.

Given this evidence on Microsoft’s strong market position, the CMA concluded that the benefits to the company of restricting the availability of the games in the cloud gaming market outweighed the costs.

If Microsoft has commercial incentives to restrict the availability of Activision’s games, would this strategy lead to a SLC in the market for cloud gaming? To answer this question, the CMA had to identify the counterfactual: i.e. the most likely outcome in the market if the merger did not proceed. Following detailed analysis of the evidence, the competition authority concluded that Activision was likely to make its games available to different cloud gaming services if the deal did not take place.

Given Microsoft’s (a) strong market position and (b) limited number of relatively small competitors in cloud gaming, the CMA concluded that Microsoft’s commercial incentive to restrict the availability games would lead to a SLC compared to the counterfactual.

Martin Coleman, the chair of the independent panel of experts who conducted the CMA’s investigation, stated that:

Microsoft already enjoys a powerful position and head start over other competitors in cloud gaming and this deal would strengthen that advantage giving it the ability to undermine new and innovative competitors.

In response to these competition concerns, Microsoft offered to supply Activision games to certain cloud gaming services for a 10-year period. However, the CMA concluded that this behavioural remedy was not enough to address the competition issues raised by the merger and recommended that the deal be prohibited.

Microsoft’s immediate response was to appeal the decision to the Competition Appeal Tribunal.

The Federal Trade Commission is currently investigating the impact of the deal in the USA while the European Commission has just completed its investigation in the European Union. On 15 May, the EC announced that Microsoft’s behavioural remedy did fully address the competition concerns identified during its investigation. Therefore, the merger was approved on condition that Microsoft fully implemented the actions outlined in the remedy.

It will be interesting to read the recommendations of the FTC when the final results of its investigation are published later this year.

Articles

CMA and EC press releases

Questions

  1. Discuss the barriers to entry that exist in both the console and cloud gaming markets.
  2. Outline some of the issues when trying to calculate market shares in cloud gaming.
  3. What is meaning of the term ‘input foreclosure’? How is this relevant to the Microsoft/Activision case?
  4. What is the difference between a behavioural and a structural remedy? In what circumstances is a behavioural remedy most likely to be effective?
  5. Discuss some of the potential limitations with the behavioural remedy proposed by Microsoft.
  6. Explain why Microsoft’s position in the downstream market for cloud gaming is likely to influence incentives it faces to restrict the availability of Activision’s games post-merger.
Posted on

Microsoft’s proposed acquisition of Activision

Why did a competition authority change its mind on one aspect of this merger?

In January 2022, Microsoft announced its plan to acquire Activision Blizzard for $68.7 billion. Activision Blizzard is one of the largest games publishers in the world and famous for titles such as Call of Duty and World of Warcraft. Sales revenue from Call of Duty: Modern Warfare II was over $10 billion within ten days of its release in 2022. Given Microsoft’s ownership of the Xbox, one of the three devices that dominate the market for gaming consoles, the deal was always likely to raise competition concerns.

Potential competition issues

Following Phase 1 and 2 merger investigations by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) a number of competition issues were raised. One particular concern was in the market for gaming consoles and the potential impact of the merger on the future availability of Call of Duty (CoD). Some of the key findings of the initial research undertaken by the CMA were that:

  • Sony’s PlayStation was a much closer rival for the Xbox than the Nintendo Switch, which tends to offer more family-orientated games.
  • PlayStation users spend significant amounts of gametime playing CoD.
  • Game availability is a key factor that influences console purchase decisions.
  • Twenty-four percent of PlayStation users who play CoD stated that they would not purchase future versions of the console if CoD was unavailable on the platform.

These findings suggest that there are commercial incentives for Microsoft to limit the availability of CoD on the PlayStation. For example, the newly merged business could make future versions of the game exclusive to the Xbox – total exclusivity. Alternatively, it could adopt a policy of partial exclusivity. For example, it could only make versions of CoD available on the PlayStation that exclude some of its more popular features.

There are costs to Microsoft of implementing a policy of total or partial exclusivity. For example, 76% per cent of PlayStation users who play CoD stated that they would not switch consoles if future versions of the game were made unavailable. By making CoD exclusive to Xbox users, Microsoft would lose revenue from forgoing potential sales of the game to this group of users. The firm may also suffer reputational damage if there was a social media backlash against an exclusivity decision.

However, these costs of implementing a policy of exclusivity could be outweighed by the potential benefits. These include:

  • The additional sales of consoles as some users switch from the PlayStation to the Xbox to gain access to CoD.
  • the sale of CoD and other games to these additional Xbox users.

To quantify these costs and benefits, the CMA used a financial model that includes information on the amounts of money users typically spend on the Xbox platform and CoD over a five-year period. This ‘lifetime value of customers’ model found that it would be profitable for Microsoft to implement a policy of exclusivity post-merger.

The CMA also noted that in the majority of cases where Microsoft had previously acquired gaming studios, the subsequent release of games had been made exclusive to the Xbox.

CMA findings

Following its analysis of the case, the CMA published its provisional findings on the 8th February 2023. One key finding was that the merger would harm consumers, as it would lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the supply of console gaming services. The CMA argued that the acquisition should proceed only if Activision Blizzard sold off the parts of its business responsible for producing CoD. This is a structural remedy.

Microsoft rejected these findings and argued that the financial modelling used by the CMA was based on inaccurate data. In its formal written response to the competition authority the company argued that:

  • The potential gains from a policy of exclusivity had been calculated over a five-year period whereas the costs (i.e. the forgone sales of CoD) had only been calculated over a one-year period. More accurate analysis should compare both the potential gains and losses over a five-year period.
  • When more recent data are used to calculate the amounts of money users typically spend on the Xbox platform and CoD over a five-year period, the figure is lower than in the original work by the CMA.

Revised CMA findings

Having adjusted its analysis to take account of these criticisms, the CMA published an update to its Provisional Findings on 24th March 2023. In this update the competition authority stated that:

The analysis now shows that it would not be commercially beneficial to Microsoft to make CoD exclusive to Xbox following the deal, but that Microsoft will instead still have the incentive to continue to make the game available on PlayStation.

Therefore, just six weeks after publishing its Provisional Findings the CMA changed its conclusion and stated that the merger would not result in a substantial lessening of competition in the market for the supply of console gaming services in the UK.

In response to these changes an ex-CMA lawyer stated that:

This is extremely unusual. Restating your provisional findings is something ‘you would rather die than do’.
It is important to remember that the investigation by the CMA also raised concerns about the impact of the acquisition on competition in the cloud gaming market. These concerns remain unaffected by these updated findings and a final report will be published by the CMA at the end of April.

Competition authorities from 16 different countries/regions are also investigating the deal, including the Federal Trade Commission in the USA and the European Commission. It will be interesting to see if these authorities agree on the potential impact of the merger on competition.

Articles

CMA documentation

Questions

  1. Under what circumstances could a merger result in a substantial lessening of competition?
  2. Summarise the thresholds that have to be met by a potential merger before it is investigated by the Competition and Markets Authority.
  3. Explain the direct and indirect network effects that exist in the console gaming market. To what extent do they create barriers to entry?
  4. Outline some different ways that Microsoft could introduce a policy of partial exclusivity for the Call of Duty franchise of games.
  5. What would be the impact of a policy of exclusivity on the cross price elasticity of demand between Xbox and PlayStation consoles?
  6. Outline the difference between behavioural and structural remedies for merger.
  7. Discuss why the acquisition of Activision by Microsoft might reduce competition in the cloud gaming market.