It’s two years since Russia invaded Ukraine. Western countries responded by imposing large-scale sanctions. These targeted a range of businesses, banks and other financial institutions, payments systems and Russian exports and imports. Some $1 trillion of Russian assets were frozen. Many Western businesses withdrew from Russia or cut off commercial ties. In addition, oil and gas imports from Russia have been banned by most developed countries and some developing countries, and a price cap of $60 per barrel has been imposed on Russian oil. What is more, sanctions have been progressively tightened over the past two years. For example, on the second anniversary of the invasion, President Biden announced more than 500 new sanctions against individuals and companies involved in military production and supply chains and in financing Russia’s war effort.
The economy in Russia has also been affected by large-scale emigration of skilled workers, the diversion of workers to the armed forces and the diversion of capital and workers to the armaments industry.
So has the economy of Russia been badly affected by sanctions and these other factors? The IMF in its World Economic Forecast of April 2022 predicted that the Russian economy would experience a steep, two-year recession. But, the Russian economy has fared much better than first predicted and the steep recession never materialised.
In this blog we look at Russia’s economic performance. First, we examine why the Russian economy seems stronger today than forecast two years ago. Then we look at its economic weaknesses directly attributable to the war.
Apparent resilience of the Russian economy
GDP forecasts have proved wrong. In April 2022, just after the start of the war, the IMF was forecasting that the Russian economy would decline by 8.5% in 2022 and by 2.3% in 2023 and grow by just 1.5% in 2024. In practice, the economy declined by only 1.2% in 2022 and grew by 3.0% in 2023. It is forecast by the IMF to grow by 2.6% in 2024. This is illustrated in the chart (click here for a PowerPoint).
Similarly, inflation forecasts have proved wrong. In April 2022, Russian consumer price inflation was forecast to be 21.3% in 2022 and 14.3% in 2023. In practice, inflation was 13.8% in 2022 and 7.4% in 2023. What is more, consumer spending in Russia has remained buoyant. In 2023, retail sales rose by 10.2% in nominal terms – a real rise of 2.8%. Wage growth has been strong and unemployment has remained low, falling from just over 4% in February 2022 to just under 3% today.
So why has the Russian economy seemingly weathered the war so successfully?
The first reason is that, unlike Ukraine, very little of its infrastructure has been destroyed. Even though it has lost a lot of its military capital, including 1120 main battle tanks and some 2000 other armoured vehicles, virtually all of its production capacity remains intact. What is more, military production is replacing much of the destroyed vehicles and equipment.
The second is that its economy started the war in a strong position economically. In 2021, it had a surplus on the current account of its balance of payments of 6.7% of GDP, reflecting large revenues from oil, gas and mineral exports. This compares with a G7 average deficit of 0.7%. It had fiscal surplus (net general government lending) of 0.8% of GDP. The G7 countries had an average deficit of 9.1% of GDP. Its gross general government debt was 16% of GDP. The G7’s was an average of 134%. This put Russia in a position to finance the war and gave it a considerable buffer against economic sanctions.
The third reason is that Russia has been effective in switching the destinations of exports and sources of imports. Trade with the West, Japan and South Korea has declined, but trade with China and various neutral countries, such as India have rapidly increased. Take the case of oil: in 2021, Russia exported 4.4 billion barrels of oil per day to the USA, the EU, the UK, Japan and South Korea. By 2023, this had fallen to just 0.6 billion barrels. By contrast, in 2021, it exported 1.9 billion barrels per day to China, India and Turkey. By 2023, this had risen to 4.9 billion. Although exports of natural gas have fallen by around 42% since 2021, Russian oil exports have remained much the same at around 7.4 million barrels per day (until a voluntary cut of 0.5 billion barrels per day in 2024 Q1 as part of an OPEC+ agreement to prop up the price of oil).
China is now a major supplier to Russia of components (some with military uses), commercial vehicles and consumer products (such as cars and electrical goods). Total trade with China (both imports and exports) was worth $147 billion in 2021. By 2023, this had risen to $240 billion.
The use of both the Chinese yuan and the Russian rouble (or ruble) has risen dramatically as a means of payment for Russian imports. Their share has risen from around 5% in 2021 (mainly roubles) to nearly 75% in 2023 (just over 37% in each currency). Switching trade and payment methods has helped Russia to circumvent many of the sanctions.
The fourth reason is that Russia has a strong and effective central bank. It has successfully used interest rates to control inflation, which is expected to fall from 7.4% in 2023 to under 5% this year and then to its target of 4% in subsequent years. The central bank policy rate was raised from 8.5% to 20% in February 2022. It then fell in steps to 7.5% in September 2022, where it remained until August 2023. It was then raised in steps to peak at 16% in December 2023, where it remains. There is a high level of confidence that the Russian central bank will succeed in bringing inflation back to target.
The fifth reason is that the war has provided a Keynesian stimulus to the economy. Military expenditure has doubled as a share of GDP – from 3.7% of GDP in 2021 to 7.5% in 2024. It now accounts for around 40% of government expenditure. The boost that this has given to production and employment has helped achieve the 3% growth rate in 2023, despite the dampening effect of a tight monetary policy.
Longer-term weaknesses
Despite the apparent resilience of the economy, there are serious weaknesses that are likely to have serious long-term effects.
There has been a huge decline in the labour supply as many skilled and professional workers have move abroad to escape the draft and as many people have been killed in battle. The shortage of workers has led to a rise in wages. This has been accompanied by a decline in labour productivity, which is estimated to have been around 3.6% in 2023.
Higher wages and lower productivity is putting a squeeze on firms’ profits. This is being exacerbated by higher taxes on firms to help fund the war. Lower profit reduces investment and is likely to have further detrimental effects on labour productivity.
Although Russia has managed to circumvent many of the sanctions, they have still had a significant effect on the supply of goods and components from the West. As sanctions are tightened further, so this is likely to have a direct effect on production and living standards. Although GDP is growing, non-military production is declining.
The public finances at the start of the war, as we saw above, were strong. But the war effort has turned a budget surplus of 0.8% of GDP in 2021 to a deficit of 3.7% in 2023 – a deficit that will be difficult to fund with limited access to foreign finance and with domestic interest rates at 16%. As public expenditure on the military has increased, civilian expenditure has decreased. Benefits and expenditure on infrastructure are being squeezed. For example, public utilities and apartment blocks are deteriorating badly. This has a direct on living standards.
In terms of exports, although by diverting oil exports to China, India and other neutral countries Russia has manage to maintain the volume of its oil exports, revenue from them is declining. Oil prices have fallen from a peak of $125 per barrel in June 2022 to around $80 today. Production from the Arabian Gulf is likely to increase over the coming months, which will further depress oil prices.
Conclusions
With the war sustaining the Russian economy, it would be a problem for Russia if the war ended. If Russia won by taking more territory in Ukraine and forcing Ukraine to accept Russia’s terms for peace, the cost to Russia of rebuilding the occupied territories would be huge. If Russia lost territory and negotiated a settlement on Ukraine’s terms, the political cost would be huge, with a disillusioned Russian people facing reduced living standards that could lead to the overthrow of Putin. As The Conversation article linked below states:
A protracted stalemate might be the only solution for Russia to avoid total economic collapse. Having transformed the little industry it had to focus on the war effort, and with a labour shortage problem worsened by hundreds of thousands of war casualties and a massive brain drain, the country would struggle to find a new direction.
Articles
- How Russia’s economy survived two years of war
The Bell (23/2/24)
- How Russia uses China to get round sanctions
The Bell, Denis Kasyanchuk (20/2/24)
- As Ukraine’s economy burns, Russia clings to a semblance of prosperity
The Observer, Larry Elliott and Phillip Inman (24/2/24)
- ‘A lot higher than we expected’: Russian arms production worries Europe’s war planners
The Guardian, Andrew Roth (15/2/24)
- There are lessons from Russia’s GDP growth — but not the ones Putin thinks
Financial Times, Martin Sandbu (11/2/24)
Russia’s economy going strongDW, Miltiades Schmidt (21/2/24)
- The West tried to crush Russia’s economy. Why hasn’t it worked?
Politico, Nahal Toosi, Ari Hawkins, Koen Verhelst, Gabriel Gavin and Kyle Duggan (24/2/24)
- Don’t Buy Putin’s Bluff. The West Can Outspend Him.
Bloomberg UK, Editorial (23/2/24)
- Russia’s war economy cannot last but has bought time
BBC News, Faisal Islam (11/2/24)
- US targets Russia with more than 500 new sanctions
BBC News, George Wright and Will Vernon (24/2/24)
- Russia’s economy is now completely driven by the war in Ukraine – it cannot afford to lose, but nor can it afford to win
The Conversation, Renaud Foucart (22/2/24)
Questions
- Argue the case for and against including military production in GDP.
- How successful has the freezing of Russian assets been?
- How could Western sanctions against Russia be made more effective?
- What are the dangers to Western economies of further tightening financial sanctions against Russia?
- Would it be a desirable policy for a Western economy to divert large amounts of resources to building public infrastructure?
- Has the Ukraine war hastened the rise of the Chinese yuan as a reserve currency?
- How would you summarise Russia’s current public finances?
- How would you set about estimating the cost to Russia of its war with Ukraine?
According to the IMF, Chinese GDP grew by 5.2% in 2023 and is predicted to grow by 4.6% this year. Such growth rates would be extremely welcome to most developed countries. UK growth in 2023 was a mere 0.5% and is forecast to be only 0.6% in 2024. Advanced economies as a whole only grew by 1.6% in 2023 and are forecast to grow by only 1.5% this year. Also, with the exception of India, the Philippines and Indonesia, which grew by 6.7%, 5.3% and 5.0% respectively in 2023 and are forecast to grow by 6.5%, 6.0% and 5.0% this year, Chinese growth also compares very favourably with other developing countries, which as a weighted average grew by 4.1% last year and are forecast to grow at the same rate this year.
But in the past, Chinese growth was much higher and was a major driver of global growth. Over the period 1980 to 2018, Chinese economic growth averaged 9.5% – more than twice the average rate of developing countries (4.5%) and nearly four times the average rate of advanced countries (2.4%) (see chart – click here for a PowerPoint of the chart).
Not only is Chinese growth now much lower, but it is set to decline further. The IMF forecasts that in 2025, Chinese growth will have fallen to 4.1% – below the forecast developing-country average of 4.2% and well below that of India (6.5%).
Causes of slowing Chinese growth
There are a number of factors that have come together to contribute to falling economic growth rates – growth rates that otherwise would have been expected to be considerably higher as the Chinese economy reopened after severe Covid lockdowns.
Property market
China has experienced a property boom over the past 20 years years as the government has encouraged construction in residential blocks and in factories and offices. The sector has accounted for some 20% of economic activity. But for many years, demand outstripped supply as consumers chose to invest in property, partly because of a lack of attractive alternatives for their considerable savings and partly because property prices were expected to go on rising. This lead to speculation on the part of both buyers and property developers. Consumers rushed to buy property before prices rose further and property developers borrowed considerably to buy land, which local authorities encouraged, as it provided a valuable source of revenue.
But now there is considerable overcapacity in the sector and new building has declined over the past three years. According to the IMF:
Housing starts have fallen by more than 60 per cent relative to pre-pandemic levels, a historically rapid pace only seen in the largest housing busts in cross-country experience in the last three decades. Sales have fallen amid homebuyer concerns that developers lack sufficient financing to complete projects and that prices will decline in the future.
As a result, many property developers have become unviable. At the end of January, the Chinese property giant, Evergrande, was ordered to liquidate by a Hong Kong court, after the judge ruled that the company did not have a workable plan to restructure around $300bn of debt. Over 50 Chinese property developers have defaulted or missed payments since 2020. The liquidation of Evergrande and worries about the viability of other Chinese property developers is likely to send shockwaves around the Chinese property market and more widely around Chinese investment markets.
Overcapacity
Rapid investment over many years has led to a large rise in industrial capacity. This has outstripped demand. The problem could get worse as investment, including state investment, is diverted from the property sector to manufacturing, especially electric vehicles. But with domestic demand dampened, this could lead to increased dumping on international markets – something that could spark trade wars with the USA and other trading partners (see below). Worries about this in China are increasing as the possibility of a second Trump presidency looks more possible. The Chinese authorities are keen to expand aggregate demand to tackle this overcapacity.
Uncertainty
Consumer and investor confidence are low. This is leading to severe deflationary pressures. If consumers face a decline in the value of their property, this wealth effect could further constrain their spending. This will, in turn, dampen industrial investment.
Uncertainty is beginning to affect foreign companies based in China. Many foreign companies are now making a loss in China or are at best breaking even. This could lead to disinvestment and add to deflationary pressures.
The Chinese stock market and policy responses
Lack of confidence in the Chinese economy is reflected in falling share prices. The Shanghai SSE Composite Index (an index of all stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange) has fallen dramatically in recent months. From a high of 3703 in September 2021, it had fallen to 2702 on 5 Feb 2024 – a fall of 27%. It is now below the level at the beginning of 2010 (see chart: click here for a PowerPoint). On 5 February alone, some 1800 stocks fell by over 10% in Shanghai and Shenzhen. People were sensing a rout and investors expressed their frustration and anger on social media, including the social media account of the US Embassy. The next day, the authorities intervened and bought large quantities of key stocks. China’s sovereign wealth fund announced that it would increase its purchase of shares to support the country’s stock markets. The SSE Composite rose 4.1% on 6 February and the Shenzhen Component Index rose 6.2%.
However, the rally eased as investors waited to see what more fundamental measures the authorities would take to support the stock markets and the economy more generally. Policies are needed to boost the wider economy and encourage a growth in consumer and business confidence.
Interest rates have been cut four times since the beginning of 2022, when the prime loan rate was cut from 3.85% to 3.7%. The last cut was from 3.55% to 3.45% in August 2023. But this has been insufficient to provide the necessary boost to aggregate demand. Further cuts in interest rates are possible and the government has said that it will use proactive fiscal and effective monetary policy in response to the languishing economy. However, government debt is already high, which limits the room for expansionary fiscal policy, and consumers are highly risk averse and have a high propensity to save.
Graduate unemployment
China has seen investment in education as an important means of increasing human capital and growth. But with a slowing economy, there are are more young people graduating each year than there are graduate jobs available. Official data show that for the group aged 16–24, the unemployment rate was 14.9% in December. This compares with an overall urban unemployment rate of 5.1%. Many graduates are forced to take non-graduate jobs and graduate jobs are being offered at reduced salaries. This will have a further dampening effect on aggregate demand.
Demographics
China’s one-child policy, which it pursued from 1980 to 2016, plus improved health and social care leading to greater longevity, has led to an ageing population and a shrinking workforce. This is despite recent increases in unemployment in the 16–24 age group. The greater the ratio of dependants to workers, the greater the brake on growth as taxes and savings are increasingly used to provide various forms of support.
Effects on the rest of the world
China has been a major driver of world economic growth. With a slowing Chinese economy, this will provide less stimulus to growth in other countries. Many multinational companies, including chip makers, cosmetics companies and chemical companies, earn considerable revenue from China. For example, the USA exports over $190 billion of goods and services to China and these support over 1 million jobs in the USA. A slowdown in China will have repercussions for many companies around the world.
There is also the concern that Chinese manufacturers may dump products on world markets at less than average (total) cost to shift stock and keep production up. This could undermine industry in many countries and could initiate a protectionist response. Already Donald Trump is talking about imposing a 10% tariff on most imported goods if he is elected again in November. Such tariffs could be considerably higher on imports from China. If Joe Biden is re-elected, he too may impose tariffs on Chinese goods if they are thought to be unfairly subsidised. US (and possibly EU) tariffs on Chinese goods could lead to a similar response from China, resulting in a trade war – a negative sum game.
Videos
Articles
- IMF Predicts China Economy Slowing Over Next Four Years
Voice of America, Evie Steele (2/2/24)
- China’s Real Estate Sector: Managing the Medium-Term Slowdown
IMF News, Henry Hoyle and Sonali Jain-Chandra (2/2/24)
- China braced for largest human migration on earth amid bleak economic backdrop
ITV News, Debi Edward (4/2/24)
- China’s property giant Evergrande ordered to liquidate as debt talks fail
Aljazeera (29/1/24)
- China’s overcapacity a challenge that is ‘here to stay’, says US chamber
Financial Times, Joe Leahy (1/2/24)
- China needs to learn lessons from 1990s Japan
Financial Times, Gillian Tett (1/2/24)
- The Trump factor is looming over China’s markets
Financial Times, Katie Martin (2/2/24)
- China’s many systemic problems dominate its outlook for 2024
The Guardian, George Magnus (1/1/24)
- China youth unemployment will stay elevated in 2024, but EIU warns economic impact will linger
CNBC, Clement Tan (25/1/24)
- Don’t count on a soft landing for the world economy – turbulence is ahead
The Guardian, Kenneth Rogoff (2/2/24)
- As falling stocks draw criticism in China, censors struggle to keep up
Washington Post, Lily Kuo (6/2/24)
- China’s doom loop: a dramatically smaller (and older) population could create a devastating global slowdown
The Conversation, Jose Caballero (12/2/24)
- China: why the country’s economy has hit a wall – and what it plans to do about it
The Conversation, Hong Bo (19/3/24)
- Confronting inflation and low growth
OECD Economic Outlook Interim Report (September 2023) (see especially Box 1)
Questions
- Why is China experiencing slowing growth and is growth likely to pick up over the next five years?
- How does the situation in China today compare with that in Japan 30 years ago?
- What policies could the Chinese government pursue to stimulate economic growth?
- What policies were enacted towards China during the Trump presidency from 2017 to 2020?
- Would you advise the Chinese central bank to cut interest rates further? Explain.
- Should China introduce generous child support for families, no matter the number of children?
China has been an economic powerhouse in recent decades – a powerhouse that has helped to drive the world economy through trade and both inward and outward investment. At the same time, its low-priced exports have helped to dampen world inflation. But is all this changing? Is China, to use President Biden’s words, a ‘ticking time bomb’?
China’s economic growth rate is slowing, with the quarterly growth in GDP falling from 2.2% in Q1 this year to 0.8% in Q2. Even though public-sector investment rose by 8.1% in the first six months of this year, private-sector investment fell by 0.2%, reflecting waning business confidence. And manufacturing output declined in August. But, despite slowing growth, the Chinese government is unlikely to use expansionary fiscal policy because of worries about growing public-sector debt.
The property market
One of the biggest worries for the Chinese economy is the property market. The annual rate of property investment fell by 20.6% in June this year and new home prices fell by 0.2% in July (compared with June). The annual rate of price increase for new homes was negative throughout 2022, being as low as minus 1.6% in November 2022; it was minus 0.1% in the year to July 2023, putting new-home prices at 2.4% below their August 2021 level. However, these are official statistics. According to the Japan Times article linked below, which reports Bloomberg evidence, property agents and private data providers report much bigger falls, with existing home prices falling by at least 15% in many cities.
Falling home prices have made home-owners poorer and this wealth effect acts as a brake on spending. The result is that, unlike in many Western countries, there has been no post-pandemic bounce back in spending. There has also been a dampening effect on local authority spending. During the property boom they financed a proportion of their spending by selling land to property developers. That source of revenue has now largely dried up. And as public-sector revenues have been constrained, so this has constrained infrastructure spending – a major source of growth in China.
The government, however, has been unwilling to compensate for this by encouraging private investment and has tightened regulation of the financial sector. The result has been a decline in new jobs and a rise in unemployment, especially among graduates, where new white collar jobs in urban areas are declining. According to the BBC News article linked below, “In July, figures showed a record 21.3% of jobseekers between the ages of 16 and 25 were out of work”.
Deflation
The fall in demand has caused consumer prices to fall. In the year to July 2023, they fell by 0.3%. Even though core inflation is still positive (0.8%), the likelihood of price reductions in the near future discourages spending as people hold back, waiting for prices to fall further. This further dampens the economy. This is a problem that was experienced in Japan over many years.
Despite slowing economic growth, Chinese annual growth in GDP for 2023 is still expected to be around 4.5% – much lower than the average rate for 9.5% from 1991 to 2019, but considerably higher than the average of 1.1% forecast for 2023 for the G7 countries. Nevertheless, China’s exports fell by 14.5% in the year to July 2023 and imports fell by 12.5%. The fall in imports represents a fall in exports to China from the rest of the world and hence a fall in injections to the rest-of-the-world economy. Currently China’s role as a powerhouse of the world has gone into reverse.
Articles
Questions
- Using PowerPoint or Excel, plot the growth rate of Chinese real GDP, real exports and real imports from 1990 to 2024 (using forecasts for 2023 and 2024). Use data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. Comment on the figures.
- Explain the wealth effect from falling home prices.
- Why may official figures understate the magnitude of home price deflation?
- Explain the foreign trade multiplier and its relevance to other countries when the volume of Chinese imports changes. What determines the size of this multiplier for a specific country?
- How does the nature of the political system in China affect the likely policy response to the problems identified in this blog?
- Is there any good news for the rest of the world from the slowdown in the Chinese economy?
Growth in the eurozone has slowed. The European Central Bank (ECB) now expects it to be 1.1% this year; in December, it had forecast a rate of 1.7% for 2019. Mario Draghi, president of the ECB, in his press conference, said that ‘the weakening in economic data points to a sizeable moderation in the pace of the economic expansion that will extend into the current year’. Faced with a slowing eurozone economy, the ECB has announced further measures to stimulate economic growth.
First it has indicated that interest rates will not rise until next year at the earliest ‘and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term’. The ECB currently expects HIPC inflation to be 1.2% in 2019. It was expected to raise interest rates later this year – probably by the end of the summer. The ECB’s main refinancing interest rate, at which it provides liquidity to banks, has been zero since March 2016, and so there was no scope for lowering it.
Second, although quantitative easing (the asset purchase programme) is coming to an end, there will be no ‘quantitative tightening’. Instead, the ECB will purchase additional assets to replace any assets that mature, thereby leaving the stock of assets held the same. This would continue ‘for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation’.
Third, the ECB is launching a new series of ‘quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III), starting in September 2019 and ending in March 2021, each with a maturity of two years’. These are low-interest loans to banks in the eurozone for use for specific lending to businesses and households (other than for mortgages) at below-market rates. Banks will be able to borrow up to 30% of their eligible assets (yet to be fully defined). These, as their acronym suggests, are the third round of such loans. The second round was relatively successful. As the Barron’s article linked below states:
Banks boosted their long-term borrowing from the ECB by 70% over the course of the program, although they did not manage to increase their holdings of business loans until after TLTRO II had finished disbursing funds in March 2017.
Whether these measures will be enough to raise growth rates in the eurozone depends on a range of external factors affecting aggregate demand. Draghi identified three factors which could have a negative effect.
- Brexit. The forecasts assume an orderly Brexit in accordance with the withdrawal deal agreed between the European Commission and the UK government. With the House of Commons having rejected this deal twice, even though it has agreed that there should not be a ‘no-deal Brexit’, this might happen as it is the legal default position. This could have a negative effect on the eurozone economy (as well as a significant one on the UK economy). Even an extension of Article 50 could create uncertainty, which would also have a negative effect
- Trade wars. If President Trump persists with his protectionist policy, this will have a negative effect on growth in the eurozone and elsewhere.
- China. Chinese growth has slowed and this dampens global growth. What is more, China is a major trading partner of the eurozone countries and hence slowing Chinese growth impacts on the eurozone through the international trade multiplier. The ECB has taken this into account, but if Chinese growth slows more than anticipated, this will further push down eurozone growth.
Then there are internal uncertainties in the eurozone, such as the political and economic uncertainty in Italy, which in December 2018 entered a recession (2 quarters of negative economic growth). Its budget deficit is rising and this is creating conflict with the European Commission. Also, there are likely to be growing tensions within Italy as the government raises taxes.
Faced with these and other uncertainties, the measures announced by Mario Draghi may turn out not to be enough. Perhaps in a few months’ there may have to be a further round of quantitative easing.
Articles
- ECB statement following policy meeting
Reuters, Larry King (7/3/19)
- European Central Bank acts to boost struggling eurozone
BBC News, Andrew Walker (7/3/19)
- The European Central Bank Tries to Avoid Repeating Past Mistakes
Barron’s, Matthew C. Klein (8/3/19)
- ECB pushes back rate hike plans, announces fresh funding for banks
CNBC, Silvia Amaro (7/3/19)
- Why the ECB Followed the Fed’s Flip-Flopping
Bloomberg, Mohamed A. El-Erian (7/3/19)
- Central Banks Don’t Have the Answer and Markets Know It
Bloomberg, Robert Burgess (7/3/19)
- Missing out on monetary normalisation
OMFIF, David Marsh (12/4/19)
- The ECB is attempting to get ahead of event
Financial Times, The editorial board (8/3/19)
- Explainer: What is the fuss about European Central Bank TLTRO loans?
Reuters, Balazs Koranyi (4/3/19)
Videos
ECB publications
Questions
- Investigate the history of quantitative easing and its use by the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB. What is the current position of the three central banks on ‘quantitative tightening’, whereby central banks sell some of the stock of assets they have purchased during the process of quantitative easing or not replace them when they mature?
- What are TLTROs and what use of them has been made by the ECB? Do they involve the creation of new money?
- What will determine the success of the proposed TLTRO III scheme?
- If the remit of central banks is to keep inflation on target, which in the ECB’s case means below 2% HIPC inflation but close to it over the medium term, why do people talk about central banks using monetary policy to revive a flagging economy?
- What is ‘forward guidance’ by central banks and what determines its affect on aggregate demand?
In recent months the Chinese central bank (the People’s Bank of China) has taken a number of measures to boost aggregate demand and arrest the slowing economic growth rate. Such measures have included quantitative easing, cuts in interest rates, a devaluation of the yuan and daily injections of liquidity through open-market operations. It has now announced that from 1 March it will reduce the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for banks by a half percentage point.
The RRR is the percentage of liabilities that banks are required to hold in the form of cash reserves – money that could otherwise have been used for lending. This latest move will bring the compulsory ratio for the larger banks down from 17.5% to 17%. This may sound like only a small reduction, but it will release some ¥650bn to ¥690bn (around $100bn) of reserves that can be used for lending.
The cut from 17.5% to 17% is the fourth this year. Throughout 2014 and 2015 it was stable at 20%.
The hope is that this lending will not only help to boost economic growth but also stimulate demand for the consumption of services. The measure can thus be seen as part of a broader strategy as the authorities seek to re-balance the economy away from its reliance on basic manufacturing towards a more diversified economy. It is also hoped that the extra demand will help to boost jobs and thus provide more opportunities for people laid off from traditional manufacturing industries.
It is expected that further reductions in the RRR will be announced later in the year – perhaps a further 1.5 to 2 percentage points.
But what will be the effect of the releasing of reserves? Will the boost be confined to $100bn or will there be a money multiplier effect? It is certainly hoped by the authorities that this will stimulate the process of credit creation. But how much credit is created depends not just on banks’ willingness to lend, but also on the demand for credit. And that depends very much on expectations about future rates of economic growth.
One issue that concerns both the Chinese and overseas competitors is the effect of the measure on the exchange rate. By increasing the money supply, the measure will put downward pressure on the exchange rate as it will boost the demand for imports.
The Chinese authorities have been intervening in the foreign exchange market to arrest a fall in the yuan (¥) because of worries about capital outflows from China. The yuan was devalued by 2.9% in August 2015 from approximately ¥1 = ¢16.11 to approximately ¥1 = ¢15.64 (see chart) and after a modest rally in November 2015 it began falling again, with the Chinese authorities being unwilling to support it at the November rate. By January 2016, it had fallen a further 2.8% to approximately ¢15.20 (click here for a PowerPoint file of the chart).
But despite the possible downward pressure on the yuan from the cut in the reserve requirement, it will probably put less downward pressure than a cut in interest rates. This is because an interest rate cut has a bigger effect on capital outflows as it directly reduces the return on deposits in China. The central bank had already cut its benchmark 1-year lending rate from 6% to 4.35% between November 2014 and October 2015 and seems reluctant at the current time to cut it further.
China central bank resumes easing cycle to cushion reform pain Reuters, Pete Sweeney (29/2/16)
China cuts reserve requirements for banks to boost economy PressTV (29/2/16)
China Moves to Bolster Lending by Easing Banks’ Reserve Ratio New York Times, Neil Gough (29/2/16)
Economists React: China’s ‘Surprise’ Bank Reserve Cut Wall Street Journal (29/2/16)
China Cuts Banks’ Reserve Requirement Ratio Bloomberg, Enda Curran (29/2/16)
China Reserve-Ratio Cut Signals Growth Is Priority Over Yuan Bloomberg, Andrew Lynch (29/2/16)
China reserve ratio cut not a signal of impending large-scale stimulus: Xinhua Reuters, Samuel Shen and John Ruwitch (2/3/16)
China injects cash to boost growth and counter capital outflows Financial Times, Gabriel Wildau (29/2/16)
China’s Economic Policy Akin To Pushing On A String Seeking Alpha, Bruce Wilds (2/3/16)
China cuts banks’ reserve ratio for fifth time in a year: Why and what’s next Channel NewsAsia, Tang See Kit, (1/3/16)
Questions
- Explain what is mean by the required reserve ratio (RRR).
- Explain how credit creation takes place.
- What will determine the amount of credit creation that will take place as a result of the $100bn of reserves in Chinese banks released for lending by the cut in the RRR from 17.5% to 17%.
- What prompted the recent cuts in the RRR?
- Why may China’s recent monetary policy measures be like pushing on a string?
- Is the reduction in the RRR a purely demand-side measure, or will it have supply-side consequences?
- Explain how different types of monetary policy affect the exchange rate.
- Should other countries welcome the cut in China’s RRR? Explain.
