Tag: Expectations of inflation

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The approach to monetary and fiscal policy

The following blog is inspired by my teaching of macroeconomic issues to my final year students at Aston University. In the classes we’ve been discussing important aspects of monetary and fiscal policy design. What has become clear to me and my students is that the trade-offs which characterise the discipline of economics are certainly alive and well in the current environment in which monetary and fiscal policy choices are being made.

To demonstrate this we consider here some of the discussions we’ve had in class around central bank independence and monetary policy mandates. We’ve also looked at fiscal policy. Here we’ve examined the state of the public finances and the importance that seems to be attached to debt stabilisation and the imposition of debt rules.

Delegation and central bank mandates

My teaching this term began by introducing my students to one of the most important and influential monetary policy models. This is the model of Kydland and Prescott. Their model, published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1977 has become the theoretical bedrock for the modern-day operational independence of central banks.1

The model explores how systemically high inflation can become established in economies when policymakers have the political incentive to lower unemployment or increase output above its long-run equilibrium value. This may be the case if governments operate monetary policy rather than the central bank (of if the central bank operates monetary policy but follows government objectives). By adopting expansionary monetary policy, governments can increase their popularity.

But this is likely to be short-lived, as any increased economic activity will only be temporary (assuming that the natural-rate hypothesis holds). Soon, inflation will rise.

But, if an election is on the horizon, there may be enough time to boost output and employment before inflation rises. In other words, an expectations-augmented Phillips curve may present governments with an incentive to loosen monetary policy and worry about the inflation consequences after the election.

However, the resulting ‘inflation surprise’ through the loosening of monetary policy means a fall in real pay and therefore in purchasing power. If people suspect that governments will be tempted to loosen policy, they will keep their expectations of inflation higher than the socially optimal inflation rate. Consequently, low-inflation targets lack credibility when governments have the temptation to loosen monetary policy. Such targets are time-inconsistent because governments have an incentive to renege and deliver higher inflation through a looser monetary policy. The result is an inflation bias.

Central bank independence
To prevent this inflationary bias arising, many central banks around the world have been given some form of operational independence with a mandate centred around an inflation-rate target. By delegating monetary policy to a more conservative central bank, the problem of inflationary bias can be addressed.

Yet central bank independence is not without its own issues and this has been an important part of the discussions with my students. Today, many economies are continuing to experience the effects of the inflationary shocks that began in 2021 (see Chart 1 for the UK CPI inflation rate: click here for a PowerPoint). The question is whether the appointment of a conservative or hard-nosed hawkish central banker trades off the stabilisation of inflation for greater volatility in output or unemployment.

The inflation–output stabilisation trade-off is closely associated with the works of Kenneth Rogoff2 and John Taylor3. The latter is known for his monetary policy rule, which has become known as the ‘Taylor rule’. This advocates that a rules-based central bank ought to place weight on both inflation and output stabilisation.

This is not without its own issues, however, since, by also placing weight on output stabilisation, we are again introducing the possibility of greater inflationary bias in policy making. Hence, while the act of delegation and a rules- or target-based approach may mitigate the extent of the bias relative to that in the Kydland and Prescott model, there nonetheless still remain issues around the design of the optimal framework for the conduct of monetary policy.

Indeed, the announcement that the UK had moved into recession in the last two quarters of 2023 can be seen as evidence that an otherwise abstract theoretical trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation is actually very real.

My classroom discussions have also shown how economic theory struggles to identify an optimal inflation-rate target. Beyond accepting that a low and stable inflation rate is desirable, it is difficult to address fully the student who asks what is so special about a 2% inflation target. Would not a 3% target, for example, be preferable, they might ask?

Whilst this may sound somewhat trivial, it has real-world consequences. In a world that now seems to be characterised by greater supply-side volatility and by more frequent inflation shocks than we were used to in recent history, might a higher inflation rate target be preferable? Certainly, one could argue that, with an inflation–output stabilisation trade-off, there is the possibility that monetary policy could be unduly restrictive in our potential new macroeconomic reality. Hence, we might come to see governments and central banks in the near future revisiting the mandates that frame the operation of their monetary policy. Time will tell.

Fiscal policy and debt stabilisation

The second topic area that I have been discussing in my final-year macroeconomics classes has centred around fiscal policy and the state of the public finances. The context for this is that we have seen a significant increase in public debt-to-GDP ratios over the past couple of decades as the public sector has attempted to absorb significant economic shocks. These include the global financial crisis of 2007–8, the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis. These interventions in the case of the UK have seen its public debt-to-GDP ratio more than triple since the early 2000s to close to 100% (see Chart 2: click here for a PowerPoint).

Understandably, given the stresses placed on the public finances, economists have increasingly debated issues around debt sustainability. These debates have been mirrored by politicians and policymakers. A key question is whether to have a public debt rule. The UK has in recent years adopted such a rule. The arguments for a rule centre on ensuring sound public finances and maintaining the confidence of investors to purchases public debt. A debt rule therefore places a discipline on fiscal policy, with implications for taxation and spending.

How easy it is to stick to a debt rule depends on three key factors. It will be harder to stick to the rule:

  • The higher the current debt-to-GDP ratio and hence the more it needs to be reduced to meet the rule.
  • The higher the rate of interest and hence the greater the cost of servicing the public debt.
  • The lower the rate of economic growth and hence the less quickly will tax revenues rise.

With a given debt-to-GDP ratio, a given average interest rate payable on its debt, and a given rate of economic growth, we can determine the primary fiscal balance relative to GDP a government would need to meet for the debt-to-GDP ratio to remain stable. This is known as the ‘debt-stabilising primary balance’. The primary balance is the difference between a government’s receipts and its expenditures less the interest payments on its debt.

This fiscal arithmetic is important in determining a government’s fiscal choices. It shows the implications for spending and taxation. These implications become ever more important and impactful on people, businesses, and society when the fiscal arithmetic becomes less favourable. This is a situation that appears to be increasingly the case for many countries, including the UK, as the rate of interest on public debt rises relative to a country’s rate of economic growth. As this happens, governments are increasingly required to run healthier primary balances. This of course implies a tightening of their fiscal stance.

Hence, the fiscal conversations with my students have focused on both the benefits and the costs of debt-stabilisation. In respect of the costs, a few issues have arisen.

First, as with the inflation-rate target, it is hard to identify an optimal public debt-to-GDP ratio number. While the fiscal arithmetic may offer some clue, it is not straightforward to address the question as to whether a debt-to-GDP ratio of say 100% or 120% would be excessive for the UK.

Second, it is possible that the debt stabilisation itself can make the fiscal arithmetic of debt stabilisation more difficult. This occurs if fiscal consolidation itself hinders long-term economic growth, which then makes the fiscal arithmetic more difficult. This again points to the difficulties in designing policy frameworks, whether they be for monetary or fiscal policy.

Third, a focus on debt stabilisation alone ignores the fact that there are two sides to any sector’s balance sheet. It would be very unusual when assessing the well-being of businesses or households if we were to ignore the asset side of their balance sheet. Yet, this is precisely the danger of focusing on public debt at the exclusion of what fiscal choices can mean for public-sector assets, from which we all can potentially benefit. Hence, some would suggest a more balanced approach to assessing the soundness of the public finances might involve a net worth (assets less liabilities) measure. This has parallels with the debates around whether mandates of central banks should be broader.

Applications in macroeconomics

What my teaching of a topics-based macroeconomics module this term has vividly demonstrated is that concepts, theories, and models come alive, and are capable of being understood better, when they are used to shine a light on real-world issues. The light being shone on monetary and fiscal policy in today’s turbulent macroeconomic environment is perhaps understandably very bright.

Indeed, the light being shone on fiscal policy in the UK and some other countries facing an upcoming election, is intensified further with the state of the public finances shaping much of the public discourse on fiscal choices. Hopefully, my students will continue to debate these important issues beyond their graduation, stressing their importance for people’s lives and, in doing so, going beyond the abstract.

References

  1. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans
    The Journal of Political Economy, Finn E Kydland and Edward C. Prescott (1977, 85(3), pp 473–92)

  2. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target
    Quarterly Journal of Economics, Kenneth Rogoff (November 1985, 100(4), pp 1169–89)

  3. Discretion versus policy rules in practice
    Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, John B Taylor (December 1993, 39, pp 195–214)

Articles

Questions

  1. What is meant by time-inconsistent monetary policy announcements? How has this concept been important for the way in which many central banks now conduct monetary policy?
  2. What is meant by a ‘conservative’ central banker? Why is the appointment of this type of central banker thought to be important in affecting inflation?
  3. What is the contemporary macroeconomic relevance of the inflation–output (or inflation–unemployment) stabilisation trade-off?
  4. How is the primary balance different from the actual budget balance?
  5. What do you understand by the concept of ‘the fiscal arithmetic’. Explain how each element of the fiscal arithmetic affects the debt-stabilising primary balance?
  6. Analyse the costs of benefits of a debt-based fiscal rule.
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An inflation make-up mandate

The monetary policy mandates of central banks have an impact on all our lives. While the terminology might not be familiar to many outside economics, their impact is, however, undeniably important. This is because they set out the objectives for the operation of monetary policy. Adjustments to interest rates or the growth of the money supply, which affect us all, reflect the mandate given to the central bank.

Since 1977 the mandate given to the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) by Congress has been to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. This mandate has become known as the dual mandate because it emphasises both employment and stable prices. Since 2012, the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee has issued an annual statemenent of its long-run goals. The latest was published in January 2019. Since this time, the Federal Reserve has explicitly set the ‘longer-run goal for inflation’ at 2 per cent. It has also emphasised that it would be ‘concerned’ if the inflation rate was persistently above or below this level.

In November 2018 the Federal Reserve began a review of its monetary policy strategy, its tools and how it communicates monetary policy. The review is being conducted within the guidelines that its statutory mandate gives and as well as the longer-term inflation goal of 2 per cent. However, one of the issues being addressed by the review is how the operation of monetary policy can avoid the rate of inflation frequently undershooting 2 per cent, as it has done since the financial crisis of the late 2000s and the introduction of the 2 per cent inflation rate target.

Chart 1 shows the annual rate of consumer price inflation in the US since 1998. It helps to illustrate the concern that low inflation rates can become entrenched. The chart shows that, while the average inflation rate from 1998 to 2008 was 2.7 per cent, from 2009 the average has been only 1.6 per cent. Interestingly, the average since 2012, when the explicit 2 per cent goal was introduced, to the present day is also 1.6 per cent. (Click here to download the PowerPoint chart.)

The concern going forward is that the natural or neutral rate of interest, which is the policy rate at which the rate of inflation is close to its target level and the level of output is close to its potential level, is now lower than in the recent past. Hence, when the next downturn occurs there is likely to be less room for cutting interest rates. Hence, the review is looking, in essence, to future-proof the conduct of monetary policy.

Chart 2 shows the Federal Fund rate since 1998. This is the rate at which commercial banks lend to each other the reserve balances they hold at the Federal Reserve in order to meet their reserve requirements. The Federal Reserve can affect this rate through buying or selling government securities. If it wants to drive up rates, it can sell holdings of government securities and reduce the money supply. If it wants to drive rates down, it can buy government securities and increase the money supply. The effects then ripple through to other interest rates and, in turn, aggregate demand and inflation. (Click here to download a copy of the PowerPoint chart.)

We can see from Chart 2 the dramatic cuts made by the Federal Reserve to interest rates as the financial crisis unfolded. The subsequent ‘normalisation’ of the Federal Funds rate in the 2010s saw the Federal Funds Rate rise to no higher than between 2.25 and 2.5 per cent. Then in 2019 the Federal Reserve began to cut rates again. This was despite historically-low unemployment rates. In November 2019 the unemployment rate fell to 3.5 per cent, its lowest since 1969. This has helped fuel the argument among some economists and financiers, which we saw earlier, that that the natural (or neutral) interest rate is now lower.

If the natural rate is lower, then this raises concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy in future economic downturns. In this context, the review is considering ways in which the operation of monetary policy would be able to prevent the rate of inflation consistently undershooting its target. This includes a discussion of how the Fed can prevent inflationary expectations becoming anchored below 2 per cent. This is important because, should they do so, they help to anchor the actual rate of inflation below 2 per cent. One possibility being considered is an inflation make-up strategy. In other words, a period of below-target inflation rates would need to be matched by a period where inflation rates could exceed the 2 per cent target in order that the long-term average of 2 per cent is met.

An inflation make-up policy would work like forward guidance in that people and markets would know know that short-term interest rates would be kept lower for longer. This would then help to force longer-term interest rates lower as well as providing people and businesses with greater certainty that interest rates will be lower for longer. This could help to encourage spending, raise economic growth and prevent inflation from overshooting its target for any extensive period of time.

An inflation make-up strategy would, in part, help to cement the idea that the inflation target is effectively symmetrical and that 2 per cent is not an upper limit for the inflation rate. But, it would do more than that: it would allow the Fed to deliberately exceed the 2 per cent target.

An inflation make-up strategy does raise issues. For example, how would the Fed determine the magnitude of any inflation make-up and for how long would a looser monetary stance be allowed to operate? In other words, would an inflation make-up strategy be determined by a specific rule or formula? Or, would the principle be applied flexibly? Finally, could a simpler alternative be to raise the target rate itself, given the tendency to undershoot the 2 per cent target rate? If so, what should that the rate be?

We should know by the end of 2020 whether the Federal Reserve will adopt, when necessary, an inflation make-up monetary policy.

Articles

Questions

  1. What do you understand by the monetary policy mandate of a central bank?
  2. Explain the ways in which the monetary policy mandate of the central bank affects our everyday lives.
  3. Why are inflation-rate expectations important in determining actual inflation rates?
  4. Why is the Federal Reserve concerned about its ability to use monetary policy effectively during future economic downturns?
  5. Discuss the economic arguments for and against central banks operating strict inflation-rate targets.
  6. Does the case for adopting an inflation make-up monetary policy mandate show that the argument for inflation-rate targeting has been lost?
  7. What do you understand by the idea of a natural or neutral policy interest rate? Would the actual rate be expected to be above or below this if the rate of inflation was below its target level?