Following the controversary over the sale of tickets for popular live events such as Taylor Swift’s Eras tour and the Oasis Live ’25 Tour, the government launched a consultation exercise in January 2025 on the resale of tickets. Titled, ‘putting fans first’, the exercise sought the views of individuals and organisations on a range of policy proposals. One of these was the implementation of a cap on the resale price of tickets.
The government is not only considering whether to implement a cap but also the level at which it might be set. The following question was included in the consultation exercise.
What is the maximum uplift that you think should be applied if ticket resales were to be subject to a price cap? Please state the reason for your selection.
• no uplift at all
• 10% or less
• between 10 and 20%
• between 20 and 30%
• other – please state
Some platforms such as Twickets and Ticketswap already cap resale prices on their platforms at between 5 and 10 per cent above the face value of the ticket. They are, therefore, less likely to be affected by any new price regulation unless the ‘no uplift at all’ option is chosen. On other platforms, such as Viagogo and Stubhub, resellers are free to list tickets at whatever price they choose. This is often referred to as the uncapped market, and tickets for the Oasis tour with a face value of £150 were listed on these websites for £14 000. The implementation of a price cap is likely to have a big impact on this part of the resale market. The chief executive of StubHub stated in June 2025 that the business would probably have to exit the UK if a cap was introduced.
Although many fans dislike the uncapped secondary ticketing market, most economists take a more positive view. They see them as a way of facilitating mutually beneficial trade and helping to reallocate tickets to those with the highest willingness to pay. This reduces levels of allocative inefficiency/deadweight welfare loss in the market.
Economists also tend to argue against the use of price controls in competitive markets because of their negative impact on supply. If price controls reduce the available returns to sellers, they have an incentive to do something else with their time/resources i.e. switch to supplying other goods and services in markets not subject to price controls. This reduces supply in the regulated market and so could have a negative impact on consumer surplus.
What are the issues with the secondary market?
Given the benefits outlined by economists of having an uncapped secondary ticketing, why is the government considering the implementation of a price cap? One potential issue of having an uncapped secondary ticketing market is that developments in technology make it easier for professional resellers to buy very large quantities of tickets. This makes it increasingly difficult for fans who want to attend the event from being able to purchase a ticket.
Reports also suggest that professional resellers use illegal methods to both mass purchase and resell tickets. For example, to overcome any limits on sales imposed by the sellers in the primary market, some use automated software, fake IDs and multiple credit cards. Two people convicted of fraudulent trading in 2024 were found to have bought 47 000 tickets over a 212-year period, using 127 names and 187 different e-mail addresses.
Some resellers have also acted in ways that do not comply with consumer law when advertising tickets for sale. For example, not providing information such as the ticket number and other details about where the seat is located i.e. the block/area and row.
These rent seeking activities by professional resellers could outweigh the positive impact of uncapped secondary market on allocative efficiency.
Implementing a resale price cap would reduce the incentives for professional resellers to purchase large quantities of tickets and engage in these rent-seeking activities. However, in the consultation document the government recognises that the implementation of a resale price cap would be a ‘significant and complex intervention’.
An important implementation issue
To calculate the resale price cap for any live event, the original price of the ticket in the primary market needs to be known. This raises an interesting question – should the cap apply to the initial face value of the ticket or the total price the customer pays?
The face value of the ticket may only represent a proportion of the actual cost of buying a ticket because of the widespread use of drip pricing. This is the practice of applying additional fees as the consumer proceeds through the online purchasing process. These fees can sometimes add around 25 per cent and more to the price of a ticket. In the consultation document, the government suggested that the cap should apply to the face value of the ticket plus all compulsory fees.
One issue raised in the response to the consultation by the Competition and Markets Authority is that these fees are not always made clear by sellers in the primary market in a clear and transparent way. Therefore, for the policy to be effective, primary market sellers would have to make information on both ticket prices and any fees clearly and easily available. Recent changes to the law that prohibit drip pricing might help to address this issue.
The potential impact of a resale price cap on fraud
To avoid the price cap, there is a danger that increasing numbers of buyers and sellers stop using capped secondary ticket platforms, where activity is easier to observe/regulate, and switch to other non-specialist platforms where detection of illegal behaviour and enforcement of consumer law is more difficult. Examples of non-specialist platforms where sales might increasingly take place include Facebook Marketplace, Instagram Shop, X (formerly Twitter) and internet forums. With lower levels of consumer protection and the greater difficulty of detecting illegal behaviour, sales via these non-specialist platforms are more vulnerable to scams and fraud.
When referring to the impact of a resale price cap, the chief executive of StubHub argued that:
It will have a massive negative impact on consumers. It’s not like the demand is going to go away, it’s just going to move somewhere else, and that somewhere else is going to be the black market [where] consumers aren’t protected.
To test the hypothesis that price controls lead to greater incidences of fraud, one study used polling data to compare ticket fraud rates in the UK with Victoria, Australia and Ireland. In 2009, the state government of Victoria made it illegal for tickets to be resold for more than 10 per cent of their face, while the Irish government introduced the Sale of Ticket Act in 2021 that prohibited the resale of tickets above their original price. The study found that the proportion of respondents who reported being victims of ticket fraud over the previous two years was around four times higher in Victoria and Ireland than the UK. The most common sales channel where consumers experienced ticket fraud in all three countries were social media platforms.
Another example of the potential impact of the price cap in Ireland on fraud relates to the first ever regular-season NFL game that is being played in Dublin on 28 September 2025 between the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Minnesota Vikings. The online bank, Revolut, reported an 80 per cent increase in the number of ticket scams when tickets for this game went on sale.
In response to the consultation exercise, the Competition and Markets Authority backed the implementation of a resale price. It will be interesting to see if the government goes through with the measure in the next few months.
Consultation
Articles
Blogs on this site
Questions
- Why might event organisers set ticket prices below the market clearing rate? Illustrate the impact of setting prices below market clearing rates on consumer, producer and total surplus in the primary market for tickets.
- Using a demand and supply diagram, explain how the uncapped secondary ticket market could reduce deadweight welfare loss. Discuss any assumptions you have made about the allocation of tickets among potential buyers in the primary market (i.e. sorting).
- Is it possible for professional resellers to continue making a profit if tickets are sold at market clearing rates in the primary market? Explain your answer.
- Under what circumstances would a maximum price set below the market clearing rate in a competitive market have a negative impact on consumer surplus? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
- Using examples, explain what is meant by ‘rent seeking’ in economic theory.
Outline some of the recent updates to the law on pricing information that businesses must show customers.
- What policies, other than a resale price cap, could the government introduce to try to address some of the issues with the ticketing market for live events?
Global long-term economic growth has slowed dramatically since the financial crisis of 2007–8. This can be illustrated by comparing the two 20-year periods 1988 to 2007 and 2009 to 2028 (where IMF forecasts are used for 2024 to 2028: see WEO Database under the Data link below). Over the two periods, average annual world growth fell from 3.8% to 3.1%. In advanced countries it fell from 2.9% to 1.6% and in developing countries from 4.8% to 4.3%. In the UK it fell from 2.4% to 1.2%, in the USA from 3.1% to 1.8% and in Japan from 1.9% to 0.5%.
In the UK, labour productivity growth in the production industries was 6.85% per annum from 1998 to 2006. If this growth rate had been maintained, productivity would have been 204% higher by the end of 2023 than it actually was. This is shown in the chart (click here for a PowerPoint).
The key driver of long-term economic growth is labour productivity, which can best be measured by real GDP per hour worked. This depends on three things: the amount of capital per worker, the productivity of this capital and the efficiency of workers themselves – the latter two giving total factor productivity (TFP). Productivity growth has slowed, and with it the long-term rate of economic growth.
If we are measuring growth in output per head of the population, as opposed to simple growth in output, then another important factor is the proportion of the population that works. With ageing populations, many countries are facing an increase in the proportion of people not working. In most countries, these demographic pressures are likely to increase.
A major determinant of long-term economic growth and productivity is investment. Investment has been badly affected by crises, such as the financial crisis and COVID, and by geopolitical tensions, such as the war in Ukraine and tensions between the USA and China and potential trade wars. It has also been adversely affected by government attempts to deal with rising debt caused by interventions following the financial crisis and COVID. The fiscal squeeze and, more recently higher interest rates, have dampened short-term growth and discouraged investment, thereby dampening long-term growth.
Another factor adversely affecting productivity has been a lower growth of allocative efficiency. Competition in many industries has declined as the rate of new firms entering and exiting markets has slowed. The result has been an increase in concentration and a growth in supernormal profits.
In the UK’s case, growth prospects have also been damaged by Brexit. According to Bank of England and OBR estimates, Brexit has reduced productivity by around 4% (see the blog: The costs of Brexit: a clearer picture). For many companies in the UK, Brexit has hugely increased the administrative burdens of trading with the EU. It has also reduced investment and led to a slower growth in the capital stock.
The UK’s poor productivity growth over many yeas is examined in the blog The UK’s poor productivity record.
Boosting productivity
So, how could productivity be increased and what policies could help the process?
Artificial intelligence. One important driver of productivity growth is technological advance. The rapid advance in AI and its adoption across much of industry is likely to have a dramatic effect on working practices and output. Estimates by the IMF suggest that some 40% of jobs globally and 60% in advanced countries could be affected – some replaced and others complemented and enhanced by AI. The opportunities for raising incomes are huge, but so too are the dangers of displacing workers and deepening inequality, as some higher-paid jobs are enhanced by AI, while many lower paid jobs are little affected and other jobs disappear.
AI is also likely to increase returns to capital. This may help to drive investment and further boost economic growth. However, the increased returns to capital are also likely to exacerbate inequality.
To guard against the growth of market power and its abuse, competition policies may need strengthening to ensure that the benefits of AI are widely spread and that new entrants are encouraged. Also training and retraining opportunities to allow workers to embrace AI and increase their mobility will need to be provided.
Training. And it is not just training in the use of AI that is important. Training generally is a key ingredient in encouraging productivity growth. In the UK, there has been a decline in investment in adult education and training, with a 70% reduction since the early 2000s in the number of adults undertaking publicly-funded training, and with average spending on training by employers decreasing by 27% per trainee since 2011. The Institute for Fiscal Studies identifies five main policy levers to address this: “public funding of qualifications and skills programmes, loans to learners, training subsidies, taxation of training and the regulation of training” (see link in articles below).
Competition. Another factor likely to enhance productivity is competition, both internationally and within countries. Removing trade restrictions could boost productivity growth; erecting barriers to protect inefficient domestic industry would reduce it.
Investment. Policies to encourage investment are also key to productivity growth. Private-sector investment can be encouraged by tax incentives. For example, in the UK the Annual Investment Allowance allows businesses to claim 100% of the cost of plant and machinery up to £1m in the year it is incurred. However, for tax relief to produce significant effects on investment, companies need to believe that the policy will stay and not be changed as economic circumstances or governments change.
Public-sector investment is also key. Good road and rail infrastructure and public transport are vital in encouraging private investment and labour mobility. And investment in health, education and training are a key part in encouraging the development of human capital. Many countries, the UK included, cut back on public-sector capital investment after the financial crisis and this has had a dampening effect on economic growth.
Regional policy. External economies of scale could be encouraged by setting up development areas in various regions. Particular industries could be attracted to specific areas, where local skilled workers, managerial expertise and shared infrastructure can benefit all the firms in the industry. These ‘agglomeration economies’ have been very limited in the UK compared with many other countries with much stronger regional economies.
Changing the aims and governance of firms. A change in corporate structure and governance could also help to drive investment and productivity. According to research by the think tank, Demos (see the B Lab UK article and the second report below), if legislation required companies to consider the social, economic and environmental impact of their business alongside profitability, this could have a dramatic effect on productivity. If businesses were required to be ‘purpose-led’, considering the interests of all their stakeholders, this supply-side reform could dramatically increase growth and well-being.
Such stakeholder-governed businesses currently outperform their peers with higher levels of investment, innovation, product development and output. They also have higher levels of staff engagement and satisfaction.
Articles
- World Must Prioritize Productivity Reforms to Revive Medium-Term Growth
IMF Blog, Nan Li and Diaa Noureldin (10/4/24)
- Why has productivity slowed down?
Oxford Martin School News, Ian Goldin, Pantelis Koutroumpis, François Lafond and Julian Winkler (18/3/24)
- How can the UK revive its ailing productivity?
Economics Observatory, Michelle Kilfoyle (14/3/24)
- With the UK creeping out of recession, here’s an economist’s brief guide to improving productivity
The Conversation, Nigel Driffield (13/3/24)
- UK economy nearly a third smaller thanks to ‘catastrophically bad’ productivity slowdown
City A.M., Chris Dorrell (12/3/24)
- Can AI help solve the UK’s public sector productivity puzzle?
City A.M., Chris Dorrell (11/3/24)
- AI Will Transform the Global Economy. Let’s Make Sure it Benefits Humanity
IMF Blog, Kristalina Georgieva (14/1/24)
- Productivity and Investment: Time to Manage the Project of Renewal
NIESR, Paul Fisher (12/3/24)
- Productivity trends using key national accounts indicators
Eurostat (15/3/24)
- New report says change to company law could add £149bn to the UK economy
B Lab UK (28/11/23)
- Investment in training and skills: Green Budget Chapter 9
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Imran Tahir (12/10/23)
Reports
Data
Questions
- Why has global productivity growth been lower since 2008 than before 2008?
- Why has the UK’s productivity growth been lower than many other advanced economies?
- How does the short-run macroeconomic environment affect long-term growth?
- Find out why Japan’s productivity growth has been so poor compared with other countries.
- What are likely to be the most effective means of increasing productivity growth?
- How may demand management policies affect the supply side of the economy?
- How may the adoption of an ESG framework by companies for setting objectives affect productivity growth?
The UK and Australia are set to sign a free-trade deal at the G7 summit in Cornwall on 11–13 June. This will eventually give tariff-free access to each other’s markets, with existing tariffs being phased out over a 15-year period. It is the first trade deal not based on an existing EU template. The government hopes that it will be followed by trade deals with other countries, including New Zealand, Canada and, crucially, the USA.
But what are the benefits and costs of such a deal?
Trade and comparative advantage
The classic economic argument is that free trade allows countries to benefit from the law of comparative advantage. According to the law, provided opportunity costs of various goods differ in two countries, both of them can gain from mutual trade if they specialise in producing (and exporting) those goods that have relatively low opportunity costs compared with the other country. In the case of the UK and Australia, the UK has a comparative advantage in products such as financial services and high-tech and specialist manufactured products. Australia has a comparative advantage in agricultural products, such as lamb, beef and wheat and in various ores and minerals. By increasing trade in these products, there can be a net efficiency gain to both sides and hence a higher GDP than before.
There is clearly a benefit to consumers in both countries from cheaper products, but the gains are likely to be very small. The most optimistic estimate is that the gain in UK GDP will be around 0.01% to 0.02%. Part of the reason is the physical distance between the two countries. For products such as meat, grain and raw materials, shipping costs could be relatively high. This might result in no cost advantage over imports from much nearer countries, such as EU member states.
But modern trade deals are less about tariffs, which, with various WTO trade rounds, are much lower than in the past. Many imports from Australia are already tariff free, with meat currently having a tariff of 12%. Modern trade deals are more about reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers, such as differing standards and regulations. This is the area where there is a high degree of concern in the UK. Import-competing sectors, such as farming, fear that their products will be undercut by Australian imports produced to lower standards.
Costs of a trade deal
In a perfectly competitive world, with no externalities, labour mobile between sectors and no concerns about income distribution, eliminating tariffs would indeed provide an efficiency gain. But these conditions do not hold. Small farmers are often unable to compete with food producers with considerable market power. The danger is that by driving out such small farmers, food production and supply might not result in lower long-run prices. Much would depend on the countervailing power of supermarkets to continue bearing down on food costs.
But the question of price is probably the least worrying issue. Meat and grain is generally produced at lower standards in Australia than in the UK, with various pesticides, fertilisers and antibiotics being used that are not permitted in the UK (and the EU). Unless the trade deal can involve UK standards being enforced on products produced in Australia for export to the UK, UK farmers could be undercut by such imports. The question then would be whether labelling of imported food products could alert consumers to the different standards. And even if they did, would consumers simply prefer to buy the cheaper products? If so, this could be seen as a market failure with consumers not taking into account all the relevant health and welfare costs. Better quality food could be seen as a merit good.
Then there are the broader social issues of the protection of rural industries and societies. Labour is relatively immobile from farming and there could be a rise in rural unemployment, which could have local multiplier effects, leading to the decline of rural economies. Rural ways of life could be seriously affected, which imposes costs on local inhabitants and visitors.
Trade itself imposes environmental costs. Even if it were privately efficient to transport products half way around the world, the costs of carbon emissions and other pollution may outweigh any private gains. At a time when the world is becoming increasingly concerned about climate change, and with the upcoming COP26 conference in Glasgow in November, it is difficult to align such a trade deal with a greater commitment to cutting carbon emissions.
Articles
- UK makes free-trade offer to Australia despite farmers’ fears
BBC News (22/5/21)
- UK-Australia trade deal: What are the arguments for and against?
BBC News, Chris Morris (21/5/21)
- Australia–UK trade deal can help spur post-pandemic recovery
The Conversation, David Collins (20/5/21)
- Australia will set the precedent for UK trade deals
Prospect, David Henig (21/5/21)
- Britain beefs with Australian farmers as Boris Johnson backs trade deal
Sydney Morning Herald, Mike Foley and Bevan Shields (20/5/21)
- Boris Johnson defends Australia trade deal that will allow cheap foreign meat imports …
Mail Online, David Wilcock (19/5/21)
- City executives raise concerns over hidden costs to trade deals
Financial Times, Daniel Thomas (22/5/21)
- Australia trade deal: Ministers discuss British farmers’ concerns
BBC News (21/5/21)
- Boris Johnson Faces His First Real Brexit Trade Test
Bloomberg, Therese Raphael (21/5/21)
- UK-Australia trade deal could mean children and patients eating meat reared in ways illegal in UK, warn experts
Independent, Jane Dalton (11/5/21)
- Australian farmers rush to reassure UK over looming free trade agreement
The Guardian, Amy Remeikis (19/5/21)
- Brexit: Boris Johnson warned trade deal with Australia could ‘decimate’ British farming
Independent, Adam Forrest (20/5/21)
- Truss’s naivety on trade with Australia could leave the UK exposed
The Observer, Phillip Inman (22/5/21)
- ‘Irresponsible’ Australia trade deal will bring ruin for UK farmers, critics warn
The Observer, James Tapper and Toby Helm (23/5/21)
- Brexit: Boris Johnson rejects claim UK-Australia trade deal would see farmers ‘lose their livelihoods’
Sky News, Tom Rayner (19/5/21)
- Small farms have a huge role to play in our sustainable future
The Guardian, Charles, Prince of Wales (23/5/21)
- Farmers’ opposition to UK-Australia trade deal grows
BBC News, Claire Marshall (2/6/21)
- UK livestock farmers fear Australia trade deal will threaten way of life
Financial Times, Judith Evans and Sebastian Payne (8/6/21)
- The UK–Australia trade deal is not really about economic gain – it’s about demonstrating post-Brexit sovereignty
The Conversation, Tony Heron and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (18/6/21)
Questions
- Why might the UK government be very keen to sign a trade deal with Australia?
- Does the law of comparative advantage prove that freer trade is more efficient than less free trade? Explain.
- What externalities are involved in the UK trading with Australia? Are they similar to those from trading with the USA?
- If a trade deal resulted in lower food prices but a decline in rural communities, how would you establish whether this would be a ‘price worth paying’?
- If some people gain from a trade deal and others lose and if it were established that the benefits to the gainers were larger than the costs to the losers, would this prove that the deal should go ahead?
A number of famous Business Schools in the UK and US such as MIT Sloan, NYU Stern and Imperial College have launched new programmes in business analytics. These courses have been nicknamed ‘Big Data finishing school’. Why might qualifications in this area be highly valued by firms?
Employees who have the skills to collect and process Big Data might help firms to successfully implement a pricing strategy that approaches first-degree price discrimination.
First-degree price discrimination is where the seller of a product is able to charge each consumer the maximum price he or she is prepared to pay for each unit of the product. Successfully implementing this type of pricing strategy could enable a firm to make more revenue. It might also lead to an increase in economic efficiency. However, the strategy might be opposed on equity grounds.
In reality, perfect price discrimination is more of a theoretical benchmark than a viable pricing strategy. Discovering the maximum amount each of its customers is willing to pay is an impossible task for a firm.
It may be possible for some sellers to implement a person-specific pricing strategy that approaches first-degree price discrimination. Firms may not be able to charge each customer the maximum amount they are willing to pay but they may be able to charge different prices that reflect customers’ different valuations of the product.
How could a firm go about predicting how much each of its customers is willing to pay? Traditionally smaller sellers might try to ‘size up’ a customer through individual observation and negotiation. The clothes people wear, the cars they drive and their ethnicity/nationality might indicate something about their income. Second-hand car dealers and stall-holders often haggle with customers in an attempt to personalise pricing. The starting point of these negotiations will often be influenced by the visual observations made by the seller.
The problem with this approach is that observation and negotiation is a time-consuming process. The extra costs involved might be greater than the extra revenue generated. This might be especially true for firms that sell a large volume of products. Just imagine how long it would take to shop at a supermarket if each customer had to haggle with a member of staff over each item in their supermarket trolley!! There is also the problem of designing compensation contracts for sales staff that provide appropriate incentives.
However the rise of e-commerce may lead to a very different trading environment. Whenever people use their smart phones, laptops and tablets to purchase goods, they are providing huge amounts of information (perhaps unconsciously) to the seller. This is known as Big Data. If this information can be effectively collected and processed then it could be used by the seller to predict different customers’ willingness to pay.
Some of this Big Data provides information similar to that observed by sellers in traditional off-line transactions. However, instead of visual clues observed by a salesperson, the firm is able to collect and process far greater quantities of information from the devices that people use.
For example, the Internet Protocol (IP) address could be used to identify the geographical location of the customer: i.e. do they live in a relatively affluent or socially deprived area? The operating system and browser might also indicate something about a buyer’s income and willingness to pay. The travel website, Orbitz, found that Apple users were 40 per cent more likely to book four or five star hotel rooms than customers who used Windows.
Perhaps the most controversial element to Big Data is the large amount of individual-level information that exists about the behaviour of customers. In particular, browsing histories can be used to find out (a) what types of goods people have viewed (b) how long they typically spend on-line and (c) their previous purchase history. This behavioural information might accurately predict price sensitivity and was never available in off-line transactions.
Interestingly, there has been very little evidence to date that firms are implementing personalised pricing on the internet. One possible explanation is that effective techniques to process the mass of available information have not been fully developed. This would help to explain the growth in business analytics courses offered by universities. PricewaterhouseCoopers recently announced its aim to recruit one thousand more data scientists over the next two years.
Another possible explanation is that firms fear a backlash from customers who are deeply opposed to this type of pricing. In a widely cited survey of consumers, 91% of the respondents believed that first-degree price discrimination was unfair.
Articles
Big data is coming for your purchase history – to charge you more money The Guardian, Anna Bernasek and DT Mongan (29/5/15)
Big data is an economic justice issue, not just a Privacy Problem The Huffington Post, Nathan Newman (16/5/15)
MIT’s $75,000 Big Data finishing school (and its many rivals) Financial Times, Adam Jones (20/3/16)
The Government’s consumer data watchdog New York Times, Natasha Singer (23/5/2015)
The economics of big data and differential pricing The Whitehouse blog, Jason Furman, Tim Simcoe (6/2/2015)
Questions
- Explain the difference between first- and third-degree price discrimination.
- Using an appropriate diagram, explain why perfect price discrimination might result in an economically more efficient outcome than uniform pricing.
- Draw a diagram to illustrate how a policy of first-degree price discrimination could lead to greater revenue but lower profits for a firm.
- Why would it be so difficult for a firm to discover the maximum amount each of its customers was willing to pay?
- Explain how the large amount of information on the individual behaviour of customers (so-called Big Data) could be used to predict differences in their willingness to pay.
- What factors might prevent a firm from successfully implementing a policy of personalised pricing?
Recent reports in the media have included headlines such as “Sexist surcharge” and “Pink premium?” Various claims have been made that women pay significantly higher prices for similar products than men.
The Times newspaper recently published the results from an investigation it carried out on the prices of hundreds of similar products that were marketed at both men and women. The study found that those products marketed at women cost 37% more on average than similar versions that were marketed at men. Examples included:
- Disposable razors: Tesco priced a packet of five of its own-brand disposable razors for women at £1. The key characteristic that targeted the razors at female customers was the colour – they were pink. For the same price, a packet targeted at male customers (i.e. they were blue) contained 10 disposable razors.
- Ballpoint pens: Staples priced a packet of five pastel-coloured Bic pens marketed ‘for her’ at £2.99. A packet of five Bic pens that were not in the ‘for her’ range (i.e. they had transparent barrels) were priced at £1.98.
- Scooters: Argos increased the price of a child’s scooter by £5 if it was pink instead of blue.
Maria Miller, the chair of the Women and Equalities Select Committee, stated that:
“It is unacceptable that women face higher costs for the same product just because they are targeted at women. Retailers have got to explain why they do this.”
A more detailed study carried out by New York City’s Department of Consumer Affairs was published in December 2015. Average prices were collected for 794 individual items across 5 different industries. The key findings were that products marketed at women were:
- 7 per cent more for toys and accessories
- 4 per cent more for children’s clothing
- 8 per cent more for adult clothing
- 13 per cent more for personal care products
- 8 per cent more for health products
Interestingly whereas the investigation in the UK only found examples of women paying higher prices than men, the New York study found some goods where the price was higher for men.
Reports in the media have claimed that this is clear evidence of price discrimination. Although this is likely to be true, it is impossible to say for certain without more detailed information on costs.
For example, when referring to the higher price for the razors marketed at women in the UK study, Richard Hyman, an analyst at RAH Advisory, stated that:
“the packaging will be different and they will sell fewer so it could be to do with the volume”
If economies of scale and the different costs of packaging can fully account for the difference in prices between the razors then it is not an example of price discrimination.
Articles
Questions
- Define price discrimination.
- Outline and explain the three different categories of price discrimination.
- Could a situation where a firms charges all of its customers the same price for a good or service ever be classed as an example of price discrimination?
- A firm with market power may still not be able to successfully implement a policy of price discrimination. Explain why.
- Under what circumstances could price discrimination improve allocative efficiency?