Category: Economics for Business: Ch 17

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Should train companies scrap peak-time fares?

In many countries, train fares at peak times are higher than at off-peak times. This is an example of third-degree price discrimination. Assuming that peak-time travellers generally have a lower price elasticity of demand, the policy allows train companies to increase revenue and profit.

If the sole purpose of ticket sales were to maximise profits, the policy would make sense. Assuming that higher peak-time fares were carefully set, although the number travelling would be somewhat reduced, this would be more than compensated for by the higher revenue per passenger.

But there are external benefits from train travel. Compared with travel by car, there are lower carbon emissions per person travelling. Also, train travel helps to reduce road congestion. To the extent that higher peak-time fares encourage people to travel by car instead, there will be resulting environmental and congestion externalities.

The Scottish experiment with abolishing higher peak-time fares

In October 2023, the Scottish government introduced a pilot scheme abolishing peak-time fares, so that tickets were the same price at any time of the day. The idea was to encourage people, especially commuters, to adopt more sustainable means of transport. Although the price elasticity of demand for commuting is very low, the hope was that the cross-price elasticity between cars and trains would be sufficiently high to encourage many people to switch from driving to taking the train.

One concern with scrapping peak-time fares is that trains would not have the capacity to cope with the extra passengers. Indeed, one of the arguments for higher peak-time fares is to smooth out the flow of passengers during the day, encouraging those with flexibility of when to travel to use the cheaper and less crowded off-peak trains.

This may well apply to certain parts of the UK, but in the case of Scotland it was felt that there would be the capacity to cope with the extra demand at peak time. Also, in a post-COVID world, with more people working flexibly, there was less need for many people to travel at peak times than previously.

Reinstatement of peak-time fares in Scotland

It was with some dismay, therefore, especially by commuters and environmentalists, when the Scottish government decided to end the pilot at the beginning of October 2024 and reinstate peak-time fares – in many cases at nearly double the off-peak rates. For example, the return fare between Glasgow and Edinburgh rose from £16.20 to £31.40 at peak times.

The Scottish government justified the decision by claiming that passenger numbers had risen by only 6.8%, when, to be self-financing, an increase of 10% would have been required. But this begs the question of whether it was necessary to be self-financing when the justification was partly environmental. Also, the 6.8% figure is based on a number of assumptions that could be challenged (see The Conversation article linked below). A longer pilot would have helped to clarify demand.

Other schemes

A number of countries have introduced schemes to encourage greater use of the railways or other forms of public transport. One of these is the flat fare for local journeys. Provided that this is lower than previously, it can encourage people to use public transport and leave their car at home. Also, its simplicity is also likely to be attractive to passengers. For example, in England bus fares are capped at £2. Currently, the scheme is set to run until 31 December 2024.

Another scheme is the subscription model, whereby people pay a flat fee per month (or week or year, or other time period) for train or bus travel or both. Germany, for example, has a flat-rate €49 per month ‘Deutschland-Ticket‘ (rising to €58 per month in January 2025). This ticket provides unlimited access to local and regional public transport in Germany, including trains, buses, trams, metros and ferries (but not long-distance trains). This zero marginal fare cost of a journey encourages passengers to use public transport. The only marginal costs they will face will be ancillary costs, such as getting to and from the train station or bus stop and having to travel at a specific time.

Articles

Questions

  1. Identify the arguments for and against having higher rail fares at peak times than at off-peak times
  2. Why might it be a good idea to scrap higher peak-time fares in some parts of a country but not in others?
  3. Provide a critique of the Scottish government’s arguments for reintroducing higher peak-time fares.
  4. With reference to The Conversation article, why is it difficult to determine the effect on demand of the Scottish pilot of scrapping peak-time fares?
  5. What are the arguments for and against the German scheme of having a €49 per month public transport pass for local and regional transport with no further cost per journey? Should it be extended to long-distance trains and coaches?
  6. In England there is a flat £2 single fare for buses. Would it be a good idea to make bus travel completely free?
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Disgruntled Oasis fans react to dynamic pricing

On Saturday 31 August, tickets for the much-heralded Oasis reunion tour went on sale through the official retailer, Ticketmaster. When the company sells tickets, the acts or their promoters can choose whether to use a static pricing system, where each type of ticket is sold at a set price until they have all been sold. Or they can use a dynamic pricing system (‘in-demand’ or ‘platinum’ tickets, as Ticketmaster calls them), where there is a starting price quoted, but where prices then rise according to demand. The higher the demand, the more the price is driven up. Acts or their promoters have the option of choosing an upper limit to the price.

Dynamic pricing

The Oasis tickets were sold under the dynamic pricing system, a system previously used for Harry Styles, Bruce Springsteen, Coldplay and Blackpink concerts, but one rejected by Taylor Swift for her recent Eras tour. Standing tickets for the Oasis concert with a face value of around £135 were quickly being sold for over £350. There were long online queues, with the prices rising as people slowly moved up the queue. When they reached the front, they had to decide quickly whether to pay the much higher price. Some people later suffered from buyer’s remorse, when they realised that in the pressure of the moment, they had paid more than they could afford.

Dynamic pricing is when prices change with market conditions: rising at times when demand exceeds supply and falling when supply exceeds demand. It is sometimes referred to as ‘surge pricing’ to reflect situations when price surges in times of excess demand.

Dynamic pricing is a form of price discrimination. It is an imperfect form of first-degree price discrimination, which is defined as people being charged the maximum price they are willing to pay for a product. Pricing in an eBay auction comes close to first-degree price discrimination. With dynamic pricing in the ticket market, some people may indeed pay the maximum, but others earlier in the queue will be lucky and pay less than their maximum.

Ticketmaster justifies the system of dynamic pricing, saying that it gives ‘fans fair and safe access to the tickets, while enabling artists and other people involved in staging live events to price tickets closer to their true market value’. The company argues that if the price is below the market value, a secondary market will then drive ticket prices up. Ticket touts will purchase large amounts of tickets, often using bots to access the official site and then resell them at highly inflated prices on sites such as Viagogo and Stubhub, where ticket prices for popular acts can sell for well over £1000. The day after Oasis tickets went on sale, Viagogo had seats priced at up to £26 000 each!

Oasis and Ticketmaster have tried to stamp out the unofficial secondary market by stating that only tickets bought through the official retailers (Ticketmaster, Gigsandtours and SeeTickets) will be valid. If fans want to resell a ticket – perhaps because they find they can no longer go – they can resell them on the official secondary market though Ticketmaster’s Fan-to-Fan site or Twickets. These official secondary sites allow holders of unwanted tickets to sell them for anything up to the original face value, but no more. Buyers pay a 12% handling fee. It remains to be seen whether this can be enforced with genuine tickets resold on the secondary market.

Examples of dynamic pricing

Dynamic pricing is not a new pricing strategy. It has been used for many years in the transport, e-commerce and hospitality sectors. Airlines, for example, have a pricing model whereby as a flight fills up, so the prices of the seats rise. If you book a seat on a budget airline a long time in advance, you may be able to get it at a very low price. If, on the other hand, you want a seat at the last minute, you may well have to pay a very high price. The price reflects the strength of demand and its price elasticity. The business traveller who needs to travel the next day for a meeting will have a very low price sensitivity and may well be prepared to pay a very high price indeed. Airlines also learn from past behaviour and so some popular routes will start at a higher price. A similar system of dynamic pricing is used with advance train tickets, with the price rising as trains get booked up.

The dynamic pricing system used by airlines and train companies is similar, but not identical, to first-degree price discrimination. The figure below illustrates first-degree price discrimination by showing a company setting the price for a particular product.

Assume initially that it sets a single profit-maximising price. This would be a price of P1, at an output of Q1, where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC). (We assume for simplicity that average and marginal costs are constant.) Total profit will be area 1: i.e. the blue area ((P1 – AC) × Q1). Area 2 represents consumer surplus, with all those consumers who would have been prepared to pay a price above P1, only having to pay P1.

Now assume that the firm uses first-degree price discrimination, selling each unit of the product at the maximum price each consumer is willing to pay. Starting with the consumer only willing to pay a price of P2, the price will go on rising up along the demand with each additional consumer being charged a higher price up to the price where the demand curve meets the vertical axis. In such a case, the firm’s profit would be not just the blue area, but also the green areas 2 and 3. Note that there is no consumer surplus as area 2 is now part of the additional profit to the firm.

Although dynamic pricing by airlines is similar to this model of first-degree price discrimination, in practice some people will be paying less than they would be willing to pay and the price goes up in stages, not continuously with each new sale of a ticket. Thus, compared with a fixed price per seat, the additional profit will be less than areas 2 + 3, but total profit will still be considerably greater than area 1 alone. Note also that there is a maximum quantity of seats (Qmax), represented by a full flight. The airline would hope that demand and its pricing model are such that Qmax is less than Q2.

Dynamic pricing also applies in the hospitality sector, as hotels raise the prices for rooms according to demand, with prices at peak times often being considerably higher than off-season prices. Rather then pre-setting prices for particular seasons, dates or weekends/weekdays, many hotels, especially chains and booking agents, adjust prices dynamically as demand changes. Airbnb offers property owners what it calls ‘Smart Pricing’, where nightly prices change automatically with demand.

Another example is Uber, which uses dynamic pricing to balance demand and supply location by location. In times of peak demand on any route, the company’s algorithm will raise the price. This will encourage people to delay travelling if they can or use alternative means of transport. It will also encourage more Uber drivers to come to that area. In times of low demand, the price will fall. This will encourage more people to use the service (rather than regular taxis or buses) and discourage drivers from working in that area.

Where dynamic pricing varies with the time or date when the purchase is made, it is sometimes referred to as inter-temporal pricing. It is a form of second-degree price discrimination, which is where a firm offers consumers a range of different pricing options for the same or similar products.

Another example of dynamic pricing, which is closer to first-degree price discrimination is the use of sophisticated algorithms and AI by Amazon, allowing it to update the prices of millions of products many times a day according to market conditions. Another is eBay auctions, where the price rises as the end date is reached, according to the willingness to pay of the bidders.

Attitudes to dynamic pricing

Consumers have grown accustomed to dynamic pricing in many industries. People generally accept the pricing model of budget airlines, for example. What makes it acceptable is that most people feel that they can take advantage of early low-priced seats and can compare the current prices on different flights and airlines when making their travel plans. Pricing is transparent. With the Oasis concert, however, there wasn’t the same degree of price transparency. Many people were surprised and dismayed to find that when they got to the front of the online queue, the price had risen dramatically.

People are familiar of dynamic pricing in the context of price cuts to shift unsold stock. Supermarkets putting stickers on products saying ‘reduced for quick sale’ is an example. Another is seasonal sales. What is less acceptable to many consumers is firms putting up prices when demand is high. They see it a profiteering. Many supermarkets are introducing electronic shelf labels (ESLs), where prices can be changed remotely as demand changes. Consumers may react badly to this if they see the prices going up. The supermarket, however, may find it a very convenient way of reducing prices to shift stock – something consumers are hardly likely to complain about.

Returning to the Oasis tour, the UK government responded to the outrage of fans as ticket prices soared. Culture Secretary, Lisa Nandy, announced that the government will investigate how surge pricing for concert tickets is used by official retailers, such as Ticketmaster. This will be part of a planned review of ticket sales that seeks to establish a fairer and more transparent system of pricing.

The problem is that, with some fans being prepared to pay very high prices indeed to see particular acts and with demand considerably exceeding supply at prices that fans would consider reasonable, some way needs to be found of rationing demand. If it is not price, then it will inevitably involve some form of queuing or rationing system, with the danger that this encourages touts and vastly inflated prices on the secondary market.

Perhaps a lesson can be drawn from the Glastonbury Festival, where prices are fixed, people queue online and where security systems are in place to prevent secondary sales by ticket touts. The 2024 price was set at £355 + a £5 booking fee and purchasers were required to register with personal details and a photo, which was checked on admission.

Update

On 5 September, the CMA announced that it was launching an investigation into Ticketmaster over the Oasis concert sales. Its concerns centred on ‘whether buyers were given clear and timely information, and whether consumer protection law was breached’. This followed complaints by fans that (i) they were not given clear and timely information beforehand that the tickets involved dynamic pricing and warned about the possible prices they might have to pay and (ii) on reaching the front of the queue they were put under pressure to buy tickets within a short period of time.

Meanwhile, band member stated that they were unaware that dynamic pricing would be used and that the decision to use the system was made by their management.

Videos

Articles

Questions

  1. What is the difference between dynamic pricing and surge pricing?
  2. What is buyer’s remorse? How could dynamic pricing be used while minimising the likelihood of buyer’s remorse?
  3. Distinguish between first-degree, second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Do the various forms of dynamic pricing correspond to one or more of these three types?
  4. Distinguish between consumer and producer surplus. How may dynamic pricing lead to a reduction in consumer surplus and an increase in producer surplus?
  5. Should Ticketmaster sell tickets on the same basis as tickets for the Glastonbury Festival?
  6. Is Oasis a monopoly? What are the ticket pricing implications?
  7. Are there any industries where firms would not benefit from dynamic pricing? Explain.
  8. What are the arguments for and against allowing tickets to be sold on the secondary market for whatever price they will fetch?
  9. How powerful is Ticketmaster in the primary and secondary ticket markets?
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The CMA fuels concerns over high petrol and diesel prices

The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has been investigating road fuel pricing in the UK. In July 2022, it launched a study into the development of the road-fuel market over recent years. The final report of this study was published in July 2023 and covered the refining, wholesale and retail elements of the market.

In the retail part of the market, the CMA noted some potential causes for concern: retailer fuel margins had increased; there were geographical variations in pricing; filling stations with fewer competitors tended to charge higher prices; retail prices tended to rise rapidly when oil prices increased but fell slowly when oil prices fell (known as ‘rocket and feather’ pricing patterns); motorway service stations charged considerably higher prices than supermarkets or other filling stations.

In response to these findings, the CMA has been publishing an interim report every four months. These reports give average pump prices and margins. They also give relative average pump prices between different types of retailer, and between each of the supermarkets.

The latest interim report was published on 26 July 2024. It reiterated the finding of the 2023 report that the fuel market has become less competitive since 2019. What is more, it continues to be so. In particular, the range of retail prices and the level of retail margins remain high compared to historic levels. The interim report estimates that ‘the increase in retailers’ fuel margins compared to 2019 resulted in increased fuel costs for drivers in 2023 of over £1.6bn’.

Price leadership

Road fuel retailing is an oligopoly, with the major companies being the big supermarkets, the retail arms of oil companies (such as Shell, BP, Esso and Texaco, operating their own filling stations) and a few large specialist companies, such as the Motor Fuel Group (MFG), the EG Group and Rontec, whose filling stations sell one or other of the main brands. But although it is an oligopoly producing a homogeneous product, it is not a cartel (unlike OPEC). Nevertheless, there has been a high degree of tacit collusion in the market with price competition limited to certain rules of behaviour in particular locations. A familiar one is setting prices ending in .9 of a penny (e.g. 142.9p), with the acceptance by competitors that Applegreen will set it ending at .8 of a penny and Asda at .7 of a penny.

One of the main forms of tacit collusion in areas where there are several filling stations is that of price leadership. Asda, and in some areas Morrisons, have been price leaders, setting the lowest price for that area, with other filling stations setting the price at or slightly above that level (e.g. 0.2p, 1.2p or 2.2p higher). Indeed, other major retailers, such as Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Esso and Shell took a relatively passive approach to pricing, unwilling to undercut Asda and accept lower profit margins.

Things changed after 2019. Asda chose to increase its profit margins. In 2022 it did this by reducing prices more slowly than would previously have been the case as wholesale prices fell. In other words, it used price feathering. Other big retailers might have been expected to use the opportunity to undercut Asda. Instead, they decided to increase their own margins by following a similar pricing path. The result was a 6 pence per litre increase in the average supermarket fuel margin from 2019 to 2022.

More recently, Asda has increased its margins more than other major retailers, making it no longer the price leader. The effect has been to put less pressure on other retailers to trim their now higher profit margins.

Remedies

The 2023 CMA report made two specific recommendations to deal with this rise in profit margins.

The first was that the CMA should be given a statutory monitoring function over the fuel market to ‘hold the industry to account’. In May this year, legislation was passed to this effect. This requires the CMA to monitor the industry and report anti-competitive practice to the government.

The second was to introduce a new statutory ‘open data real-time fuel finder scheme’. This would give motorists access to live, station-by-station fuel prices.

Several major retailers already contribute to a voluntary price data sharing scheme. However, this covers only around 40% of UK forecourts. According to the CMA, it ‘falls well short of the comprehensive, real-time, station-by station data needed to empower motorists and drive competition’. The CMA has thus called on the new Labour government to introduce legislation to make its recommended system compulsory. This, it is hoped, would make the retail fuel market much more competitive by improving consumer information about prices at alternative filling stations in their area.

Articles

CMA reports

Questions

  1. What forms can tacit collusion take?
  2. Why are fuel prices at motorway service stations so much higher than in towns? What is the relevance of the price elasticity of demand to the answer?
  3. What are the main findings of the CMA’s July 2024 Interim Report
  4. What is meant by rocket and feather pricing?
  5. What recommendations does the CMA make for increasing competition in the retail road fuel market?
  6. Find out how competitive retail fuel pricing is in two other developed countries. Why are they more or less competitive than the UK?
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Vetting vets

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is proposing to launch a formal Market Investigation into anti-competitive practices in the UK’s £2bn veterinary industry (for pets rather than farm animals or horses). This follows a preliminary investigation which received 56 000 responses from pet owners and vet professionals. These responses reported huge rises in bills for treatment and medicines and corresponding rises in the cost of pet insurance.

At the same time there has been a large increase in concentration in the industry. In 2013, independent vet practices accounted for 89% of the market; today, they account for only around 40%. Over the past 10 years, some 1500 of the UK’s 5000 vet practices had been acquired by six of the largest corporate groups. In many parts of the country, competition is weak; in others, it is non-existent, with just one of these large companies having a monopoly of veterinary services.

This market power has given rise to a number of issues. The CMA identifies the following:

  • Of those practices checked, over 80% had no pricing information online, even for the most basic services. This makes is hard for pet owners to make decisions on treatment.
  • Pet owners potentially overpay for medicines, many of which can be bought online or over the counter in pharmacies at much lower prices, with the pet owners merely needing to know the correct dosage. When medicines require a prescription, often it is not made clear to the owners that they can take a prescription elsewhere, and owners end up paying high prices to buy medicines directly from the vet practice.
  • Even when there are several vet practices in a local area, they are often owned by the same company and hence there is no price competition. The corporate group often retains the original independent name when it acquires the practice and thus is is not clear to pet owners that ownership has changed. They may think there is local competition when there is not.
  • Often the corporate group provides the out-of-hours service, which tends to charge very high prices for emergency services. If there is initially an independent out-of-hours service provider, it may be driven out of business by the corporate owner of day-time services only referring pet owners to its own out-of-hours service.
  • The corporate owners may similarly provide other services, such as specialist referral centres, diagnostic labs, animal hospitals and crematoria. By referring pets only to those services owned by itself, this crowds out independents and provides a barrier to the entry of new independents into these parts of the industry.
  • Large corporate groups have the incentive to act in ways which may further reduce competition and choice and drive up their profits. They may, for example, invest in advanced equipment, allowing them to provide more sophisticated but high-cost treatment. Simpler, lower-cost treatments may not be offered to pet owners.
  • The higher prices in the industry have led to large rises in the cost of pet insurance. These higher insurance costs are made worse by vets steering owners with pet insurance to choosing more expensive treatments for their pets than those without insurance. The Association of British Insurers notes that there has been a large rise in claims attributable to an increasing provision of higher-cost treatments.
  • The industry suffers from acute staff shortages, which cuts down on the availability of services and allows practices to push up prices.
  • Regulation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is weak in the area of competition and pricing.

The CMA’s formal investigation will examine the structure of the veterinary industry and the behaviour of the firms in the industry. As the CMA states:

In a well-functioning market, we would expect a range of suppliers to be able to inform consumers of their services and, in turn, consumers would act on the information they receive.

Market failures in the veterinary industry

The CMA’s concerns suggest that the market is not sufficiently competitive, with vet companies holding significant market power. This leads to higher prices for a range of vet services. However, the CMA’s analysis suggests that market failures in the industry extend beyond the simple question of market power and lack of competition.

A crucial market failure is asymmetry of information. The veterinary companies have much better information than pet owners. This is a classic principal–agent problem. The agent, in this case the vet (or vet company), has much better information than the principal, in this case the pet owner. This information can be used to the interests of the vet company, with pet owners being persuaded to purchase more extensive and expensive treatments than they might otherwise choose if they were better informed.

The principal–agent problem also arises in the context of the dependant nature of pets. They are the ones receiving the treatment and, in this context, are the principals. Their owners are the ones acquiring the treatment for them and hence are the pets’ agents. The question is whether the owners will always do the best thing for their pets. This raises philosophical questions of animal rights and whether owners should be required to protect the interests of their pets.

Another information issue is the short-term perspective of many pet owners. They may purchase a young and healthy pet and assume that it will remain so. However, as the pet gets older, it is likely to face increasing health issues, with correspondingly increasing vet bills. But many owners do not consider such future bills when they purchase the pet. They suffer from what behavioural economists call ‘irrational exuberance’. Such exuberance may also occur when the owner of a sick pet is offered expensive treatment. They may over-optimistically assume that the treatment will be totally successful and that their pet will not need further treatment.

Vets cite another information asymmetry. This concerns the costs they face in providing treatment. Many owners are unaware of these costs – costs that include rent, business rates, heating and lighting, staff costs, equipment costs, consumables (such as syringes, dressings, surgical gowns, antiseptic and gloves), VAT, and so on. Many of these costs have risen substantially in recent months and are reflected in the prices pet owners are charged. With people experiencing free health care for themselves from the NHS (or other national provider), this may make them feel that the price of pet health care is excessive.

Then there is the issue of inequality. Pets provide great benefits to many owners and contribute to owners’ well-being. If people on low incomes cannot afford high vet bills, they may either have to forgo having a pet, with the benefits it brings, or incur high vet bills that they ill afford or simply go without treatment for their pets.

Finally, there are the external costs that arise when people abandon their pets with various health conditions. This has been a growing problem, with many people buying pets during lockdown when they worked from home, only to abandon them later when they have had to go back to the office or other workplace. The costs of treating or putting down such pets are born by charities or local authorities.

The CMA is consulting on its proposal to begin a formal Market Investigation. This closes on 11 April. If, in the light of its consultation, the Market Investigation goes ahead, the CMA will later report on its findings and may require the veterinary industry to adopt various measures. These could require vet groups to provide better information to owners, including what lower-cost treatments are available. But given the oligopolistic nature of the industry, it is unlikely to lead to significant reductions in vets bills.

Articles

CMA documents

Questions

  1. How would you establish whether there is an abuse of market power in the veterinary industry?
  2. Explain what is meant by the principal–agent problem. Give some other examples both in economic and non-economic relationships.
  3. What market advantages do large vet companies have over independent vet practices?
  4. How might pet insurance lead to (a) adverse selection; (b) moral hazard? Explain. How might (i) insurance companies and (ii) vets help to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard?
  5. Find out what powers the CMA has to enforce its rulings.
  6. Search for vet prices and compare the prices charged by at least three vet practices. How would you account for the differences or similarities in prices?
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Bad Apple: App Store abuse of dominance leads to €1.8bn fine

High-tech firms, such as Google, Amazon, Meta and Apple, have increasingly been gaining the attention of competition authorities across the world, and not in a good way! Over the past few years, competition authorities in the UK, USA and Europe have all opened various cases against Apple, with particular focus on its App Store (see, for example, a blog post on this site from 2021 about the Epic v. Apple case in the USA).

The lead-up to the €1.8 billion fine issued by the European Commission (Europe’s competition regulator) on the 4th March 2024, began in 2019 when music streaming provider, Spotify, filed a complaint against Apple, after years of being bound by the ‘unfair’ App Store rules imposed by Apple.1

Apple’s App Store has traditionally served as the only platform through which application developers can distribute their apps to iOS users, and app developers have had no choice but to adhere to whatever rules are set by Apple. As iPhone and iPad users know, the App Store is the only way in which users can download apps to their iOS devices, establishing Apple’s App Store as a ‘gatekeeper’, as described in the European Commission’s (EC) press release expressing their initial concerns in April 2021.2 When it comes to music streaming apps, Apple not only serves as the exclusive platform for downloading these apps, but also has its own music streaming app, Apple Music, that competes with other music-streaming providers.

This means that Apple holds a dominant position in the market for the distribution of music streaming apps to iOS users through its App Store. Being a dominant firm is not necessarily a problem. However, firms which hold a dominant position do have a special responsibility not to abuse their position. The EC found that Apple was abusing its dominant position in this market, with particular concerns about the rules it imposed on music streaming app developers.

Apple requires that app developers use Apple’s own in-app purchase system. This means that users must make any in-app purchases or subscriptions to music streaming apps through Apple’s system, subsequently subjecting app developers to a 30% commission fee. The EC found that this often led app developers to pass on these costs to consumers through an increase in prices.

Although users could still purchase subscriptions outside of the app, which may be cheaper for users as these payments will not be subject to commission, the EC found that Apple limits the ability for app developers to inform users about these alternative methods. For example, Apple prevented app developers from including links within their apps to their websites, where users could purchase subscriptions. The implications of this extends beyond increased prices for consumers, potentially resulting in a degraded user experience as well.

These restrictions imposed by Apple are examples of what are known as ‘anti-steering provisions’, and it is this conduct that led the Commission to issue the fine for the abuse of a dominant market position.

Whilst this case has now been concluded, the spotlight is not off of Apple yet. The European Commission had required that all ‘gatekeepers’ must comply with their Digital Markets Act (DMA) by the 7 March 2024.3 One implication of this for Apple, is the requirement to allow third-party app stores on iOS devices.

Whilst Apple has agreed to this requirement, concerns have been raised about the accompanying measures which Apple will introduce. This includes varying terms for app developers based on whether or not they offer their app exclusively through Apple’s App Store. As outlined in a recent article,4 one implication is that app developers exceeding 1 million existing downloads through the Apple App Store will incur a fee of €0.50 per additional user if they opt to distribute their app also through a competing app store. This may act as a deterrent to popular app developers to offer their app through a competing store.

The success of a platform like an app store, relies greatly on generating ‘network effects’ – more users attract more developers, leading to more users, and so on. Therefore, not being able to offer some of the most popular apps would make it challenging for a new app store to compete effectively with Apple’s App Store.

Recently, Spotify, along with game developer Epic and others, have expressed various concerns about Apple’s compliance with the DMA in a letter to the EC.5 It will be interesting to see whether the EC is satisfied with Apple’s approach to comply with the requirements of the DMA.

References

  1. A Timeline: How we got here
    Time to Play Fair (Spotify) (updated March 2024)

  2. Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Apple on App Store rules for music streaming providers
    EC Press Release (30/4/21)

  3. The Digital Markets Act
    EC: Business, Economy, Euro DG

  4. Apple’s exclusionary app store scheme: An existential moment for the Digital Markets Act
    VOXEU, Jacques Crémer, Paul Heidhues, Monika Schnitzer and Fiona Scott Morton (6/3/24)

  5. A Letter to the European Commission on Apple’s Lack of DMA Compliance
    Time to Play Fair (Spotify) (1/3/24)

Articles

Questions

  1. Why might ‘anti-steering provisions’ that limit the ability of app developers to inform users of alternative purchasing methods be harmful to consumers?
  2. Why is the existence of Apple’s own music streaming service, Apple Music, particularly significant in the context of its role as the operator of the App Store?
  3. Reflect on the potential advantages and disadvantages of allowing third-party app stores on iOS devices, as mandated by the Digital Markets Act (DMA).