Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 10

Posted on

The liquidity – return trade-off: Lessons from private credit funds

Wobbles in the private credit market in the fourth quarter of 2025 spooked those retail investors with investments in private credit funds – a significant segment of the growing shadow banking sector. These funds use investors’ money to finance lending to businesses and individuals who struggle to, or do not want to, access credit from banks and the public market. Therefore, the risks are higher.

The failures of two auto parts suppliers in the USA last year have highlighted the risks involved. Retail investors are exiting such funds in significant numbers. Bcred, Blackstone’s $82 billion private credit fund, saw money equivalent to 8% of its net asset value (NAV) withdrawn. The firm, and employees, put $400m in to maintain confidence.

Blue Owl, another credit manager, closed investors’ usual quarterly redemption window, largely due to unprecedented demand. The fund’s managers have decided that they will wind down the fund and return money back to investors over time, whether that want it or not.

Several other listed funds run by big names, such as Blackrock and KKR, have slashed dividends and written down asset values. This week, both Morgan Stanley and Cliffwater limited withdrawals from their credit funds.

So, what has happened? In recent years, there has been a big growth in private credit funds in the USA aimed at individual retail investors. With interest margins low and fees from public investment products diminishing due to the shift to passive investing, financial institutions spied an opportunity for chunky fees by offering private credit investment to retail investors.

The liquidity–return trade-off

Such investors are attracted by the potential for higher returns that private credit funds offered compared to public funds. The need to provide higher returns was related partly to the higher credit risk associated with the lending, but also to the illiquidity of the private credit assets that the funds invested in.

While much attention in the financial media has focused on the heightened credit risk in private funds, less attention has been given to the liquidity issue. At the heart of the private credit business model is a level of illiquidity that individual retail investors would not be comfortable with. The liquidity–return trade-off is one of the fundamental concepts in finance. Investors must be prepared to trade-off liquidity for higher returns, and vice versa. They cannot have both.

This blog will discuss that trade-off in the context of private credit funds and its lessons for retail investors, particularly in Europe where institutions are gearing up to offer such investment products.

Liquidity preference

One of the fundamental concepts in finance is the maturity mismatch between the preferences of ultimate lenders (typically households) and the requirements of ultimate borrowers (typically firms, but also households and governments too). Typically, lenders want to ‘lend short’ while borrowers want to ‘borrow long’. The financial system reconciles this mismatch by providing two important economic functions – maturity transformation and liquidity provision.

Banks offer maturity transformation by offering current and other accounts to individuals where deposits can be redeemed at short notice. These institutions use the deposits to finance long-term lending for a variety of purposes; examples include property, investment in capital or day-to-day spending. Their effective management of this process is important economically for the smooth running of the payments mechanism and for economic growth.

But, to fulfil this, banks have to hold a mixture of assets with varying degrees of liquidity – some highly liquid, such as cash and short-term government debt instruments, and some illiquid, such as long-term loans. Liquidity is such an important issue for banks that their assets are listed on their balance sheet in order of liquidity – from most liquid to least liquid.

However, there is an inverse relationship between liquidity and expected return. Banks and their customers have to sacrifice return if they want higher liquidity. Therefore, liquid assets tend to offer a low rate of return and illiquid assets a higher rate of return. Consequently, in order to retain sufficient liquidity, the overall return banks can generate is limited compared to a situation where they invest wholly in illiquid assets.

If individuals want to invest directly in long-term financial assets, such as debt and equity, there must be a secondary market where these can be bought and sold – the stock market. Without this mechanism providing liquidity, individuals are less likely to invest in these assets in the first place. Few would want to wait for a debt security to mature or hold a share in perpetuity. Secondary markets mean they don’t have to.

Liquidity and private credit

Private credit funds have existed for a long time as part of the shadow banking sector and have grown in scale. Such funds invest in non-tradable, long-term illiquid loans as a parallel to the better-known private equity sector. Traditionally they have been targeted at institutional investors, who are more comfortable with the higher credit risk and illiquidity involved.

However, while institutions are prepared to forgo liquidity for many years in expectation of higher returns, individual retail investors are not – they have a higher liquidity preference. Funds tailoring private credit funds acknowledged that individual investors required a liquidity incentive to invest. Since there is no liquid secondary market to facilitate liquidation, private funds aimed at such retail investors offered quarterly redemption opportunities. The industry standard settled on around 5% of a fund’s value.

However, offering these ‘liquidity windows’ creates a tension in the private credit business model. Private credit operates on the basis of illiquidity in return for higher returns. This includes borrowers prepared to pay a higher interest rate on debt to avoid exposure to the glare of public market scrutiny.

Further, the prices of private loans are not ‘marked-to-the-market’ like publicly traded debt, so they are not correlated with public markets. This enables fund managers to work out credit problems over time rather than be forced into fire sales to meet the liquidity needs of investors.

Offering liquidity confounds that. To do so, private credit funds end up operating like quasi-public funds. They have to hold sufficient liquid assets to cover redemptions. Indeed, regulations for such funds in Europe are proposing a minimum of 20% of assets in liquid investments so there is a reserve to meet redemptions. But, by doing so, funds will not be able to generate the promised returns. Indeed, returns may be not much higher that that offered by public traded funds.

Further, providing quarterly redemption windows requires fair and timely valuations of the fund. Irrespective of perceptions around credit risk, if investors feel that the valuation is generous then many will want to take advantage of the liquidity window to redeem and no limit on withdrawals, be it 5%, 10% or whatever, is sufficient. However, with no secondary market mechanism to remove the excess demand, those told they cannot redeem their investment will only increase their demands for liquidity further and exit at the next available opportunity.

This irreconcilable tension in offering private credit funds to retail investors is being recognised. Not only are funds like Blue Owl being wound up, but the share prices of providers in the USA have fallen sharply as markets realise that the anticipated returns from selling private credit to retail investors are unlikely to be realised. Blackstone’s market capitalisation has halved from $250 billion at the end of 2024 to $134 billion on 11 March 2026.

But this is the moment when private credit funds are being offered to retail investors in Europe. The lesson for European retail investors from the US experience is that you can’t have high liquidity and high return. As with most allocation decisions, there is a trade-off.

Articles

Questions

  1. What is maturity transformation? Explain how banks conduct maturity transformation.
  2. What is liquidity provision? Explain how secondary financial markets provide liquidity.
  3. Explain why private credit funds offer a higher expected return than public ones?
  4. Analyse the pressures on profit margins in public markets which led financial institutions to offer private credit funds. In doing so, consider the ethics around offering such a product to retail investors.
  5. Explain why offering such funds to individual (retail) investors has not worked.
Posted on

The global economic impacts of the war with Iran

With relentless bombing of Iran by Israel and the USA, and with Iranian counterattacks on Gulf states, the costs of the war are mounting. The most obvious are in terms of human lives, injuries and suffering. But there are significant economic costs too. Some of these are immediate, such as the rising price of oil and hence the costs of fuel, or the fall in stock market prices. Some will be longer term, depending on how the war develops. For example, prices could rise more generally as supply chains are disrupted.

The impacts will vary across the world and across markets. The most obvious markets to be affected are those where significant supply comes from the Persian Gulf. Approximately 20% of total global oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Oil prices rose considerably in the days following the start of the war on 28 February, with Brent crude, a key measure of international oil prices, rising from $71.3 on 27 February to a peak of $119.4 per barrel by the morning of 9 March – a rise of 67%. It was possible that they would rise even further in the short term. However, prices fell back substantially later on 9 March after G7 finance ministers declared that the group ‘stands ready’ to release oil from strategic reserves if needed. By late in the day, the price had fallen to around $90. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

However, despite the announcement on 11 March that 32 countries had agreed to release 400m barrels of oil reserves, oil prices began rising again and reached $100 on 12 March after three tankers had been struck in the Gulf, two of them close to the Strait of Hormuz. With Iran pledging to keep the Strait closed, there were worries that the release of oil reserves would provide only temporary relief. Just over 20m barrels of oil normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz. The 400m barrels released from storage is the equivalent, therefore, of only 20 days’ worth of lost oil from the Gulf.

Rising oil prices will drive up inflation. For those countries with a heavy dependence on Gulf oil, particularly countries in Asia, there could be significant supply problems. For oil exporters in the Persian Gulf, with tankers unable to traverse the Strait of Hormuz, the economic impact is huge. Oil exporters outside the Gulf, such as Russia, Norway and Canada, however, will gain from the higher prices. Clearly the size of these effects will depend on how long the conflict continues and how long the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

And it is not just oil that is affected. Other products, such as liquified natural gas (LNG), petrochemicals, industrial materials, fertilizers, metals and minerals are transported through the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf countries import much of their food through the Strait.

Cuts in supplies of oil and other products represent an adverse supply shock. Such shocks push up prices (cost-push inflation), while adversely affecting aggregate output. This can lead to stagflation – a combination of higher inflation and stagnation or even falling output. Central banks with a simple mandate to keep inflation to a target are likely to raise interest rates, or at least delay in reducing them. In the USA, with a dual mandate of controlling inflation but also maximising employment, the response may be less deflationary, depending on the judgement of the Federal Reserve.

Uncertainty

There is great uncertainty about how long the conflict will last. There is also a lack of clarity and consistency from the US administration about its war aims. This uncertainty has affected financial markets, which have seen considerable volatility. Stock markets have seen widespread falls, with airline, travel and AI-heavy stocks being particularly vulnerable.

If the war is concluded relatively swiftly, the economic effects could be relatively small. If the war continues, and especially if the Gulf countries are drawn further into the conflict and if the conflict spreads to other countries, the economic effects could be much more substantial. A prolonged conflict could see oil prices remaining above $100 per barrel, potentially increasing global inflation by 1 percentage point or more. This would slow or halt the move by central banks to cut rates and thereby reduce global economic growth – potentially, as we have seen, leading to stagflation.

Then there is the issue of a potential new international refugee crisis. If the economic and political system in Iran deteriorates rapidly, this could trigger a wave of migration to neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, already hosting large numbers of refugees. Many could seek sanctuary further afield in Europe, with several countries already facing a backlash against immigration. The political and economic effects of this on host countries could be significant – but as yet, highly uncertain.

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. Who are the biggest gainers and losers from disruption to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf?
  2. Illustrate the effect of the current oil price shock on an aggregate demand and supply diagram (either static or dynamic).
  3. Why is the Iranian war likely to be less damaging to the European economy than the Ukrainian war has been?
  4. Why have AI-related stock prices been vulnerable to the uncertainty caused by the Iranian war?
  5. How are the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank likely to respond to the rising price of oil and the broader economic effects of the war? Why might their responses be different?
  6. What is the likely impact of the Iranian war on global economic recovery?
  7. How might the Iranian war affect global economic alliances?
  8. How is the current oil price shock likely to affect the eurozone? Will it be different from the oil price shock that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
  9. What are the likely economic effects of large-scale migration caused by the war?
Posted on

Youth unemployment and the post-pandemic peak

Unemployment in the UK reached its highest level in nearly five years at the close of 2025, according to new data from the Office for National Statistics. Figures show the unemployment rate rising to 5.2% in the three months to December, up slightly from 5.1% in the preceding quarter.

This marks the highest unemployment level since the pandemic, coinciding with a slowdown in wage growth and increasing speculation that interest rates may soon be lowered.

Youth unemployment

However, young people are taking the heaviest hit, with unemployment climbing to 16.1% among those aged 16 to 24. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) This is the highest level in more than a decade, including the spike seen during the pandemic. Economists largely attribute this trend to rising payroll costs, which they say are discouraging employers from offering entry level roles. Long-term youth unemployment is also worsening, with recent data showing that a growing share of unemployed young people have been out of work for over 12 months, highlighting deeper and more persistent barriers to re entry.

At the same time, although wages for those in work continue to grow faster than prices, the pace of wage growth is steadily slowing, adding further pressure on young people already facing the most challenging labour market conditions in years. According to ONS data, the annual growth in average weekly wages, excluding bonuses, slowed to 4.2% in the last three months of 2025. Private-sector wage growth eased to 3.4%, bringing it closer to the 3.25% rate that the Bank of England believes is consistent with its 2% inflation target.

The impact on interest rates

The Bank of England is watching the slowdown in the UK jobs market closely as it gauges when next to lower its interest rates. In February 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee voted to hold the base rate (Bank Rate) at 3.75%. However, the committee voted with a majority of 5-4, with four members voting to reduce the rate to 3.5%.

The Bank of England uses interest rates as a policy tool to control inflation, the rate at which general prices rise in the economy. The current rate of inflation of 3.4% is above the Bank of England’s target of 2%.

In addition to the split vote, some economists believe that the easing in pay growth makes it likely that Bank Rate will be cut at the next meeting on 19th March. Paul Dales, chief UK economist at Capital Economics, said the fall in wage growth ‘supports the idea that the Bank of England has at least a couple more interest rate cuts in its locker’. A decrease in interest rates will be welcomed by investors.

What is behind the increase in youth unemployment?

Young people always tend to be the most impacted by a downturn in hiring. But economists warned that the rise in youth unemployment was a sign that employers are being more cautious about hiring younger workers. Openings for low-skilled entry-level roles and for new graduates have dropped steeply. Many businesses have slowed hiring due to an increase in costs because of measures in Chancellor Rachel Reeves’s last two Budgets. Businesses claim that the combination of increases in employer National Insurance contributions and a rise in the minimum wage mean they are facing higher payroll costs.

Peter Dixon at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research said, ‘there are indications that younger workers in particular are being priced out of the market’, supporting the explanation that raising the minimum wage might also be disincentivising the hiring of young people.

The ONS reported that the retail and wholesale sector saw the biggest fall in the number of workers on company payrolls, with 65,000 jobs lost in the sector since January last year. Meanwhile, health and social work saw the biggest rise in payrolled workers of any sector, adding 39,000 jobs in the year to January. Financial analyst at AJ Bell, Danni Hewson, suggested that those leaving the retail sector were now entering healthcare, with both sectors employing large numbers of women. However, she also warned that a recent surge in investment in artificial intelligence could hit young people the hardest as it could result ‘in a scarcity of entry level posts’ (see the blog Will AI make the world less equal?.

Job vacancies

Job vacancy data across the UK indicates a significant cooling in labour demand. According to the latest ONS figures, vacancies fell from 736,000 in the three months to December to 726,000 in January, signalling continued weakening in hiring activity. According to the job search site, Adzuna, the number of vacant positions has dropped to its lowest level in five years, with job listings sliding 3% in January to 695,000, marking the first time vacancies have dipped below 700,000 since early 2021. Notably, graduate opportunities have fallen below 10,000 for the first time since Adzuna started tracking in 2016, underscoring the deepening challenges for new entrants to the workforce.

This downward trend in job openings extends patterns seen throughout late 2025, with vacancies down 16% from the previous January and nearly 20% lower than six months earlier. This coincides with a rise in unemployment to 5.2%, slower wage growth, and a growing concern that young people are disproportionately affected as hiring slows. As opportunities shrink, competition has intensified: there are now 2.4 jobseekers per vacancy, up from 2.27 in December, with the most sought-after roles including warehouse staff, healthcare support workers, lorry drivers, labourers and kitchen assistants.

How can the situation be improved?

Pat McFadden, Secretary for Work and Pensions, has commissioned the former Health Secretary Alan Milburn to lead a review into the causes of rising youth inactivity. There will be a particular focus on mental health issues that are pushing young people out of education and employment. This initiative responds to the growing number of young people not in education, employment, or training (NEETs), many of whom are now classified as inactive rather than unemployed. Some receive health-related benefits and are therefore not required to look for work, while others fall outside the benefits system entirely, making them harder to identify and support.

However, Pat McFadden said there was ‘more to do to get people into jobs’, and that tackling youth unemployment is a key government priority. He added that Labour was working to make it easier for young people to find and secure an apprenticeship, supported by a wider package of reforms. The reforms announced by McFadden include creating 50,000 additional apprenticeships. The government will also expand support for 350,000 people to move into work or training in sectors such as care and construction, with the risk of losing benefits if they refuse. They also include the provision of 55,000 state-funded, six-month work placements for the long-term unemployed.

While these measures are widely seen as necessary, campaign groups argue the government should go further by extending its ‘Youth Guarantee’ to cover all young people up to age 24, rather than ending at 22.

However, as Alice Martin, head of research at Lancaster University’s Work Foundation, notes, initiatives designed to help people return to the labour market have limited impact ‘if the jobs aren’t out there.’ Even graduates are finding that opportunities are scarce, and for those leaving education with few qualifications, the situation is even more challenging. Sectors such as retail, once a reliable source of first jobs, have been in long-term structural decline, a trend that is now accelerating and further narrowing the pathways available to young people entering the workforce.

The situation has prompted government discussions about postponing the planned rise in the minimum wage for 18- to 20-year-olds to address employers’ concerns and encourage more youth employment. However, on Wednesday, Keir Starmer stressed that Labour remains committed to its manifesto pledge to align the pay of younger workers with that of older employees. The Prime Minister confirmed that the promise to ‘remove the discriminatory age bands’ in the minimum wage system still stands, and that the increase scheduled for April will proceed as planned.

Starmer said ‘We’ve made commitments to young people in our manifesto, and we will keep to those commitments, including the commitment that we would make sure that the living wage and minimum wage will go up this April, which we can absolutely confirm to you will happen.’

Unemployment outlook

Multiple economic forecasts predict that unemployment will to continue to rise in 2026. The most frequently cited projection places the 2026 unemployment rate around 5.2%–5.5%. However, some economists expect businesses to regain confidence and begin hiring again later in the year, supporting a gradual stabilisation in job markets.

Yet risks remain significant: if that recovery fails to materialise, unemployment could edge toward 6% by the end of the year, with forecasts from JP Morgan suggesting unemployment may reach 2 million in the first half as firms delay recruitment following the recent rise in the employers’ National Insurance rate. This environment is proving especially challenging for young people, with early career opportunities among the first to disappear and delayed entry into work potentially limiting long-term earnings and progression.

As hiring becomes more cautious and entry-level roles tighten, the path into the labour market risks becoming narrower, underscoring the need for policies and conditions that support both employer confidence and opportunities for new entrants.

Articles

FT Articles (subscribers only)

Data

Questions

  1. Explain why youth unemployment has risen more sharply than overall unemployment at the end of 2025.
  2. What are the costs to the individual of being unemployed?
  3. What are the wider non-monetary costs to society?
  4. Explain the main financial costs to the wider economy of a rising unemployment rate.
  5. Assess the likely impact of slowing wage growth on the Bank of England’s decision about whether or not to cut interest rates in early 2026.
  6. Discuss how falling job vacancies, particularly graduate and entry‑level opportunities, might affect long‑term labour market outcomes for young people.
  7. Evaluate the effectiveness of government policies such as expanding apprenticeships, increasing work placements, and reviewing youth inactivity in reducing youth unemployment.
Posted on

The Russian economy after four years of war

At the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we look at the effect of the war on the Russian economy. Two years ago, in the blog The Russian economy after two years of war, we argued that the Russian economy had seemingly weathered the war successfully.

Unlike Ukraine, very little of its infrastructure had been destroyed; it had started the war with a current account balance of payments surplus, a budget surplus and a low general government debt-to-GDP ratio; it had achieved a lot of success in diverting its exports, including oil, away from countries imposing sanctions to countries such as China and India; it was the same with imports, with China especially becoming a major suppliers of machinery, components and vehicles; it has a strong central bank, which engenders a high level of confidence in managing inflation; the military expenditure provided a Keynesian boost to the economy, with production and employment rising.

The situation today

But two years further on, the Russian economy is looking a lot weaker and on the verge of recession. GDP growth fell to 0.6 per cent in 2025 and is forecast to be no more than 1 per cent for the next two years. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) And despite growth still being positive (just), this is largely because of the growth in military expenditure. Retail and wholesale trade fell by 1.1% in 2025, reflecting supply chain problems and high inflation dampening consumer demand.

With labour being diverted into the armaments and allied industries or into the armed forces, this has led to labour shortages. This has been compounded by the emigration of up to 1 million people by 2025 – often young, educated and skilled professionals.

Official CPI inflation averaged 8.7 per cent in 2025, although the prices of food and other consumer essentials rose by more, especially in recent months. At the beginning of 2026, supermarket prices rose by 2.3% in just one month, made worse by a rise in VAT from 20% to 22%. The central bank has responded to the high inflation with high interest rates, which averaged 19.2% in 2025, giving a real rate of 10.5%. With such a high real rate, the response of households has been to save. This has masked the constraints on production, or imports, of consumer goods. Savings have also been boosted by large payments to soldiers and bereaved families, with the money saved by the recipients being used in part to fund future such payments. So far there has been trust in the banking system, but if that trust waned and people starting making large withdrawals of savings, it could be seriously destabilising.

Whilst the high real interest rates have helped to mask shortages of consumer goods, they have had a seriously dampening effect on investment by domestic companies. Gross capital formation fell by 3% in 2025, not helped by an increase in the corporation tax from 20% to 25%. At the same time, foreign direct investment remains subdued due to high perceived risks. The lack of investment, plus the labour shortages, will have profound effects on the supply side of the economy, with potential output in the non-military sector likely to decline over the medium term.

The balance of payments and government finances are turning less favourable. The balance of trade surplus has declined from US$173bn in 2021 to US$67bn in 2025. This could decline further, or even become a deficit, if oil prices continue to be weak, if Western sanctions are tightened (such as stopping the flow of Russian oil exports in the ‘shadow’ fleet of tankers) or if major importing countries stop buying Russian oil. Indian refiners have announced that they are not taking Russian crude in March/April as India seeks to finalise a trade deal with the USA.

The budget balance has moved from a small surplus of 0.8% of GDP in 2021 to a deficit of 2.9% in 2025. Although the government debt-to-GDP ratio remains low by international standards at 23.1% of GDP in 2025, this was up from 16.5% in 2021 and is set to rise further as budget deficits deepen. Nevertheless, as long as the saving rate remains high, the debt can be serviced by domestic bond purchase.

Russia’s economy is definitely weakening and labour shortages and low investment will create major problems for the future. But whether this deterioration will be enough to change Russia’s stance on the war in Ukraine remains to be seen.

Articles

Videos

Reports

Data

Questions

  1. What constraints are there currently on the supply side of the Russian economy?
  2. Some economists have argued that the economic effects of a stalemate in the Ukraine war would suit the Russian leadership more than peace or victory. Why might this be so?
  3. Under what circumstances might a deep recession in Russia be more likely than stagnation?
  4. In what ways does Russia’s current financial system resemble a pyramid scheme?
  5. What cannot a Keynesian boost contunue to support the Russian economy indefinitely?
Posted on

Shrinkflation, skimpflation and sneakflation: ways of hiding inflation

Have you noticed that many products in the supermarket seem to be getting smaller or are poorer quality, or that special offers are not as special as they used to be? When you ring customer services, does it seem that you have to wait longer than you used to? Do you now have to pay for extras that used to be free? These are all ways that producers try to pass on cost increases to consumers without rising prices. There are three broad ways in which producers try to hide inflation.

The first is called ‘shrinkflation’. It is defined as having less product in the same package or a smaller package for the same price. For example, reducing the number of chocolates in a tub, reducing the size of a can of beans, jar of coffee or block of butter, reducing the number of sheets in a toilet roll, or the length of a ride in a fairground or portion sizes in a restaurant or takeaway. A 2023 YouGov poll revealed that 75% of UK adults are either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned about shrinkflation. A similar poll in 2025 showed that this figure had increased to 80%. The product category with the greatest concerns was snack foods (e.g. crisps, confectionery items, nuts, etc.).1

The second form of hidden inflation is called ‘skimpflation’. This is defined as decreasing the quality of a product or service without lowering the price. Examples include cheaper ingredients in food or confectionery, such as using palm oil instead of butter, or reducing the cocoa content in chocolate or the meat content in sausages and pies, or package holidays reducing the quality of meals, or customer service centres or shops reducing the number of staff so that people have to wait longer on the phone or to be served.

The third is called ‘sneakflation’. This is similar to skimpflation but normally refers to reducing what you get when you pay for a service, such as a flight, by now charging for extras, such as luggage or food. Sometimes shrinkflation or skimpflation are seen as subsets of sneakflation.

These practices have had a lot of publicity in recent months, with consumers complaining that they are getting less for their money. Many people see them as a sneaky way of passing on cost increases without raising the price. But the changes are often subtle and difficult for shoppers to spot when they are buying an item. Skimpflation especially is difficult to observe at the time of purchase. It’s only when people consume the product that they think that it doesn’t seem as good as it used to be. Even shrinkflation can be hard to spot if the package size remains the same but there is less in it, such as fewer biscuits in a tin or fewer crisps in a packet. People would have to check the weight or volume, while also knowing what it used to be.

If firms are legitimately passing on costs and are up-front about what they are doing, then most consumers would probably understand it even if they did not like it. It’s when firms do it sneakily that many consumers get upset. Also, firms may do it to increase profit margins – in other words, by reducing the size or quality beyond what is necessary to cover the cost increase.

Does the official rate of inflation take such practices into account?

The answer is that some of the practices are taken into account – especially shrinkflation. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) accounts for shrinkflation by monitoring price changes per unit of weight or volume, rather than just the price. Data collectors track the weight, volume or count of item. When a product’s size is reduced, the ONS records this as a price increase in CPI or CPIH inflation statistics. This is known as a ‘quality adjustment’ process and allows the ONS to isolate price changes from product size changes. As CPI data from the ONS is used by the Bank of England in monitoring its 2% inflation target, it too is incorporating shrinkflation.

ONS quality adjustments are also applied to non-market public services, such as healthcare, education and policing to measure changes in service quality rather than just volume. This allows a more accurate measurement of productivity as it focuses on outcomes and user experience per pound spent rather than just focusing on costs.

Skimpflation is more difficult to monitor. The quality adjustment process may miss some quality changes and hence some skimpflation goes unrecorded. This means that the headline inflation rate might understate the true decline in purchasing power felt by consumers.

How extensive is hidden inflation?

Despite public perception, shrinkflation has a relatively small impact on the headline CPI and CPIH inflation rate in the UK because it is largely confined to certain sectors, such as bread and cereals, personal care products, meat products, and sugar, jams, syrups, chocolate & confectionery. Nevertheless, in these sectors it is particularly prevalent, especially in the packaged foodstuffs and confectionery sector. The latest research by the ONS in 2019 covered the period June 2015 to June 2017 and is shown in the following figure.2

According to research in the USA by Capital One Shopping, some major brands reduced product sizes by over 30% in 2025 without reducing prices, with shrinkflation averaging 14.8% among selected national grocery brands.3 Shrinkflation had been observed by 74% of Americans at their grocery store. Of these, 81% took some kind of action as a result, with 48% abandoning a brand. Nevertheless, across all products, shrinkflation accounts for quite a small percentage of any overall price rises.

A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that shrinkflation accounted for less than 1/10 of a percentage point of the 34.5% increase in overall consumer prices from 2019 to 2024.4 The reason is that the items that were downsized comprised a small percentage of goods and services. Indeed, many goods and services, such as housing, cannot be downsized in the same way that household products can.

Nevertheless, with consumer budgets being squeezed by the inflation that followed the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hidden inflation has become more prevalent in many countries and an increasing concern of consumers.

References

  1. Shrinkflation concern rises in 2025, but fewer Britons are changing shopping habits

    2. YouGov (15/8/25)

  2. Shrinkflation: How many of our products are getting smaller?

    3. Office for National Statistics (21/1/19)

  3. Shrinkflation Statistics

    4. Capital One Shopping (30/12/25)

  4. What is “Shrinkflation,” And How Has It Affected Grocery Store Items Recently?

    5. U.S. Government Accountability Office (12/8/25)

Videos

Articles

Journal Article

Questions

  1. If shrinkflation, when included in CPI statistics, accounts for such a small percentage of inflation, why are people so concerned about it?
  2. From a company’s perspective, is it a good idea to engage in (a) shrinkflation; (b) skimpflation?
  3. Go round you local supermarket and identify examples of shrinkflation and skimpflation.
  4. How are various EU countries attempting to inform consumers of shrinkflation?
  5. Why is skimpflation often harder to detect than shrinkflation?
  6. Give some other examples of sneakflation in the provision of services.
  7. How could behavioural economists help firms decide whether or how to engage in shrinkflation or skimpflation?