Category: Essential Economics for Business: Ch 13

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The Russian economy after four years of war

At the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we look at the effect of the war on the Russian economy. Two years ago, in the blog The Russian economy after two years of war, we argued that the Russian economy had seemingly weathered the war successfully.

Unlike Ukraine, very little of its infrastructure had been destroyed; it had started the war with a current account balance of payments surplus, a budget surplus and a low general government debt-to-GDP ratio; it had achieved a lot of success in diverting its exports, including oil, away from countries imposing sanctions to countries such as China and India; it was the same with imports, with China especially becoming a major suppliers of machinery, components and vehicles; it has a strong central bank, which engenders a high level of confidence in managing inflation; the military expenditure provided a Keynesian boost to the economy, with production and employment rising.

The situation today

But two years further on, the Russian economy is looking a lot weaker and on the verge of recession. GDP growth fell to 0.6 per cent in 2025 and is forecast to be no more than 1 per cent for the next two years. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) And despite growth still being positive (just), this is largely because of the growth in military expenditure. Retail and wholesale trade fell by 1.1% in 2025, reflecting supply chain problems and high inflation dampening consumer demand.

With labour being diverted into the armaments and allied industries or into the armed forces, this has led to labour shortages. This has been compounded by the emigration of up to 1 million people by 2025 – often young, educated and skilled professionals.

Official CPI inflation averaged 8.7 per cent in 2025, although the prices of food and other consumer essentials rose by more, especially in recent months. At the beginning of 2026, supermarket prices rose by 2.3% in just one month, made worse by a rise in VAT from 20% to 22%. The central bank has responded to the high inflation with high interest rates, which averaged 19.2% in 2025, giving a real rate of 10.5%. With such a high real rate, the response of households has been to save. This has masked the constraints on production, or imports, of consumer goods. Savings have also been boosted by large payments to soldiers and bereaved families, with the money saved by the recipients being used in part to fund future such payments. So far there has been trust in the banking system, but if that trust waned and people starting making large withdrawals of savings, it could be seriously destabilising.

Whilst the high real interest rates have helped to mask shortages of consumer goods, they have had a seriously dampening effect on investment by domestic companies. Gross capital formation fell by 3% in 2025, not helped by an increase in the corporation tax from 20% to 25%. At the same time, foreign direct investment remains subdued due to high perceived risks. The lack of investment, plus the labour shortages, will have profound effects on the supply side of the economy, with potential output in the non-military sector likely to decline over the medium term.

The balance of payments and government finances are turning less favourable. The balance of trade surplus has declined from US$173bn in 2021 to US$67bn in 2025. This could decline further, or even become a deficit, if oil prices continue to be weak, if Western sanctions are tightened (such as stopping the flow of Russian oil exports in the ‘shadow’ fleet of tankers) or if major importing countries stop buying Russian oil. Indian refiners have announced that they are not taking Russian crude in March/April as India seeks to finalise a trade deal with the USA.

The budget balance has moved from a small surplus of 0.8% of GDP in 2021 to a deficit of 2.9% in 2025. Although the government debt-to-GDP ratio remains low by international standards at 23.1% of GDP in 2025, this was up from 16.5% in 2021 and is set to rise further as budget deficits deepen. Nevertheless, as long as the saving rate remains high, the debt can be serviced by domestic bond purchase.

Russia’s economy is definitely weakening and labour shortages and low investment will create major problems for the future. But whether this deterioration will be enough to change Russia’s stance on the war in Ukraine remains to be seen.

Articles

Videos

Reports

Data

Questions

  1. What constraints are there currently on the supply side of the Russian economy?
  2. Some economists have argued that the economic effects of a stalemate in the Ukraine war would suit the Russian leadership more than peace or victory. Why might this be so?
  3. Under what circumstances might a deep recession in Russia be more likely than stagnation?
  4. In what ways does Russia’s current financial system resemble a pyramid scheme?
  5. What cannot a Keynesian boost contunue to support the Russian economy indefinitely?
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Who pays Trump’s tariffs?

Three recent reports (see links below) have suggested that US consumers and businesses pay most of the tariffs imposed by the second Trump administration. The percentage varies from around 86% to 96%. US customs revenue surged by approximately $200 billion in 2025, but this was a tax paid almost entirely by US consumers and businesses. Foreign suppliers largely maintained their (pre-tariff) prices. They took a hit in terms of reduced volumes rather than reduced pre-tariff prices.

The incidence of a tariff between consumers, domestic importers and overseas producers will depend on price elasticities of demand and supply. The following diagram shows a product where the importing country is large enough to have a degree of market power, which will normally be the case with the USA. The greater its buying power, the flatter will be its demand curve, showing that the foreign supplier will have little influence on the price. With no tariff, the equilibrium price paid by importers will be at point a, where demand equals supply. Q1 would be imported at a price of P1.

Imposition of a tariff will shift the supply curve upwards by the amount of the tariff. The new equilibrium price paid by importers will be at point b, where the new supply curve crosses the demand curve. Importers thus now pay a post-tariff price of P2: an effective rise in price of P2 minus P1. Foreign exporters receive P3, which is what they are paid by importers after the tariff has been paid.

The consumer price will be above P2 as that includes a mark-up by US businesses on top of the price they pay to import the product. Importers may bear some of the increase in price and not pass the full amount onto consumers, depending on competition and their ability to absorb cost increases.

President Trump argued that there would be very little rise in price from the tariffs and that overseas suppliers would bear the brunt of the tariffs. Indeed, recently he has argued that this must be the case as US inflation has been falling. In response, critics maintain that the rate of inflation would have fallen more without the tariffs and that current prices would be lower than they are. Also, if US importing firms or retailers bear some of the increased cost, even though this helps to dampen the price rise, their lower profits could damage investment and employment.

The Reports

The first report is from the New York Fed (one of the regional branches of the Federal Reserve Bank). It examines the effect of tariffs imposed in 2025, over three periods: (i) January to August, (ii) September to October, and (iii) November. In the first period, 94% of the tariffs were paid by US importers and 6% by foreign exports; in the second period, the figures were 92% and 8% and in the third period, 86% and 14%.

The second report is The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 from the Congressional Budget Office. Box 2-1 notes that, as of November 2025, ‘the effective tariff rate was about 13 percentage points higher than the roughly 2 percent rate on imports in 2024’. Its analysis suggests that 95% of the tariffs will be borne by importers. Of these higher import prices, 30% will be borne by US businesses, largely through reduced profit margins, and 70% by consumers through higher prices. This will also allow many businesses which produce goods that compete with foreign imports to ‘increase their prices because of the decline in competition from abroad and the increased demand for tariff-free domestic goods’.

The third report is from the Kiel Insitut. In its Policy Brief, Americaʼs Own Goal: Who Pays the Tariffs?, it finds that US importers and consumers bear 96% of the cost of the 2025 tariffs, with foreign exporters absorbing only about 4%. It bases it findings on shipment-level data covering over 25 million transactions valued at nearly $4 trillion. This also shows that exports to the USA declined as foreign exporters preferred to reduce volumes rather than absorbing the tariffs.

The tariffs raised some $200 billion in 2025, around 3.8% of Federal tax receipts. But, as we have seen, this was paid largely by US consumers and business. It goes some way to offsetting the annual cut in tax revenues of around $450 to $520 billion per year from the tax cuts, largely to the better off, in Trump’s ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’.

Reports

Aricles

Questions

  1. Summarise the findings of the three reports (but just Box 2-1 of the Congressional Budget Office one).
  2. Assess the argument that protectionism leads to inefficiency in the protected industries.
  3. Under what circumstances would exporters to the USA absorb a high percentage of tariff increases? Consider questions of elasticity.
  4. Can tariffs ever be justified on efficiency grounds?
  5. Can tariffs be justified as a bargaining ploy? Can they be used as a means of achieving freer and fairer trade?
  6. Read the blog, President Reagan on tariffs and summarise President Reagan’s arguments. Are they still relevant today?
  7. Consider the arguments for and against the EU raising tariffs on US goods.
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The precious metals roller coaster

Precious metals, such as gold, silver and platinum, are seen as safe havens by investors in uncertain times. With the on-off nature of Donald Trump’s tariffs, with ongoing wars, such as the war in Ukraine, and with threats of US action in Iran, with inflation slow to fall and pressure by the Trump administration on the Federal Reserve to make precipitant cuts in interest rates, investors have flocked to precious metals.

Precious metals peaked in late January 2026. Compared with just four months earlier, gold was up by 48%, platinum by 76% and silver by a massive 162%. Silver and platinum were also boosted by their industrial uses. Silver has excellent conductive properties and is used for electronics, AI, solar energy (photovoltaic cells), chemical catalysts and medical equipment. Over 50% of its consumption is for industrial purposes. Platinum is used as a catalyst in catalytic converters to reduce exhaust emissions, in medical devices, chemical processing, oil refining, electronics and glass manufacturing.

The rise was fuelled by speculation, which gathered momentum in December and January. But then the prices of all three metals fell dramatically on Friday 30 January and a bit more on 2 February. Despite a moderate bounce back on 3 February, the prices then fell again and by the end of 5 February, gold had fallen by 15%, platinum by 30% and silver by a massive 42% from the peak.

Figure 1 illustrates the effect of speculation on the rise in price of a precious metal, such as silver. Assume that demand rises from D0 to D1 for the reasons given above. Equilibrium moves from point a to point b and the price rises from P1 to P2. Seeing the price rising, holders of the metal wait until the price rises further before selling. Supply shifts from S1 to S2. Potential purchasers of the metal, anticipating a further rise in price, buy now before the price does rise. Demand shifts from D1 to D2. As a result, equilibrium moves from point b to point c and price rises to P3.

Figure 2 illustrates the effect of speculation on the subsequent fall in prices triggered by a belief that price will fall. Speculative selling shifts the supply curve from S2 to S3. Potential demanders hold back and the demand curve shifts from D2 to D3. Equilibrium moves to point d and price falls from P3 to P4. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the two figures.)

But why did prices fall so dramatically? The first reason was that analysts were beginning to argue that the exuberance of investors had led the price of all three metals to overshoot the fundamental balance of supply and demand. Once a tipping point arrived, people sold quickly to lock in the gains they had made over previous weeks. This profit taking caused prices to plummet as speculation of further falls drove prices lower.

So what was the tipping point? This was the appointment by Donald Trump of Kevin Warsh as the new Chair of the Federal Reserve to take over from Jerome Powell when his tenure comes to an end in May this year.

It was expected that Trump would appoint someone much more willing to cut interest rates and this worried investors, who feared that inflation would rise again. This uncertainty drove demand for precious metals, which are seen as a safe haven. But Kevin Walsh is viewed as hawkish on monetary policy and less likely to slash interest rates than other possible choices for Chair. This triggered the fall in precious metal prices.

But the main factors that drove the demand for the metals still exist. There is still uncertainty, still an increased demand from central banks for gold, still a growing demand for silver and platinum for industrial uses. The next day, 3 February, it seemed that the prices of all three metals had over-corrected. Investors started buying again at the lower prices and consequently prices rose again – once more fuelled by speculation. Gold rose by 6.1%, platinum by 7.9% and silver by 11.6%.

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. What has happened to the price of silver since this blog was written? Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate this.
  2. Identify the factors that affect the demand for and supply of (a) silver; (b) gold.
  3. What determines the elasticity of supply of silver (a) in total; (b) to the market?
  4. Choose another commodity other than the three metals considered in this blog. Find out what has happened to their prices over the past 12 months and explain why these price movements have occurred.
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Fed independence under attack

Donald Trump is keen to lower US interest rates substantially and rapidly in order to provide a boost to the US economy. He is also keen to reduce the cost of living for US citizens and sees lower interest rates as a means of reducing the burden of debt servicing for both consumers and firms alike.

But interest rates are set by the US central bank, the Federal Reserve (the ‘Fed’), which is formally independent from government. This independence is seen as important for providing stability to the US economy and removing monetary policy from short-term political pressures to cut interest rates. Succumbing to political pressures would be likely to create uncertainty and damage long-term stability and growth.

Yet President Trump is pushing the Fed to lower interest rates rapidly and despite three cuts in a row of 0.25 percentage points in the last part of 2025 (see chart below), he thinks this as too little and is annoyed by suggestions that the Fed is unlikely to lower rates again for a while. He has put great pressure on Jerome Powell, the Fed Chair, to go further and faster and has threatened to replace him before his term expires in May this year. He has also made clear that he is likely to appoint someone more willing to cutting rates.

The Federal Reserve headquarters in Washington is currently being renovated. The nine-year project is costing $2.5 billion and is due to be completed next year. President Trump has declared that the project’s costs are excessive and unnecessary.

On 11 January, Federal prosecutors confirmed that they were opening a criminal investigation into Powell, accusing him of lying to Congress in his June 2025 testimony regarding the scope and costs of the renovations.

Powell responded by posting a video in which he claimed that the real reason that he was being threatened with criminal charges was not because of the renovations but because the Fed had ignored President Trump’s pressure and had set interest rates:

based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the President. This is about whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions – or whether, instead, monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation.

The Fed’s mandate

The Federal Reserve Board decides on monetary policy and then the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decides how to carry it out. It decides on interest rates and asset sales or purchases. The FOMC meets eight times a year.

The Fed is independent of both the President and Congress, and its Chair is generally regarded as having great power in determining the country’s economic policy.

Since 1977, the Fed’s statutory mandate has been to promote the goals of stable prices and maximum employment. Because of the reference to both prices and employment, the mandate is commonly referred to as a ‘dual mandate’. Its inflation target is 2 per cent over the long run with ‘well anchored’ inflationary expectations.

The dual mandate is unlike that of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and most other central banks, which all have a single key mandate of achieving a target of a 2 per cent annual rate of consumer price inflation over a particular time period.

With a dual mandate, the two objectives may well conflict from time to time. Moreover, changes in monetary policy affect these objectives with a lag and potentially over different time horizons. Hence, an assessment may have to be made of which is the most pressing problem. This does give some leeway in setting interest rates somewhat lower than if there were a single inflation-rate target. Nevertheless, the assessment is in terms of how best to achieve the mandate and not to meet current political goals.

Statement by former Fed Chairs and Governors

On 12 January, three former Chairs of the Federal Reserve (Janet Yellen, Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan), four former Treasury Secretaries (Timothy Geithner, Jacob Lew, Henry Paulson and Robert Rubin) and seven other top former economic officials issued the following statement (see Substack link in the Articles section below):

The Federal Reserve’s independence and the public’s perception of that independence are critical for economic performance, including achieving the goals Congress has set for the Federal Reserve of stable prices, maximum employment, and moderate long-term interest rates. The reported criminal inquiry into Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell is an unprecedented attempt to use prosecutorial attacks to undermine that independence. This is how monetary policy is made in emerging markets with weak institutions, with highly negative consequences for inflation and the functioning of their economies more broadly. It has no place in the United States whose greatest strength is the rule of law, which is at the foundation of our economic success.

Response of investors

What will happen to the dollar, US bond prices, share prices and US inflation, and what will happen to investment, depends on how people respond to the threat to the Fed’s independence. Initially, there was little response from markets, with investors probably concluding that President Trump is unlikely to be able to sway FOMC members. What is more, several Republican lawmakers have begun criticising the Trump administration’s criminal investigation, making it harder for the President to influence Fed decisions.

Even if Powell is replaced, either in the short term or in May, by a chair keen to pursue the Trump agenda, that chair will still be just one of twelve voting members of the FOMC.

Seven are appointed by the President, but serve for staggered 14-year terms. Four have been appointed by President Trump, but the other three were appointed by President Biden, although one – Lisa Cook – is being indicted by the Supreme Court for mortgage fraud, with the hearing scheduled for January 21. She claims that this is a trumped-up charge to provide grounds for removing her from the Fed. If she is removed, President Trump could appoint a replacement minded to cut rates.

The other five members include the President of the New York Fed and four of the eleven other regional Fed Presidents serving in rotation. These four are generally hawkish and would oppose early rate cuts.

Thus it is unlikely that President Trump will succeed in pushing the Fed to lower interest rates earlier than they would have done. For that reason, markets have remained relatively sanguine.

Nevertheless, Donald Trump’s actions could well cause investors to become more worried. Will he try to find other ways to undermine the Fed? Will his actions over Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland and Iran, let alone his policies towards Ukraine and Russia and towards Israel and Gaza, heighten global uncertainty? Will his actions towards Venezuela and his desire to take over Greenland embolden China to attempt to annex Taiwan, and Russia to continue to resist plans to end the war in Ukraine or to make stronger demands?

Such developments could cause investor confidence to wane and for stock markets to fall. Time will tell. I think we need a crystal ball!

Videos

Articles

Questions

  1. What are the arguments for central bank independence?
  2. What are the arguments for control of monetary policy by the central government?
  3. Assess the above arguments.
  4. Find out what has happened to interest rates, the US stock market and the dollar since this blog was written.
  5. How do the fiscal decisions by government affect monetary policy?
  6. Compare the benefits of the dual mandate system of the Fed with those of the single mandate of the Bank of England and ECB.
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Commercial banking: the emerging risks from the shadow-banking sector

Recently, a flurry of bankruptcies among non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) in the USA has drawn attention to the risks associated with alternative credit channels in the shadow-banking sector – lending which is not financed with deposits. There is concern that this could be the start of a wave of bankruptcies among such NBFIs, especially given concerns about a potential downswing in the economic cycle – a time when defaults are more likely.

While providing alternative sources of funding, the opacity of lending in the shadow-banking sector means it is not clear what risks NBFIs face themselves and, more significantly, what risks they pose to the financial system as a whole. There is particular concern about the impact on regulated banks.

Already, JP Morgan Chase in its third quarter earnings report announced a $170m charge stemming from the bankruptcy of Tricolor, which specialised in sub-prime car financing. Mid-sized banks, Western Alliance and Zions Bancorp, have reported losses from loans to a group of distressed real estate funds. This has highlighted the interconnectedness between NBFIs and regulated banking, and the potential for problems in the shadow-banking sector to have a direct impact on mainstream banks.

In this blog, we will trace the secular trends in the financial systems of more advanced economies which have given rise to alternative credit channels and, in turn, to potential banking crises. We will explain the relationship between regulated banks and shadow banks, analysing the risks involved, the potential impact on the financial system and the policy implications.

What are the secular trends in banking?

The traditional model of commercial banking involved taking deposits and using them to finance loans to households and firms. However, cycles of banking crises, regulatory changes and financial innovation over the past 50 years produced new models.

First, banks diversified away from direct lending to providing other banking services – on-balance sheet activities, such as investing in financial securities, and off-balance sheet activities, such as acting as agents in the sale of financial securities.

Second, alternative credit channels based on financial markets have grown in significance.

In the 1980s, international regulations around traditional banking activities – taking deposits and making loans – were being formalised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) under what became known as the Basel framework (see, for example, Economics section 18.2 or Economics for Business section 28.2). For the first time, this stipulated liquidity and capital requirements for international banks relating to their traditional lending activities. However, at the same time the deregulation of financial markets and financial innovation provided banks with opportunities to derive revenues from a range of other financial services.

After the financial crisis, liquidity and capital requirements for banks were tightened further through the Basel III regulations. Commercial banks had to have even higher levels of capital as a buffer for bad debts associated with direct lending. A higher level of capital to cover potential losses increases the marginal cost of lending, since each pound of additional loan requires additional capital. This reduced the marginal return, and consequently, the incentive to lend directly.

These regulatory developments created an incentive to pursue activities which do not require as much capital, since their marginal cost is lower and potential return is higher. Consequently, banks have placed less emphasis on lending and more on purchasing short-term and long-term financial securities and generating non-interest income from off-balance sheet activities. For instance, research by the Bank of England found that during the 1980s, interest income accounted for more than two-thirds of total income for large international banks. In contemporary times, non-interest income tends to be greater than interest income. Figure 1 illustrates the declining proportion of total assets represented by commercial and consumer loans for all regulated US banks. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

With banks originating less lending, activity has migrated to different avenues in the shadow-banking sector. This sector has always existed, but deregulation and financial innovation created opportunities for the growth of shadow banking – lending which is not financed with deposits. Traditionally, non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs), such as pension funds, hedge funds and insurance companies, use funds from investors to buy securities through financial markets. However, new types of NBFIs have emerged which originate loans themselves, notably private credit institutions. As Figure 2 illustrates, a lot of the expansion in the activities of NBFIs has been the due to increased lending by these institutions (defined as ‘other financial institutions (OFIs)). Note that the NBFI line includes OFIs. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Since, NBFIs operate outside conventional regulatory frameworks, their credit intermediation and maturity transformation are not subject to the same capital requirements or oversight that banks are. As a result, they do not need to have the same level of capital to insulate against loan losses. Therefore, lending in the shadow-banking sector has a lower marginal cost compared to equivalent lending in the banking sector. Consequently, it generates a higher rate of return. This can explain the large growth in the assets of OFIs illustrated in Figure 2.

Risks in shadow banking

Banking involves trade-offs and this is the case whether the activities happen in the regulated or shadow-banking sector. Increasing lending increases profitability. But as lending continues to increase, at some point the risk-return profile becomes less favourable since institutions are lending to increasingly higher-risk borrowers and for higher-risk projects.

In downturns, when rates of defaults rise, such risks become apparent. Borrowers fail and default, causing significant loan losses for lenders. With lower levels of capital, NBFIs will have a lower buffer to insulate investors from these losses, increasing the likelihood of default.

Is this a problem? Well, for a long-time regulators thought not. It was thought that failures in the shadow-banking sector would have no implications for deposit-holders in regulated banks and the payments mechanism. Unfortunately, current developments in the USA have highlighted that this is unlikely to be the case.

The connections between regulated and shadow banking

The financial system is highly interconnected, and each successive financial crisis has shown that systemic risks lurk in obscure places. On the face of it, NBFIs appear separate from regulated banks. But banks’ new business models have not removed them from the lending channel, merely changed their role. Short-term financing used to be conducted and funded by banks. Now, it is conducted by NBFIs, but still financed by banks. Long-term loan financing is no longer on banks’ balance sheets. However, while the lending is conducted by NBFIs, it is largely funded by banks.

NBFIs cannot be repositories of liquidity. Since they do not have deposits and are not part of the payments system, they have no access to official liquidity backstops. So, they do so indirectly by using deposit-taking banks as liquidity insurance. Banks provide this liquidity in a variety of ways:

  • Investing in the securities issued by private capital funds;
  • Providing bridge financing to credit managers to securitise credit card receivables;
  • Providing prime broker financing to a hedge fund engaged in proprietary trading.

Furthermore, banks have increasingly made loans to NBFIs. Data for US commercial banks lending to the shadow-banking sector are publicly available only since 2015. But, as Figure 3 illustrates, it has seen a steady upward trend with a surge in activity in 2025. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

Banks had an incentive to diversify into these activities since they are a source of revenue requiring less regulatory capital. The model requires risk and return to follow capital out of the banking system into the shadow-banking sector. However, while risky capital and its associated expected return have moved in the shadow-banking system, not all of the liquidity and credit default risk may have done so. Ultimately, some of that risk may be borne by the deposit-holders of the banks.

This is not an issue if banks are fully aware of the risks. However, problems arise when banks do not know the full risks they are taking.

There are reasons why this may be the case. Credit markets involve significant asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. This creates conditions for the classic problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.

Moral hazard is a hidden action problem, whereby borrowers take greater risks because they share the possible downside losses with the lender. Adverse selection is the hidden information problem, whereby lenders do not have full information about the riskiness of borrowers or their activities.

The economics of information suggests that banks exploit scale, scope and learning economies to overcome the costs associated with asymmetric information in lending. However, that applies to direct lending when banks have full information about credit default risk on their loan book. When banks finance lending indirectly through NBFIs, there is an extension of the intermediation chain, and while banks may know the NBFIs, they will have much less information about the risks associated with the lending they are ‘underwriting’. This heightens their problems of asymmetric information associated with credit default risk.

What are the risks at present?

The level of debt in the global economy is at unprecedented levels. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that it rose to $351 trillion dollars in 2024, approximately 235% of weighted global gross domestic product (GDP). It is in this environment that private credit channels through NBFIs have been expanding. With this, it is more likely that NBFIs’ trade-off between credit risk and return has tilted greatly in favour of the former. Some point to the recent collapse of Tricolor and First Brands – both intermediary financing companies funded by private credit – as evidence of elevated levels of risk.

Many are pointing out that the failures observed in the USA so far have a whiff of fraud associated with them, with suggestions of multiple loans being secured against the same working capital. However, such behaviour is symptomatic of ‘late-cycle’ lending, where the incentive to squeeze more profit from lending in a more competitive environment leads to short-cuts – short-cuts that banks, at one stage removed along the intermediation chain, will have less information about.

It is in a downturn that such risks become apparent. Widening credit spreads and the reduced availability of credit causes financial stress for higher-risk borrowers. Inevitably, that higher risk will lead to higher defaults, more provision for loan losses and write-downs in the value of loan assets.

While investors in NBFIs are first in line to bear the losses, they are not the only ones exposed. At moments of stress, the credit lines that banks have provided get drawn and that increases the exposure of banks to the risks associated with NBFIs and whoever they have lent to. As NBFIs fail, the financing provided by banks will not be repaid and they will thus have to absorb losses associated with the lending of the NBFIs. So, while it appears that risk has left the banking system, it hasn’t. Ultimately, the liquidity and credit default risk of the non-bank sector is financed by bank deposits.

Furthermore, the opaqueness of the exposure of banks to risks in the shadow-banking sector may have issues for the wider financial system. In 2008, banks became wary of lending to each other during the financial crisis because they didn’t know the exposure of counterparty institutions to losses from securitised debt instruments. Now, as more and more banks reveal exposures to NBFIs, concerns about the unknown position of other banks may produce a repeat of the credit crunch which occurred then. A seizing up of credit markets will worsen any downturn. However, unlike 2008, the financial resources available to central banks and governments to deal with any consequences are severely limited.

Only time and the path of the US economy will reveal the extent of any contagion related to lending in the shadow-banking sector. However, central banks are already worried about the risks associated with the shadow-banking sector and have been taking steps to identify and ameliorate them. Events in the USA over the past few weeks may accelerate the process and bring more of that lending within the regulatory cordon.

Articles

Academic paper

Data

Questions

  1. Explain why the need to hold more capital raises its cost for banks.
  2. Why does this reduce the lending they undertake?
  3. What is the attraction of ‘off-balance sheet transactions’ for regulated banks?
  4. Analyse the asymmetric information that banks face when providing liquidity to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
  5. Examine the dangers for the financial system associated with regulated banks’ exposure to NBFIs?
  6. Discuss some policy recommendations regarding bank lending to NBFIs.