The annual Agricultural Outlook for the next ten years has just been published jointly by the OECD and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Click here and here for audio presentations of the report by the FAO’s Jacques Diouf and the OECD’s Angel Gurría.
The report argues that world recovery will raise agricultural prices. This will be partly the direct result of higher demand and partly the result of higher prices of agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers and fuel. But prices will not rise back to the peak levels of 2007/8. These higher prices, however, would have a positive effect on world food output, especially in the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). This, in turn, would limit the price rises.
So is this good news for food producers and consumers? The following articles look at the issues
Articles
Economic upturn, energy to lift farm prices-FAO/OECD Reuters, Gus Trompiz (15/6/10)
Higher average farm prices expected, food security concerns persist, say OECD and FAO FAO Media Centre (15/6/10)
Food commodity prices to rise Financial Times, Javier Blas (15/6/10)
Price increases fuel fears of food ‘crises’ Financial Times, Javier Blas (15/6/10)
Emerging economies ‘to enjoy food production boom’ BBC News (15/6/10)
Rising crop prices can be ‘good news’ for farmers: UN/OECD MSN News, Malaysia (15/6/10)
Food prices to rise by up to 40% over next decade, UN report warns Guardian (15/6/10)
Wheat, oils and dairy prices to stay up 40% for next decade, FAO BakeryAndSnacks.com, Jess Halliday (15/6/10)
Food prices could soar up by 40 per cent in next decade, UN report warns UN News Centre (15/6/10)
Report and data
OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2010-2019: portal page OECD and FAO
OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2010-2019: Highlights OECD and FAO
OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2010-2019: Database OECD and FAO
Commodity prices Index Mundi
Questions
- Explain what is likely to happen to food prices. What are the explanations given in the report?
- Represent the analysis on a supply and demand diagram (or diagrams).
- What is the relevance of (a) income elasticity of demand, (b) price elasticity of demand, (c) cross-price elasticity of demand, (d) price elasticity of supply, in explaining the likely future movements of food prices and why some food prices are likely to rise faster than others?
- What factors are likely to impact on the production of food in developing countries?
As one of his first acts, the new UK Coalition government’s Chancellor, George Osborne, set up an independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) (see Nipping it in the Budd: Enhancing fiscal credibility?. The role of the OBR is to provide forecasts of the economy and the data on which to base fiscal policy.
On 14 June, the OBR produced its first forecast in time for the Budget scheduled for 22 June. It has some bad news and some good news. First the bad news: it forecasts that growth for 2011 will be 2.6% – down from the 3–3.5% forecast by Labour in its last Budget in March. But now the good: it forecasts that the public-sector deficit in 2010/11 will be 10.5% of GDP – down from the 11.1% forecast by Labour; and that public-sector debt will be 62.2%, not the 63.6% forecast by Labour. These forecasts are before any policy changes announced in the Budget on 22 June.
Meanwhile, the accountants BDO have published a survey of business confidence. This shows the largest drop since the survey began. Talk by the government of cuts and worries that this will impact directly on the private sector have caused many businesses to cut investment plans. The worries are compounded by fears of a decline in export demand as countries abroad also make cuts.
So what does the future hold? Should we put any faith in forecasts? And should we be more worried about a double-dip recession or by failure to make sufficient inroads to deficits to calm markets?
Articles
Growth forecast is cut but borrowing improves Guardian, Phillip Inman and Hélène Mulholland (14/6/10)
UK watchdog slashes growth forecasts Financial Times, Chris Giles (14/6/10)
Fiscal watchdog downgrades UK growth forecast BBC News (14/6/10)
OBR UK growth forecast downgraded BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (14/6/10)
‘Sorry it is so complicated’ BBC Daily Politics, Stephanie Flanders (14/6/10)
Britain’s new economic forecasts: what the analysts say Guardian (14/6/10)
Spending cuts under fire amid new borrowing forecasts Independent, Russell Lynch (14/6/10)
The self-fulfilling deficit spiral Guardian, Adam Lent (14/6/10)
UK business confidence sees ‘record drop’ BBC News (13/6/10)
Britain to avoid double dip but recovery will be weak, CBI warns Independent, David Prosser (14/6/10)
A winding path to inflation The Economist (3/6/10)
Is inflation or deflation a greater threat to the world economy? The Economist: debate (1/6/10)
A question for chancellor Osborne Financial Times, Martin Wolf (11/6/10)
Fiscal conservatism may be good for one nation, but threatens collective disaster Independent, Joseph Stiglitz (15/6/10)
Hawks v doves: economists square up over Osborne’s cuts Guardian, Phillip Inman (14/6/10)
Data and forecasts
Pre-Budget forecast Office for Budget Responsibility (14/6/10)
Pre-Budget Report data Google docs (14/6/10)
Forecast for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts HM Treasury (May 2010)
Questions
- How reliable is the OBR’s forecast likely to be? What factors could cause the forecast for economic growth to be (a) an overestimate; (b) an underestimate?
- What is likely to happen to aggregate demand over the coming months? Explain.
- What is meant by the ‘structural deficit’. Why might the structural deficit fall as the economy recovers? Would you explain this in terms of a shift or a movement along the short-term aggregate supply curve?
- Which is the greatest threat over the long term: inflation or deflation?
- Do you agree that the debate about cutting the deficit is merely a question of timing, not of the amount to cut?
- Why may policies of fiscal tightening, if carried out generally around the world, involve the fallacy of composition?
- Is there any common ground between the fiscal ‘hawks’ and fiscal ‘doves’ (see the last Guardian article above)?
In 2008 and 2009, as the global recession deepened, so governments around the world turned to Keynesian policies. Aggregate demand had to be boosted. This meant a combination of fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal stimulus packages were adopted, combining increased government expenditure and cuts in taxes. On the monetary policy front, central banks cut interest rates to virtually zero and expanded the money supply in bouts of quantitative easing.
The global recession turned out not to be a deep as many had feared and the Keynesian policies were hailed by many as a success.
But how the tide is turning! The combination of the recession (which reduced tax revenues and increased welfare spending) and the stimulus packages played havoc with public finances. Deficits soared. These deficits had to be financed, and increasingly credit agencies and others were asking how sustainable such deficits were over the longer term. These worries have been compounded by the perilous state of the public finances in countries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Hungary. The focus has thus turned to cuts. In fact there is now an international ‘competition’ as to which country can wear the hairiest hair shirt. The new Coalition government in the UK, for example, is busy preparing the general public for deep cuts to come.
We are now seeing a re-emergence of new classical views that increased deficits, far from stimulating the economy and resulting in faster growth, largely crowd out private expenditure. To prevent this crowding out and restore confidence in financial markets, deficits must be rapidly cut, thereby allowing finance to be diverted to the private sector.
But if the contribution to aggregate demand of the public sector is to be reduced, and if consumption, the largest component of aggregate demand, is also reduced as households try to reduce their reliance on borrowing, where is the necessary rise in aggregate demand to come from? We are left with investment and net exports – the remaining two components of aggregate demand, where AD = C + G + I + (X – M).
But will firms want to invest if deficit reduction results in higher taxes, higher unemployment and less spending by the government on construction, equipment and many other private-sector goods and services. Won’t firms, fearing a decline in consumer demand, and possibly a ‘double-dip recession’, hold off from investing? As for export growth, this depends very much on growth in the rest of the world. If the rest of the world is busy making cuts too, then export growth may be very limited.
The G20, meeting in Korea on 4 June, wrestled with this problem. But the mood had definitely turned. Leaders seemed much more concerned about deficit reduction than maintaining the fiscal stimulus.
The following articles look at the arguments between Keynesians and new classicists. The disagreements between their authors reflect the disagreements between economists and between politicians about the timing and extent of cuts.
Articles
Time to plan for post-Keynesian era Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs (7/6/10)
The Keynesian Endpoint CNBC Guest Blog, Tony Crescenzi (7/6/10)
Keynes, Recovered Boston Review, Jonathan Kirshner (May/June 2010)
How Keynes, not mining, saved us from recession Sydney Morning Herald, Ross Gittins (7/6/10)
The verdict on Keynes Asia Times, Martin Hutchinson (2/6/10)
The G20 Has Officially Voted For Global Depression Business Insider, Marshall Auerback (7/6/10)
Deficit disorder: the Keynes solution New Statesman, Robert Skidelsky (17/5/10)
Hawks v doves: economists square up over Osborne’s cuts Guardian, Phillip Inman (14/6/10)
Reports and data
OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, May 2010 (see)
Economics: Growth rising faster than expected but risks increasing too, says OECD Economic Outlook OECD (26/5/10)
Economy: responses must reflect governments’ views of national situations OECD (26/5/10)
Editorial and summary of projections OECD (26/5/10)
General assessment of the macroeconomic situation OECD (26/5/10)
Statistical Annex to OECD Economic Outlook No. 87 OECD (10/6/10)
Communiqué, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Busan, Republic of Korea G20 (5/6/10)
Questions
- Summarise the arguments for and against making rapid cuts in public-sector deficits.
- What forms can crowding out take? Under what circumstances will a rise in public-sector deficits (a) cause and (b) not cause crowding out?
- Assess the policy measures being proposed by the G20.
- How important is confidence for the success of (a) fiscal stimulus packages and (b) deficit reduction policies in boosting economic growth?
As the news from the Gulf of Mexico goes from very bad to even worse, so BP is increasingly coming under the international spotlight for its approach to risk management and safety. Was it sufficiently cautious? Could the accident on April 20 that killed 11 men and has been gushing some 800,000 gallons per day of crude oil into the sea have been averted? When the consequences of a pipe rupture are so catastrophic, is ‘catastrophic risk’ appropriately priced? As Tony Hayward, BP’s Chief Executive, told the Financial Times (see links below): “It was ‘an entirely fair criticism’ to say the company had not been fully prepared for a deep-water oil leak.”
One insight into BP’s approach to risk has come to light with the leaking of a 2002 memo from BP on how human life ought to be valued in any cost–benefit analysis of a project. As the Chicagoist summarises the memo:
A two page document prepared by risk managers in 2002 titled “Cost benefit analysis of three little pigs” shows the type of thinking BP put into risk assessment. The memo shows, in cartoonish fashion, that blast resistant trailers for BP’s workers weren’t necessary, because the cost was too high. In 2005, a refinery caught fire, killing 15 and injuring 170 people.
So how should catastrophic risk be taken into account? What does a company do when the probability of a disaster is extremely low and yet the costs of such a disaster, were it to occur, are extremely high?
BP’s Shocking Memo The Daily Beast, Rick Outzen (25/5/10)
Old BP document calculates worth of human life with “Three Little Pigs” diagram Yahoo News, Brett Michael Dykes (25/5/10)
Industry can cut accident risks, says BP chief Financial Times, Ed Crooks and Edward Luce (2/6/10)
BP ‘not prepared’ for deep-water spill Financial Times, Ed Crooks (2/6/10)
The BP Oil Spill’s Lessons for Regulation Project Syndicate, Kenneth Rogoff (1/6/10)
US oil firms ‘unprepared’ for major offshore disaster BBC News (15/6/10)
Questions
- What is meant by catastrophic risk?
- Why is it difficult to put an accurate valuation on outcomes with a very low probability of occurrence?
- Explain the table entitled “Cost benefit analysis of three little pigs” in the Rick Outzen blog.
- How should human life be valued?
- What value should be put on a serious injury (of a particular type)?
- Should BP (or any other company, for that matter) ever conduct operations that risk human life? Explain your answer.
- On what basis should BP have decided whether or not to install a $500,000 acoustic trigger that could have shut off the well when the blowout protector failed?
- How is the existence of environmental externalities relevant to BP’s decisions on safety?
Over the past 13 years of the Labour government, the incomes of the richest 1 per cent in the UK have grown substantially faster than that of other income groups, as they also did under the previous Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997. But, thanks to complex redistributive policies, including tax credits, the rise in relative poverty that occurred in the 1980s and 90s has been arrested. With the exception of the top 1 per cent, disposable income growth has been similar across the income groups.
As Larry Elliott, the Guardian’s Economics editor argues:
During the Thatcher-Major years, real incomes for the richest fifth of the population rose fastest, averaging growth of about 2.5% a year. The next richest quintile did a little less well, the middle 20% a bit less well still, and so on all the way down to the poorest 20% of the population, which saw the smallest real income gains of less than 1% a year.
Under Labour, the very high rewards secured by the top 1% of earners has obscured an even distribution of real income growth across the five quintiles.
The new coalition government maintains that anti-poverty policies have failed:
… Iain Duncan Smith, the work and pensions secretary, made a statement trashing Labour’s record: “Vast sums of money have been poured into the benefits system over the last decade in an attempt to address poverty, but today’s statistics clearly show that this approach has failed. Little progress has been made in tackling child poverty, society is more unequal than 50 years ago and there are more working age people living in poverty than ever before.
A new approach is needed which addresses the drivers behind poverty and actually improves the outcomes of the millions of adults and children trapped in poverty.”
The following articles explore what has been happening to inequality and poverty and look at the policies proposed by the coalition government. The data on inequality are also given, along with commentary on them by the Institute for Fiscal Studies
Articles
Labour’s poverty record may be flawed, but the damage was done by the Tories Guardian, Larry Elliott (24/5/10)
The distribution of income: For richer, for poorer Guardian editorial (24/5/10)
What the poverty figures show Guardian Joe Public blog, Julia Unwin (chief executive of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation) (21/5/10)
Data and reports
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) 1994/95-2008/09 Department for Work and Pensions(19/5/10)
Households Below Average Income (pdf file) National Statistics, First Release (20/5/10)
Effects of taxes and benefits on household income Office for National Statistics (see also, especially Tables 26 and 27)
Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2010 Institute for Fiscal Studies
A range of poverty data The Poverty Site
Questions
- What has happened to the distribution of original, gross, disposable and post-tax income distribution (a) by percentage shares of quintile groups of income; (b) in terms of gini coefficients? (See the “Effects of taxes and benefits on household income” reference above.)
- Why is income inequality likely to increase unless strong redistributive policies are pursued by the government?
- What are ‘the drivers behind poverty’?
- To what extent is there a trade-off between economic growth and redistributing incomes from rich to poor?
- Why is it argued that in an increasingly interdependent world, senior executives have to be paid extremely high salaries and be given very large bonuses in order for a company to recruit sufficiently talented people and yet wages have to be kept low to allow goods to remain competitive?
- Why was income much more equally distributed in the 1960s and 70s than it is today?
- What redistributive policies is the new coalition government in the UK pursuing? What factors will determine their success?