The UK is officially back in recession: or to be more accurate, a double-dip recession.
The generally accepted definition of a recession is two or more quarters of negative growth in real GDP. According to figures released by the Office for National Statistics, the UK economy shrank by 0.2% in quarter 1, 2012, having shrunk by 0.3% in quarter 4, 2011.
(Click on the following link for a PowerPoint of the above chart: Double dip 2)
As you can see from the chart (click chart for a larger version), these declines are tiny compared with the recession of 2008/9. Nevertheless, with the eurozone economy slowing (Britain’s largest export market), and with cuts to government expenditure set to bite harder in the coming months, there are worries that there may be more quarters of negative growth to come.
So what are the causes of this double-dip recession? Are they largely external, in terms of flagging export markets; or are they internal? Is the new recession the direct result of the tight fiscal policy pursued by the Coalition government?
And what is to be done? Is there no option but to continue with the present policy – the government’s line? Or should the austerity measures be reined in? After all, as we saw in the last blog post (Economic stimulus, ‘oui’; austerity, ‘non’), the mood in many European countries is turning against austerity.
The following articles explore the causes and policy implications of the latest piece of bad news on the UK economy.
Articles
Double-dip recession a terrible blow for George Osborne Guardian, Larry Elliott (25/4/12)
Double-dip recession figures mark another bad day for George Osborne Guardian, Larry Elliott (25/4/12)
UK double-dip recession: what the economists say Guardian (25/4/12)
Feared double dip recession becomes reality as British economy contracts again in first quarter of 2012 Daily Record (25/4/12)
Britain in double-dip recession as growth falls 0.2pc The Telegraph, Angela Monaghan and Szu Ping Chan (25/4/12)
Did the eurozone crisis cause the double-dip recession? Guardian, Polly Curtis (25/4/12)
UK’s double-dip recession Financial Times, Chris Giles (25/4/12)
UK is in ‘double dip’ recession FT Adviser, Rebecca Clancy and John Kenchington (25/4/12)
Flanders explains GDP figure BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (25/4/12)
No recovery for UK: No let up for ONS BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (25/4/12)
Double-dip recession: There’s always fantasy island BBC News, Paul Mason (25/4/12)
UK double-dip recession to drag on into summer, economists warn The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (26/4/12)
George Osborne can stop the rot, but only by spending as he slashes The Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (25/4/12)
Double dip has arrived – and Osborne is running out of escape routes Independent, Ben Chu (26/4/12)
Britain’s bosses tell the ONS: it’s bad, but not a recession Independent, Tom Bawden, Lucy Tobin , Gideon Spanier (26/4/12)
The Chancellor received plenty of warning Independent, David Blanchflower (26/5/12)
Data
Gross Domestic Product: Preliminary Estimate, Q1 2012 ONS (25/4/12)
Preliminary Estimate of GDP Time Series Dataset 2012 Q ONS (25/4/12)
World Economic Outlook Database IMF (17/4/12)
Business and Consumer Surveys (for all individual EU countries and for the EU as a whole) European Commission: Economic and Financial Affairs
Consumer Confidence Nationwide Building Society
Questions
- Assess the current state of the UK economy and its likely course over the coming few months.
- Why may looking at the business surveys provide a truer picture of the state of the UK economy than the official measure of GDP?
- Why has the UK economy gone back into recession?
- Compare the policy approaches of the Coalition government with those of the Labour opposition.
- How important is it for the UK to retain its AAA credit rating?
Fuel prices at German petrol stations fluctuate wildly – by up to €0.14 per day. They are also often changed several times per day. In morning rush hours, when demand is less elastic, prices may shoot up, only to drop again once people are at work.
But is this a sign of healthy competition? Critics claim the opposite: that it’s a sign of the oligopoly power of the oil companies. More than two-thirds of Germany’s petrol stations are franchises of five big oil companies: BP/Aral, Esso, Jet, Shell and Total. These five companies directly control the prices at the pumps. According to the Der Spiegel article below, oil companies:
have sophisticated computer systems that allow them to precisely control, right down to the minute, when they increase their prices nationwide, and by how many cents. The prices are not set by the individual franchise holders. Instead, they are centrally controlled – for example, in the town of Bochum, at the headquarters of Aral, a BP subsidiary that is the market leader in Germany.
The price manager merely presses a button and price signs immediately change at all 2,391 Aral service stations in Germany. All filling stations are electronically linked with Bochum via a dedicated network called Rosi. After each price increase, they watch closely to see how the competition reacts and whether they follow suit.
… If the competitor’s prices are significantly cheaper, the Aral franchise holder can, with the help of Rosi, apply for permission to reduce the prices again.
Not only do the oil companies control the prices at the pumps, but they observe closely, via their franchise holders, the actions of their rivals, and then respond in ways which critics claim is collusive rather than competitive. The problem has become worse with the introduction of incentives to the franchise owners of additional commission if they exceed the price of their competitors within the local area. This has the effect of ratcheting prices up.
The sophisticated pricing strategies, with prices adjusted frequently according to price elasticity of demand, are making it very hard for independent operators to compete.
In response, the German Cartel Office has launched an investigation into the oil companies and in particular into the issues of collusion and frequent price changes and how these impact on independent operators.
German anti-trust authority probes alleged fuel cartel Deutsche Welle (4/4/12)
German antitrust watchdog to probe oil majors-paper Reuters, Ludwig Burger (3/4/12)
Oil giants probed over claims they rigged petrol prices in Germany The Telegraph, Nathalie Thomas (4/4/12)
BP, Exxon, Esso, Jet, Shell and Total in Germany Price Fix Probe International Business Times (9/4/12)
German cartel office probes petrol company pricing MarketWatch (4/4/12)
Kartellverfahren gegen fünf Mineralölkonzerne (in German) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Helmut Bünder and Manfred Schäfers (4/4/12)
Crazy gas prices driving German consumers mad msnbc, Andy Eckardt (3/4/12)
Big Oil’s Strategy for Jacking Up Gas Prices Der Spiegel, Alexander Jung and Alexander Neubacher (5/4/12)
Questions
- What the features of the German road fuel oligopoly?
- Why does the price elasticity of demand for petrol and diesel vary with the time of day? Is it likely to vary from one week to another and, if so, why?
- In what ways have the actions of the big five oil companies been against the interests of the independent petrol station operators?
- Consider the alternatives open to the German Federal Cartel Office for making the market more competitive.
- Would it be a good idea for the big five German companies to be forced to adopt the Western Australian system of price changes?
On 21 March, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, delivered the 2012 Budget for the UK. The details of the tax and benefit changes can be found in the Budget Report, with the Treasury’s summary of the tax changes here.
One of the key elements in the Budget was the reduction in the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45% from April 2013. The Chancellor argued that the introduction of the 50% rate in 2010 had raised very little extra tax revenue. Partly this was the result of people managing their tax affairs so that they could bring forward income to the year before the 50% rate was introduced – a practice known as forestalling. People are likely to do the reverse with the latest tax change and delay receiving income until next year. For details of the effects of forestalling, see the Office for Budget Responsibility’s Economic and fiscal outlook charts and tables Box 4.2a.
But part of the reason for the 50% tax rate raising relatively little has been the effect on incentives. A rise in the top rate of income tax can encourage people to move from the country – or move their incomes; it may discourage top earners from working more; it may encourage people to engage in various tax avoidance schemes; it may encourage people to evade taxes by not declaring all their income.
The effect of a rise (or fall) in the marginal income tax rate (t) on taxable income is given by the taxable income elasticity (TIE). This is defined as the proportionate change in taxable income (Y) divided by the proportionate change in the net-of-income-tax rate (r) (where r = 100 – t: i.e. the percentage of an extra pound that is not paid in income tax, but is retained by the taxpayer for spending or saving). TEI is thus ΔY/Y ÷ Δr/r. The larger the disincentive effect of raising taxes, the more will taxable income fall and hence the higher will be the value of TIE.
The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in 2010 based its calculations on a TIE of 0.35 for the rise in the top marginal rate of income tax from 40% to 50%. This means that for each 1% fall in the net-of-income-tax rate, taxable income would fall by 0.35%. With a TIE of 0.35, the OBR calculated that the new top rate would bring an extra £2.9bn per year by 2011-12 (after allowing for any temporary residual effects of forestalling). However, the OBR now believes that the TIE is significantly higher and that the 50% rate will bring only an extra £0.7bn in 2011/12.
In its analysis of the effects of a cut in the top rate from 50% to 45%, the OBR has assumed a TIE of 0.45.
Turning to the costing of the move to 45 per cent, measured against our baseline that reflects the new information on the 50 per cent yield, we have endorsed as reasonable and central the Government’s estimate that the underlying cost would be around £0.1 billion in 2013-14, based on an assumed TIE of 0.45. The figure is as low as this because a TIE of 0.45 implies that the revenue-maximising additional tax rate is around 48 per cent. Moving from just above to just below this rate would therefore have very little revenue impact. Moving the additional rate back to 40 per cent would take it further below the revenue maximising rate and would thus be more expensive at roughly an additional £600 million. But for the reasons set out above we would again emphasise the huge uncertainties here.
Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2012 (p110)
The government’s arguments for reducing the top tax rate, therefore, are that it will have little effect on tax revenue, but would have a significant effect in encouraging inward investment, discouraging emigration of high earners and encouraging high earners to work more.
Articles
Rich tax cuts offset by changes to relief Financial Times, Vanessa Houlder (21/3/12)
Budget 2012: A big debate about small numbers (cont’d) BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (21/3/12)
Budget 2012: End of 50p tax, but 45p rate here to stay The Telegraph, Robert Winnett (21/3/12)
Budget 2012: Top income tax rate ‘won’t go any lower than 45p’ This is Money, Tim Shipman (22/3/12)
Why is tax avoidance a reason for letting people off tax? New Statesman, Alex Hern (22/3/12)
Study: Millionaires Don’t Flee States Due To Tax Hikes Think Progress, Pat Garofalo (22/3/12)
Laffer Curve Fun, with a side serving of nepotism Mark Wadsworth blog (22/3/12)
Budget 2012: are we really all in this together? Guardian, Polly Curtis (21/3/12)
Did the 50p tax rate really raise less than £1 billion in 2010/11? Touch Stone, Howard Reed (22/3/12)
45p: Power beats evidence Stumbling and Mumbling, Chris Dillow (22/3/12)
Reports, documents and presentations
Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2012 OBR
Budget 2012 HM Treasury (21/3/12)
Budget 2012 IFS (March 2012)
The Exchequer effect of the 50 per cent additional rate of income tax HMRC (March 2012)
Can More Revenue be Raised by Increasing Income Tax Rates for the Very Rich? IFS, Mike Brewer and James Browne (2009)
The 50p income tax rate IFS, James Browne (March 2012)
Questions
- What are the arguments for and against reducing the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%? Do the same arguments apply to a further reduction to 40%?
- According to the OBR, at what top tax rate is the top of the Laffer curve?
- Why are the OBR’s calculations subject to considerable possible error?
- Why might a fall in the top tax rate from 50% to 40% not exactly reverse all the effects of an earlier rise in the top tax rate from 40% to 50%? In other words, why may the effects not be symmetrical?
- Distinguish between the income and substitution effects of a change in income tax rates. Which is assumed to be larger by the OBR in the case of reducing the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%? Explain.
Here’s an excellent article (the first link below) for giving an overview of macroeconomic thinking and policy since the start of the financial crisis in 2007. It looks at how a Keynesian consensus emerged in 2008–9, culminating in policies of fiscal and monetary stimulus being adopted in most major economies.
It also looks at how this consensus broke down from 2010 with the subsequent problem of rising public-sector deficits and debt, and was replaced by a new, although less widespread, consensus of fiscal restraint.
The article is not just about economic theory and policy, but also about the process and politics of how consensus and ‘dissensus’ emerge. It looks at the spread of ideas as a process of ‘contagion’ and how dissent may reflect the view of different defined groups, such as political parties or schools of economic thought.
Consensus, Dissensus and Economic Ideas: The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism During the Economic Crisis, Henry Farrell (George Washington University) and John Quiggin (University of Queensland) (9/3/12)
Keynesianism in the Great Recession Out of the Crooked Timber, Henry Farrell (9/3/12)
Economics in the Crisis (see also) The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman (5/3/12)
Questions
- What were the features of the Keynesian consensus in 2008–9?
- To what extent can the consensus of that period be described as the result of ‘contagion’?
- Why did consensus break down in 2010?
- How do economic experts play a political role in economic crises?
- To what extent does a lack of consensus benefit politicians?
- Why may the appearance of a consensus be more important in driving policy than actual consensus?
What will be the effect of raising tax allowances – the threshold at which people start paying income tax? The Coalition government in the UK has a policy of raising the threshold to £10,000 by 2015/16. As a step on this road, the present plan is to raise the threshold from £7475 in 2011/12 to £8105 in 2012/13. The Liberal Democrats, however, are urging the Chancellor to raise allowances more quickly.
The government maintains that raising the personal allowance is progressive – that it will give relatively more help to the poor. New research by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, however, casts doubt on this claim. The IFS demonstrates that the benefits will be unevenly distributed, with the greatest benefits going to middle-income families where more than one person works but where no-one earns the higher tax rate. The poorest people – those earning below the threshold – will gain nothing at all.
Read the following articles and the IFS report and establish just who would benefit by a rise in the tax threshold and whether or not the move could be described at ‘progressive’.
Articles
Tax move ‘benefits better-off’ Independent, Joe Churcher (9/3/12)
Raising tax threshold would benefit rich more than poor, says IFS MyFinances.co.uk (11/3/12)
Rise in income tax threshold would help the rich Financial Times, Vanessa Houlder (9/3/12)
Budget 2012: raising the personal tax allowance threshold isn’t fair Guardian blog, Heather Stewart (9/3/12)
IFS report
A £10,000 personal allowance: who would benefit, and would it boost the economy? IFS, James Browne (March 2012)
Questions
- Define the term ‘progressive tax’.
- For what reasons might raising the personal tax allowance (a) be progressive; (b) not be progressive?
- How does eliminating child benefit for any families where either parent earns the higher tax rate affect the progressiveness of raising income tax thresholds?
- What additional measures could be taken to ensure that raising tax thresholds was progressive across the whole income range and for all households?
