Tag: automatic fiscal stabilisers

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The UK government’ fiscal stance

In this blog we show how we can apply fiscal metrics to assess the UK government’s fiscal stance. This captures the extent to which fiscal policy contributes to the level of economic activity in the economy.

Changes in the fiscal stance can then be used to estimate the extent to which discretionary fiscal policy measures represent a tightening or loosening of policy. We can measure the size and direction of fiscal impulses arising from changes in the government’s budgetary position.

Such an analysis is timely given the Autumn Budget presented by Rachel Reeves on 30 October 2024. This was the first Labour budget in 14 years and the first ever to be presented by a female Chancellor of the Exchequer.

We conclude by considering the forecast profile of expenditures and revenues for the next few years and the new fiscal rules announced by the Chancellor.

The fiscal stance

At its most simple, the fiscal stance measures the extent to which fiscal policy increases or decreases demand, thereby influencing growth and inflation (see Box 1.F, page 28, Autumn Budget 2024: see link below).

The fiscal stance is commonly estimated by measures of pubic-sector borrowing. To understand this, we can refer to the circular flow of income model. In this model, excesses of government spending (an injection) over taxation receipts (a withdrawal or leakage) represent a net injection into the circular flow and hence positively affect the level of aggregate demand for national output, all other things being equal.

A commonly used measure of borrowing in assessing the fiscal stance of the is the primary deficit. Unlike public-sector net borrowing, which is simply the excess of the sector’s spending over its receipts (largely taxation), the primary deficit subtracts net interest costs. It therefore excludes the interest payments on outstanding public-sector debts (and interest income earned on financial assets). The primary deficit can therefore be written as public-sector borrowing less net interest payments.

As discussed in our blog Fiscal impulses in November 2023, the primary deficit captures whether the public sector is able to afford its present fiscal choices by abstracting from debt-serving costs that reflect past fiscal choices. In this way, the primary deficit is a preferable measure to net borrowing both in assessing the impact on economic activity, i.e. the fiscal stance, and in assessing whether today’s fiscal choices will require government to issue additional debt.

Chart 1 shows public-sector net borrowing and the primary balance as shares of GDP for the UK since financial year 1975/76 (click here for a PowerPoint). The data are from the latest Public Finances Databank published by the Office for Budget Responsibility, published on the day of the Autumn Budget in October (see Data links below).

Over the period 1975/6 to 2023/24, public-sector net borrowing and the primary deficit had averaged 3.8% and 1.3% of GDP respectively. In the financial year 2023/24, they were 4.5% and 1.5% (they had been as high as 15.1% and 14.1% in 2020/21 as a result of COVID support measures). In 2024/25 net borrowing and the primary deficit are forecast to be 4.5% and 1.6% respectively. By 2027/28, while net borrowing is forecast to be 2.3% of GDP, there is forecast to be a primary surplus of 0.7% of GDP.

The Autumn Budget lays out plans for higher tax revenues to contribute two-thirds of the overall reduction in the primary deficit over the forecast period (up to 2029/30), while spending decisions contribute the remaining third.

The largest tax-raising measure is an increase in the employer rate of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) by 1.2 percentage points to 15% from April 2025. This will be levied on employee wages above a Secondary Threshold of £5000, reduced from £9100, which will increase in line with CPI inflation each year from April 2028. (See John’s blog, Raising the minimum wage: its effects on poverty and employment, for an analysis on the effects of this change.) This measure, allowing for other changes to the operation of employer NICs, is expected to raise £122 billion over the forecast period. This amounts to over two-thirds of the additional tax take from the taxation measures taken in the Budget.

Chart 2 shows both net borrowing and the primary deficit after being cyclically-adjusted (click here for a PowerPoint). This process adjusts these fiscal indicators to account for those parts of spending and taxation that are affected by the position of the economy in the business cycle. These are those parts that act as automatic stabilisers helping, as the name suggests, to stabilise the economy.

The process of cyclical adjustment leads to estimates of receipts and expenditures as if the economy were operating at its potential output level and hence with no output gap. The act of cyclically adjusting the primary deficit, which is our preferred measure of the fiscal stance, allows us to assess better the public sector’s fiscal stance.

Over the period from 1975/6 up to and including 2023/24, the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit (CAPD) averaged 1.1% of potential GDP. In 2024/25 the CAPD is forecast to be 1.5% of potential GDP. It then moves to a surplus of 0.5% by 2027/28. It therefore mirrors the path of the unadjusted primary deficit.

Measuring the fiscal impulse

To assess even more clearly the extent to which the fiscal stance is changing, we can use the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to measure a fiscal impulse. This captures the magnitude of change in discretionary fiscal policy.

The term should not be confused with fiscal multipliers which measure the impact of fiscal changes on outcomes, such as real GDP and employment. Instead, we are interested in the size of the impulse that the economy is being subject to. Specifically, we are measuring discretionary fiscal policy changes that result in structural changes in the government budget and which, therefore, allow an assessment of how much, if at all, a country’s fiscal stance has tightened or loosened.

The size of the fiscal impulse is measured by the year-on-year percentage point change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit (CAPD) as a percentage of potential GDP. A larger deficit or a smaller surplus indicates a fiscal loosening. This is consistent with a positive fiscal impulse. On the other hand, a smaller deficit or a larger surplus indicates a fiscal tightening. This is consistent with a negative fiscal impulse.

Chart 3 shows the magnitude of UK fiscal impulses since the mid-1970s (Click here for a PowerPoint file). The scale of the fiscal interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included the COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) and Job Retention Scheme (‘furlough’), stand out sharply. In 2020 the CAPD to potential output ratio rose from 1.7 to 14.4%. This represents a positive fiscal impulse of 12.4% of GDP.

This was followed in 2021 by a tightening of the fiscal stance, with a negative fiscal impulse of 10.1% of GDP as the CAPD to potential output fell back to 4.0%. Subsequent tightening was tempered by policy measures to limit the impact on the private sector of the cost-of-living crisis, including the Energy Price Guarantee and Energy Bills Support Scheme.

For comparison, the fiscal response to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 saw a cumulative positive fiscal impulse of 5.6% of GDP. While smaller in comparison to the discretionary fiscal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it nonetheless represented a sizeable loosening of the fiscal stance.

Chart 4 focuses on the implied fiscal impulse for the forecast period up to 2029/30 (click here for a PowerPoint). The period is notable for a negative fiscal impulse each year. Across the period as a whole, this there is a cumulative negative fiscal impulse of 2.6% of GDP. Most of the ‘heavy-lifting’ of the fiscal consolidation occurs in the three financial years from 2025/26 during which there is a cumulative negative impulse of 2.0% of GDP.

Looking forward

To conclude, we consider the implications for the projected profiles of public-sector spending, receipts and liabilities over the forecast period up to 2029/30.

Chart 5 plots data since the mid-1950s (click here for a PowerPoint). It shows the size of total public-sector spending (also known as ‘total managed expenditures’), taxation receipts (sometimes referred as the ‘tax burden’) and total public-sector receipts as shares of GDP. This last one includes additional receipts, such as interest payments on financial assets and income generated by public corporations, as well as taxation receipts.

The OBR forecasts that in real terms (i.e. after adjustment for inflation), public-sector spending will increase on average over the period from 2025/26 to 2029/30 by 1.4% per year, but with total receipts due to rise more quickly at 2.5% per year and taxation receipts by 2.8% per year. The implications of this, as discussed in the OBR’s October 1014 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (see link below), are that:

the size of the state is forecast to settle at 44% of GDP by the end of the decade, almost 5 percentage points higher than before the pandemic” while additional tax revenues will “push the tax take to a historic high of 38% of GDP by 2029-30

Finally, the government has committed to two key rules: a stability rule and an investment rule.

The stability rule. This states that the current budget must be in surplus by 2029/30 or, once 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period, it will be in balance or surplus every third year of the rolling forecast period thereafter. The current budget refers to the difference between receipts and expenditures other than capital expenditures. In effect, it captures the ability of government to meet day-to-day spending and is intended to ensure that over the medium term any borrowing is solely for investment. It is important to note that ‘balance’ is defined in a range of between a deficit and surplus of no more than 0.5% of GDP.

The stability rule replaces the borrowing rule of the previous government that public net borrowing, therefore inclusive of investment expenditures, was not to exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.

The investment rule. The government is planning to increase investment. In order to do this in a financially sustainable way, the investment rule states that public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) or net financial debt for short, is falling as a share GDP by 2029/30, until 2029/30 becomes the third year of the forecast period. PSNFL should then fall by the third year of the rolling forecast period. PSNFL is a broader measure of the sector’s balance sheet than public-sector net debt (PSND), which was targeted under the previous government and which was required to fall by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period.

The new target, as well as now extending to the Bank of England, ‘nets off’ not just liquid liabilities (i.e. cash in the bank and foreign exchange reserves) but also financial assets such as shares and money owed to it, including expected student loan repayments. While liabilities are broader too, including for example, the local government pension scheme, the impact is expected to reduce the new liabilities target by £236 billion or 8.2 percentage points of GDP in 2024/25. The hope is that both rules can support what the Budget Report labels a ‘step change in investment’.

As Chart 6 shows, public investment as a share of GDP has not exceeded 6% this century and during the 2010s averaged only 4.4% (click here for a PowerPoint). The forecast has it rising above 5% for a time, but easing to 4.8% by end of the period.

This suggests more progress will be needed if the UK is to experience a significant and enduring increase in public investment. Of course, this needs to be set in the context of the wider public finances and is illustrative of the choices facing fiscal policymakers across the globe after the often violent shocks that have rocked economies and impacted on the state of the public finances in recent years.

Articles

Official documents

Data

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by the following fiscal terms:
    (a) Structural deficit,
    (b) Automatic stabilisers,
    (c) Discretionary fiscal policy,
    (d) Public-sector net borrowing,
    (e) Primary deficit,
    (f) Current budget balance,
    (g) Public-sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL).
  2. Explain the difference between a fiscal impulse and a fiscal multiplier.
  3. In designing fiscal rules what issues might policymakers need to consider?
  4. What are key differences between the fiscal rules of the previous Conservative government and the new Labour government in the UK? What economic arguments would you make for and against the ‘old’ and ‘new’ fiscal rules?
  5. What is meant by the ‘sustainability’ of the public finances? What factors might impact on their sustainability?
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A Spring dose of fiscal policy

On March 23, Rishi Sunak, the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, delivered his Spring Statement, in which he announced changes to various taxes and grants. These measures were made against the background of rising inflation and falling living standards.

CPI inflation, currently at 6.2%, is still rising and the Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that inflation will average 7.4% this year. The poor spend a larger proportion of their income on energy and food than the rich. With inflation rates especially high for gas, electricity and basic foodstuffs, the poor have been seen their cost of living rise by considerably more than the overall inflation rate.

According to the OBR, the higher inflation, by reducing real income and consumption, is expected to reduce the growth in real GDP this year from the previously forecast 6% to 3.8% – a much smaller bounce back from the fall in output during the early stages of the pandemic. Despite this growth in GDP, real disposable incomes will fall by an average of £488 per person this year. As the OBR states:

With inflation outpacing growth in nominal earnings and net taxes due to rise in April, real living standards are set to fall by 2.2 per cent in 2022/23 – their largest financial year fall on record – and not recover their pre-pandemic level until 2024/25.

Fiscal measures

The Chancellor announced a number of measures, which, he argued, would provide relief from rises in the cost of living.

  • Previously, the Chancellor had announced that national insurance (NI) would rise by 1.25 percentage points this April. In the Statement he announced that the starting point for paying NI would rise from a previously planned £9880 to £12 570 (the same as the starting point for income tax). This will more than offset the rise in the NI rate for those earning below £32 000. This makes the NI system slightly more progressive than before. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
  • A cut in fuel duty of 5p per litre. The main beneficiaries will be those who drive more and those with bigger cars – generally the better off. Those who cannot afford a car will not benefit at all, other than from lower transport costs being passed on in lower prices.
  • The 5% VAT on energy-saving household measures such as solar panels, insulation and heat pumps will be reduced to zero.
  • The government’s Household Support Fund will be doubled to £1bn. This provides money to local authorities to help vulnerable households with rising living costs.
  • Research and development tax credits for businesses will increase and small businesses will each get another £1000 per year in the form of employment allowances, which reduce their NI payments. He announced that taxes on business investment will be further cut in the Autumn Budget.
  • The main rate of income tax will be cut from 20% to 19% in two years’ time. Unlike the rise in NI, which only affects employment and self-employment income, the cut in income tax will apply to all incomes, including rental and savings income.

Fiscal drag

The Chancellor announced that public finances are stronger than previously forecast. The rapid growth in tax receipts has reduced public-sector borrowing from £322 billion (15.0 per cent of GDP) in 2020/21 to an expected £128 billion (5.4 per cent of GDP) in 2021/22, £55 billion less than the OBR forecast in October 2021. This reflects not only the growth in the economy, but also inflation, which results in fiscal drag.

Fiscal drag is where rises in nominal incomes mean that the average rate of income tax rises. As tax thresholds for 2022/23 are frozen at 2021/22 levels, a greater proportion of incomes will be taxed at higher rates and tax-free allowances will account for a smaller proportion of incomes. The higher the rate of increase in nominal incomes, the greater fiscal drag becomes. The higher average rate of tax drags on real incomes and spending. On the other hand, the extra tax revenue reduces government borrowing and gives the government more room for extra spending or tax cuts.

The growth in poverty

With incomes of the poor not keeping pace with inflation, many people are facing real hardship. While the Spring Statement will provide a small degree of support to the poor through cuts in fuel duty and the rise in the NI threshold, the measures are poorly targeted. Rather than cutting fuel duty by 5p, a move that is regressive, removing or reducing the 5% VAT on gas and electricity would have been a progressive move.

Benefits, such as Universal Credit and the State Pension, are uprated each April in line with inflation the previous September. When inflation is rising, this means that benefits will go up by less than the current rate of inflation. This April, benefits will rise by last September’s annual inflation rate of 3.1% – considerably below the current inflation rate of 6.2% and the forecast rate for this year of 7.4%. This will push many benefit recipients deeper into poverty.

One measure rejected by Rishi Sunak is to impose a temporary windfall tax on oil companies, which have profited from the higher global oil prices. Such taxes are used in Norway and are currently being considered by the EU. Tax revenues from such a windfall tax could be used to fund benefit increases or tax reductions elsewhere and these measures could be targeted on the poor.

Articles

OBR data and analysis

Questions

  1. Are the changes made to national insurance by the Chancellor progressive or regressive? Could they have been made more progressive and, if so, how?
  2. What are the arguments for and against cutting income tax from 20% to 19% in two years’ time rather than reversing the current increases in national insurance at that point?
  3. What will determine how rapidly (if at all) public-sector borrowing decreases over the next few years?
  4. What are automatic fiscal stabilisers? How does their effect vary with the rate of inflation?
  5. Examine the public finances of another country. Are the issues similar to those in the UK? Recommend fiscal policy measures for your chosen country and provide a justification.
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A Keynesian Budget?

The UK government has made much of its spending commitments in the UK Budget and Spending Review delivered on 27 October 2021. Spending on transport infrastructure, green energy and health care figured prominently. The government claimed that these were to help achieve its objectives of economic growth, carbon reduction and ‘levelling up’. This means that government expenditure will be around 42% of GDP for the five years from 2022 (from 1988 to 2000 it averaged 36%). Although it temporarily rose to 52% in 2020/21, this was the result of supporting the economy through the pandemic. But does this mean that the government is now a ‘Keynesian’ one?

When the economy is in recession, as was the case in 2020 with the effects of the pandemic, increased government expenditure financed by borrowing rather than taxation is the classic Keynesian remedy to boost aggregate demand and close the output gap. The increased injection of spending works through the multiplier process to raise equilibrium national income and reduce unemployment.

But is this the objective of the extra spending announced in October 2021? To answer this, it is important to look at forecasts for the state of the economy with no change in government policy and at the balance of government expenditure and taxation resulting from the Budget. The first chart shows public sector net borrowing from 2006/7 and forecast to 2026/7. The green and red lines from 2021/22 onwards give the PSNB forecasts with and without the October 2021 measures.

As you can see, there was a large increase in the PSNB in 2020/21, reflecting the government’s measures to support firms and workers during the pandemic. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) This was very much a Keynesian response, where a large budget deficit was necessary to support aggregate demand. It was also to protect the supply side of the economy by enabling firms to survive.

But could the October 2021 announcements also be seen as a Keynesian response to the macroeconomic situation? If we redraw Chart 1, focusing just on the forecast period and adjust the vertical scale, we can see that the measures have a net effect of increasing the PSNB and thus acting as a stimulus to aggregate demand. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) The figures are shown in the following table, which shows the totals from Table 5.1 in the Autumn Budget and Spending Review 2021 document:

Effects of Spending Review and Budget 2021 on PSNB (+ = increase in PSNB)

At first sight, it would seem that the Budget was mildly expansionary. To see how much so, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) measures the ‘fiscal stance’ using the ‘cyclically adjusted primary deficit (CAPD)’. This is PSNB minus interest payments and minus expenditures and tax revenues that fluctuate with the cycle and which therefore act as automatic stabilisers. The OBR’s forecast of the CAPD shows it to be expansionary, but decreasing over time. In 2021/22, there is forecast to be a net injection of around 3.2% (excluding ‘virus-related’ support), falling to 2.7% in 2022/23 and then gradually to around 0.6% by 2026/27. So it does seem that fiscal policy remains expansionary throughout the period, but less and less so.

But this alone does not make it ‘Keynesian’. A Keynesian Budget would be one that uses fiscal policy to adjust aggregate demand (AD) according to whether AD is forecast to be deficient or excessive without the Budget measures. To operate a Keynesian Budget, it would be necessary to forecast the output gap without any policy measures. If was forecast to be negative (a deficiency of demand, with equilibrium output below the potential level), then an expansionary policy should be pursued by raising government expenditure, cutting taxes or some combination of the two. If it was forecast to be positive (an excess demand, with equilibrium output above the potential level), then a contractionary/deflationary policy should be pursued by cutting government expenditure, raising taxes or some combination of the two.

So what is the forecast for the output gap? The OBR states that, after being negative in 2020
(–0.4% of potential GDP), it has risen substantially to 0.9% in 2021 with the rapid bounce back from the pandemic. But it is forecast to remain positive, albeit declining, until reaching zero in 2025. This is illustrated in Chart 3. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) So fiscal policy remains mildly expansionary until 2025, after having provided a considerable stimulus in 2021.

This is not normally what a Keynesian economist would recommend. Fiscal policy should be designed to achieve a zero output gap. With the output gap being substantially positive in 2021, there is a problem of excess demand. This can be seen in supply-chain difficulties and labour shortages in certain areas and higher inflation, with CPI inflation predicted by the OBR to rise to 4.4 per cent in 2022. The combination of higher prices, the rise in national insurance from April 2022 by 1.25 percentage points and the freezing of income tax personal allowances will squeeze living standards. And the cancelling of the £20 per week uplift to Universal Credit and no increase in its rate for the unemployed will put particular pressure on some of the poorest people.

The government is hoping that the rise in government expenditure will have beneficial supply-side effects and increase potential national income. The aim is to create a high-wage, high-skilled, high-productivity economy though investment in innovation, infrastructure and skills. As the OBR states, ‘The rebounding economy has provided the Chancellor with a Budget windfall that he has added to with tax rises that lift the tax burden to its highest since the early 1950s’.

It remains to be seen whether the extra spending on education, training, infrastructure and R&D will be sufficient to achieve the long-term growth the Chancellor is seeking. The OBR is forecasting very modest growth into the longer term when the bounce back has worked through. Real GDP is forecast to grow on average by just 1.5% per year from 2024 to 2026. What is more, the OBR sees permanent scarring effects of around 2% of GDP from the pandemic and around 4% of GDP from Brexit.

Articles

Analysis

Documents

Data

Questions

  1. What do you understand by ‘fiscal stance’?
  2. What are ‘automatic fiscal stabilisers? How might they affect GDP over the next few years?
  3. If the government had chosen to pursue a zero output gap from 2022/23 onwards, how would this have affected the balance between total government expenditure and taxation in the 2021 Budget and Spending Review?
  4. Provide a critique of the Budget from the left.
  5. Provide a critique of the budget from the right.
  6. Was this a ‘Green Budget’?
  7. Is the Budget following the ‘golden rule’ of fiscal policy?
  8. Look through Table 5.1 in the Budget and Spending Review document (linked below). Which of the measures will have the most substantial effect on aggregate demand?
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A more active fiscal policy? Changing the rule book

In his 2016 Autumn Statement, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, announced that he was abandoning his predecessor’s target of achieving a budget surplus in 2019/20 and beyond. This was partly in recognition that tax revenues were likely to be down as economic growth forecasts were downgraded by the Office for Budget Responsibility. But it was partly to give himself more room to boost the economy in response to lower economic growth. In other words, he was moving from a strictly rules-based fiscal policy to one that is more interventionist.

Although he still has the broad target of reducing government borrowing over the longer term, this new flexibility allowed him to announce increased government spending on infrastructure.

The new approach is outlined in the updated version of the Charter for Budget
Responsibility, published alongside the Autumn Statement. The government’s fiscal mandate would now include the following:

 •  a target to reduce cyclically-adjusted public-sector net borrowing to below 2% of GDP by 2020/21;
 •  a target for public-sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be falling in 2020/21.

It also states that:

In the event of a significant negative shock to the UK economy, the Treasury will review the appropriateness of the fiscal mandate and supplementary targets as a means of returning the public finances to balance as early as possible in the next Parliament.

In the Autumn Statement, the new approach to fiscal policy is summarised as follows:

This new fiscal framework ensures the public finances continue on the path to sustainability, while providing the flexibility needed to support the economy in the near term.

With his new found freedom, the Chancellor was able to announce spending increases, despite deteriorating public finances, of £36bn by 2021/22 (see Table 1 in the Autumn Statement).

Most of the additional expenditure will be on infrastructure. To facilitate this, the government will set up a new National Productivity Investment Fund (NPIF) to channel government spending to various infrastructure projects in the fields of housing, transport, telecoms and research and development. The NPIF will provide £23bn to such projects between 2017/18 and 2021/22.

But much of the additional flexibility in the new Fiscal Mandate will be to allow automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate. The OBR forecasts an increase in borrowing of £122bn over the 2017/18 to 2021/22 period compared with its forecasts made in March this year. Apart from the additional £23bn spending on infrastructure, most of the rest will be as a result of lower tax receipts from lower economic growth. This, in turn, is forecast to be the result of lower investment caused by Brexit uncertainties and lower real consumer spending because of the fall in the pound and the consequent rise in prices.

But rather than having to tighten fiscal policy to meet the previous borrowing target, the new Fiscal Mandate will permit this rise in borrowing. The lower tax payments will help to reduce the dampening effect on the economy.

So are we entering a new era of fiscal policy? Is the government now using discretionary fiscal policy to boost aggregate demand, while also attempting to increase productivity? Or is the relaxation of the Fiscal Mandate just a redrawing of the rules to give a bit more flexibility over the level of stimulus the government can give the economy?

Videos

Autumn Statement 2016: Philip Hammond’s speech (in full) GOV.UK (23/11/16)
Philip Hammond’s autumn statement – video highlights The Guardian (23/11/16)
Key points from the chancellor’s first Autumn Statement BBC News, Andrew Neil (23/11/16)
Autumn Statement: higher borrowing, lower growth Channel 4 News, Helia Ebrahimi (23/11/16)
Autumn Statement: Chancellor’s growth and borrowing figures BBC News (23/11/16)
Markets react to Autumn Statement Financial Times on YouTube, Roger Blitz (23/11/16)
Hammond’s Autumn Statement unpicked Financial Times on YouTube, Gemma Tetlow (23/11/16)
Autumn Statement 2016: The charts that show the cost of Brexit Sjy News, Ed Conway (24/11/16)
BBC economics editor Kamal Ahmed on the Autumn Statement. BBC News (23/11/16)
Autumn statement: debate Channel 4 News, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Jane Ellison, and Labour’s Shadow Business Secretary, Clive Lewis (23/11/16)
Autumn Statement: Workers’ pay growth prospects dreadful, says IFS BBC News, Kevin Peachey and Paul Johnson (24/11/16)

Articles

Autumn Statement 2016: Expert comment on fiscal policy Grant Thornton, Adam Jackson (23/11/16)
Philip Hammond loosens George Osborne’s fiscal rules to give himself more elbow room as Brexit unfolds CityA.M., Jasper Jolly (23/11/16)
Britain’s New Fiscal Mandate Opens Way To Invest For Economic Growth Forbes, Linda Yueh (23/11/16)
Autumn Statement 2016: experts respond The Conversation (23/11/16)
Chancellor’s ‘Reset’ Leaves UK Economy Exposed And Vulnerable Huffington Post, Alfie Stirling (23/11/16)
Britain’s Autumn Statement hints at how painful Brexit is going to be The Economist (26/11/16)
Chancellor’s looser finance targets highlight weaker UK economy The Guardian, Phillip Inman (24/11/16)
Hammond’s less-than-meets-the-eye plan that hints at the future Financial Times, Martin Sandbu (23/11/16)
Economists’ views on Philip Hammond’s debut Financial Times, Paul Johnson, Bronwyn Curtis and Gerard Lyons (24/11/16)

Government Publications
Autumn Statement 2016 HM Treasury (23/11/16)
Charter for Budget Responsibility: autumn 2016 update HM Treasury

Reports, forecasts and analysis
Economic and fiscal outlook – November 2016 Office for Budget Responsibility (23/11/16)
Autumn Statement 2016 analysis Institute for Fiscal Studies (November 2016)

Questions

  1. Distinguish between discretionary fiscal policy and rules-based fiscal policy.
  2. Why have forecasts of the public finances worsened since last March?
  3. What is meant by automatic fiscal stabilisers? How do they work when the economic growth slows?
  4. What determines the size of the multiplier from public-sector infrastructure projects?
  5. What dangers are there in relaxing the borrowing rules in the Fiscal Mandate?
  6. Examine the arguments for relaxing the borrowing rules more than they have been?
  7. If the economy slows more than has been forecast and public-sector borrowing rises faster, does the Chancellor have any more discretion in giving a further fiscal boost to the economy?
  8. Does the adjustment of borrowing targets as the economic situation changes make such a policy a discretionary one rather than a rules-based one?
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Deficit plans: clear or vague?

In their manifestos, the parties standing for the UK general election on May 7th state their plans for fiscal policy and, more specifically, for reducing public-sector net borrowing and public-sector net debt. The degree of detail in the plans varies, especially with regards to where cuts will be made, but there are nevertheless some very clear differences between the parties.

The Institute for Fiscal Studies has examined the public finance plans of the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and SNP and has published a briefing note (see link below) and an accompanying press release. It accuses all four parties’ plans of being short on detail over specific cuts (especially the Conservatives), and over borrowing requirements (especially Labour):

None of these parties has provided anything like full details of their fiscal plans for each year of the coming parliament, leaving the electorate somewhat in the dark as to both the scale and composition of likely spending cuts and tax increases. In our analysis we have used the information provided in each manifesto, plus in some cases some necessary assumptions, to shed light on the four parties’ plans.

But despite the lack of detail, the IFS claims that there are big differences in the parties’ plans. These are illustrated in the following three charts from the IFS Briefing Note.



According to Carl Emmerson, IFS deputy director:

“There are genuinely big differences between the main parties’ fiscal plans. The electorate has a real choice, although it can at best see only the broad outlines of that choice. Conservative plans involve a significantly larger reduction in borrowing and debt than Labour plans. But they are predicated on substantial and almost entirely unspecified spending cuts and tax increases. While Labour has been considerably less clear about its overall fiscal ambitions its stated position appears to be consistent with little in the way of further spending cuts after this year”.

So what would be the implications of the plans of the various parties for fiscal policy and what, in turn, would be the implications for economic growth and investment? The various videos and articles look at the briefing note and at what is missing from the parties’ plans.

Videos

Voters ‘in the dark’ over budgets BBC News, Robert Peston (23/4/15)
Election 2015: Main parties respond to IFS deficit claims BBC News, James Landale (23/4/15)
Election 2015: ‘Not enough detail’ on deficit cut plans, says IFS BBC News, Paul Johnson (23/4/15)
IFS: Electorate ‘left in the dark’ by political parties ITV News, Chris Ship (23/4/15)
Voters Left In Dark Over Spending Cuts, Says IFS Sky News (23/4/15)
Post-election austerity: parties’ plans compared Institute for Fiscal Studies, Press Briefing (23/5/15)

Articles

IFS: election choice is stark Economia, Oliver Griffin (23/4/15)
Election 2015: Voters ‘left in the dark’, says IFS BBC News (23/4/15)
The huge choice for voters BBC News, Robert Peston (23/4/15)
IFS manifesto analysis: fantasy island of Tory deficit reduction plan The Guardian, Larry Elliott (23/4/15)
Tories have £30bn black hole in spending plans, says IFS The Guardian, Heather Stewart (23/4/15)
Ed Miliband will leave Britain an extra £90bn in debt, IFS finds The Telegraph, Steven Swinford (23/4/15)
IFS despairs as it finds no party’s imaginary numbers add up The Guardian, John Crace (23/4/15)
Reality Check: Why should we trust the IFS? BBC News, Sebastian Chrispin (23/4/15)
IFS: Households can expect lower incomes, whoever wins the election BBC News, Brian Milligan (28/4/15)

Briefing Notes
Post-election Austerity: Parties’ Plans Compared Institute for Fiscal Studies, Briefing Note BN170, Rowena Crawford, Carl Emmerson, Soumaya Keynes and Gemma Tetlow (April 15)
Taxes and Benefits: The Parties’ Plans Institute for Fiscal Studies, Briefing Notw BN 172, Stuart Adam, James Browne, Carl Emmerson, Andrew Hood, Paul Johnson, Robert Joyce, Helen Miller, David Phillips, Thomas Pope and Barra Roantree (April 2015)

Questions

  1. What detail is missing about cuts in the Conservative plans?
  2. What detail is missing in the Labour plans on borrowing requirements?
  3. How do (a) the Liberal Democrat plans and (b) the SNP plans differ from Conservative and Labour plans?
  4. Find out the public finances plans of (a) the Green Party; (b) UKIP; and (c) Plaid Cymru. How different are these plans from those of other parties?
  5. Define ‘austerity’.
  6. How would a tightening of fiscal policy affect economic growth (a) in the short term; (b) in the long term?
  7. How would an expansion of the economy affect the budget balance through automatic fiscal stabilisers?
  8. What is meant by the structural deficit? How could this be reduced?
  9. Would the structural deficit be affected by austerity policies and the resulting size of the output gap, or is it independent of such policies? Explain.