Category: Economics 11e

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End of the bull run?

With the onset of the pandemic in early 2020, stock markets around the world fell dramatically, with many indices falling by 30% or more. In the USA, the Dow Jones fell by 37% and the Nasdaq fell by 30%. In the UK, the FTSE 100 fell by 33% and the FTSE 250 by 41%.

But with a combination of large-scale government support for their economies, quantitative easing by central banks and returning confidence of investors, stock markets then made a sustained recovery and have continued to grow strongly since – until recently, that is.


With inflation well above target levels, central banks have ended quantitative easing (QE) or have indicated that they soon will. Interest rates are set to rise, if only slowly. The Bank of England raised Bank Rate from its historic low of 0.1% to 0.25% on 16 December 2021 and ceased QE, having reached its target of £895 billion of asset purchases. On 4 February 2022, it raised Bank Rate to 0.5%. The Fed has announced that it will gradually raise interest rates and will end QE in March 2022, and later in the year could begin selling some of the assets it has purchased (quantitative tightening). The ECB is not ending QE or raising interest rates for the time being, but is likely to do so later in the year.

At the same time economic growth is slowing, leading to fears of stagflation. Governments are likely to dampen growth further by tightening fiscal policy. In the UK, national insurance is set to rise by 1.25 percentage points in April.

The slowdown in growth may discourage central banks from tightening monetary policy more than very slightly. Indeed, in the light of its slowing economy, the Chinese central bank cut interest rates on 20 January 2022. Nevertheless, it is likely that the global trend will be towards tighter monetary policy.

The fears of slowing growth and tighter monetary and fiscal policy have led many stock market investors to predict an end to the rise in stock market prices – an end to the ‘bull run’. This belief was reinforced by growing tensions between Russia and NATO countries and fears (later proved right) that Russia might invade Ukraine with all the turmoil in the global economy that this would entail. Stock market prices have thus fallen.

The key question is what will investors believe. If they believe that share prices will continue to fall they are likely to sell. This has happened since early January, especially in the USA and especially with stocks in the high-tech sector – such stocks being heavily represented in the Nasdaq composite, a broad-based index that includes over 2500 of the equities listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange. From 3 January to 18 February the index fell from 15 833 to 13 548, a fall of 14.4%. But will this fall be seen as enough to reflect the current economic and financial climate. If so, it could fluctuate around this sort of level.

However, some may speculate that the fall has further to go – that indices are still too high to reflect the earning potential of companies – that the price–earnings ratio is still too high for most shares. If this is the majority view, share prices will indeed fall.

Others may feel that 14.4% is an overcorrection and that the economic climate is not as bleak as first thought and that the Omicron coronavirus variant, being relatively mild for most people, especially if ‘triple jabbed’, may do less economic damage than first feared. In this scenario, especially if the tensions over Ukraine are diffused, people are likely to buy shares while they are temporarily low.

But a lot of this is second-guessing what other people will do – known as a Keynesian beauty contest situation. If people believe others will buy, they will too and this will push share prices up. If they think others will sell, they will too and this will push share prices down. They will all desperately wish they had a crystal ball as they speculate how people will interpret what central banks, governments and other investors will do.

Articles

Questions

  1. What changes in real-world factors would drive investors to (a) buy (b) sell shares at the current time?
  2. How does quantitative easing affect share prices?
  3. What is meant by the price-earnings ratio of a share? Is it a good indicator as to the likely movement of that share’s price? Explain.
  4. What is meant by a Keynesian beauty contest? How is it relevant to the stock market?
  5. Distinguish between stabilising and destabilising speculation and illustrate each with a demand and supply diagram. Explain the concept of overshooting in this context.
  6. Which is more volatile, the FTSE 100 or the FTSE 250? Explain.
  7. Read the final article linked above. Were the article’s predictions about the Fed meeting on 26 January borne out? Comment.
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Inflationary growth, stagflation or recession? Looking ahead

Inflation across the world has been rising. This has been caused by a rise in aggregate demand as the global economy has ‘bounced back’ from the pandemic, while supply-chain disruptions and tight labour markets constrain the ability of aggregate supply to respond to the rise in demand.

But what of the coming months? Will supply become more able to respond to demand as supply-chain issues ease, allowing further economic growth and an easing of inflationary pressures?

Or will higher inflation and higher taxes dampen real demand and cause growth, or even output, to fall? Are we about to enter an era of ‘stagflation’, where economies experience rising inflation and economic stagnation? And will stagnation be made worse by central banks which raise interest rates to dampen the inflation but, in the process, dampen spending.

Despite the worries of central banks, with inflation being higher than forecast a few months ago, forecasts (e.g. the OECD’s) are still for inflation to peak fairly soon and then to fall back to around 2 to 3 per cent by the beginning of 2023 – close to central bank target rates.

In the UK, annual CPI inflation reached 5.4% in December 2021. The UK Treasury’s January 2022 new monthly forecasts for the UK economy by 15 independent institutions give an average forecast of 4.0% for CPI inflation for 2022. In the USA, annual consumer price inflation reached 7 per cent in December 2021, but is forecast to fall to just over the target rate of 2% by the end of 2022.

If central banks respond to the current high inflation by raising interest rates more than very slightly and by stopping quantitative easing (QE), or even engaging in quantitative tightening (selling assets purchased under previous QE schemes), there is a severe risk of a sharp slowdown in economic activity. Household budgets are already being squeezed by the higher prices, especially energy and food prices. And people will face higher taxes as governments seek to reduce their debts, which soared with the Covid support packages during the pandemic.

The Fed has signalled that it will end its bond buying (QE) programme in March 2022 and may well raise interest rates at the same time. Quantitative tightening may then follow. But although GDP growth is still strong in the USA, Fed policy and stretched household budgets could well see spending slow and growth fall. Stagflation is less likely in the USA than in the UK and many other countries, but there is still the danger of over-reaction by the Fed given the predicted fall in inflation.

But there are reasons to be confident that stagflation can be avoided. Supply-chain bottlenecks are likely to ease and are already showing signs of doing so, with manufacturing production recovering and hold-ups at docks easing. The danger may increasingly become one of demand being excessively dampened rather than supply being constrained. Under these circumstances, inflation could rapidly fall, as is being forecast.

Nevertheless, as Covid restrictions ease, the hospitality and leisure sector is likely to see a resurgence in demand, despite stagnant or falling real disposable incomes, and here there are supply constraints in the form of staffing shortages. This could well lead to higher wages and prices in the sector, but probably not enough to prevent the fall in inflation.

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. Under what circumstances would stagflation be (a) more likely; (b) less likely?
  2. Find out the causes of stagflation in the early/mid-1970s.
  3. Argue the case for and against the Fed raising interest rates and ending its asset buying programme.
  4. Why are labour shortages likely to be higher in the UK than in many other countries?
  5. Research what is likely to happen to fuel prices over the next two years. How is this likely to impact on inflation and economic growth?
  6. Is the rise in prices likely to increase or decrease real wage inequality? Explain.
  7. Distinguish between cost-push and demand-pull inflation. Which of the two is more likely to result in stagflation?
  8. Why are inflationary expectations a major determinant of actual inflation? What influences inflationary expectations?
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Inflation in Turkey: a self-inflicted problem?

Inflation has been rising around the world as a combination of a recovery in demand and supply-chain issues have resulted in aggregate demand exceeding aggregate supply. Annual consumer price inflation at the beginning of 2022 is around 2.5% in China, 3.5% in Sweden, 5% in the eurozone, Canada and India, 6% in the UK and South Africa, 7% in the USA and 7.5% in Mexico. In each case it is forecast to go a little higher before falling back again.

Inflation in Turkey

In Turkey inflation is much higher. The official annual rate of consumer price inflation in December 2021 was 36.1%, sharply up from 21.3% in November. But according to Turkey’s influential ENAGrup the December rate was much higher still at 82.8%. Official producer price inflation was 79.9% and this will feed through into official consumer price inflation in the coming weeks.

The rise in inflation has hit the poor particularly badly. According to the official statistics, in the year to December 2021, domestic energy prices increased by 34.2%, food by 44.7% and transport by 53.7%. In response, the government has raised the minimum wage by nearly 50% for 2022.

Causes of high and rising inflation

Why is Turkey’s inflation so much higher than in most developed and emerging economies and why has it risen so rapidly? The answer is that aggregate demand has been excessively boosted – well ahead of the ability of supply to respond. This has driven inflation expectations.

Turkey’s leader, President Erdoğan, in recent years has been seeking to stimulate economic growth through a mixture of supply-side, fiscal and monetary policies. He has hoped that the prospect of high growth would encourage both domestic and inward investment and that this would indeed drive the high growth he seeks. To encourage investment he has sought to reduce the reliance on imports through various measures, such as public procurement favouring domestic firms, tax reliefs for business and keeping interest rates down. He has claimed that the policy is focused on investment, production, employment and exports, instead of the ‘vicious circle of high interest rates and low exchange rates’.

With the pandemic, fiscal policy was largely focused on health, social security and employment measures. Such support was aided by a relatively healthy public finances. General government debt was 32% of GDP in 2020. This compares with 74% for the EU and 102% for the G7. Nevertheless, the worsening budget deficit has made future large-scale expenditure on public infrastructure, tax cuts for private business and other supply-side measures more difficult. Support for growth has thus fallen increasingly to monetary policy.

The Turkish central bank is not independent, with the President firing senior officials with whom he disagrees over monetary policy. The same applies to the Finance Ministry, with independently-minded ministers losing their jobs. Monetary and exchange rate policy have thus become the policy of the President. And it is here that a major part of the current problem of rising inflation lies.

Monetary and exchange rate policy

Despite rising inflation, the central bank has reduced interest rates. At its monthly meeting in September 2021, the Turkish central bank reduced its key rate from 19% to 18% and then to 16% in October, to 15% in November and 14% in December. These unprecedented rate cuts saw a large increase in the money supply. M1 rose by 11.7% in November alone; the annual growth rate was 59.5%. Broad money (M2 and M3) similarly rose. M3 grew by an annual rate of 51% in November 2021. The cut in interest rates and rise in money supply led to a rise in nominal expenditure which, in turn, led to higher prices.


The cut in interest rates and rise in nominal aggregate demand led to a large depreciation in the exchange rate. On 1 September 2021, 100 Turkish lira exchanged for $12.05. By 11 January 2022 the rate had fallen to $7.22 – a 40.1% depreciation. This depreciation, in turn, further stoked inflation as the lower exchange rate pushed up the price of imported goods. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Attempts were made to stem this fall in the lira on 20 December, by which point 100 lira were trading for just $5.50 (see chart) and speculation against the lira was gathering momentum. President Erdoğan announced a scheme to protect lira deposits against currency volatility, guaranteeing lira deposits in hard currency terms. The mechanism adopted was a rise in the interest rate on lira deposits with a maturity of 3 to 12 months, thereby encouraging people to lock in deposits for the medium term and not, therefore, to use them to speculate against the lira by buying other currencies. Other interest rates would be unaffected. At the same time the central bank used foreign currency reserves to engage in large-scale purchases of the lira on the foreign exchange market.

The lira rallied. By 23 December, 100 lira were trading for $8.79. But then selling of the lira began again and, as stated above, by early January 100 lira had fallen to $7.22. The underlying problem of excess demand and high inflationary expectations had not been solved.

It remains to be seen whether the President will change his mind and decide that the central bank needs to raise interest rates to reduce inflation and restore confidence.

Videos

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. Until the pandemic, the Turkish economy could be seen as a success story. Why?
  2. What supply-side policies did Turkey pursue?
  3. Use either an aggregate demand and supply diagram or a dynamic aggregate demand and supply (DAD/DAS) diagram to explain what has happened to inflation in Turkey in the past few months.
  4. Explain the thinking behind the successive cuts in interest rates since September 2021.
  5. Why did the measures introduced on 20 December 2021 only temporarily halt the depreciation of the lira?
  6. Choose a country with a higher rate of inflation than Turkey (see second data link above). Find out the causes of its high rate. Are they similar to those in Turkey?
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Brexit: one year on from the Trade and Cooperation Agreement

The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020 and entered an 11-month transition phase during which previous arrangements largely applied. On 30 December 2020, the UK and the EU signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) (see also), which set out the details of the post-Brexit trading arrangements between the UK and the EU after the ending of the transition period on 31 December 2020. The new arrangements have been implemented in stages so as to minimise disruption.

A major change was implemented on 1 January 2022, when full customs controls came into effect on imports into the UK from the EU. Later in the year a range of safety and security measures will be introduced, such as physical checks on live animals.

Not surprisingly, the anniversary of the TCA has been marked by many articles on Brexit: assessing its effects so far and looking into the future. Most of the articles see Brexit as having imposed net costs on the UK and the EU. They reflect the views of economists generally. As the first FT article linked below states, “The debate among economists on Brexit has rarely been about whether there would be a hit to growth and living standards, but rather how big a hit”.

The trade and GDP costs of Brexit

The Office for Budget Responsibility in October 2021 attempted to measure these costs in terms of the loss in trade and GDP. In October 2021, it stated:

Since our first post-EU referendum Economic and Fiscal Outlook in November 2016, our forecasts have assumed that total UK imports and exports will eventually both be 15 per cent lower than had we stayed in the EU. This reduction in trade intensity drives the 4 per cent reduction in long-run potential productivity we assume will eventually result from our departure from the EU.
 
…the evidence so far suggests that both import and export intensity have been reduced by Brexit, with developments still consistent with our initial assumption of a 15 per cent reduction in each.

This analysis is supported by evidence from John Springford, deputy director of the Centre for European Reform think-tank. He compares the UK’s actual performance with a ‘doppelgänger’ UK, which is an imaginary UK that has not left the EU. The doppelgänger used “is a subset of countries selected from a larger group of 22 advanced economies by an algorithm. The algorithm finds the countries that, when combined, create a doppelgänger UK that has the smallest possible deviation from the real UK data until December 2019, before the pandemic struck.” According to Springford, the shortfall in trade in October 2021 was 15.7 per cent – very much in line with the OBR’s forecasts.

Explanations of the costs

Why, then, have have been and will continue to be net economic costs from Brexit?

The main reason is that the UK has moved from being in the EU Single Market, a system of virtually friction-free trade and factor movements, to a trade agreement (the TCA) which, while being tariff and quota free for goods produced in the UK and the EU, involves considerable frictions. These frictions include greatly increased paperwork, which adds to the cost of trade. This has affected small businesses particularly, for whom the increased administrative costs generally represent a larger proportion of total costs than for large businesses.

Although EU tariffs are not imposed on goods wholly originating in the UK, they are imposed on many goods that are not. Under ‘rules of origin’ regulations, an item can only count as a British good if sufficient value or weight is added. If insufficient value is added, then customs charges are imposed. Similar rules apply from 1 January 2022 on goods imported into the Great Britain from the EU which are only partially made in the EU. The issue of rules of origin was examined in the blog A free-trade deal? Not really. Goods being moved between Great Britain and the EU are checked at ports and can only be released into the market if they have a valid customs declaration and have received customs clearance. This involves considerable paperwork for businesses. As the article below from Internet Retailing states:

UK and EU importers need to be able to state the origin of the goods they trade between the UK and EU. For some goods, exporters need to hold supplier declarations to show where they were made and where materials came from. From January 1, those issuing statements of origin for goods exported to the EU will need to hold the supplier declarations at the time that they export their goods, whereas up till now the those declarations could be supplied later.

Brexit has had considerable effects on the labour market. Many EU citizens returned to their home countries both before and after Brexit, creating labour shortages in many sectors. Also, it has become more difficult for UK citizens to work in the EU, with work permits required in most cases. This has had a major effect on some UK workers. For example, British touring musicians and performers find it difficult to tour, given the lack of an EU-wide visa waiver, ‘cabotage’ rules that ban large UK tour vehicles from making more than two stops before returning to the UK and new paperwork needed to take certain musical instruments into the EU.

Another issue concerns investment. Will greater restrictions in trade between the EU and the UK reduce inward investment to the UK, with international companies preferring to locate factories producing for Europe in the EU rather than the UK as the EU market is bigger than the UK market? So far, fears have not been realised as inward investment has held up well, partly because of the rapid bounce-back from the pandemic and the successful roll-out of the vaccine. Nevertheless, the UK’s dominance as a recipient of inward investment to Europe has been replaced by a three-way dominance of the UK, France and Germany, with France being the biggest recipient of the three in 2019 and 2020. It will be some years before the extent to which Brexit has damaged inward investment to the UK, if at all, becomes clear.

The TCA applies to goods, not services. One of the major concerns has been the implications of Brexit for financial services and the City of London. Before Brexit, financial institutions based in the UK had ‘passporting rights’. These allowed them to offer financial services across EU borders and to set up branches in EU countries easily. With the ending of the transition period in December 2020, these passporting rights have ceased. The EU has granted temporary ‘equivalence’ to such institutions until June 2022, but then it comes to an end and there is no prospect of deal on financial services in the near future. Indeed, the EU is actively trying to encourage more financial activity to move from the UK to the EU. Several financial institutions have already relocated all or part of their business from London to the EU.

The articles below examine these costs and many give examples of specific firms and how Brexit has impacted on them. As you will see, there are quite a lot of articles and you might just want to select a few. Or if this blog is being used for classes, the articles could be assigned to different students and used as the basis for discussion.

The future

Whilst the additional costs in terms of trade restrictions and paperwork are clear, it is too soon to know how well firms will be able to overcome them. Many of those who support Brexit argue that the UK now has freedom to impose lighter UK regulations on firms and that this could encourage economic growth. Other supporters of Brexit, however, argue that Brexit gives the UK government the opportunity to impose tougher environmental, safety and employment protection regulations. Again, it is too soon to know what direction the current and future governments will move.

Then there is the question of trade deals with non-EU countries. How many will there be? When will they be signed? What will their terms be? So far, the deals signed have largely been just a roll-over of the deals the UK previously had with these countries as a member of the EU. The one exception is the deal with Australia. But the gains from that are tiny – an estimated gain of between 0.02 and 0.08 per cent of GDP from 2035 (compared with the estimated 4 per cent loss from leaving the EU’s Single Market). Also there are fears by the UK agricultural sector that cheaper food from Australia, produced under lower standards, could undercut UK farmers, especially after the end of a 15-year transitional period. So far, a trade deal with the USA seems a long way off.

Then there are uncertainties about the Northern Ireland Protocol, under which there is an effective border between Great Britain and the EU down the Irish Sea, with free trade across the Northern Ireland–Republic of Ireland border. Will it be rewritten? Will the UK renege on its treaty commitments to impose checks on goods flowing between Northern Ireland and Great Britain?

Difficulties with the Northern Ireland Protocol, highlight another uncertainty and that is the political relationships between the UK and the EU, which have come under considerable strain with various post-Brexit disputes. Could these difficulties damage trade further and, if so, by how much?

What is clear is that there is considerable uncertainty about the future, a future that for some time is likely to be affected by the pandemic and its aftermath in both the UK and the EU. As the OBR states:

It is too early to reach definitive conclusions because:

  • The terms of the TCA are yet to be implemented in full, meaning trade barriers will rise further as more of the deal comes into force. For example, the introduction of full checks on UK imports has recently been delayed until 2022.
  • The full effect of the referendum outcome and higher trade barriers will probably take several years to come through, with businesses needing considerable time to adjust.
  • The pandemic has delivered a large shock to UK and global trade volumes over the past 18 months, making it difficult to disentangle the separate effect of leaving the EU.
  • Finally, trade data tend to be relatively volatile and are revised frequently, rendering any initial conclusions subject to change as the data are revised.

Analysis

Articles

Survey

Questions

  1. Summarise the reasons why the volume of trade between the UK and the EU is likely to be below the level it would have been if the UK had remained in the Single Market.
  2. How can economists disentangle the effects of Brexit from the effects of Covid? How is the ‘doppelgänger UK’ model used for this purpose?
  3. Are there any economic advantages of the UK’s exit from the EU? If so, what are they and how significant are they?
  4. The OBR forecasts that there will be a long-term reduction of 15 per cent in both UK imports from the EU and UK exports to the EU. What might cause this figure to be (a) greater than 15 per cent; (b) less than 15 per cent?
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The future of shipping and trade

Shipping and supply chains generally have experienced major problems in 2021. The global pandemic disrupted the flow of trade, and the bounce-back in the summer of 2021 saw supply chains stretched as staff shortages and physical capacity limits hit the transport of freight. Ships were held up at ports waiting for unloading and onward transportation. The just-in-time methods of delivery and stock holding were put under considerable strain.

The problems were compounded by the blockage of the Suez canal in March 2021. As the blog, JIT or Illegit stated “When the large container ship, the Ever Given, en route from Malaysia to Felixtowe, was wedged in the Suez canal for six days in March this year, the blockage caused shipping to be backed up. By day six, 367 container ships were waiting to transit the canal. The disruption to supply cost some £730m.”

Another major event in 2021 was the Glasgow COP26 climate conference and the growing willingness of countries to commit to decarbonising their economies. But whereas electricity can be generated from renewable sources, and factories and land transport, such as cars, vans and trains, can run on electricity, it is not so easy to decarbonise shipping, especially for long journeys. They cannot plug in to the grid or draw down from overhead cables. They have to carry their own fuel sources with them.

So, have the pandemic and the Ever Given incident exposed weaknesses in the global supply chain and in shipping in particular? And, if so, in what ways is shipping likely to adapt? And will the pressure to decarbonise lead to a radical rethinking of shipping and long-distance trade?

These are some of the issues considered in the podcast linked below. In it, “Shipping strategist Mark Williams tells Helen Lewis how examining the challenge of decarbonising shipping reveals a future which looks radically different to today, in a world where population, oil extraction and economic growth have all peaked, and trade is transformed”.

Listen to the podcast and have a go at the questions below which are based directly on it.

Podcast

Articles

Questions

  1. Why should we care about the shipping industry?
  2. What lessons can be drawn from the Ever Given incident?
  3. What structural changes are needed to make shipping an industry fit for the long-term demands of the global economy?
  4. Distinguish between just-in-time supply chains and just-in-case supply chains.
  5. What are ‘reshoring’ and ‘nearshoring’? How have they been driven by a growth in trade barriers?
  6. What are the implications of reshoring and nearshoring for (a) globalisation and (b) the UK’s trading position post-Brexit?
  7. What is the contribution of shipping to global greenhouse gas emissions? What other pollutants are emitted from the burning of heavy fuel oil (or ‘bunker fuel’)?
  8. What levers exist to persuade shipping companies to decarbonise their vessels?
  9. What alternative ‘green’ fuels are available to power ships?
  10. What are the difficulties in switching to such fuels?
  11. What economies of scale are there in shipping?
  12. How do the ownership patterns in shipping benefit decision making and change in the industry?
  13. Are ammonia or nuclear power the answer to the decarbonisation of shipping? What are their advantages and disadvantages?
  14. Why are President Xi’s views on the future of shipping so important?
  15. How will the decarbonisation of economies affect the demand for shipping?
  16. What is likely to happen to Chinese demand for iron ore and coking coal over the coming years? What effect will it have on shipping?
  17. How and by how much is the European Emissions Trading System likely to contribute to the decarbonisation of shipping?
  18. What is the Sea Cargo Charter? What difference is it likely to make to the decarbonisation of shipping?
  19. In what ways do cargo ships optimise productivity?
  20. What impact is slowing population growth, or even no population growth, likely to have on shipping?