Category: Economics for Business: Ch 27

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‘Liberation day’: or start of a Trump slump?

On April 2nd, Donald Trump announced sweeping new ‘reciprocal’ tariffs. These would be in addition to 25% tariffs on imports of cars, steel and aluminium already announced and any other tariffs in place on individual countries, such as China. The new tariffs would apply to US imports from every country, except for Canada and Mexico where tariffs had already been imposed.

The new tariffs will depend on the size of the country’s trade in goods surplus with the USA (i.e. the USA’s trade in goods deficit with that country). The bigger the percentage surplus, the bigger the tariff. But, no matter how small a country’s surplus or even if it runs a deficit (i.e. imports more goods from the USA than it sells), it will still face a minimum 10% ‘baseline’ tariff.

President Trump states that these tariffs are to counter what he claims as unfair trade practices inflicted on the USA. People had been expecting that these tariffs would reflect the tariffs applied by other countries on US goods and possibly also non-tariff barriers, such as the ban on chlorine-washed chicken or hormone-injected beef in the EU and UK. But, by basing them on the size of a country’s trade surplus, this meant imposing them on many countries with which the USA has a free-trade deal with no tariffs at all.

The table gives some examples of the new tariff rates. The largest rates will apply to China and south-east Asian countries, which supply low-priced products, such as clothing, footwear and electronics to the US market. In China’s case, it now faces a reciprocal tariff rate of 34% plus the previously imposed tariff rate of 20%, giving a massive 54%.

What is more, the ‘de minimis’ exemption will be scrapped for packages sent by private couriers. This had exempted goods of $800 or less sent direct to consumers from China and other countries from companies such as Temu and Alibaba. It is also intended to cut back on packages of synthetic opioids sent from these countries.

The US formula for reciprocal tariffs

As we have seen, reciprocal tariffs do not reflect countries’ tariff rates on the USA. Instead, rates for countries running a trade in goods surplus with the USA (a US trade deficit with these countries) are designed to reflect the size of that surplus as a percentage of their total imports from the USA. The White House has published the following formula.


where:

When the two elasticities are multiplied together this gives 1 and so can be ignored. As there was no previous ‘reciprocal’ tariff, the rise in the reciprocal tariff rate is the actual reciprocal tariff rate. The formula for the reciprocal tariff rate thus becomes the percentage trade surplus of that country with the USA: (exports – imports) / imports, expressed as a percentage. This is then rounded up to the nearest whole number.

President Trump also stated that countries would be given a discount to show US goodwill. This involves halving the rate from the above formula and then rounding up to the nearest whole number.

Take the case of China. China’s exports of goods to the USA in 2024 were $439bn, while its imports of goods from the USA were $144bn, giving China a trade surplus with the USA of $295bn. Expressing this as a percentage of exports gives ($295/$439 × 100)/2 = 33.6%, rounded up to 34%. For the EU, the formula gives ($227bn/$584bn × 100)/2 = 19.4%, rounded up to 20%.

Questioning the value of φ. Even if you accept the formula itself as the basis for imposing tariffs, the value of the second term in the denominator, φ, is likely to be seriously undervalued. The term represents the elasticity of import prices with respect to tariff changes. It shows the proportion of a tariff rise that is passed on to consumers, which is assumed to be just one quarter, with producers bearing the remaining three quarters. In reality, it is highly likely that most of the tariff will get passed on, as it was with the tariffs applied in Donald Trump’s first presidency.

If the value for φ were 1 (i.e. all the tariff passed on to the consumer), the formula would give a ‘reciprocal tariff’ of just one quarter of that with a value of φ of 0.25. The figures in the table above would look very different. If the rates were then still halved, all countries with a tariff below 40% (such as the EU, Japan or India) would instead face just the baseline tariff of 10%. What is more, China’s rate would be reduced from 54% to 30% (the original 20% plus the baseline of 10%). Cambodia’s would be reduced to 13%. Even if the halving discount were no longer applied, the rates would still be only half of those shown in the table (and 37% for China).

Are the tariffs justified?

Even if a correct value of φ were used, a percentage trade surplus is a poor way of measuring the protection used by a country. Many countries running a trade surplus with the USA are low-income countries with low labour costs. They have a comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods. That allows such goods to be purchased at low cost by Americans. Their trade surplus may not be a reflection of protection at all.

Also, if protection is to be used to reflect the trade imbalance with each country, then why impose a 10% baseline on countries, like the UK, with which the USA has a trade surplus? By the Trump administration’s logic, it ought to be subsidising UK imports or accepting of UK tariffs on imports of US goods.

But President Trump also wants to address the USA’s overall trade deficit. The US balance of trade in goods deficit was $1063bn in 2023 (the latest year for a full set of figures). But the overall balance of payments must balance. There were thus surpluses elsewhere on the balance of payments account (and some other deficits). There was a surplus on the services account of $278bn and on the financial account of $924bn. In other words, inward investment to the USA (both direct and portfolio) and the acquisition of dollars by other countries as a reserve asset were very large and helped to drive up the exchange rate. This made US goods less competitive and imports relatively cheaper.

The USA has a large national debt of some $36 trillion of which some $9 trillion is owed to foreign investors (people, institutions or countries). Servicing the debt pushes up US interest rates. This helps to maintain a high exchange rate, thereby making imports cheaper and worsening the trade deficit. The fiscal burden of servicing the debt also crowds out US government expenditure on items such as defence, education, law and order and infrastructure. President Trump hopes that tariffs will bring in additional revenue to help finance the deficit.

Effects on the USA

If the tariffs reduce spending on imports and if other countries do not retaliate, then the US balance of trade should improve. However, a tariff is effectively a tax on imported goods. It is charged to the importing company not to the manufacturer abroad. As we saw in the context of the false value for φ, most of the tariff will be passed on to American consumers. Theoretically the incidence of the tariff is shared between the supplier and the purchaser, but in practice, most of the higher cost to the importer will be passed on to the consumer. As with other taxes, the effect is to transfer money from the consumer to the government, making people poorer but giving the government extra revenue. This revenue will be dollars, not foreign currency.

As some of the biggest price rises will be for cheap manufactured products, such as imports from China, and various staple foodstuffs, the effects could be felt disproportionately by the poor. Higher import prices will allow domestic producers competing with these imports to raise their prices too. The tariffs are thus likely to be inflationary. But because the inflation would be the result of higher costs, not higher demand, this could lead to recession as real incomes fell.

American resources will be diverted by the tariffs from sectors in which the USA has a comparative advantage, such as advanced manufactured goods and services, to more basic products. Tariffs on cheap imports will make domestic versions of these products more profitable: even though they are more costly to produce, they will be sold at a higher price.

The tariffs will also directly affect goods produced by US companies. The reason is that many use complex supply chains involving parts produced abroad. Take the case of Apple. Even though it is an American company which designs its products in California, the company sources parts from several Asian countries and has factories in Vietnam, China, India, and Thailand. These components will face tariffs and thus directly affect the price of iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, etc. Similarly affected are other US tech hardware manufacturers, US car manufactures, clothing and footwear producers, such as The Gap and Nike, and home goods producers.

Monetary policy response. How the Fed would respond is not clear. Higher inflation and lower growth, or even a recession, produces what is known as ‘stagflation’: inflation combined with stagnation. Many countries experienced stagflation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when higher commodity prices led to soaring inflation and economic slowdown. There was a cost-of-living crisis.

If a central bank has a simple mandate of keeping inflation to a target, higher inflation would be likely to lead to higher interest rates, making recession even more likely. It is the inflation of the two elements of stagflation (inflation and stagnation) that is addressed. The recession is thus likely to be deepened by monetary policy. But as the Fed has a dual mandate of controlling inflation but also of maximising employment, it may choose not to raise interest rates, or even to lower them, to get the optimum balance between these two targets.

If other countries retaliate by themselves raising tariffs on US exports and/or if consumers boycott American goods and services, this will further reduce incomes in the USA. Just two days after ‘liberation day’, China retaliated against America’s 34% additional tariff on Chinese imports by imposing its own 34% tariff on US imports to China.

A trade war will make the world poorer, especially the USA. Investors know this. In the two days following ‘liberation day’, stock markets around the world fell sharply and especially in the USA. The Dow Jones was down 9.3% and the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite was down 11.4%.

Effects on the rest of the world

The effects of the tariffs on other countries will obviously depend on the tariff rate. The countries facing the largest tariffs are some of the poorest countries which supply the USA with simple labour-intensive products, such as garments, footwear, food and minerals. This could have a severe effect on their economies and cause rapidly increasing poverty and hardship.

If countries retaliate, then this will raise prices of their imports from the USA and hurt their own domestic consumers. This will fuel inflation and push the more seriously affected countries into recession.

If the USA retaliates to this retaliation, thereby further escalating the trade war, the effects could be very serious. The world could be pushed into a deep recession. The benefits of trade, where all countries can gain by specialising in producing goods with low opportunity costs and importing those with high domestic opportunity costs, would be seriously eroded.

What President Trump hopes is that the tariffs will put him in a strong negotiating position. He could offer to reduce or scrap the tariffs on a particular country in exchange for something he wants. An example would be the offer to scrap or reduce the baseline 10% tariff on UK exports and/or the 25% tariff on UK exports of cars, steel and aluminium. This could be in exchange for the UK allowing the importation of US chlorinated chicken or abolishing the digital services tax. This was introduced in 2020 and is a 2% levy on tech firms, including big US firms such as Amazon, Alphabet (Google), Meta and X.

It will be fascinating but worrying to see how the politics of the trade war play out.

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Questions

  1. What is the law of comparative advantage? Does this imply that free trade is always the best alternative for countries?
  2. From a US perspective, what are the arguments for and against the tariffs announced by President Trump on 2 April 2025?
  3. What response to the tariffs is in the UK’s best interests and why?
  4. Should the UK align with the EU in responding to the tariffs?
  5. What is meant by a negative sum game? Explain whether a trade war is a negative sum game. Can a specific ‘player’ gain in a negative sum game?
  6. What happened to stock markets directly following President Trump’s announcement and what has happened since? Explain you findings.
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The perplexing rally in gold prices

Gold has always held an allure and with the price of gold on international markets trending upwards since October 2022 (see Figure 1: click here for a PowerPoint), people seem to be attracted to it once again. The price reached successively higher peaks throughout 2023 before surging to above $2300 per oz in 2024 and peaking at $2425.31 per oz on 20 May 2024.

While gold tends to become attractive during wartime, economic uncertainty and bouts of inflation, all of which have characterised the last few years, the sustained price rise has perplexed market analysts and economists. The rally had been expected to peter out over the past 20 months. But, as the price of gold rose to sustained higher levels, with no significant reversals, some analysts have speculated that it is not the typical short-term factors which are driving the increased demand for and price of gold but more fundamental changes in the global economic system.

This blog will first discuss the typical short-term factors which influence gold prices before discussing the potential longer-term forces that may be at work.

Short-term factors

So, what are the typical short-term economic forces which drive the demand for gold?

The most significant are the real rates of interest on financial assets. These rates represent the opportunity cost of holding an asset such as gold which offers no income stream. When the real return from financial assets like debt and equity instruments is low, the demand for and price of gold tends to be high. In contrast, when the real return from such assets is high, the price of gold tends to be lower. An explanation for this is that real rates of return are strongly related to inflation rates and investors perceive gold as a hedge against inflation since its price is positively correlated with a general rise in prices. Higher unexpected inflation reduces the real rate of return of securities like debt and equity whose value is derived from cash flows anticipated in the future. In such circumstances, gold become an attractive alternative investment. As inflationary expectations decline, real returns from financial assets should rise, and the demand for gold should fall.

The relationship between real returns, proxied by the yield on US 10-year TIPS (Treasury inflation-protected securities), and gold prices can be used to examine this explanation. Real returns rose steadily in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the price of gold, which rose during the early stages of the pandemic in 2020, has not fallen. Instead, it has remained at elevated levels for much of that time (see Figure 2: click here for a PowerPoint).

There have been short periods when changes in real returns seemed to have a high correlation with changes in gold prices. In late 2022, for example, falling real rates coincided with rising gold prices. The same pattern was repeated between October and December 2023. However, when real returns rose again in the New Year of 2024, in response to stubbornly higher expected inflation and the expectation of ‘higher-for-longer’ interest rates, particularly in the USA, gold prices continued to rise. Indeed, across the 5-year period the correlation coefficient between the two series is actually positive at 0.268, showing little evidence supporting this explanation for the pattern for the gold price.

Real returns in the USA, however, may not be the correct ones to consider when seeking explanations for the pattern of gold’s price. Much of the recent demand is from China. Analysts suggest that Chinese investors are looking for a safe asset to hold as their economy stagnates and real returns from alternatives, like domestic property and equity, have decreased. Further, there are some concerns that the Chinese currency, the renminbi, may be undervalued in response to the sluggish growth. Holding gold is a good hedge against inflation (currency depreciation produces inflationary pressure). Consequently, the Chinese market may be exerting pricing power in relation to real returns in a way not seen before (see the Dempsey and Leng FT article linked below).

However, some analysts suggest that the rise in price is disproportionate to these short-term factors and point to potential long-term structural changes in the global financial order which may produce significant changes in the market for gold.

Long-term factors

Since 2018, there have been bouts of gold purchasing by central banks around the world. In contrast to the 1990s and 2000s, central banks have been net purchasers since 2010. The purchasing fell back during the coronavirus pandemic but has surged again, with over 1000 metric tonnes purchased in both 2022 and 2023 (see Figure 3: click here for a PowerPoint).

Analysts have pointed to similarities between the recent pattern and central bank purchases of gold during the late 1960s and early 1970s (see The Conversation article linked below). Then, central banks sought to diversify themselves from dollar-denominated assets due to concerns about higher inflation in the USA and its impact on the value of the US dollar. Under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, central banks could redeem dollars for gold from the US Federal Reserve at a fixed rate. The pressure on the USA to redeem the gold led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.

While the current period of central bank purchases does not appear to be related to expected inflation, some commentators suggest it could signal a regime change in the global financial system as significant as the collapse of Bretton Woods. The rise of Chinese political power and the resurgence of US isolationist tendencies portend an increasingly multipolar geopolitical scene. Such concerns may cause central bankers to diversify away from dollar denominated assets to avoid being caught out by geopolitical tensions. Gold may be perceived as an asset through which investors can hedge that risk better.

Indeed, the rise in demand among Chinese investors may indicate a reluctance to hold US assets due to their risk of seizure during heightened geopolitical tensions between China and the USA. Chinese holdings of US financial assets as a percentage of GDP are back to the level they were  when the country joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (see the Rana Foroohar FT article linked below). Allied to this is an increasing tendency to repatriate gold bullion from centres such as London and New York.

Added to these worries about geopolitical risk are concerns about traditional safe-haven assets – government debt securities. US government budget deficits and debt levels continue to rise. Similar patterns are observed across many developed market economies (DMEs). Analysts are concerned such debts are reaching unsustainable levels (economist.com). The view is that at some point, perhaps soon, a tipping point will be reached where investors recognise this. They will demand higher rates of return on these government debt securities, pushing yields up and prices down (bond yields and prices have a negative relationship).

In expectation of this, investors may be wary of holding such government debt securities and move to hold gold as an alternative safe-haven asset to avoid potential capital losses. However, there has been no sign of this behaviour in bond prices and yields yet.

Finally, there are economists who argue that the increased demand for gold is caused by a different regime-change in the global economy. This is not one driven by geopolitics, but by changing inflationary expectations – from a low-inflation, low-interest-rate environment to a higher-inflation, higher-interest-rate environment.

Some of the anticipation relating to inflation is derived from the persistent fiscal stimulus, evidenced by the higher government debt levels described above, coupled with the long period of monetary stimulus (quantitative easing) in developed market economies during the 2010s.

Further, some economists highlight the substantial capital investment needed for the green transition and reindustrialisation. While the financing for this capital investment may absorb some of the excess money flowing around financial markets, the scale involved will create a great demand for resources, fuelling inflation and raising the cost of capital as borrowers compete for resources.

Finally, the demographic forces from an aging population will also cause inflationary pressures. Rising dependency ratios across many developed market economics will create shortages, particularly of labour. This persistent scarcity of labour will continually drive up wages and prices, fuelling inflation and the demand for gold.

Conclusion

The recent surge in the price of gold has led to great interest by investors, financial market analysts and economists. At first, there was a perception that the price increase was similar to recent history and driven by short-term decreases in the real rate of return from financial assets, which reduced the opportunity cost of holding gold.

However, as the upward trend in the price of gold has persisted and does not seem to be explained by changes in real interest rates, economists have considered other reasons that might signal longer-term significant changes in the global financial system. These relate to changing geopolitical risk derived from an increasingly multipolar environment, concerns about the sustainability of government debt levels and expectations of persistently higher inflation in the world economy.

Only time will tell whether these explanations prove correct. If inflationary pressures subside, particularly in the USA, and if real returns from financial assets rebound, a decrease in the demand for and price of gold will suggest that the previous rise was driven by short-term forces.

If prices don’t fall back, it will only fuel the debate that it is a sign of significant changes in the global financial order.

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Questions

  1. Explain the relationship between real returns and inflation for financial securities like debt and equity.
  2. Why is gold perceived to be an effective hedge against inflation?
  3. Contrast the factors which influenced the demand for gold in the period which preceded the end of Bretton Woods with those influencing demand now?
  4. What has happened to the price of gold since this blog was published? Is there any evidence for the profound changes in the global economic order suggested or was it the short-term forces driving demand after all?
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Worries about the Chinese economy

According to the IMF, Chinese GDP grew by 5.2% in 2023 and is predicted to grow by 4.6% this year. Such growth rates would be extremely welcome to most developed countries. UK growth in 2023 was a mere 0.5% and is forecast to be only 0.6% in 2024. Advanced economies as a whole only grew by 1.6% in 2023 and are forecast to grow by only 1.5% this year. Also, with the exception of India, the Philippines and Indonesia, which grew by 6.7%, 5.3% and 5.0% respectively in 2023 and are forecast to grow by 6.5%, 6.0% and 5.0% this year, Chinese growth also compares very favourably with other developing countries, which as a weighted average grew by 4.1% last year and are forecast to grow at the same rate this year.

But in the past, Chinese growth was much higher and was a major driver of global growth. Over the period 1980 to 2018, Chinese economic growth averaged 9.5% – more than twice the average rate of developing countries (4.5%) and nearly four times the average rate of advanced countries (2.4%) (see chart – click here for a PowerPoint of the chart).

Not only is Chinese growth now much lower, but it is set to decline further. The IMF forecasts that in 2025, Chinese growth will have fallen to 4.1% – below the forecast developing-country average of 4.2% and well below that of India (6.5%).

Causes of slowing Chinese growth

There are a number of factors that have come together to contribute to falling economic growth rates – growth rates that otherwise would have been expected to be considerably higher as the Chinese economy reopened after severe Covid lockdowns.

Property market
China has experienced a property boom over the past 20 years years as the government has encouraged construction in residential blocks and in factories and offices. The sector has accounted for some 20% of economic activity. But for many years, demand outstripped supply as consumers chose to invest in property, partly because of a lack of attractive alternatives for their considerable savings and partly because property prices were expected to go on rising. This lead to speculation on the part of both buyers and property developers. Consumers rushed to buy property before prices rose further and property developers borrowed considerably to buy land, which local authorities encouraged, as it provided a valuable source of revenue.

But now there is considerable overcapacity in the sector and new building has declined over the past three years. According to the IMF:

Housing starts have fallen by more than 60 per cent relative to pre-pandemic levels, a historically rapid pace only seen in the largest housing busts in cross-country experience in the last three decades. Sales have fallen amid homebuyer concerns that developers lack sufficient financing to complete projects and that prices will decline in the future.

As a result, many property developers have become unviable. At the end of January, the Chinese property giant, Evergrande, was ordered to liquidate by a Hong Kong court, after the judge ruled that the company did not have a workable plan to restructure around $300bn of debt. Over 50 Chinese property developers have defaulted or missed payments since 2020. The liquidation of Evergrande and worries about the viability of other Chinese property developers is likely to send shockwaves around the Chinese property market and more widely around Chinese investment markets.

Overcapacity
Rapid investment over many years has led to a large rise in industrial capacity. This has outstripped demand. The problem could get worse as investment, including state investment, is diverted from the property sector to manufacturing, especially electric vehicles. But with domestic demand dampened, this could lead to increased dumping on international markets – something that could spark trade wars with the USA and other trading partners (see below). Worries about this in China are increasing as the possibility of a second Trump presidency looks more possible. The Chinese authorities are keen to expand aggregate demand to tackle this overcapacity.

Uncertainty
Consumer and investor confidence are low. This is leading to severe deflationary pressures. If consumers face a decline in the value of their property, this wealth effect could further constrain their spending. This will, in turn, dampen industrial investment.

Uncertainty is beginning to affect foreign companies based in China. Many foreign companies are now making a loss in China or are at best breaking even. This could lead to disinvestment and add to deflationary pressures.

The Chinese stock market and policy responses
Lack of confidence in the Chinese economy is reflected in falling share prices. The Shanghai SSE Composite Index (an index of all stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange) has fallen dramatically in recent months. From a high of 3703 in September 2021, it had fallen to 2702 on 5 Feb 2024 – a fall of 27%. It is now below the level at the beginning of 2010 (see chart: click here for a PowerPoint). On 5 February alone, some 1800 stocks fell by over 10% in Shanghai and Shenzhen. People were sensing a rout and investors expressed their frustration and anger on social media, including the social media account of the US Embassy. The next day, the authorities intervened and bought large quantities of key stocks. China’s sovereign wealth fund announced that it would increase its purchase of shares to support the country’s stock markets. The SSE Composite rose 4.1% on 6 February and the Shenzhen Component Index rose 6.2%.

However, the rally eased as investors waited to see what more fundamental measures the authorities would take to support the stock markets and the economy more generally. Policies are needed to boost the wider economy and encourage a growth in consumer and business confidence.

Interest rates have been cut four times since the beginning of 2022, when the prime loan rate was cut from 3.85% to 3.7%. The last cut was from 3.55% to 3.45% in August 2023. But this has been insufficient to provide the necessary boost to aggregate demand. Further cuts in interest rates are possible and the government has said that it will use proactive fiscal and effective monetary policy in response to the languishing economy. However, government debt is already high, which limits the room for expansionary fiscal policy, and consumers are highly risk averse and have a high propensity to save.

Graduate unemployment
China has seen investment in education as an important means of increasing human capital and growth. But with a slowing economy, there are are more young people graduating each year than there are graduate jobs available. Official data show that for the group aged 16–24, the unemployment rate was 14.9% in December. This compares with an overall urban unemployment rate of 5.1%. Many graduates are forced to take non-graduate jobs and graduate jobs are being offered at reduced salaries. This will have a further dampening effect on aggregate demand.

Demographics
China’s one-child policy, which it pursued from 1980 to 2016, plus improved health and social care leading to greater longevity, has led to an ageing population and a shrinking workforce. This is despite recent increases in unemployment in the 16–24 age group. The greater the ratio of dependants to workers, the greater the brake on growth as taxes and savings are increasingly used to provide various forms of support.

Effects on the rest of the world

China has been a major driver of world economic growth. With a slowing Chinese economy, this will provide less stimulus to growth in other countries. Many multinational companies, including chip makers, cosmetics companies and chemical companies, earn considerable revenue from China. For example, the USA exports over $190 billion of goods and services to China and these support over 1 million jobs in the USA. A slowdown in China will have repercussions for many companies around the world.

There is also the concern that Chinese manufacturers may dump products on world markets at less than average (total) cost to shift stock and keep production up. This could undermine industry in many countries and could initiate a protectionist response. Already Donald Trump is talking about imposing a 10% tariff on most imported goods if he is elected again in November. Such tariffs could be considerably higher on imports from China. If Joe Biden is re-elected, he too may impose tariffs on Chinese goods if they are thought to be unfairly subsidised. US (and possibly EU) tariffs on Chinese goods could lead to a similar response from China, resulting in a trade war – a negative sum game.

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Questions

  1. Why is China experiencing slowing growth and is growth likely to pick up over the next five years?
  2. How does the situation in China today compare with that in Japan 30 years ago?
  3. What policies could the Chinese government pursue to stimulate economic growth?
  4. What policies were enacted towards China during the Trump presidency from 2017 to 2020?
  5. Would you advise the Chinese central bank to cut interest rates further? Explain.
  6. Should China introduce generous child support for families, no matter the number of children?
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What does 2023 have in store for the UK economy?

Last year was far from the picture of economic stability that all governments would hope for. Instead, the overarching theme of 2022 was uncertainty, which overshadowed many economic predictions throughout the year. The Collins English Dictionary announced that their word of the year for 2022 is ‘permacrisis’, which is defined as ‘an extended period of instability and insecurity’.

For the UK, 2022 was an eventful year, seeing two changes in prime minister, economic stagnation, financial turmoil, rampant inflation and a cost of living crisis. However, the UK was not alone in its economic struggles. Many believe that it is a minor miracle that the world did not experience a systemic financial crisis in 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to the biggest land war in Europe since 1945, the most serious risk of nuclear escalation since the Cuban missile crisis and the most far-reaching sanctions regime since the 1930s. Soaring food and energy costs have fuelled the highest rates of inflation since the 1980s and the biggest macroeconomic challenge in the modern era of central banking (with the possible exception of the financial crisis of 2007–8 and its aftermath). For decades we have lived with the assumptions that nuclear war was never going to happen, inflation will be kept low and rich countries will not experience an energy crisis. In 2022 all of these assumptions and more have been shaken.

With the combination of rising interest rates and a massive increase in geopolitical risk, the world economy did well to survive as robustly as it did. However, with public and private debt having risen to record levels during the now-bygone era of ultra-low interest rates and with recession risks high, the global financial system faces a huge stress test.

Government pledges

Rishi Sunak, the UK Prime Minister, started 2023 by setting out five pledges: to halve inflation, boost economic growth, cut national debt as a percentage of GDP, and to address NHS waiting lists and the issue of immigrants arriving in small boats. Whilst most would agree that meeting these pledges is desirable, a reduction in inflation is forecast to happen anyway, given the monetary policy being pursued by the Bank of England and an easing of commodity prices; and public-sector debt as a percentage of GDP is forecast to fall from 2024/25.

Success in meeting the first four pledges will partly depend on the effects of the current industrial action by workers across the UK. How soon will the various disputes be settled and on what terms? What will be the implications for service levels and for inflation?

A weak global economy

Success will also depend on the state of the global economy, which is currently very fragile. In fact, it is predicted that a third of the global economy will be hit by recession this year. The head of the IMF has warned that the world faces a ‘tougher’ year in 2023 than in the previous 12 months. Such comments suggest the IMF is likely soon to cut its economic forecasts for 2023 again. The IMF already cut its 2023 outlook for global economic growth in October, citing the continuing drag from the war in Ukraine, as well as inflationary pressures and interest rate rises by major central banks.

The World Bank has also described the global economy as being ‘on a razor’s edge’ and warns that it risks falling into recession this year. The organisation expects the world economy to grow by just 1.7% this year, which is a sharp fall from an estimated 2.9% in 2022 according to the Global Economic Prospects report (see link below). It has warned that if financial conditions tighten, then the world’s economy could easily fall into a recession. If this becomes a reality, then the current decade would become the first since the 1930s to include two global recessions. Growth forecasts have been lowered for 95% of advanced economies and for more than 70% of emerging market and developing economies compared with six months ago. Given the global outlook, it is no surprise that the UK economy is expected to face a prolonged recession with declining growth and increased unemployment.

The current state of the UK economy

Despite all the concerns, official figures show that, even though households have been squeezed by rising prices, UK real GDP unexpectedly grew in November, by 0.1%. This has been explained by a boost to bars and restaurants from the World Cup as people went out to watch the football and also by demand for services in the tech sector.

At first sight, the UK’s cost of living crisis might look fairly mild compared to other countries. Its inflation rate was 10.7% in November 2022, compared to 12.6% in Italy, 16% in Poland and over 20% in Hungary and Estonia. But UK inflation is still way above the Bank of England’s 2% target. The Bank went on to tighten monetary policy further, by increasing interest rates to 3.5% in December. Further rate rises are expected in 2023. In fact, the markets and the Bank both expect the main rate to reach 5.2% by the end of this year. With the consequent squeeze on real incomes, the Bank of England expects a recession in the UK this year – possibly lasting until mid-2024.

The UK is also affected by global interest rates, which affect global growth. Global interest rates average 5%. A 1 percentage point increase would reduce global growth this year from 1.7% to 0.6%, with per capita output contracting by 0.3%, once changes in population are taken into account. This would then meet the technical definition of a global recession. This means that the Bank’s November economic forecast, which was based on a Bank Rate of 3%, may worsen due to an even larger contraction than previously expected. The resulting drop in spending and investment by people and businesses could then cause inflation to come down faster than the Bank had predicted when rates were at 3%.

There could be some positive news however, that may help bring down inflation in addition to rate rises. There has been some appreciation in the pound since the huge drop caused by the September mini-budget that had brought its value to a nearly 40-year low. This will help to reduce inflation by reducing the price of imports.

As far as workers are concerned, pay increases have been broadly contained, with 2022 being one of the worst years in decades for UK real wage growth. Limiting pay rises can have a deflationary effect because people have less to spend, but it also weighs on economic growth and productivity. Despite the impact on inflation, there is a lot of unrest across the UK, with strike action continuing to be at the forefront of the news. Strikes over pay and conditions continue in various sectors in 2023, including transport, health, education and the postal service. Strikes and industrial action have a negative effect on the wider economy. If wages are stagnating and the economy is not performing well, productivity will suffer as workers are less motivated and less investment in new equipment takes place.

Financial stresses

The UK economy is also under threat of a prolonged recession due to the proportion of households that lack insulation against financial setbacks. This proportion is unusually large for a wealthy economy. A survey conducted prior to the pandemic, found that 3 million people in the UK would fall into poverty if they missed one pay cheque, with the country’s high housing costs being a key source of vulnerability. Another survey recently suggested that one-third of UK adults would struggle if their costs rose by just £20 a month.

The pandemic itself meant that over 4 million households have taken on additional debt, with many now falling behind on repaying it. This, combined with recent jumps in energy and food bills, could push many over the edge, especially if heating costs remain high when the present government cap on energy prices ends in April.

However, there could be some better news for households with the easing of COVID restrictions in China. This could have a positive impact on the UK economy if it helps ease supply-chain disruptions occurring since the height of the global pandemic. It could reduce inflationary pressure in the UK and other countries that trade with China by making it easier – and therefore less costly – for people to get hold of goods.

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Questions

  1. Define the term ‘deflation’.
  2. Explain how an appreciation of the pound is good for inflation.
  3. Discuss the wider economic impacts of industrial strike action.
  4. Why is it important for the government to keep wages contained?