Author: John Sloman

The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rachel Reeves, will present her annual Budget in late autumn. It will involve some hard economic and political choices. The government would like to spend more money on improving public services but has pledged not to raise taxes ‘on working people’, which is interpreted as not raising the rates of income tax, national insurance for employees and the self-employed, and VAT. What is more, government borrowing is forecast by the OBR to be £118 billion, or nearly 4.0% of GDP, for the the year 2025/26. This is a fall from the 5.1% in 2024/25 and is well below the 15.0% in 2020/21 during the pandemic. But it is significantly above the 2.1% in 2018/19.

The government has pledged to stick to its two fiscal rules. The first is that the day-to-day, or ‘current’, budget (i.e. excluding investment) should be in surplus or in deficit of no more than 0.5 per cent of GDP by 2029/30 (or the third year of the rolling forecast period from the 2026/27 Budget). This allows investment to be funded by borrowing. The second rule is that public-sector net debt, which includes public-sector debt plus pension liabilities minus equity, loans and other financial assets, should be falling by 2029/30 (or the third year of the rolling forecast period from the 2026/27 Budget). The current budget deficit (i.e. excluding borrowing for investment) was forecast by the OBR in March to be 1.2% of GDP for 2025/26 (see Chart 1) and to be a surplus of 0.3% in 2029/30 (£9.9 billion). (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The OBR’s March forecasts, therefore, were that the rules would be met with current policies and that the average rate of economic growth would be 1.8% over the next four years.

However, there would be very little room for manoeuvre, and with global political and economic uncertainty, including the effects of tariffs, climate change on harvests and the continuing war in Ukraine, the rate of economic growth might be well below 1.8%.

The March forecasts were based on the assumption that inflation would fall and hence that the Bank of England would reduce interest rates. Global pressure on inflation, however, might result in inflation continuing to be above the Bank of England’s target of 2%. This would mean that interest rates would be slow to fall – if at all. This would dampen growth and make it more expensive for the government to service the public-sector debt, thus making it harder to reduce the public-sector deficit.

A forecast earlier this month by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) (see link below and Chart 2) reflects these problems and paints a gloomier picture than the OBR’s March forecast. The NIESR forecasts that GDP will grow by only 1.3 per cent in 2025, 1.2 per cent in 2026, 1.1% in 2027 and 1.0% in 2028, with the average for 2025 to 2023 being 1.13%. This is the result of high levels of business uncertainty and the effects of tariffs on exports. With no change in policy, the current deficit would be £41.2 billion in the 2029/30 financial year. Inflation would fall somewhat, but would stick at around 2.7% from 2028 to 2030. Net debt would be rising in 2029/30 &ndash but only slightly, from 98.7% to 99.0%. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

So what are the policy options open to the government for dealing with a forecast current budget deficit of £41.2 billion (1.17% of GDP)? There are only three broad options.

Increase borrowing

One approach would be to scrap the fiscal rules and accept increased borrowing – at least temporarily. This would avoid tax increases or expenditure cuts. By running a larger budget deficit, this Keynesian approach would also have the effect of increasing aggregate demand and, other things being equal, could lead to a multiplied rise in national income. This in turn would lead to higher tax revenues and thereby result in a smaller increase in borrowing.

There are two big problems with this approach, however.

The first is that it would, over time, increase the public-sector debt and would involve having to spend more each year on servicing that debt. This would leave less tax revenue for current spending or investment. It would also involve having to pay higher interest rates to encourage people to buy the additional new government bonds necessary to finance the increased deficit.

The second problem is that the Chancellor has said that she will stick to the fiscal rules. If she scraps them, if only temporarily, she runs the risk of losing the confidence of investors. This could lead to a run on the pound and even higher interest rates. This was a problem under the short-lived Liz Truss government when the ‘mini’ Budget of September 2022 made unfunded pledges to cut taxes. There was a run on the pound and the Bank of England had to make emergency gilt purchases.

One possibility that might be more acceptable to markets would be to rewrite the investment rule. There could be a requirement on government to invest a certain proportion of GDP (say, 3%) and fund it by borrowing. The supply-side benefits could be faster growth in potential output and higher tax revenue over the longer term, allowing the current deficit rule to be met.

Cut government expenditure

Politicians, especially in opposition, frequently claim that the solution is to cut out public-sector waste. This would allow public expenditure to be cut without cutting services. This, however, is harder than it might seem. There have been frequent efficiency drives in the public sector, but from 1919 to 2023 public-sector productivity fell by an average of 0.97% per year.

Causes include: chronic underinvestment in capital, resulting in outdated equipment and IT systems and crumbling estates; decades of underfunding that have left public services with crumbling estates, outdated equipment and insufficient IT systems; inconsistent, short-term government policy, with frequent changes in government priorities; bureaucratic systems relying on multiple legacy IT systems; workforce challenges, especially in health and social care, with high staff turnover, recruitment difficulties, and a lack of experienced staff.

The current government has launched a Public Sector Productivity Programme. This is a a cross-government initiative to improve productivity across public services. Departments are required to develop productivity plans to invest in schemes designed to achieve cost savings and improve outcomes in areas such as the NHS, police, and justice system. A £1.8 billion fund was announced in March 2024, to support public-sector productivity improvements and digital transformation. Part of this is to be invested in digital services and AI to improve efficiency. According to the ONS, total public-service productivity in the UK grew by 1.0% in the year to Q1 2025; healthcare productivity grew 2.7% over the same period. It remains to be seen whether this growth in productivity will be maintained. Pressure from the public, however, will mean that any gains are likely to be in terms of improved services rather than reduced government expenditure.

Increase taxes

This is always a controversial area. People want better public services but also reduced taxes – at least for themselves! Nevertheless, it is an option seriously being considered by the government. However, if it wants to avoid raising the rates of income tax, national insurance for employees and the self-employed, and VAT, its options are limited. It has also to consider the political ramifications of taking unpopular tax-raising measures. The following are possibilities:

Continue the freeze on income tax bands. They are currently frozen until April 2028. The extra revenue from extending the freeze until April 2030 would be around £7 billion. Although this may be politically more palatable than raising the rate of income tax, the revenue raised will be well short of the amount required and thus other measures will be required. Although some £40 billion will have been raised up to 2028 (which has already been factored in), as inflation falls, so the fiscal drag effect will fall: nominal incomes will need to rise less to achieve any given rise in real incomes.

Cutting tax relief for pensions. Currently, people get income tax relief at their marginal rate on pension contributions made by themselves and their employer up to £60 000 per year or 100% of their earnings, whichever is smaller. When people draw on their pension savings, they pay income tax at their marginal rate, even if the size of their savings has grown from capital gains, interest or dividends. Reducing the limits or restricting relief to the basic rate of tax could make a substantial contribution to increasing government revenue. In 2023/24, pension contribution relief cost the government £52 billion. Restricting relief to the basic rate or cutting the annual limit would make the relief less regressive. In such a case, when people draw on their pension savings, the income tax rate could be limited to the basic rate to avoid double taxation.

Raising the rate of inheritance tax (IHT) or reducing the threshold. Currently, estates worth more than £325 000 are taxed at a marginal rate of 40%. The threshold is frozen until 2029/30 and thus additional revenue will be received by the government as asset prices increase. If the rate is raised above 40%, perhaps in bands, or the threshold were lowered, then this will earn additional revenue. However, the amount will be relatively small compared to the predicted current deficit in 2029/30 of £41 billion. Total IHT revenue in 2022/23 was only 6.7 billion. Also, it is politically dangerous as people could claim that the government was penalising people who had saved in order to help the next generation, who are struggling with high rents or mortgages.

Increased taxes on business. The main rate of corporation tax was raised from 19% to 25% in April 2023 and the employers’ national insurance rate was raised from 13.8% to 15% and the threshold reduced from £9100 to £5000 per year in April 2025. There is little or no scope for raising business taxes without having significant disincentive effects on investment and employment. Also, there is the danger that raising rates might prompt companies to relocate abroad.

Raise fuel and/or other duties. Fuel duties raise approximately £24 billion. They are set to decline gradually with the shift to EVs and more fuel-efficient internal combustion engines. Fuel duty remained unchanged at 57.95p per litre from 2011 to 2022 and then was ‘temporarily’ cut to 52.95p. The rate of 52.95p is set to remain until at least 2026. There is clearly scope here to raise it, if only by the rate of inflation each year. Again, the main problem is a political one that drivers and the motor lobby generally will complain. Other duties include alcohol, tobacco/cigarettes/vaping, high-sugar beverages and gambling. Again, there is scope for raising these. There are two problems here. The first is that these duties are regressive, falling more heavily on poorer people. The second is that high duties can encourage illegal trade in these products.

Raising one of the three major taxes: income tax, employees’ national insurance and VAT. This will involve reneging on the government’s election promises. But perhaps it’s better to bite the bullet and do it sooner rather than later. Six European countries have VAT rates of 21%, three of 22%, three of 23%, two of 24%, four of 25%, one of 25.5% and one of 27%. Each one percentage point rise would raise about 9 billion. A one percentage point rise across all UK income tax rates would raise around £5.8 billion. As far as employees’ national insurance rates are concerned, the Conservative government reduced the main rate twice from 12% to 10% in January 2024 and from 10% to 8% in April 2024. The government could argue that raising it back to, say, 10% would still leave it lower than previously. A rise to 10% would raise around £11 billion.

Conclusion

The choices for the Chancellor are not easy. As the NIESR’s Economic Outlook puts it:

Simply put, the Chancellor cannot simultaneously meet her fiscal rules, fulfil spending commitments, and uphold manifesto promises to avoid tax rises for working people. At least one of these will need to be dropped – she faces an impossible trilemma.

Articles

• The Chancellor’s Trilemma

UK Economic Outlook: NIESR, Benjamin Caswell, Fergus Jimenez-England, Hailey Low, Stephen Millard, Eliza da Silva Gomes, Adrian Pabst, Tibor Szendrei and Arnab Bhattacharjee (6/8/25)

• Reeves must raise tax to cover £41bn gap, says think tank

BBC News, Lucy Hooker (6/8/25)

• Chancellor warned ‘substantial tax rises’ needed – as she faces ‘impossible trilemma’

Sky News, Gurpreet Narwan (6/8/25)

• Rachel Reeves needs to put up taxes to cover £40bn deficit, thinktank says

The Guardian, Phillip Inman (6/8/25)

• What’s the secret to fixing the UK’s public finances? Here’s what our panel of experts would do

The Conversation, Steve Schifferes, Conor O’Kane, Guilherme Klein Martins, Jonquil Lowe and Maha Rafi Atal (15/8/25)

• Why radical tax reform may be only way for Reeves to balance the books

The Guardian, Phillip Inman (21/8/25)

• Reeves and Starmer to prepare ground for tax rises in a difficult autumn budget

The Guardian, Jessica Elgot, Richard Partington and Eleni Courea (7/8/25)

• How much money does the UK government borrow, and does it matter?

BBC News (21/8/25)

• More pain for Reeves as government borrowing cost nears 27-year high

The Guardian, Phillip Inman (26/8/25)

Data

• Public Finances Databank (Excel file)

Office for Budget Responsibility, (21/8/25)

• Public service productivity, quarterly, UK: January to March 2025

Office for National Statistics (28/7/25)

Questions