Tag: government bonds

In recent months there has been growing uncertainty across the global economy as to whether the US economy was going to experience a ‘hard’ or ‘soft landing’ in the current business cycle – the repeated sequences of expansion and contraction in economic activity over time. Announcements of macroeconomic indicators have been keenly anticipated for signals about how quickly the US economy is slowing.

Such heightened uncertainty is a common feature of late-cycle slowing economies, but uncertainty now has been exacerbated because it has been a while since developed economies have experienced a business cycle like the current one. The 21st century has been characterised by low inflation, low interest rates and recessions caused by various types of crises – a stock market crisis (2001), a banking crisis (2008) and a global pandemic (2020). In contrast, the current cycle is a throwback to the 20th century. The high inflation and the ensuing increases in interest rates have produced a business cycle which echoes the 1970s. Therefore, few investors have experience of such economic conditions.

The focus for investors during this stage of the cycle is when the slowing economy will reach the minimum. They will also be concerned with the depth of the slowdown: will there still be some growth in income, albeit low; or will the trough be severe enough to produce a recession, and, if so, how deep? Given uncertainty around the length and magnitude of business cycles, this leads to greater risk aversion among investors. This affects reactions to announcements of leading and lagging macroeconomic indicators.

This blog examines what sort of economic conditions we should expect in a late-cycle economy. It analyses the impact this has had on investor behaviour and the ensuing dynamics observed in financial markets in the USA.

The Business Cycle


The business cycle refers to repeated sequences of expansion and contraction (or slowdown) in economic activity over time. Figure 1 illustrates a typical cycle. Typically, these sequences include four main stages. In each one there are different effects on consumer and business confidence:

  • Expansion: During this stage, the economy experiences growth in GDP, with incomes and consumption spending rising. Business and consumer confidence are high. Unemployment is falling.
  • Peak: This is the point at which the economy reaches its maximum output, but growth has ceased (or slowed). At this stage, inflationary pressures peak as the economy presses against potential output. This tends to result in tighter monetary policy (higher interest rates).
  • Slowdown: The higher interest rates raise the cost of borrowing and reduce consumption and investment spending. Consumption and incomes both slow or fall. (Figure 1 illustrates the severe case of falling GDP (negative growth) in this stage.) Unemployment starts rising.
  • Trough: This is the lowest point of the cycle, where economic activity bottoms out and the economy begins to recover. This can be associated with slow but still rising national income (a soft landing) or national income that has fallen (a hard landing, as shown in Figure 1).

While business cycles are common enough to enable such characterisation of their temporal pattern, their length and magnitude are variable and this produces great uncertainty, particularly when cycles approach peaks and troughs.

As an economy’s cycle approaches a trough, such as US economy’s over the past few months, uncertainty is exacerbated. The high interest rates used to tackle inflation will have increased borrowing costs for businesses and consumers. Access to credit may have become more restricted. Profit margins are reduced, especially for industrial sectors sensitive to the business cycle, reducing expected cash flows.

The combination of these factors can increase the risk of a recession, producing greater volatility in financial markets. This manifests itself in increased risk aversion among investors.

Utility theory suggests that, in general, investors will exhibit loss aversion. This means that they do not like bearing risk, fearing that the return from an investment may be less than expected. In such circumstances, investors need to be compensated for bearing risk. This is normally expressed in terms of expected financial return. To bear more risk, investors require higher levels of return as compensation.

As perceptions of risk change through the business cycle, so this will change the return investors will require from the financial instruments they hold. Perceived higher risk raises the return investors will require as compensation. Conversely, lower perceived risk decreases the return investors expect as compensation.

Investors’ expected rate of return is manifested in the discount rate that they use to value the anticipated cash flows from financial instruments in discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. Equation 1 is the algebraic expression of the present-value discounted series of cash flows for financial instruments:

 
 
Where:
V = present value
C = anticipated cash flows in each of time periods 1, 2, 3, etc.
r = expected rate of return

For fixed-income debt securities, the cash flow is constant, while for equity securities (shares), expectations regarding cash flows can change.

Slowing economies and risk aversion

In a slowing economy, with great uncertainty about the scale and timing of the bottom of the cycle, investors become more risk averse about the prospects of firms. This this leads to higher risk premia for financial instruments sensitive to a slowdown in economic activity.

This translates into a higher expected return and higher discount rate used in the valuation of these instruments (r in equation 1). This produces decreases in perceived value, decreased demand and decreased prices for these financial instruments. This can be observed in the market dynamics for these instruments.

First, there may be a ‘flight to safety’. Investors attach a higher risk premium to risker financial instruments, such as equities, and seek a ‘safe-haven’ for their wealth. Therefore, we should observe a reorientation from more risky to less risky assets. Demand for equities falls, while demand for safer assets, such as government bonds and gold, rises.

There is some evidence for this behaviour as uncertainty about the US economic outlook has increased. Gold, long seen as a hedge against market decline, is at record highs. US Government bond prices have risen too.

To analyse whether this may be a flight to safety, I analysed the correlation between the daily US government bond price (5-year Treasury Bill) and share prices represented by the two more significant stock market indices in the USA: the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite. I did this for two different time periods. Table 1 shows the results. Panel (a) shows the correlation coefficients for the period between 1 May 2024 and 31 July 2024; Panel (b) shows the correlation coefficients for the period between 1 August 2024 and 9 September 2024.

In the period between May and July 2024, the 5-year Treasury Bill and share price indices had significantly positive correlations. When share prices rose, the Treasury Bill’s price rose; when share prices fell, the bill’s price fell. During that period, expectations about falling interest rates dominated valuations and that effected the valuations of all financial instruments in the same way – lower expected interest rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding instruments and reduces the expected rates of return. Hence, the discount rate applied to cash flows is reduced, and present value rises. The opposite happens when macroeconomic indicators suggest that interest rates will stay high (ceteris paribus).

As the summer proceeded, worries about a ‘hard landing’ began to concern investors. A weak jobs report in early August particularly exercised markets, producing a ‘flight to safety’. Greater risk aversion among investors meant that they expect a higher return from equities. This reduced perceived value, reducing demand and price (ceteris paribus). To insulate themselves from higher risk, investors bought safer assets, like government bonds, thereby pushing up their prices. This behaviour was consistent with the significant negative correlation observed between US government debt prices and the S&P 500 and Nasdaq indices in Panel (b).

Another signal of increased risk aversion among investors is ‘sector rotation’ in their equity portfolios. Increased risk aversion among investors will lead them to divest from ‘cyclical’ companies. Such companies are in industrial sectors which are more sensitive to the changing economic conditions across the business cycle – consumer discretionary and communication services sectors, for example. To reduce their exposure to risk, investors will switch to ‘defensive’ sectors – those less sensitive to the business cycle. Examples include consumer staples and utility sectors.

Cyclical sectors will suffer a greater adverse impact on their cash flows and risk in a slowing economy. Consequently, investors expect higher return as compensation. This reduces the value of those shares. Demand for them falls, depressing their price. In contrast, defensive sectors will be valued more. They will see an increase in demand and price. This sector rotation seems to have happened in August (2024). Figure 2 shows the percentage change between 1 August and 9 September 2024 in the S&P 500 index and four sector indices, comprising companies from the communication services, consumer discretionary, consumer staples and utilities sectors.


Overall, the S&P 500 index was slightly higher, as shown by the first bar in the chart. However, while the cyclical sectors experienced decreases in their share prices, particularly communication services, the defensive companies experienced large price increases – nearly 3% for utilities and over 6% for consumer staples.

Conclusion

Economies experience repeated sequences of expansion and contraction in economic activity over time. At the moment, the US economy is approaching the end of its current slowing phase. Increased uncertainty is a common feature of late-cycle economies and this manifests itself in heightened risk aversion among investors. This produces certain dynamics which have been observable in US debt and equity markets. This includes a ‘flight to safety’, with investors divesting risky financial instruments in favour of safer ones, such as US government debt securities and gold. Also, investors have been reorientating their equity portfolios away from cyclicals and towards defensive securities.

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. What is risk aversion? Sketch an indifference curve for a risk-averse investor, treating expected return and risk as two-characteristics of a financial instrument.
  2. Show what happens to the slope of the indifference curve if the investor becomes more risk averse.
  3. Using demand and supply analysis, illustrate and explain the impact of a flight to safety on the market for (i) company shares and (ii) US government Treasury Bills.
  4. Use economic theory to explain why the consumer discretionary sector may be more sensitive than the consumer staples sector to varying incomes across the economic cycle.
  5. Research the point of the economic cycle that the US economy has reached as you read this blog. What is the relationship between bond and equity prices? Which sectors have performed best in the stock market?

The US Federal Reserve, like many other central banks, engaged in massive quantitative easing in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/8. Over three rounds, QE1, QE2 and QE3, it accumulated $4.5 trillion of assets – mainly government bonds and mortgage-backed securities (see chart below: click here for a PowerPoint). But, unlike its counterparts in the UK, the eurozone and Japan, it has long ceased its programme of asset purchases.. In October 2014, it announced that QE was at an end. All that would be done in future would be to replace existing holdings of assets as they matured, keeping total holdings roughly constant.

But now this policy is set to change. The Fed is about to embark on a programme of ‘quantitative tightening’, already being dubbed ‘QT’. This involves the Fed reducing its holdings of assets, mainly government bonds and government-backed mortgage-related securities.

This, however, for the time being will not include selling its holding of bonds or mortgage-backed securities. Rather, it will simply mean not buying new assets to replace ones when they mature, or only replacing part of the them. This was discussed by the 75 participants at the joint meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and Board of Governors on 14–15 March.

As the minutes put it: “Many participants emphasized that reducing the size of the balance sheet should be conducted in a passive and predictable manner.”

A more active form of QT would involve selling assets before maturity and thus reducing the size of the Fed’s balance sheet more rapidly. But either way, reducing assets would put downward pressure on the money supply and support the higher interest rates planned by the FOMC.

The question is whether there is enough liquidity elsewhere in the system and enough demand for credit, and willingness of the banking system to supply credit, to allow a sufficient growth in broad money – sufficient, that is, to support continued growth in the economy. The answer to that question depends on confidence. The Fed, not surprisingly, is keen not to damage confidence and hence prefers a gradualist approach to reducing its holdings of assets bought during the various rounds of quantitative easing.

Articles

Fed’s asset shift to pose new test of economy’s recovery, resilience Reuters, Howard Schneider and Richard Leong (6/4/17)
Federal Reserve likely to begin cutting back $4.5 trillion balance sheet this year Washington Post, Ana Swanson (5/4/17)
Why the Fed’s debate about shrinking its balance sheet really, really matters Money Observer, Russ Mould (7/4/17)
The Fed and ECB keep a cautious eye on the exit Financial Times (7/4/17)
Get ready for the Fed’s next scary policy change CBS Money Watch, Anthony Mirhaydari (5/4/17)
The Fed wants to start shrinking its $4.5 trillion balance sheet later this year Business Insider, Akin Oyedele (5/4/17)
Inside the Fed’s March Meeting: The Annotated Minutes Bloomberg, Luke Kawa, Matthew Boesler and Alex Harris (5/4/17)
QE was great for asset prices – will ‘QT’ smash them? The Financial Review (Australia), Patrick Commins (7/4/17)
Shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet Brookings, Ben Bernanke (26/1/17)

Data

Selected data Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Questions

  1. Distinguish between active and passive QT.
  2. If QE is a form of expansionary monetary policy, is QT a form of contractionary monetary policy?
  3. Could QT take place alongside an expansion of broad money?
  4. What dangers lie in the Fed scaling back its holdings of government (Treasury) bonds and mortgage-backed securities?
  5. Why is it unlikely that the Fed will reduce its holdings of securities to pre-crisis levels?
  6. Why are the Bank of England, the ECB and the Bank of Japan still pursuing a policy of QE?
  7. What are the implications for exchange rates of QT in the USA and QE elsewhere?
  8. Find out data for the monetary base, for narrow money (M1) and broader money (M2) in the USA. Are narrow and/or broad money correlated with Federal Reserve asset holdings?

In August 2012, the ECB president, Mario Draghi, said that the ECB would ‘do whatever it takes‘ to hold the single currency together and support the weaker economies, such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. At the same time, he announced the introduction of outright monetary purchases (OMTs), which would involve purchasing eurozone countries’ bonds in the secondary markets. There were no limits specified to such purchases, but they would be sterilised by the sale of other assets. In other words, they would not increase the eurozone money supply. But despite the fanfare when OMTs were announced, they have never been used.

Today, the eurozone economy is struggling to grow. The average annual growth rate across the eurozone is a mere 0.5%, albeit up from the negative rates up to 2013 Q3. GDP is still over 2% below the peak in 2008. Inflation is currently standing at 0.8%, well below the 2% target. The ECB’s interest rate (‘main refinancing operations rate’) is 0.25%.

The recovery is hindered by a strong euro. As the chart shows, the euro has been appreciating against the dollar. The euro exchange rate index has also been rising. This has made it harder for the eurozone countries to export.

So what can the ECB do to stimulate the eurozone economy? Other central banks, such as the Bank of England, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan have all had substantial programmes of quantitative easing. The ECB has not. Perhaps OMTs could be used without sterilisation. The problem here is that there are no eurozone bonds issued by the ECB and hence none that could be purchased, only the bonds of individual member countries. Buying bonds of weaker countries in the eurozone would be seen as favouring these countries and might create a moral hazard.

Reducing interest rates is hardly an option given that they are at virtually zero already. And expansionary fiscal policy in the weaker countries has been ruled out by having to stick to the bailout conditions for these countries, which require the pursuit of austerity policies.

One possibility would be to intervene in the foreign currency market by buying US and other countries’ bonds. This would drive down the euro and provide a stimulus to exports. This option is considered in the Jeffrey Frankel article.

Articles

Why the European Central Bank should buy American The Guardian, Jeffrey Frankel (13/3/14)
Draghi holds course in face of deflation threat Reuters, Paul Carrel and Leika Kihara (13/3/14)
ECB’s Draghi: Strong Euro Pulling Down Euro Zone Inflation Wall Street Journal, Christopher Lawton and Todd Buell (13/3/14)
Draghi Bolstering Guidance Seen as Convincing on Rates Bloomberg, Jeff Black and Andre Tartar (13/3/14)
ECB president Mario Draghi counters euro upswing Financial Times, Claire Jones (13/3/14)
Turning Japanese? Euro zone exporters must hope not Reuters, Neal Kimberley (14/3/14)
Prospect of ECB QE drives eurozone bond rally Financial Times, Laurence Mutkin (12/3/14)

Data

Statistical Data Warehouse ECB
Winter forecast 2014 – EU economy: recovery gaining ground European Commission: Economic and Financial Affairs DG
AMECO online European Commission: Economic and Financial Affairs DG

Questions

  1. Why is the ECB generally opposed to quantitative easing of the type used by other central banks?
  2. What is meant by ‘sterilisation’? Why does sterilisation prevent OMTs being classed as a form of quantitative easing?
  3. Would it be possible for OMTs to be used without sterilisation in such as way as to avoid a moral hazard for the highly indebted eurozone countries?
  4. Is the eurozone in danger of experiencing deflation?
  5. What are the dangers of deflation?
  6. Why does the ECB not cut its main refinancing rate below zero?
  7. If the ECB buys US bonds, what effect would this have on the euro/dollar exchange rate?
  8. Would purchasing US bonds affect the eurozone money supply? Explain.
  9. What other means are there of the ECB stimulating the eurozone economy? How effective would they be likely to be?

Japan’s general election on 16 December was won by the centre-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Shinzo Abe. It gained a two-thirds majority in the lower house. It returns to power after losing to the Democratic Party in 2009. Previously it had been in office for most of the time since 1955.

The LDP has promised to revive the flagging Japanese economy, which has been suffering from years of little or no growth and returned to recession last quarter. Economic confidence has been damaged by a dispute with China about the sovereignty over some small islands in the East China Sea. The economy, whose exports make up some 13% of GDP, has suffered from the global slowdown and a high yen. The yen has appreciated against the dollar by around 40% since 2007.

The economy has also suffered from the shutdown of all its nuclear reactors following the earthquake and tsunami last year. Nuclear power accounted for over 30% of the country’s electricity generation.

Mr Abe promises to revive the economy through fiscal and monetary policies. He plans a fiscal stimulus package in early 2013, with increased government expenditure on infrastructure and other public-works. He also wants the Bank of Japan to increase its inflation target from 1% to 3% and to achieve this through various forms of monetary easing.

The initial reactions of markets to the election result were favourable. The stock market rose and the yen fell.

However, as the following articles discuss, there are dangers associated with Mr Abe’s policies. The expansionary fiscal policy will lead to a rise in the country’s general-government debt, which, at some 240% of GDP, is by far the largest in the developed world. This could lead to a loss of confidence in Japanese debt and a fall in the price of bonds on the secondary markets and a rise in government borrowing costs. Also, a depreciation of the yen, while welcomed by exporters, would increase the price of imports, including food and raw materials.

Changing of guard in Japan as PM concedes vote CNN, Yoko Wakatsuki, Brian Walker, and Hilary Whiteman (17/12/12)
LDP Win Clears Pipes for Japan Fiscal Spigot Bloomberg Businessweek, Toru Fujioka (17/12/12)
Economic implications of Japan’s election Huffington Post (16/12/12)
Japan economy contracts again Taipei Times (11/12/12)
Japan elections: Shares rise and yen weakens on Abe win BBC News (17/12/12)
Shinzo Abe’s challenges in reviving Japan’s economy BBC News, Puneet Pal Singh (17/12/12)
Can Shinzo Abe Save Japan? Slate, Matthew Yglesias (30/11/12)
Deflation only natural when politicians refuse to fix oversupplied Japan Japan Times, Teruhiko Mano (17/12/12)
New Year messages from Japan BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (18/12/12)
Japan – Muddling On Or Growing Stronger? Seeking Alpha, Anthony Harrington (12/12/12)
Japanese government unveils £138bn stimulus package The Guardian (11/1/13)

Questions

  1. Using macroeconomic data from sources such as sites 6, 7 and 9 in the Economics Network’s Economic Data freely available online, describe Japan’s macroeconomic situation over the past 10 years.
  2. Why has the Japanese yen appreciated so much in recent years?
  3. What forms could monetary easing take in Japan?
  4. Why might it prove difficult to stimulate the Japanese economy through fiscal and monetary policies?
  5. What undesirable side-effects might result from expansionary fiscal and monetary policies?
  6. What structural weaknesses are there in the Japanese economy that have hindered economic growth? What policies might the new Japanese government pursue in tackling these structural weaknesses?

Eurozone leaders met at a summit in Brussels on 28 and 29 June. Expectations ahead of the summit were low that any significant progress would be made on supporting eurozone banks and governments, on achieving more effective bank regulation or stimulating economic growth.

For once, EU leaders surprised markets by reaching a more comprehensive agreement than anticipated. The agreement has five key elements:

1. The use of funds from the soon-to-be launched eurozone bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to lend to banks directly. Previously, funds had been made available to national governments to lend to their banks. This, however, increased the debts of the national governments, such as Spain, which made it harder for them to meet deficit and debt targets.

2. The setting up of a new banking supervisory body to impose common standards, such as capital adequacy requirements, on banks across the eurozone.

3. The use of the eurozone bailout fund to buy government bonds on the secondary market, provided governments are sticking to agreed deficit reduction measures. This would help to reduce interest rates on government bonds in countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, currently having to pay interest rates 5 or 6 percentage points above those on German bonds.

4. A €120bn growth package to target EU money at small businesses, youth unemployment and infrastructure improvements. Most of the money would be from existing funds, such as EU Structural Funds, which are currently unused. There would be some additional funds, however, including €10bn to boost the lending capacity of the European Investment Bank.

5. A 10-year ‘roadmap’ towards greater fiscal union, including the creation of a eurozone treasury, which could limit overall spending by national governments.

Generally the agreement has been greeted positively, with stock markets in the eurozone and across the world rising significantly. But will the measures be enough to reassure investors over the coming weeks? Will they cure the problems of the eurozone or are they just one more, albeit larger, sticking plaster?

The following webcasts, podcasts and articles look at the agreement and the resulting prospects for the eurozone.

Webcasts and podcasts
Eurozone bends the rules to save single currency euronews (29/6/12)
Markets Like Euro Crisis Deal, Merkel Defensive Associated Press (29/6/12)
Eurozone crisis: ‘Breakthrough’ at summit BBC News, Gavin Hewitt (29/6/12)
EU summit outcome exceeds – low – expectations euronews (29/6/12)
Italy and Spain are main beneficiaries after EU summit euronews (30/6/12)
EU bank aid deal ‘better than expected, worse than needed’ euronews (29/6/12)
New eurozone deal ‘not enough’ BBC Today Programme, James Shugg (29/6/12)
Eurozone: ‘Massive concession’ from Angela Merkel BBC Today Programme, Gavin Hewitt and Robert Peston (29/6/12)

Articles
Eurozone bank bailout deal throws lifeline to Spain and Italy Guardian, Ian Traynor and Phillip Inman (29/6/12)
Spain lifeline after EU allows direct access to eurozone bailout funds Guardian (29/6/12)
Less disunion The Economist, Charlemagne’s notebook (29/6/12)
Eurozone agrees on bank recapitalisation BBC News (29/6/12)
Merkel defends compromise deal on eurozone banks BBC News (29/6/12)
A first, tentative step to salvation for the eurozone Independent, Leading article (29/6/12)
Analysis – Sharing a vision may be Europe’s biggest challenge Reuters, Alan Wheatley (3/7/12)
Eurozone bank agreement welcomed FT Adviser, Rebecca Clancy & Bradley Gerrard (2/7/12)
The real victor in Brussels was Merkel Financial Times, Wolfgang Münchau (1/7/12)
Finns, Dutch cast first doubt on EU summit deal EurActiv (3/7/12)
A Euro deal from Brussels BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (29/6/12)

Document
Conclusions of the European Council (28/29 June 2012) European Council (29/6/12)

Questions

  1. What are the advantages of the ESF lending to banks directly? Are there any problems associated with the proposal?
  2. To what extent will the measures solve the problems of the eurozone? What else might need to be done?
  3. Are there any potential moral hazards contained in the proposals and how are they likely to be tackled?
  4. Explain the concept of ‘seniority’ in the following statement: “the debt owed by Spain to the EFSF, if and when it is transferred to the ESM, will not gain seniority”. Why might this be good for private financiers?
  5. If governments’ bonds are to be purchased by the ESM, what conditions are likely to be attached?