Category: Economics for Business: Ch 02

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The global economic impacts of the war with Iran – update

With relentless bombing of Iran by Israel and the USA, and with Iranian counterattacks on Gulf states, the costs of the war are mounting. The most obvious are in terms of human lives, injuries and suffering. But there are significant economic costs too. Some of these are immediate, such as the rising price of oil and hence the costs of fuel, or the fall in stock market prices. Some will be longer term, depending on how the war develops. For example, prices could rise more generally as supply chains are disrupted.

The impacts will vary across the world and across markets. The most obvious markets to be affected are those where significant supply comes from the Persian Gulf. Approximately 20% of total global oil consumption passes through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Oil prices rose considerably in the days following the start of the war on 28 February, with Brent crude, a key measure of international oil prices, rising from $71.3 on 27 February to a peak of $119.4 per barrel by the morning of 9 March – a rise of 67%. It was possible that they would rise even further in the short term. However, prices fell back substantially later on 9 March after G7 finance ministers declared that the group ‘stands ready’ to release oil from strategic reserves if needed. By late in the day, the price had fallen to below $85. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

However, despite the announcement on 11 March that 32 countries had agreed to release 400m barrels of oil reserves, oil prices began rising again and reached $100 on 12 March after three tankers had been struck in the Gulf, two of them close to the Strait of Hormuz. With Iran pledging to keep the Strait closed, there were worries that the release of oil reserves would provide only temporary relief. Just over 20m barrels of oil normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz. The 400m barrels released from storage is the equivalent, therefore, of only 20 days’ worth of lost oil from the Gulf.

Not only did oil prices rise, but the price became much more volatile as markets reacted to the news on a continuous basis. Intra-day fluctuations in oil prices of several percentage points became typical, reflecting shifting expectations. The second chart shows daily fluctuations, with the highest and lowest prices for each day shown, along with the closing price. (Click here for a PowerPoint.)

The biggest fluctuation had been on 9 March when fears of the closing of the Strait of Hormuz saw the price of Brent crude rising to nearly $120 but falling to around $84 later in the day (a fall of around 30%) after the G7 announcement about releasing reserves.

There was another big fluctuation on 23 March. The previous day (Sunday), President Trump threatened to bomb Iran’s power plants if Iran did not allow free passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran threatened to retaliate by striking Gulf countries’ energy and water systems. In early trading on Monday 23rd, Brent crude rose to over $115 per barrel. But later that day, Trump said that there had been constructive talks between the USA and Iran. The oil price immediately dropped to around $96 – a fall of 17% – before settling at around $100.

Rising oil prices will drive up inflation. For those countries with a heavy dependence on Gulf oil, particularly countries in Asia, there could be significant supply problems. For oil exporters in the Persian Gulf, with tankers unable to traverse the Strait of Hormuz, the economic impact is huge. Oil exporters outside the Gulf, such as Russia, Norway and Canada, however, will gain from the higher prices. Clearly the size of these effects will depend on how long the conflict continues and how long the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

And it is not just oil that is affected. Other products, such as liquified natural gas (LNG), petrochemicals, industrial materials, fertilizers for food production, medicines, helium for microchip production, metals and minerals are transported through the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf countries import much of their food through the Strait. On 18 March, Israel struck Iran’s huge South Pars gas field off the Gulf coast. This is the largest gas field in the world and is a major source of export revenue for Iran. Iran responded by striking the Qatari gas hub in Ras Laffan. Donald Trump responded by threatening to ‘blow up’ the entire Iranian South Pars gas field if Iran made further strikes on Qatar. The effect of this escalation was to drive oil and gas prices up further. By the week ending 20 March, the oil price closed at just over $112 per barrel.

Cuts in supplies of oil and other products represent an adverse supply shock. Such shocks push up prices (cost-push inflation), while adversely affecting aggregate output. This can lead to stagflation – a combination of higher inflation and stagnation or even falling output. Central banks with a simple mandate to keep inflation to a target are likely to raise interest rates, or at least delay in reducing them. In the USA, with a dual mandate of controlling inflation but also maximising employment, the response may be less deflationary, depending on the judgement of the Federal Reserve.

Uncertainty

There is great uncertainty about how long the conflict will last. There is also a lack of clarity and consistency from the US administration about its war aims. This uncertainty has affected financial markets, which have seen considerable volatility. Stock markets have seen widespread falls, with airline, travel and AI-heavy stocks being particularly vulnerable.

If the war is concluded relatively swiftly, the economic effects could be relatively small. If the war continues, and especially if the Gulf countries are drawn further into the conflict and if the conflict spreads to other countries, the economic effects could be much more substantial. A prolonged conflict could see oil prices remaining above $100 per barrel, potentially increasing global inflation by 1 percentage point or more. This would slow or halt the move by central banks to cut rates and thereby reduce global economic growth – potentially, as we have seen, leading to stagflation.

The uncertainty was reflected in the decision of the Fed to keep interest rates unchanged at its meeting on 17/18 March. The Fed has the twin targets of keeping inflation close to 2% and maximising employment. Fed Chair, Jay Powell, acknowledged the current tension between the two goals: ‘upward risks for inflation and downward risks for employment, and that puts us in a difficult situation’. He also recognised that the future for inflation and the economy was highly uncertain as the war developed. This made interest rate setting difficult.

Then there is the issue of a potential new international refugee crisis. If the economic and political system in Iran deteriorates rapidly, this could trigger a wave of migration to neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, already hosting large numbers of refugees. Many could seek sanctuary further afield in Europe, with several countries already facing a backlash against immigration. The political and economic effects of this on host countries could be significant – but as yet, highly uncertain.

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Data

Report

Questions

  1. Who are the biggest gainers and losers from disruption to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf?
  2. Illustrate the effect of the current oil price shock on an aggregate demand and supply diagram (either static or dynamic).
  3. Why is the Iranian war likely to be less damaging to the European economy than the Ukrainian war has been?
  4. Why have AI-related stock prices been vulnerable to the uncertainty caused by the Iranian war?
  5. How have the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank responded to higher oil prices and the broader economic effects of the war? Why might their responses be different in the coming months?
  6. What is the likely impact of the Iranian war on global economic recovery?
  7. How might the Iranian war affect global economic alliances?
  8. How is the current oil price shock likely to affect the eurozone? Will it be different from the oil price shock that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
  9. What are the likely economic effects of large-scale migration caused by the war?
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Shrinkflation, skimpflation and sneakflation: ways of hiding inflation

Have you noticed that many products in the supermarket seem to be getting smaller or are poorer quality, or that special offers are not as special as they used to be? When you ring customer services, does it seem that you have to wait longer than you used to? Do you now have to pay for extras that used to be free? These are all ways that producers try to pass on cost increases to consumers without rising prices. There are three broad ways in which producers try to hide inflation.

The first is called ‘shrinkflation’. It is defined as having less product in the same package or a smaller package for the same price. For example, reducing the number of chocolates in a tub, reducing the size of a can of beans, jar of coffee or block of butter, reducing the number of sheets in a toilet roll, or the length of a ride in a fairground or portion sizes in a restaurant or takeaway. A 2023 YouGov poll revealed that 75% of UK adults are either ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned about shrinkflation. A similar poll in 2025 showed that this figure had increased to 80%. The product category with the greatest concerns was snack foods (e.g. crisps, confectionery items, nuts, etc.).1

The second form of hidden inflation is called ‘skimpflation’. This is defined as decreasing the quality of a product or service without lowering the price. Examples include cheaper ingredients in food or confectionery, such as using palm oil instead of butter, or reducing the cocoa content in chocolate or the meat content in sausages and pies, or package holidays reducing the quality of meals, or customer service centres or shops reducing the number of staff so that people have to wait longer on the phone or to be served.

The third is called ‘sneakflation’. This is similar to skimpflation but normally refers to reducing what you get when you pay for a service, such as a flight, by now charging for extras, such as luggage or food. Sometimes shrinkflation or skimpflation are seen as subsets of sneakflation.

These practices have had a lot of publicity in recent months, with consumers complaining that they are getting less for their money. Many people see them as a sneaky way of passing on cost increases without raising the price. But the changes are often subtle and difficult for shoppers to spot when they are buying an item. Skimpflation especially is difficult to observe at the time of purchase. It’s only when people consume the product that they think that it doesn’t seem as good as it used to be. Even shrinkflation can be hard to spot if the package size remains the same but there is less in it, such as fewer biscuits in a tin or fewer crisps in a packet. People would have to check the weight or volume, while also knowing what it used to be.

If firms are legitimately passing on costs and are up-front about what they are doing, then most consumers would probably understand it even if they did not like it. It’s when firms do it sneakily that many consumers get upset. Also, firms may do it to increase profit margins – in other words, by reducing the size or quality beyond what is necessary to cover the cost increase.

Does the official rate of inflation take such practices into account?

The answer is that some of the practices are taken into account – especially shrinkflation. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) accounts for shrinkflation by monitoring price changes per unit of weight or volume, rather than just the price. Data collectors track the weight, volume or count of item. When a product’s size is reduced, the ONS records this as a price increase in CPI or CPIH inflation statistics. This is known as a ‘quality adjustment’ process and allows the ONS to isolate price changes from product size changes. As CPI data from the ONS is used by the Bank of England in monitoring its 2% inflation target, it too is incorporating shrinkflation.

ONS quality adjustments are also applied to non-market public services, such as healthcare, education and policing to measure changes in service quality rather than just volume. This allows a more accurate measurement of productivity as it focuses on outcomes and user experience per pound spent rather than just focusing on costs.

Skimpflation is more difficult to monitor. The quality adjustment process may miss some quality changes and hence some skimpflation goes unrecorded. This means that the headline inflation rate might understate the true decline in purchasing power felt by consumers.

How extensive is hidden inflation?

Despite public perception, shrinkflation has a relatively small impact on the headline CPI and CPIH inflation rate in the UK because it is largely confined to certain sectors, such as bread and cereals, personal care products, meat products, and sugar, jams, syrups, chocolate & confectionery. Nevertheless, in these sectors it is particularly prevalent, especially in the packaged foodstuffs and confectionery sector. The latest research by the ONS in 2019 covered the period June 2015 to June 2017 and is shown in the following figure.2

According to research in the USA by Capital One Shopping, some major brands reduced product sizes by over 30% in 2025 without reducing prices, with shrinkflation averaging 14.8% among selected national grocery brands.3 Shrinkflation had been observed by 74% of Americans at their grocery store. Of these, 81% took some kind of action as a result, with 48% abandoning a brand. Nevertheless, across all products, shrinkflation accounts for quite a small percentage of any overall price rises.

A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that shrinkflation accounted for less than 1/10 of a percentage point of the 34.5% increase in overall consumer prices from 2019 to 2024.4 The reason is that the items that were downsized comprised a small percentage of goods and services. Indeed, many goods and services, such as housing, cannot be downsized in the same way that household products can.

Nevertheless, with consumer budgets being squeezed by the inflation that followed the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hidden inflation has become more prevalent in many countries and an increasing concern of consumers.

References

  1. Shrinkflation concern rises in 2025, but fewer Britons are changing shopping habits

    2. YouGov (15/8/25)

  2. Shrinkflation: How many of our products are getting smaller?

    3. Office for National Statistics (21/1/19)

  3. Shrinkflation Statistics

    4. Capital One Shopping (30/12/25)

  4. What is “Shrinkflation,” And How Has It Affected Grocery Store Items Recently?

    5. U.S. Government Accountability Office (12/8/25)

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Articles

Journal Article

Questions

  1. If shrinkflation, when included in CPI statistics, accounts for such a small percentage of inflation, why are people so concerned about it?
  2. From a company’s perspective, is it a good idea to engage in (a) shrinkflation; (b) skimpflation?
  3. Go round you local supermarket and identify examples of shrinkflation and skimpflation.
  4. How are various EU countries attempting to inform consumers of shrinkflation?
  5. Why is skimpflation often harder to detect than shrinkflation?
  6. Give some other examples of sneakflation in the provision of services.
  7. How could behavioural economists help firms decide whether or how to engage in shrinkflation or skimpflation?
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Getting real with house prices

When I worked as a professional economist at HM Treasury and later the Council of Mortgage Lenders (now part of UK Finance), I would regularly brief on the state of the affordability of housing, with a particular focus on the owner-occupied market. That was back in the late 1990s. Fast forward a quarter of a century and I recognise not only how much I have aged but also how deep-rooted and long-standing the affordability problem is.

It is perhaps not surprising that in her first speech as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, referenced directly the housing market and the need to address supply-side issues. She has set a target of one and a half million new homes built over the next five years.

It is therefore timely to revisit the trends in house prices across the UK. By applying the distinction between nominal and real values we get a very clear sense of the deteriorating affordability of housing.

Nominal house price patterns

The average UK actual or nominal house price in April 2024 was £281 000. As Chart 1 shows, this masks considerable differences across the UK. In England the average price was £298 000 (105 per cent of the UK average), though this is heavily skewed by London where the average price was £502 000 (178 per cent of the UK average). Meanwhile, in Scotland it was £190 000 (68 per cent of the UK average), in Wales £208 000 (74 per cent of the UK average) and in Northern Ireland it was £178 000 (74 per cent of the UK average). (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

A simple comparison of the average house price in April 2024 with January 1970 reveals a 72-fold increase in the UK, an 80-fold increase in England, including a 101-fold increase in London, a 65-fold increase in Wales, a 59-fold increase in Scotland and a 45-fold increase in Northern Ireland. Whilst these figures are sensitive to the particular period over which we choose to measure, there is little doubting that upward long-term trend in house prices.

Whilst nominal prices trend upwards over time, the short-term rates of increase are highly volatile. This can be seen from an inspection of Chart 2, which shows the annual rates of increase across the four nations of the UK, as well as for London. This is evidence of frequent imbalances between the flows of property on to the market to sell (instructions to sell) and the number of people looking to buy (instructions to buy). An increase in instructions to buy (housing demand) relative to those to sell (housing supply) puts upward pressure on prices; an increase in the number of instructions to sell (housing supply) relative to those to buy (housing demand) puts downward pressure on prices. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Chart 2 nicely captures the recent slowdown in the housing market. The inflationary shock that began to take hold in 2021 led the Bank of England to raise Bank Rate on 15 occasions – from 0.25 per cent in December 2021 to 5.25 per cent in August 2023 (which remains the rate at the time of writing, but could be cut at the next Bank of England meeting on 1 August 2024). Higher Bank Rate has pushed up mortgage rates, which has contributed to an easing of housing demand. Demand has also been dampened by weak growth in the economy, higher costs of living and fragile consumer confidence. The result has been a sharp fall in the rate of house price inflation, with many parts of the UK experiencing house price deflation. As the chart shows, the rate of deflation has been particularly pronounced and protracted in London, with house prices in January 2024 falling at an annual rate of 5.1 per cent.

Real house price patterns

Despite the volatility in house prices, such as those of recent times, the longer-term trend in house prices is nonetheless upwards. To understand just how rapidly UK house prices have grown over time, we now consider their growth relative to consumer prices. This allows us to analyse the degree to which there has been an increase in real house prices.

To calculate real or inflation-adjusted house prices, we deflate nominal house prices by the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Chart 3 shows the resulting real house prices series across the UK as if consumer prices were fixed at 2015 levels.

The key message here is that over the longer-term we cannot fully explain the growth in actual (nominal) house prices by the growth in consumer prices. Rather, we see real increases in house prices. Inflation-adjusted UK house prices were 5.3 times higher in April 2024 compared to January 1970. For England the figure was 5.9 times, Wales 4.8 times, Scotland 4.3 times and for Northern Ireland 3.3 times. In London, inflation-adjusted house prices were 7.4 times higher. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

As we saw with nominal house prices, the estimated long-term increase in real house prices is naturally sensitive to the period over which we measure. For example, the average real UK house price in August 2022 was 5.8 times higher than in January 1970, while in London they were 8.7 times higher. But the message is clear – the long-term increase is not merely nominal, reflecting increasing prices generally, but is real, reflecting pressures that are increasing house prices relative to general price levels.

Chart 4 shows how the volatility in house prices continues to be evident when house prices are adjusted for changes in consumer prices. The UK’s annual rate of real house price inflation was as high as 40 per in January 1973; on the other hand, in June 1975 inflation-adjusted house prices were 15 per cent lower than a year earlier. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

Over the period from January 1970 to April 2024, the average annual rate of real house price inflation in the UK was 3.2 per cent. Hence house prices have, on average, grown at an annual rate of consumer price inflation plus 3.2 per cent. For the four nations, real house price inflation has averaged 3.8 per cent in England, 3.4 per cent in Wales, 3.0 per cent in Scotland and 2.9 per cent in Northern Ireland. Further, the average rate of real house price inflation in London since January 1970 has been 4.5 per cent. By contrast, that for the East and West Midlands has been 3.7 and 3.5 per cent respectively. The important point here is that the pace with which inflation-adjusted house prices have risen helps to contextualise the extent of the problem of housing affordability – a problem that only worsens over time when real incomes do not keep pace.

House building

The newly elected Labour government has made the argument that it needs to prioritise planning reform as an engine for economic growth. While this ambition extends beyond housing, the scale of the supply-side problem facing the housing market can be seen in Chart 5. The chart shows the number of housing completions in the UK since 1950 by type of tenure. (Click here to download a PowerPoint copy of the chart.)

The chart shows the extent of the growth in house building in the UK that occurred from the 1950s and into the 1970s. Over these three decades the typical number of new properties completed each year was around 320 000 or 6 per thousand of the population. The peak of house building was in the late 1960s when completions exceeded 400 000 per year or over 7.5 per thousand of the population. It is also noticeable how new local authority housing (‘council houses’) played a much larger role in the overall housing mix.

Since 1980, the average number of housing completions each year has dropped to 191 000 or 3.2 per thousand of the population. If we consider the period since 2000, the number of completions has averaged only 181 000 per year or 2.9 per thousand of the population. While it is important to understand the pressures on housing demand in any assessment of the growth in real house prices, the lack of growth in supply is also a key factor. The fact that less than half the number of properties per thousand people are now being built compared with half a century or so ago is an incredibly stark statistic. It is a major determinant of the deterioration of housing affordability.

However, there are important considerations around the protection of the natural environment that need to be considered too. It will therefore be interesting to see how the reforms to planning develop and what their impact will be on house prices and their affordability.

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Statistics

Questions

  1. Explain the difference between a rise in the rate of house price inflation a rise in the level of house prices.
  2. Explain the difference between nominal and real house prices.
  3. If nominal house prices rise can real house price fall? Explain your answer.
  4. What do you understand by the terms instructions to buy and instructions to sell?
  5. What factors are likely to affect the levels of instructions to buy and instructions to sell?
  6. How does the balance between instructions to buy and instructions to sell affect house prices?
  7. How can we differentiate between different housing markets? Illustrate your answer with examples.
  8. What metrics could be used to measure the affordability of housing?
  9. Discuss the argument that the deterioration of housing affordability is the result of market failure.
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Getting real with retail sales

In the third of our series on the distinction between nominal and real values we show its importance when analysing retail sales data. In the UK, such data are available from the Office for National Statistics. This blog revisits an earlier one, Nominal and real retail sales figures: interpreting the data, written in October 2023. We find that inflation-adjusted retail sales data reveal some stark patterns in the sector. They help contextualise some of the challenges faced by high streets up and down the UK.

The Retail Sales Index

Retail sales relate to spending on items such as food, clothing, footwear and household goods. They involve sales by retailers directly to final consumers, whether in store or online. Spending on services such as holidays, air fares and train tickets, insurance, banking, hotels and restaurants are not included, as are sales of motor vehicles. The Retail Sales Index for Great Britain is based on a monthly survey of around 5000 retailers across England, Scotland and Wales and is thought to capture around three-quarters of turnover in the retail industry.

Estimates of retail sales are published in index form. There are two indices published by the ONS: a value and volume measure. The value index reflects the total turnover of business, while the volume index adjusts the value index for price changes. Hence, the value estimates are nominal, while the volume estimates are real. The key point here is that the nominal estimates reflect both price and volume changes, whereas the real estimates adjust for price movements to capture only volume changes.

The headline ONS figures for May 2024 showed a rise by 2.9 per cent in the volume of retail sales, following a 1.8 per cent fall in April. In value terms, May saw a 3.3 per cent rise in retail sales following a 2.3 fall in March. Monthly changes can be quite volatile, even after seasonal adjustment, and sensitive to peculiar factors. For example, the poor weather in April 2024 helped to depress retail spending. It is, therefore, sensible to take a longer-term view when looking for clearer patterns in spending behaviour.

Growth of retail sales

Chart 1 plots the monthly value and volume of retail sales in Great Britain since 1996. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). In value terms, monthly spending in the retail sector has increased by 169 per cent since January 1996, whereas in volume terms, spending has increased by 77 per cent. Another way of thinking about this is in terms of the average annual rate of increase. This shows that the value of spending has risen at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent while the volume of spending has risen at an annual rate of 2.0 per cent. This difference is to be expected in the presence of rising prices, since nominal growth, as we have just noted, reflects both price and volume changes.

Chart 1 helps to identify two periods where the volume of retail spending ceased to grow. The first of these is following the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. The period from 2008 to 2013 saw the volume of retail sales stagnate and flatline, with a recovery in volumes only really starting to take hold in 2014. Yet in nominal terms retail sales grew by around 14 per cent.

The second of the two periods is from 2021. Chart 2 helps to demonstrates the extent of the struggles of the retail sector in this period. It shows a significant divergence between the volume and value of retail sales. Indeed, between April 2021 and October 2023, while the value of retail sales increased by 8.0 per cent the volume of retail sales fell by 11.0 per cent.

The recent value-volume divergence reflects the inflation shock that began to emerge in 2021. This saw consumer prices, as measured by the Consumer Prices Index (CPI), rise across 2022 and 2023 by 9.1 per cent and 7.3 per cent respectively, with the annual rate of CPI inflation hitting 11.1 per cent in October 2022. Hence, while inflation was a drag on the volume of spending it nonetheless meant that the value of spending continued to rise. Once more this demonstrates why understanding the distinction between nominal and real is important. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart).

To illustrate the longer-term trend in the volume of retail spending alongside its volatility, Chart 3 plots yearly retail sales volumes and also their percentage change on the previous year.

The chart nicely captures the prolonged halt to retail sales growth following the global financial crisis, the fluctuations caused by COVID and then the sharp falls in the volume of retail spending in 2022 and 2023 as the effects of the inflationary shock on peoples’ finances bit sharply. This cost-of-living crisis significantly affected many people’s disposable income. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart).

Categories of retail sales

We conclude by considering categories of retail spending. Chart 4 shows volumes of retail sales by four broad categories since 1996. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). These are food stores, predominantly non-food stores, non-store retail and automotive fuel (i.e. sales of petrol and diesel “at the pumps”).

Whilst all categories have seen an increase in their spending volumes over the period as a whole, there are stark differences in this rate of growth. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most rapid growth is in non-store retail. This includes online retailing, as well as market stalls and catalogues.

The volume of retail spending in the non-store sector has grown at an average annual rate over this period of 6.3 per cent, compared with 2.6 per cent for non-food stores, 1.2 per cent for predominantly food stores and 1.0 per cent for automotive fuels. The growth of non-store retail has been even more rapid since 2010, when the average annual rate of growth in the volume of purchases has been 10.2 per cent, compared to 1.8 per cent for non-food stores, 1.0 per cent for automotive fuels and zero growth for food stores.

If we focus on the most recent patterns in the categories of retail sales, we see that the monthly volume of spending in all categories except non-store retail is now lower than the average in 2019. Specifically, when compared to 2019 levels, the volume of spending in non-food stores in May 2024 was 2.6 per cent lower, while that in food stores was 4.4 per cent lower, and the volume of spending on automotive fuels was 10.8 per cent lower. In contrast, spending in non-store retail was 21.2 per cent higher. Yet this is not to imply that this sector has been immune to the pressures faced by their high-street counterparts. Although it is difficult to disentangle fully the effects of the pandemic and lockdowns on non-store retail sales data, the downward trajectory in the volume of retail sales in the sector that occurred as the economy ‘reopened’ in 2021 and 2022 continued into 2023 when purchases fell by 3.5 per cent.

Final thoughts

The retail sector is an incredibly important part of the economy. A recent research briefing from the House of Commons Library reports that there were 2.7 million jobs in the UK retail sector in 2022, equivalent to 8.6 per cent of the country’s jobs with 314 040 retail businesses as of January 2023. Yet the importance of the retail sector cannot be captured by these statistics alone. Some would argue that the very fabric and wellbeing of our towns and cities is affected by the wellbeing of the sector and, importantly, by structural changes that affect how people interact with retail.

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Research Briefing

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Data

Questions

  1. Which of the following is/are not counted in the UK retail sales data: (i) purchase of furniture from a department store; (ii) weekly grocery shop online; (iii) a stay at a hotel on holiday; (iv) a meal at your favourite café or restaurant?
  2. Why does an increase in the value of retail sales not necessarily mean that their volume has increased?
  3. In the presence of deflation, which will be higher: nominal or real growth rates?
  4. Discuss the factors that could explain the patterns in the volume of spending observed in the different categories of retail sales in Chart 4.
  5. Discuss what types of retail products might be more or less sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic environment.
  6. Conduct a survey of recent media reports to prepare a briefing discussing examples of retailers who have struggled or thrived in the recent economic environment.
  7. What do you understand by the concepts of ‘consumer confidence’ and ‘economic uncertainty’? How might these affect the volume of retail spending?
  8. Discuss the proposition that the retail sales data cast doubt on whether people are ‘forward-looking consumption smoothers’.
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Nominal and real retail sales figures: interpreting the data

The distinction between nominal and real values in one of the ‘threshold concepts’ in economics. These are concepts that are fundamental to a discipline and which occur again and again. The distinction between nominal and real values is particularly important when interpreting and analysing data. We show its importance here when analysing the latest retail sales data from the Office for National Statistics.

Retail sales relate to spending on items such as food, clothing, footwear, and household goods (see). They involve sales by retailers directly to end consumers whether in store or online. The retail sales index for Great Britain is based on a monthly survey of around 5000 retailers across England, Scotland and Wales and is thought to capture around 75 per cent of turnover in the sector.

Estimates of retail sales are published in index form. There are two indices published by the ONS: a value and volume measure. The value index reflects the total turnover of business, while the volume index adjusts the value index for price changes. Hence, the value estimates are nominal, while the volume estimates are real. The key point here is that the nominal estimates reflect both price and volume changes, whereas the real estimates adjust for price movements to capture only volume changes.

The headline ONS figures for September 2023 showed a 0.9 per cent volume fall in the volume of retail sales, following a 0.4 per cent rise in August. In value terms, September saw a 0.2 per cent fall in retail sales following a 0.9 per cent rise in August. Monthly changes can be quite volatile, even after seasonal adjustment, and sensitive to peculiar factors. For example, the unusually warm weather this September helped to depress expenditure on clothes. It is, therefore, sensible to take a longer-term view when looking for clearer patterns in spending behaviour.

Chart 1 plots the value and volume of retail sales in Great Britain since 1996. (Click here for a PowerPoint of this and the other two charts). In value terms, retail sales spending increased by 165 per cent, whereas in volume terms, spending increased by 73 per cent. This difference is expected in the presence of rising prices, since nominal growth, as we have just noted, reflects both price and volume changes. The chart is notable for capturing two periods where the volume of retail spending ceased to grow. The first of these is following the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. The period from 2008 to 2013 saw the volume of retail sales stagnate and flatline with a recovery in volumes only really starting to take hold in 2014. Yet in nominal terms retail sales grew by around 16 per cent.

The second of the two periods is the decline in the volume of retail sales from 2021. To help illustrate this more clearly, Chart 2 zooms in on retail sales over the past five years or so. We can see a significant divergence between the volume and value of retail sales. Between April 2021 and September 2023, the volume of retail sales fell by 11%. In contrast, the value of retail sales increased by 8.4%. The impact of the inflationary shock and the consequent cost-of-living crisis that emerged from 2021 is therefore demonstrated starkly by the chart, not least the severe drag that it has had on the volume of retail spending. This has meant that the aggregate volume of retail sales in September 2023 was only back to the levels of mid-2018.

Finally, Chart 3 shows the patterns in the volumes of retailing by four categories since 2018: specifically, food stores, predominantly non-food stores, non-store retail, and automotive fuel. The largest fall in the volume of retail sales has been experienced by non-store retailing – largely online retailing. From its peak in December 2020, non-store retail sales decreased by almost 20 per cent up to September 2023. While this needs to be set in the context of the volume of non-store retail purchases being 14% higher than in February 2020 before the pandemic lockdowns were introduced, it is nonetheless indicative of the pressures facing online retailers.

Importantly, the final chart shows that the pressures in retailing are widespread. Spending volumes on automotive fuels, and in food and non-food stores are all below 2019 levels. The likelihood is that these pressures will persist for some time to come. This inevitably has potential implications for retailers and, of course, for those that work in the sector.

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Questions

  1. Why does an increase in the value of retail sales not necessarily mean that their volume has increased?
  2. In the presence of deflation, which will be higher: nominal or real growth rates?
  3. Discuss the factors that could explain the patterns in the volume of spending observed in the different categories of retail sales in Chart 3.
  4. Discuss what types of retail products might be more or less sensitive to the macroeconomic environment.
  5. Conduct a survey of recent media reports to prepare a briefing discussing examples of retailers who have struggled or thrived in the recent economic environment.
  6. What do you understand by the concepts of ‘consumer confidence’ and ‘economic uncertainty’? How might these affect the volume of retail spending?
  7. Discuss the proposition that the retail sales data cast doubt on whether people are ‘forward-looking consumption smoothers’.