Under the Basel II arrangements, banks were required to maintain particular capital adequacy ratios (CARs). These were to ensure that banks had sufficient capital to allow them to meet all demands from depositors and to cover losses if a borrower defaulted on payment. Basel II, it was (wrongly) thought would ensure that the banking system could not collapse.
There were three key ratios. The first was an overall minimum CAR of 8%, measured as Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets. As Economics 7th edition page 509 explains:
Tier 1 capital includes bank reserves (from retained profits) and ordinary share capital, where dividends to shareholders vary with the amount of profit the bank makes. Such capital thus places no burden on banks in times of losses as no dividend need be paid. What is more, unlike depositors, shareholders cannot ask for their money back. Tier 2 capital consists largely of preference shares. These pay a fixed rate of interest and thus do continue to place a burden on the bank even when losses are made (unless the bank goes out of business).
Risk-weighted assets are the value of assets, where each type of asset is multiplied by a risk factor. Under the internationally agreed Basel II accord, cash and government bonds have a risk factor of zero and are thus not included. Inter-bank lending between the major banks has a risk factor of 0.2 and is thus included at only 20 per cent of its value; residential mortgages have a risk factor of 0.35; personal loans, credit-card debt and overdrafts have a risk factor of 1; loans to companies carry a risk factor of 0.2, 0.5, 1 or 1.5, depending on the credit rating of the company. Thus the greater the average risk factor of a bank’s assets, the greater will be the value of its risk weighted assets, and the lower will be its CAR.
The second CAR was that Tier 1 capital should be at least 4% of risk weighted assets.
The third CAR was that equity capital (i.e. money raised from the issue of ordinary shares) should be at least 2% of risk weighted assets. This is known as the ‘core capital ratio’.
Before 2008, it was thought by most commentators that these capital adequacy ratios were sufficiently high. But then the banking crisis erupted. Banks were too exposed to sub-prime debt (i.e. debt that was excessively risky, such as mortgages on property at a time when property prices were rapidly declining). Much of this debt was disguised by being bundled up with other securities in what were known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy: the largest bankruptcy in history, with Lehmans owing $613 billion. Although its assets had a book value of $639, these were insufficiently liquid to enable Lehmans to meet the demands of its creditors.
The collapse of Lehmans sent shock waves around the world. Banks across the globe came under tremendous pressure. Many held too much sub-prime debt and had insufficient capital to meet creditors’ demands. As a result, they had to be bailed out by their governments. Clearly the Basel II regulations were too lax.
For several months there have been discussions about new tighter regulations and, on 12 September 2010, central bankers from the major countries met in Basel, Switzerland, and agreed the Basel III regulations. Although the overall CAR (Tier 1 and 2) was kept at 8%, the Tier 1 ratio was raised from 4% to 6% and the core Tier 1 ratio was raised from 2% to 4.5%, to be phased in by 2015. In addition there were two ‘buffers’ introduced.
As well as having to maintain a core Tier 1 ratio of 4.5%, banks would also have to hold a ‘conservation buffer’ of 2.5%. “The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions.” In effect, then, the core Tier 1 ratio will rise from 2% to 7% (i.e. 4.5% minimum plus a buffer of 2.5%).
The other buffer is a ‘countercyclical buffer’. This will be “within a range of 0% – 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital and will be implemented according to national circumstances.” The idea of this buffer is to allow banks to withstand volatility in the global economy. It will be phased in between 2016 and 2019.
The Basel III agreement will still need to be ratified by the G20 countries meeting at Seoul on 10 and 11 November this year. That meeting will also consider other elements of bank regulation.
So will these extra capital requirements be sufficient to allow banks to withstand any future crisis? The following articles discuss this question.
Articles
Global bankers agree new capital reserve rules BBC News (12/9/10)
Q&A: Basel rules on bank capital – who cares? BBC News, Laurence Knight (13/9/10)
Basel III and Sound Banking New American, Charles Scaliger (17/9/10)
Wishy-washy rules might come back to haunt regulators Financial Times, Patrick Jenkins (18/9/10)
Basel III proposal released Newsweek, Joel Schectman (17/9/10)
New Bank Rules May Not Prevent More Meltdowns FXstreet, Henrik Arnt (16/9/10)
Basel III CBS Money Watch, Mark Thoma (14/9/10)
Basel III: To lend or not to lend Investment Week, Martin Morris (16/9/10)
Taming the banks The Economist (16/9/10)
Basel’s buttress The Economist (16/9/10)
Do new bank-capital requirements pose a risk to growth? The Economist, guest contributions
Myners: New rules ‘ignore bank liquidity’ BBC Today Programme, Robert Peston and Lord Myners (18/9/10)
Official press releases and documents
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards Bank for International Settlements Press Release (12/9/10)
The Basel iii Accord Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA)
Details of the new capital requirements Bank for International Settlements
Details of the phase-in arrangements Bank for International Settlements
Questions
- What impact will a higher capital adequacy ratio have on banks’ behaviour?
- For what reasons may the Basel III regulations be considered too lax?
- When there is an increase in deposits into the banking sector, banks can increase loans by a multiple of this. This bank deposits multiplier is the inverse of the liquidity ratio. Is there a similar bank capital multiplier and, if so, what determines its size?
- Why will Basel III be phased in over a number of years? Is this too long?
Economists are famous for disagreeing – as, of course, are politicians. And there is a lot of disagreement around at the moment. George Osborne is determined to cut Britain’s large public-sector deficit, and cut it quickly. This, argues the Coalition government and many economists, is necessary to maintain the UK’s AAA sovereign credit rating. This, in turn, will allow interest rates to be kept down and the international confidence will encourage investment. In short, the cut in aggregate demand by government would be more than compensated by a rise in aggregate demand elsewhere in the economy, and especially from investment and exports. By contrast, not cutting the deficit rapidly would undermine confidence. This would make it more expensive to borrow and would discourage inward investment.
Not so, say the opposition and many other economists. A contractionary fiscal policy will achieve just that – an economic contraction. In other words, there is a real danger of a double-dip recession. Far from encouraging investment, it will do just the opposite. Consumers, fearing falling incomes and rising unemployment, will cut back on spending. Businesses, fearing a fall in sales, will cut back on investment. Economic pessimism, and hence caution, will feed on themselves.
So who are right? The first two blogs by Stephanie Flanders, the BBC’s Economics Editor, look at the arguments on both sides. The third attempts to sum up. The other articles continue the debate. For example, the link to The Economist contains several contributions from commentators on either side of the debate. See also the earlier posting on this site, The ‘paradox of cuts’.
Articles
The case for Mr Osborne’s austerity BBC News Blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (7/9/10)
The case against Mr Osborne’s austerity BBC News Blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (8/9/10)
Austerity plans: Where do you stand? BBC News Blogs, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (10/9/10)
Are current deficit reduction plans likely to boost growth? The Economist debates, various invited guests
Debt and growth revisited Vox, Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (11/8/10)
Leading article: Mr Osborne should prepare a Plan B Independent (13/9/10)
Shock fall in UK retail sales adds to fears of double-dip recession Guardian, Larry Elliott (16/9/10)
Chancellor accused of £100bn economic growth gamble by Compass Guardian, Larry Elliott (18/9/10)
Double-dip recession: bulls and bears diverge over future economic prospects Guardian, Phillip Inman (16/9/10)
Speech by Mervyn King to TUC Congress TUC (15/9/10)
Barber, Blanchflower and the fake debate on double dip The Spectator, Ed Howker (14/9/10)
Confidence data
Consumer confidence Nationwide
ICAEW / Grant Thornton UK Business Confidence Monitor (BCM) ICAEW
Business and Consumer Surveys Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Questions
- Summarise the arguments for the Coalition government’s programme of rapidly reducing the public-sector deficit.
- Summarise the arguments against the Coalition government’s programme of rapidly reducing the public-sector deficit.
- What factors are likely to determine whether there will be a double-dip recession as a result of the austerity programme?
- Why is it very hard to predict the effects of the austerity programme?
- How effective is an expansionary monetary policy likely to be in the context of a tightening fiscal policy?
- How important are other countries’ macroeconomic policies in determining the success of George Osborne’s policies?
- How similar to or different from other recessions has the recent one been? What are the policy implications of these similarities/differences?
For the past three years the Japanese yen has been appreciating against the US dollar and many other currencies. From the end of June 2007 to 14 September 2010, the yen appreciated from ¥100 = $0.81 to ¥100 = $1.20 (a 48% appreciation). Over the same period the yen exchange rate index rose from 113.3 to 172.4 (a 52% appreciation). The rising yen has been impeding Japan’s recovery as it has made its exports more expensive, while, at the same time, making imports cheaper and thus making it harder for domestic firms to compete.
Until 14 September 2010, the yen was freely floating. But on 15 September, the Japanese central bank decided to intervene by selling yen and buying dollars and other currencies.
But why had the yen risen so strongly? There are four main reasons.
The first is the persistent Japanese trade surpluses, partly stimulated by falling costs of production in Japan.
The second is the unwinding of the carry trade. Before the banking crisis of 2007/8, many banks and other financial institutions borrowed yen, given the low interest rates in Japan, and used the yen to purchase dollars and pounds, given the much higher interest rates in the USA and the UK. The effect of this ‘carry trade’, as it was known, was to drive up the exchange rates of the dollar and sterling and drive down the value of the yen. This encouraged further speculation as people sold yen in anticipation of further depreciation and purchased dollars and sterling in anticipation of further appreciation. With the banking crisis, however, short-term financial flows decreased and the current account became more important in determining exchange rates. The carry trade began to unwind and people began selling dollars and sterling and buying yen. What is more, towards the end of 2008, interest rates were reduced substantially in the USA and the UK in order to stimulate aggregate demand. The interest rate differential between Japan and the USA and UK virtually disappeared. This further encouraged the purchase of yen and the sale of dollars and sterling as carry trade investors began paying back their loans to Japan.The third reason for the appreciation of the yen is the actions of the Chinese who have used their surpluses to buy other currencies: originally mainly dollars, but increasingly yen.
The fourth reason is speculation. As the yen has risen, so increasingly people have bought yen in anticipation of further appreciation. But, of course, this speculation has brought about the very effect the speculators anticipated. Such speculation can be very powerful, given that some $4 trillion goes across the foreign exchange markets every day (see The inexorable growth of FOREX).
So will the intervention by the Bank of Japan be successful in causing the yen to depreciate? Or will the forces that drove up the yen prove impossible to resist? The following articles consider this question and also look at the factors that caused the yen to appreciate and its effects on the Japanese economy.
Articles
Japan’s $21b move to weaken yen may be futile Sydney Morning Herald (16/9/10)
Japan acts to weaken surging yen Guardian, Larry Elliott and Graeme Wearden (15/9/10)
Q+A: How is Japan judging success in yen intervention? Reuters, Hideyuki Sano and Charlotte Cooper (17/9/10)
Tokyo action puts brake on yen Financial Times, Peter Garnham (17/9/10)
It’s hard to keep a strong yen down CTV, Canada, Brian Milner (16/9/10)
Firm stance on yen stressed / Govt, BOJ strike decisive pose, but drastic action still required Daily Yomiuri, Japan, Tadashi Isozumi and Yomiuri Shimbun (16/9/10)
Bernanke Shadow of Easing Limits BOJ Success With Yen Weakness Bloomberg, Ron Harui and Joshua Zumbrun (17/9/10)
The Bank Of Japan Is Spitting In The Wind Wall Street Journal blogs: The Source, Nicholas Hastings (16/9/10)
Japan intervenes in markets to combat rising yen BBC News, Mariko Oi (15/9/10)
Q&A: What’s moving the Japanese yen? BBC News (15/9/10)
Currency intervention’s mixed record of success BBC News, Russell Hotten (16/9/10)
Yen intervention: Because I Kan The Economist (16/9/10)
Beggar, then sneakily enrich, thy neighbour The Economist (15/9/10)
The yen and gold The Economist, Buttonwood (15/9/10)
Data
Dollar/yen exchange rate X-rates.com
Statistical Interactive Database – interest and exchange rates data Bank of England
Currencies BBC News
Currency converter Yahoo Finance
Questions
- Why has the Japanese yen appreciated so much over the past three years?
- What will be the effect of the Bank of Japan’s exchange market intervention on Japanese money supply? What will determine the size of this effect?
- Why might the Bank of Japan’s actions have been influenced by the anticipation of further quantitative easing by the US Federal Reserve Bank?
- What factors determine the likely success of foreign exchange market intervention by central banks?
- What will determine how speculators will react to the Bank of Japan’s actions?
- Discuss the following quote from the second The Economist article above: “A bit of inflation in Japan wouldn’t just be a good thing. It would be a really, really great thing. And if other countries react to Japan’s intervention by attempting to print and sell their own currencies in order to toss the deflationary potato to someone else, well then so much the better.”
- If all countries seek to achieve export-led growth, is this a zero-sum game?
- Why has the price of gold been rising?
Ginsters is a large producer of pasties in Cornwall. Most of its ingredients come from Cornwall, but the pasties are sold throughout Britain. But, not surprisingly, they are also sold in Cornwall. In fact, there is a large Tesco virtually next door to the Ginsters’ pasty plant and, as you can imagine, it does a good trade in Ginsters’ pasties, pies and sandwiches. After all, they are a local product.
But are they delivered directly from the Ginsters’ factory? No they are not. In fact, they are sent by lorry to the Avonmouth distribution depot, some 125 miles away, only to be sent back again to the Tesco supermarket next door! So does it make economic sense to incur all the costs of transporting the pasties 250 miles only to end up virtually where they started?
It is a similar story with Rodda’s Cornish clotted cream. It is made with Cornish milk but is also sold nationwide. In this case it is transported some 340 miles to get to another Tesco supermarket virtually next door to the Rodda plant.
The following articles and podcast consider the logistics of manufactured food distribution, and ask whether private costs are the only thing that should be taken into account when judging the sense of the system.
Articles
From here to eternity: 340-mile journey for clotted cream made two miles away Guardian, Steven Morris (3/9/10)
Food miles row as pasties travel 250 miles to the supermarket next door This is Cornwall (30/8/10)
Supermarket food mileage ‘completely bonkers’ BBC Today Programme, Tim Lang (30/8/10)
Questions
- Why does Tesco’s distribution system for pasties, clotted cream and other products made in parts of the country away from large centres of population make sense in ‘conventional economic terms’?
- What economies of scale are there in pasty production and distribution?
- What externalities are involved in the distribution of Ginsters’ pasties?
- Consider the arguments for and against locating mass producers of food products nearer to the ‘centre of gravity’ of markets.
The prices of grains and other foodstuffs are rising rapidly. Wheat prices rose some 40 per cent in July and have continued to rise rapidly since. In June wheat futures were trading at around 450 US cents/bushel. By early September, they were trading at around 700 US cents/bushel. Global food prices generally rose by 5% over the two months July/August. And it’s not just food. Various other commodity prices, such as copper and oil, have also increased substantially.
At the beginning of September there were three days of food riots in Mozambique in protest against the 30% rise in the price of bread. Seven people were killed and 288 were injured. On 2 September Russia announced that it was extending a ban on wheat exports for another 12 months following a disastrous harvest. In Pakistan, the floods have destroyed a fifth of the country’s crops. Drought in Australia and floods in the Canadian prairies have reduced these countries’ grain production.
In response to the higher prices and fears of food riots spreading, the United Nations has called a special meeting on 24 September to bring food exporters and importers together to consider “appropriate reactions to the current market situation”. And yet, although global cereal production is down by some 5% on last year, it is still predicted to be the third largest harvest on record.
So what is causing the price rises? Is it simply a question of the balance of supply and demand and, if so, what has caused the relevant shifts in supply and/or demand? And what role does speculation play? The following articles look at the issues and at the outlook for commodity prices over the coming months.
Clearly changes in commodity prices affect the rate of inflation. The news item (Bank of England navigates choppy waters) amongst other issues looks at the outlook for inflation and the various factors influencing it.
Articles
Commodity prices soar as spectre of food inflation is back Guardian, Simon Bowers (6/8/10)
Food inflation is a rumble that won’t go away Telegraph, Garry White (8/8/10)
Global wheat supply forecast cut BBC News (12/8/10)
Commodity crisis sparks fear of food inflation on high street Independent, James Thompson and Sean O’Grady (10/8/10)
Should we be concerned about high wheat prices? BBC News, Will Smale (6/8/10)
Commodity prices: Wheat The Economist (12/8/10)
Interactive: What’s driving the wheat price spike? Financial Times, Akanksha Awal, Valentina Romei and Steven Bernard (20/8/10)
Wheat pushes world food prices up BBC News (1/9/10)
UN to hold crisis talks on food prices as riots hit Mozambique Guardian, David Smith (3/9/10)
Grain prices spark global supply fears CBC News, Kevin Sauvé (3/9/10)
GRAINS-US wheat firms after Russian ban extension Forex Yard (3/9/10)
Global food prices reach 20 year high BBC News, John Moylan (3/9/10)
Speculators ‘not to blame for higher food costs’ BBC Today Programme, David Hightower (4/9/10)
Q&A: Rising world food prices BBC News (3/9/10)
Don’t starve thy neighbour The Economist (9/9/10)
Data
Commodity prices Index Mundi
Commodity prices BBC market data
Energy prices U.S. Energy Information Administration
Questions
- Use a supply and demand diagram to illustrate (a) what has been happening to wheat prices (b) what is likely to happen to wheat prices over the coming months?
- How relevant is the price elasticity of demand and supply and the income elasticity of demand to your analysis?
- What factors have caused the shifts in demand and/or supply of wheat and copper?
- What has been the role of speculation in the price rises? Is this role likely to change over the coming months?
- What is likely to happen to food prices in the shops over the coming months? Would you expect bread prices to rise by the same percentage as wheat? If so, why; if not, why not?
- If commodity prices generally rose by 5 per cent over the coming year, would you expect inflation to be 5 per cent? Again, if so, why; if not, why not?