Tag: financial crisis

According to a report by the McKinsey Global Institute, global debt is now higher than before the financial crisis. And that crisis was largely caused by excessive lending. As The Telegraph article linked below states:

The figures are as remarkable as they are terrifying. Global debt – defined as the liabilities of governments, firms and households – has jumped by $57 trillion, or 17% of global GDP, since the fourth quarter of 2007, which was supposed to be the peak of the bad old credit-fuelled days. In 2000, total debt was worth 246% of global GDP; by 2007, this had risen to 269% of GDP and today we are at 286% of GDP.

This is not how policy since the financial crisis was supposed to have worked out. Central banks and governments have been trying to encourage greater saving and reduced credit as a percentage of GDP, a greater capital base for banks, and reduced government deficits as a means of reducing government debt. But of 47 large economies in the McKinsey study, only five have succeeded in reducing their debt/GDP ratios since 2007 and in many the ratio has got a lot higher. China, for example, has seen its debt to GDP ratio almost double – from 158% to 282%, although its government debt remains low relative to other major economies.

Part of the problem is that the lack of growth in many countries has made it hard for countries to reduce their public-sector deficits to levels that will allow the public-sector debt/GDP ratio to fall.

In terms of the UK, private-sector debt has been falling as a percentage of GDP. But this has been more than offset by a rise in the public-sector debt/GDP ratio. As Robert Peston says:

[UK indebtedness] increased by 30 percentage points, to 252% of GDP (excluding financial sector or City debts) – as government debts have jumped by 50 percentage points of GDP, while corporate and household debts have decreased by 12 and 8 percentage points of GDP respectively.

So what are the likely consequences of this growth in debt and what can be done about it? The articles and report consider these questions.

Articles

Instead of paying down its debts, the world’s gone on another credit binge The Telegraph, Allister Heath (5/2/15)
Global debts rise $57tn since crash BBC News, Robert Peston (5/2/15)
China’s Total Debt Load Equals 282% of GDP, Raising Economic Risks The Wall Street Journal, Pedro Nicolaci da Costa (4/2/15)

Report

Debt and (not much) deleveraging McKinsey Global Institute, Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel, and Mina Mutafchieva (February 2015)

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by ‘leverage’.
  2. Why does a low-leverage economy do better in a downturn than a high-leverage one?
  3. What is the relationship between deficits and the debt/GDP ratio?
  4. When might an increase in debt be good for an economy?
  5. Comment on the statement in The Telegraph article that ‘In theory, debt is fine if it is backed up by high-quality collateral’.
  6. Why does the rise is debt matter for the global economy?
  7. Is it possible for (a) individual countries; (b) all countries collectively to ‘live beyond their means’ by consuming more than they are producing through borrowing?
  8. What is the structure of China’s debt and what problems does this pose for the Chinese economy?

Following the recession of 2008/9, the UK has engaged in four rounds of quantitative easing (QE) – the process whereby the central bank increases the money supply by purchasing government bonds, and possibly other assets, on the open market from various institutions. The final round was announced in July 2012, bringing the total assets purchased to £375bn. As yet, however, there are no plans for quantitative tightening – the process of the Bank of England selling some of these assets, thereby reducing money supply.

The aim of QE has been to stimulate aggregate demand. Critics claim, however, that the effect on spending has been limited, since the money has not gone directly to consumers but rather to the institutions selling the assets, who have used much of the money to buy shares, bonds and other assets. Nevertheless, with banks having to strengthen their capital base following the financial crisis, QE has helped then to achieve this without having to make even bigger reductions in lending.

The Bank of England now reckons that the recovery is sufficiently established and there is, therefore, no need for further QE.

This is also the judgement of the Federal Reserve about the US economy, which experienced annual growth of 3.5% in the third quarter of 2014. The IMF predicts that US growth will be around 3% for the next three years.

The Fed has had three rounds of QE since the financial crisis, but in October 2014 called an end to the process. Since the start of this year, it has been gradually reducing the amount it injects each month from $85bn to $15bn. The total bond purchases over the past five years have been some $3.6tn, bringing the Fed’s balance sheet to nearly $4.5tn.

But as QE comes to an end in the USA, Japan is expanding its programme. On 31 October, the Bank of Japan announced that it would increase its asset purchases from ¥60-70tn per year to ¥80tn (£440bn). The Japanese government and central bank are determined to boost economic growth in Japan and escape the two decades of deflation and stagnation. The Tokyo stock market rose by some 8% in the week following the announcement and the yen fell by more than 5% against the dollar.

And the European Central Bank, which has not used full QE up to now, looks as if it is moving in that direction. In October, it began a programme of buying asset-backed securities (ABSs) and covered bonds (CBs). These are both private-sector securities: ABSs are claims against non-financial companies in the eurozone and CBs are issued by eurozone banks and other financial institutions.

It now looks as if the ECB might take the final step of purchasing government bonds. This is probably what is implied by ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement after the 6 November meeting of the ECB that the ground was being prepared for “further measures to be implemented, if needed”.

But has QE been as successful as its proponents would claim? Is it the solution now to a languishing eurozone economy? The following articles look at these questions.

Fed calls time on QE in the US – charts and analysis The Guardian, Angela Monaghan (29/10/14)
Quantitative easing: giving cash to the public would have been more effective The Guardian, Larry Elliott (29/10/14)
End of QE is whimper not bang BBC News, Robert Peston (29/10/14)
Federal Reserve ends QE The Telegraph, Katherine Rushton (29/10/14)
Bank of Japan to inject 80 trillion yen into its economy The Guardian, Angela Monaghan and Graeme Wearden (31/10/14)
Every man for himself The Economist, Buttonwood column (8/11/14)
Why Japan Surprised the World with its Quantitative Easing Announcement Townhall, Nicholas Vardy (7/11/14)
Bank of Japan QE “Treat” Is a Massive Global Trick Money Morning, Shah Gilani (31/10/14)
ECB stimulus may lack desired scale, QE an option – sources Reuters, Paul Carrel and John O’Donnell (27/10/14)
ECB door remains open to quantitative easing despite doubts over impact Reuters, Eva Taylor and Paul Taylor (9/11/14)
ECB could pump €1tn into eurozone in fresh round of quantitative easing The Guardian,
Angela Monaghan and Phillip Inman (6/11/14)
Ben Bernanke: Quantitative easing will be difficult for the ECB CNBC, Jeff Cox (5/11/14)
Not All QE Is Created Equal as U.S. Outpunches ECB-BOJ Bloomberg, Simon Kennedy (6/11/14)
A QE proposal for Europe’s crisis The Economist, Yanis Varoufakis (7/11/14)
UK, Japan and 1% inflation BBC News, Linda Yueh (12/11/14)
Greenspan Sees Turmoil Ahead As QE Market Boost Unwinds Bloomberg TV, Gillian Tett interviews Alan Greenspan (29/10/14)

Questions

  1. What is the transmission mechanism between central bank purchases of assets and aggregate demand?
  2. Under what circumstances might the effect of a given amount of QE on aggregate demand be relatively small?
  3. What dangers are associated with QE?
  4. What determines the likely effect on inflation of QE?
  5. What has been the effect of QE in developed countries on the economies of developing countries? Has this been desirable for the global economy?
  6. Have businesses benefited from QE? If so, how? If not, why not?
  7. What has been the effect of QE on the housing market (a) in the USA; (b) in the UK?
  8. Why has QE not been ‘proper’ money creation?
  9. What effect has QE had on credit creation? How and why has it differed between the USA and UK?
  10. Why did the announcement of further QE by the Bank of Japan lead to a depreciation of the yen? What effect is this depreciation likely to have?

Following the financial crisis, all sectors of the economy continue to repair their balance sheets. As well as households, non-financial corporations and government, this is true of the banking sector. In part, the repairing and rebalancing of their balance sheets is being brought about by regulatory pressures. The objective is to make banks more resilient to shocks and less susceptible to financial distress.

The need for banks to repair and rebalance their balance sheets is significant because of their systemic importance to the modern-day economy. Financial institutions that are systemically important to national economies are know as SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions) while those of systemic importance to the global economy are know as G-SIFIs or G-SIBs (global systemically important banks). The increasing importance of financial institutions to economic activity is known as financialisation.

One way of measuring the degree of financialisation here in the UK is to consider the aggregate size of the balance sheet of resident UK banks and building societies (including foreign subsidiaries operating here). The chart shows that the balance sheet grew from £2.6 trillion in 1998 Q1 to £8.5 trillion in 2010 Q1. Another way of looking at this is to consider this growth relative to GDP. This reveals that the aggregate balance sheet of banks and building societies grew over this period from 3 times annual GDP to a staggering 5.6 times GDP. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

But, now consider the aggregate banking balance sheet in the 2010s. This reveals a shrinking balance sheet. At the end of the second quarter of this year (2014 Q2) it had fallen back to £7.1 trillion or 4 times GDP. As a share of GDP, this was the smallest the aggregate balance sheet had been since 2005 Q1.

Does a shrinking balance sheet matter? This is where the analysis becomes tricky and open to debate. If the smaller size is consistent with a more stable financial system then undoubtedly that is a good thing. But, size is not that all matters. The composition of the balance sheet matters too. This requires an analysis of, among other things, the liquidity of assets (i.e. assets that can be readily turned in a given amount of cash), the reliability of the income flow from assets and the resources available to withstand periods of slow economic growth, including recessions, or periods of financial difficulty.

As we have identified before (see Financialisation: Banks and the economy after the crisis), the financial crisis could herald new norms for the banking system with important implications for the economy. If so, we may need to become accustomed to consistently lower flows of credit and not to the levels that we saw prior to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. However, an alternative view is that we are merely experiencing a pause before the next expansionary phase of the credit cycle. This is consistent with the financial instability hypothesis (see Keeping a Minsky-eye on credit) which argues that credit cycles are an integral part of modern financialised economies. Only time will tell which view will turn out to be right.

Articles

‘Cleaning up bank balance sheets is key’ Irish Examiner, John Walsh (10/10/14)
More action needed at European banks: Fitch Courier Mail, (17/10/14)
Bank lending to small businesses falls by £400m The Telegraph, Rebecca Burn-Callander (20/10/14)
Bank lending to SMEs falls by £400m SME insider, Lindsey Kennedy (21/10/14)
Record world debt could trigger new financial crisis, Geneva report warns The Guardian, Phillip Inman (29/10/14)
RBS shares jump as bank’s bad debts improve The Guardian, Jill Treanor (30/10/14)

Data

Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England

Questions

  1. Using examples, demonstrate your understanding of financialisation.
  2. Draw up a list of the alternative ways in which we might measure financialisation.
  3. What factors are likely to explain the recent reduction in the aggregate balance sheet of resident banks and building societies in the UK?
  4. How might we go about assessing whether the aggregate level of lending by financial institutions is sustainable?
  5. How might we go about assessing whether the level of lending by individual financial institutions is sustainable?
  6. How would reduced flows of credit be expected to impact on the economy both in the short term and in the longer term?
  7. Are credit cycles inevitable?
  8. Of what significance are credit cycles in explaining the business cycle?

UK house prices are incredibly volatile. This helps to explain the fascination that many of us have with the British housing market. According to the latest ONS house Price Index, the average UK house price in August 2013 was 3.8 per cent higher than 12 months earlier. The rates varied across the home nations: 4.1 per cent in England, 1.1 per cent in Northern Ireland, 1 per cent in Wales and -0.7 per cent in Scotland. Here we take a look at international house price inflation rates. Is the British housing market as unique as we think it is?

Let’s begin at home (excuse the pun). If we take the period from 1970 Q1 to 2013 Q2, the average annual rate of house price inflation across the UK is 9.7 per cent. The average rate in England is 9.8 per cent, as it is in Wales too, while in Scotland it is 9.0 per cent and in Northern Ireland it is 8.8 per cent. While the long-term averages of the UK nations are rather more similar than perhaps we might expect, what is quite interesting is the differences that emerge in more recent times. If we take the period from July 2008 to August 2013, the average annual rate of house price inflation in the UK is -0.2 per cent, in England it is 0.1 per cent, in both Wales and Scotland it is -1.0 per cent, while in Northern Ireland it is -11 per cent.

The recent English average is heavily distorted by London and to a lesser extent the rest of the South East. In London and the South East the average annual house price inflation rates since July 2008 have been 2.6 per cent and 0.2 per cent respectively. In all the other English regions the average rate has been negative. In my own region of the East Midlands the average rate has been -1.2 per cent – this is exactly the UK average if both London and the South East are removed from the figures.

Now let’s go international. Chart 1 shows annual house price inflation rates for the UK and six other countries since 1997. Interestingly, it shows that house price volatility is a common feature of housing markets. It is not a uniquely British thing. It also shows that the USA is notable for its relatively robust house price inflation rates of late. In the first half of 2013 annual house price inflation has been running at 7 per cent in America, compared with 2 to 3 per cent here in the UK. In contrast, the Netherlands has seen near-double digit rates of house price deflation over the past year, albeit with a rebound in the third quarter of this year. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The chart captures very nicely the effect of the financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn on global house prices. Ireland saw annual rates of house price deflation touch 23 per cent in 2009 compared with rates of deflation of 12 per cent in the UK. Denmark too suffered significant house price deflation with prices falling at an annual rate of 15 per cent in 2009.

House price volatility appears to be an inherent characteristic of housing markets worldwide. Let’s now consider the extent to which house prices rise over the longer term. In doing so, we consider real house price growth after having stripped out the effect of consumer price inflation. Real house price growth measures the growth of house prices relative to consumer prices.

Chart 2 shows real house prices since 1996 Q1. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart.) It shows that up to 2013 Q2, real house prices in the UK have risen by a factor of 2.24, i.e. they are two and a quarter times higher. This is a little less than in Sweden where prices are 2.5 times higher.

Chart 2 shows that the increase in real house prices in the UK and Sweden is significantly higher than in the other countries in the sample. In particular, in the USA real house prices in 2013 Q2 are only 1.16 times higher than in 1996 Q1. In the US actual house prices, when viewed over the past 17 years or so, have grown only a little more quickly than consumer prices.

The latest data on house prices suggest that house price volatility is not unique to the UK. However the rate of growth over the longer term relative to consumer prices is markedly quicker than in many other countries. It is this which helps to explain the amount of attention paid to the UK housing market – and not least by policy-makers.

Data

House Price Indices: Data Tables Office for National Statistics

Articles

First time buyers in race to beat house price rises Telegraph, Nicole Blackmore (8/11/13)
House prices soar by £13,000: Values rise at fastest rate for 3 years Express, Sarah O’Grady (7/11/13)
House prices: ‘south-east set to outpace London’ for first time in a decade Guardian, Jennifer Rankin (6/11/13)
UK house prices hit record level, says ONS BBC News, (15/10/13)
UK house prices rise at fastest pace in three years in October – Nationwide Reuter (31/11/13)
Jonathan Portes: UK house prices a ‘force of evil’ BBC News, (5/11/13)

Questions

  1. What is meant by the annual rate of house price inflation? What about the annual rate of house price deflation?
  2. What factors are likely to affect housing demand?
  3. What factors are likely to affect housing supply?
  4. Explain the difference between nominal and real house prices. What does a real increase in house prices mean?
  5. How might we explain the recent differences between house price inflation rates in London and the South East relative to the rest of the UK?
  6. What might explain the very different long-term growth rates in real house prices in the USA and the UK?
  7. Why were house prices so affected by the financial crisis?
  8. What factors help explain the volatility in house prices?

On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the USA, filed for bankruptcy. Although the credit crisis had been building since mid 2007, the demise of Lehmans was a pivotal event in the unfolding of the financial crisis and the subsequent severe recession in most developed economies. Banks were no longer seen as safe and huge amounts of government money had to be poured into banks to shore up their capital and prevent further bankruptcies. Partial nationalisation seemed the only way of rescuing several banks and with it the global financial system.

A deep and prolonged recession followed (see Chart 1: click here for a PowerPoint). In response, governments pursued expansionary fiscal policies – at least until worries about rising government deficits and debt caused a lurch to austerity policies. And central banks pursued policies of near zero interest rates and subsequently of quantitative easing. But all the time debate was taking place about how to reform banking to prevent similar crises occurring in the future.

Solutions have included reform of the Basel banking regulations to ensure greater capital adequacy. The Basel III regulations (see Chart 2) demand considerably higher capital ratios than the previous Basel II regulations.

Other solutions have included proposals to break up banks. Indeed, just this week, the Lloyds Banking Group has hived off 631 of its branches (one sixth of the total) into a newly reformed TSB. Another proposal is to ring-fence the retail side of banks from their riskier investment divisions. In both cases the aim has been to avoid the scenario where banks are seen as too big to fail and can thus rely on governments to bail them out if they run into difficulties. Such reliance can make banks much more willing to take excessive risks. Further details of the new systems now in place are given in the Robert Peston article below.

But many critics maintain that not nearly enough has been done. Claims include:

• The Basel III rules are not tough enough and banks are still being required to hold too little capital.
• Rewards to senior bankers and traders are still excessive.
• The culture of banking, as a result, is still too risk loving in banks’ trading arms, even though they are now much more cautious about lending to firms and individuals.
• This caution has meant a continuing of the credit crunch for many small businesses.
• Higher capital adequacy ratios have reduced bank lending and have thus had a dampening effect on the real economy.
• The so-called ring-fences may not be sufficient to insulate retail banking from problems in banks’ investment divisions.
• Banks are not being required to hold sufficient liquidity to allow them to meet customers’ demands for cash in all scenarios.
• Banks’ reliance on each other still leaves a systemic risk for the banking system as a whole.
• Fading memories of the crisis are causing urgency to tackle its underlying problems to diminish.
• Problems may be brewing in less regulated parts of the banking world, such as the growing banking sector in China.

The following articles look at the lessons of the banking crisis – those that have been learned and those that have not. They look at the measures put in place and assess whether they are sufficient.

Lehman Brothers collapse, five years on: ‘We had almost no control’ The Guardian, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (13/9/13)
Lehman Brothers collapse: five years on, we’re still feeling the shockwaves The Guardian, Larry Elliott (13/9/13)
Five years after Lehman, could a collapse happen all over again? The Observer, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (15/9/13)
Five years after Lehman, all tickety-boo? BBC News, Robert Peston (9/9/13)
What have we learned from the bank crash? Independent, Yalman Onaran, Michael J Moore and Max Abelson (14/9/13)
We’ve let a good financial crisis go to waste since Lehman Brothers collapsed The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (12/9/13)
The Lehman legacy: Lessons learned? The Economist (9/9/13)
The dangers of debt: Lending weight The Economist (14/9/13)
The Lehman anniversary: Five years in charts The Economist (14/9/13)

Questions

  1. Why did Lehman Brothers collapse?
  2. Explain the role of the US sub-prime mortgage market in the global financial crisis of 2007/8.
  3. In the context of banking, what is meant by (a) capital adequacy; (b) risk-based capital adequacy ratios; (c) leverage; (d) leverage ratios?
  4. Explain the Basel III rules on (a) risk-based capital adequacy (see the textbook and the chart above); (b) non-risk-based leverage (introduced in 2013: see here for details).
  5. Explain and comment on the following statement by Adair Turner: ‘We created an over-leveraged financial system and an over-leveraged real economy. We created a system such that even if the direct cost of bank rescue was zero, the impact of their near-failure on the economy was vast.’
  6. Under what circumstances might the global financial system face a similar crisis to that of 2007/8 at some point in the future?
  7. Why is there an underlying conflict between increasing banks’ required capital adequacy and ensuring a sufficient supply of credit to consumers and business? What multiplier effects are likely to occur from an increase in the capital adequacy ratio?