Month: May 2011

The debate about how much and how fast to cut the deficit has often been presented as a replaying of the debates of the 1920s and 30s between Keynes and the Treasury.

The justification for fiscal expansion to tackle the recession in 2008/9 was portrayed as classic Keynesianism. The problem was seen as a short-term one of a lack of spending. The solution was seen as one of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. There was relatively little resistance to such stimulus packages at the time, although some warned against the inevitable growth in public-sector debt.

But now that the world economy is in recovery mode – albeit a highly faltering one in many countries – and given the huge overhang of government deficits and debts, what would Keynes advocate now? Here there is considerable disagreement.

Vince Cable, the UK Business Secretary, argues that Keynes would have supported the deficit reduction plans of the Coalition government. He would still have stressed the importance of aggregate demand, but would have argued that investor and consumer confidence, which are vital preconditions for maintaining private-sector demand, are best maintained by a credible plan to reduce the deficit. What is more, inflows of capital are again best encouraged by fiscal rectitude. As he argued in the New Statesman article below

One plausible explanation, from Olivier Blanchard of the IMF, is that the Keynesian model of fiscal policy works well enough in most conditions, but not when there is a fiscal crisis. In those circumstances, households and businesses react to increased deficits by saving more, because they expect spending cuts and tax increases in the future. At a time like this, fiscal multipliers decline and turn negative. Conversely, firm action to reduce deficits provides reassurance to spend and invest. Such arguments are sometimes described as “Ricardian equivalence” – that deficits cannot stimulate demand because of expected future tax increases.

Those on the other side are not arguing against a long-term reduction in government deficits, but rather that the speed and magnitude of cuts should depend on the state of the economy. Too much cutting and too fast would cause a reduction in aggregate demand and a consequent reduction in output. This would undermine confidence, not strengthen it. Critics of the Coalition government’s policy point to the fragile nature of the recovery and the historically low levels of consumer confidence

The following articles provide some of the more recent contributions to the debate.

Keynes would be on our side New Statesman, Vince Cable (12/1/11)
Cable’s attempt to claim Keynes is well argued — but unconvincing New Statesman, David Blanchflower and Robert Skidelsky (27/1/11)
Growth or cuts? Keynes would not back the coalition – especially over jobs Guardian, Larry Elliott (17/1/11)
People do not understand how bad the economy is Guardian, Vince Cable (20/5/11)
The Budget Battle: WWHD? (What Would Hayek Do?) AK? (And Keynes?) PBS Newshour, Paul Solman (29/4/11)
Keynes vs. Hayek, the Rematch: Keynes Responds PBS Newshour, Paul Solman (2/5/11)
On Not Reading Keynes New York Times, Paul Krugman (1/5/11)
Would a More Expansionary Fiscal Policy Be Effective Right Now? Yes: On the Invisible Bond Market and Inflation Vigilantes Once Again Blog: Grasping Reality with a Prehensile Tail, Brad DeLong (12/5/11)
Keynes, Crisis and Monopoly Capitalism The Real News, Robert Skidelsky and Paul Jay (29/4/11)

Questions

  1. What factors in the current economic environment affect the level of consumer confidence?
  2. What are the most important factors that will determine whether or not a policy of fiscal consolidation will drive the economy back into recession?
  3. How expansionary is monetary policy at the moment? Is it enough simply to answer this question by reference to central bank repo rates?
  4. What degree of crowding out would be likely to result from an expansionary fiscal policy in the current economic environment? If confidence is adversely affected by expansionary fiscal policy, would this represent a form of crowding out?
  5. Why may fiscal multipliers have ‘turned negative’?
  6. For what reasons might a tight fiscal policy lead to an increase in aggregate demand?
  7. Your turn: what would Keynes have done in the current macroeconomic environment?

Each month the Bank of England releases figures on the amount of net lending to households. Net lending measures the additional amount of debt acquired by households in the month and so takes into account the amount of debt that households repay over the month. For some time now, the levels of net lending have been remarkably low. Over the first quarter of 2011, monthly net lending to households averaged £1.2 billion. This might sound like a lot of money and in many ways this is true. But, to put the weakness of this figure into perspective, the monthly average over the past ten years is £7 billion.

Household debt can be categorised as either secured debt or unsecured debt. The former is mortgage debt while the latter includes outstanding amounts due on credit and store cards, overdrafts and personal loans. Levels of net secured lending have averaged £1 billion per month over the first 3 months of 2011. This compares with a 10-year average of £5.8 billion per month. Levels of net unsecured lending have averaged £196 million per month over the first 3 months of 2011. This compares with a 10-year average of £1.2 billion per month. In 12 of the months between December 2008 and January 2011 net unsecured lending was actually negative. This means that the value of repayments was greater than new unsecured lending. Once bad debts are taken into account we observe from the autumn of 2008 almost persistent monthly falls in the stock of unsecured debt.

Weak levels of net lending reflect two significant factors. First, on the supply-side, lending levels remain constrained and credit criteria tight. Second, on the demand-side, households remain anxious during these incredibly uncertain times and would appear to have a very limited appetite for taking on additional credit.

Finally, a note on the stock of debt that we households collectively hold. The stock of household debt at the end of March 2011 was £1.45 trillion. This is £7.2 billion or 0.5% lower than in March 2010. The stock of secured debt has risen over this period by only £2.6 billion or 0.2%, while unsecured debt – also known as consumer credit – has fallen £9.9 billion or 4.5%. These figures help to reinforce the message that British households continue to consolidate their financial positions.

Articles

Latest data shows UK economy still sluggish Euronews (4/5/11)
Bank reveals weal lending on mortgages City A.M., Julian Harris (5/5/11)
Mortgage lending plummets by 60% Belfast Telegraph (5/5/11)
Mortgage lending down as borrowers repay debt thisismoney.co.uk (4/5/11)
Average UK household owes more than £50,000 in debts Mirror, Tricia Phillips (6/5/11)

Data

Lending data are available from the Bank of England’s statistics publication, Monetary and Financial Statistics (Bankstats) (See Tables A5.2-A5.7).

Questions

  1. What is the difference between gross lending and net lending?
  2. What do you understand by a negative net lending number?
  3. What is the difference between net secured lending and net unsecured lending?
  4. What factors do you think help to explain the recent weakness in net lending?
  5. How would you expect the net lending figures in a year’s time to compare with those now?
  6. As of 31 March 2011, UK households had accumulated a stock of debt of £1.45 trillion. In what ways could we put this figure into context? Should we as economists be concerned?
  7. It is said that households are consolidating their financial position. What do you understand by this term and what factors have driven this consolidation?
  8. What are the implications for the wider economy of households consolidating their financial position?

The snow the UK has seen over the past two winters created massive disruption, but that is only one reason for hoping for a milder winter to come. With the cold weather, the UK economy faced threats of gas shortages, as households turned on their heating. However, despite the freezing temperatures, many households were forced to turn off their heating regularly, due to the excessive bills they would face. This trend is expected to be even more prevalent if the 2011/12 winter is as cold, as fuel tariffs are predicted to rise. The Bank of England has said that gas and electricity prices could rise this year by 15% and 10% respectively. British Gas’s Parent company, Centrica said:

“In the UK the forward wholesale prices of gas and power for delivery in winter 2011/12 are currently around 25% higher than prices last winter, with end-user prices yet to reflect this higher wholesale market price environment.”

These predictions might see the average UK household paying an extra £148 over the next year. Although these are only estimates, we are still very likely to see many households being forced to turn off their heating. One thing which therefore is certain: a warmer winter would be much appreciated!

Articles

Switch energy tariff to help beat bill rises Guardian, Miles Brignall (14/5/11)
Quarter of households predicted to turn off heating BBC News, Brian Milligan (14/5/11)
Power bills set to soar by 50% in four years Scotsman (14/5/11)
Domestic fuel bills poised to rise by up to £200 Financial Times, Elaine Moore (13/5/11)

Data

Energy price statistics Department of Energy & Climate Change
Energy statistics publications Department of Energy & Climate Change

Questions

  1. Which factors have contributed to rising energy prices? Illustrate these changes on a demand and supply diagram.
  2. To what extent do these higher prices contribute to rising inflation?
  3. What impact might these price rises have on (a) poverty and (b) real income distribution in the UK?
  4. Why are energy prices currently being investigated by Ofgem? What powers does the regulator have and what actions could be taken?

According to a report just published by accountancy firm Deloitte, UK household real disposable incomes are set to fall for the fourth year in a row. What is to blame for this? According to Deloitte’s chief economic adviser, Roger Bootle, there are three main factors.

The first is the combination of tax rises and government expenditure cuts, which are now beginning to have a large impact. Part of this is the direct effect on consumer disposable incomes of higher taxes and reduced benefits. Part is the indirect effect on employment and wages of reduced public expenditure – both for public-sector employees and for those working for companies that supply the public sector.

The second is the rise in food, fuel and raw material prices, which have driven up the rate of inflation, thereby eroding real incomes. For most people, “pay growth is unlikely to catch up with inflation any time soon. Inflation is heading towards – and possibly above – 5%. Real earnings are therefore all but certain to fall for the fourth successive year in a row – the first time that this has occurred since the 1870s.”

The third is that demand in the private sector is unlikely to compensate for the fall in demand in the public sector. “I still doubt that the private sector can compensate for the cuts in public sector employment – which is already falling by 100,000 a year.

The upshot is that I expect households’ disposable incomes to fall by about 2% this year in real terms – equivalent to about £780 per household. And it will take until 2015 or so for incomes to get back to their 2009 peak.

… In terms of the year-on-year change in circumstances, although not the absolute level, that would make 2011 the worst year for households since 1977 (the depths of the recent recession aside). Were interest rates to rise too, conditions would arguably be the worst for households since 1952.”

Well, that’s a pretty gloomy forecast! The following articles examine the arguments and consider the likelihood of the forecasts coming true. They also look at the implications for monetary and fiscal policy.

Since I wrote the above, two more gloomy forecasts have been published: the first by the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the second by Ernst & Young’s Item Club. Both reports are linked to below.

Articles
Squeeze on incomes expected to rule out rate rise Guardian, Phillip Inman (3/5/11)
No rate rise until 2013, says Bootle MoneyMarketing, Steve Tolley (3/5/11)
UK households ‘face £780 drop in disposable incomes’ BBC News (3/5/11)
Why our purchasing power is set to suffer the biggest squeeze since 1870 The Telegraph, Ian Cowie (3/5/11)
2012 ‘worst year’ for household finances says Deloitte BBC News, Ian Stuart, Chief Economist with Deloitte (3/5/11)
Retailers expect sales gloom to continue Guardian, Graeme Wearden (3/5/11)
What makes consumers confident? BBC News, Shanaz Musafer (4/5/11)
Household incomes in UK ‘may return to 2004 levels’ BBC News (13/5/11)
Biggest squeeze on incomes since 1980s TotallyMoney, Michael Lloyd (13/5/11)
High street to endure decade of gloom, says Ernst & Young Item Club Guardian, Julia Kollewe (16/5/11)
Outlook for spending ‘bleak’ and road to recovery is long, Ernst & Young ITEM Club warns The Telegraph, James Hall (16/5/11)

Reports
Feeling the pinch: Overview Deloitte (3/5/11)
Feeling the pinch: Full Report Deloitte (3/5/11)
Long-term effects of recession on living standards yet to be felt IFS Press Release (13/5/11)
ITEM Club Spring 2011 forecast Ernst & Young
UK high street faces difficult decade as consumer squeeze intensifies and households focus on paying down debt, says ITEM Club Ernst & Young (16/5/11)

Data
Forecasts for Output, Prices and Jobs The Economist
Forecasts for the UK economy: a comparison of independent forecasts HM Treasury
Commodity Prices Index Mundi
Consumer Confidence Index Nationwide Building Society (Feb 2011)
Confidence indicators for EU countries Economic and Financial Affairs DG

Questions

  1. For what reasons may real household incomes fall by (a) more than and (b) less than the 2% forecast by Deloitte?
  2. What is likely to happen to commodity prices over the coming 24 months and why?
  3. With CPI inflation currently running at an annual rate of 4% (double the Bank of England’s target rate of 2%), consider whether it is now time for the Monetary Policy Committee to raise interest rates.
  4. For what reasons might households respond to falling real incomes by (a) running down savings; (b) building up savings?
  5. What are the implications of the report for tax revenues in the current financial year?
  6. What makes consumers confident?

Growth figures across many countries still remain vulnerable, including the UK, where growth lies at only 0.5%. Despite some countries starting to grow more rapidly, the numbers still remain close to 0. The eurozone area is a particularly interesting case, as there are so many individual countries that are all interdependent. So, despite growth in the eurozone area increasing to 0.8% in the first three months of 2011, which is higher than that for the UK, this doesn’t explain the full story in the area. Germany has grown by 1.5% and it is this figure which has largely contributed to the 0.8% figure. It was also helped by growth of 1% in France and incredibly of 0.8% in Greece, despite its huge debts. The growth in Greece is allegedly down to a better export market.

Why then wasn’t the figure higher? Whilst countries like Germany showed an acceleration in demand, growth remained sluggish in Spain and Italy at only 0.1% and 0.3% respectively and Portugal faced the second consecutive quarter of negative growth and so has officially gone back into recession. This situation may get even worse as the austerity measures put in place by the EU and IMF take effect. One of the key arguments against joining the eurozone is that the policies implemented are never going to be in the best interests of any one country. With some countries beginning to grow more quickly and others remaining sluggish, what should happen to macroeconomic policy? Should interest rates remain low in a bid to boost aggregate demand or should they rise as other countries see accelerating growth?

An interesting question here is why do countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal struggle, whilst France and Germany begin their recovery? One obvious explanation is that Germany and France are at the heart of the eurozone, where as Spain, Portugal and Italy remain on the periphery. Ken Wattret at BNP Paribas said:

“The periphery are getting the worst of both worlds. The core countries like Germany are doing really well and that’s keeping the euro strong, and it’s making the ECB [European Central Bank] more inclined to tighten policy.”

If the ECB do go ahead with a tightening of monetary policy, it could spell further trouble for those countries on the periphery of the Euro area that would benefit from interest rates remaining low and a weaker Euro. The following articles look at the conflicts within the 2-speed Eurozone.

Articles

Sterling lags euro on growth outlook; trails dollar Reuters (13/5/11)
Eurozone’s growth surprises as UK lags behind Telegraph, Emma Rowley (13/5/11)
Eurozone’s economic growth accelerates BBC News (13/5/11)
Solid finances help drive German economic revival Financial Times, Ralph Atkins (13/5/11)
UK’s economy in the slow lane as eurozone surges Scotsman, Scott Reid (14/5/11)
Euro growth eclipses rivals despite north-south divergences AFP, Roddy Thomson (13/5/11)
Eurozone economic growth data prompts political clash BBC News (13/5/11)
Fresh fears for UK economy as Germany and France power ahead Guardian, Larry Elliott (13/5/11)
Portugal’s GDP is set to shrink this year and next Wall Street Journal, Alex Macdonald and Patricia Kowsmann (14/5/11)

Data

UK GDP Growth National Statistics
Eurozone growth rates ECB
EU countries’ Growth rates of GDP in volume Eurostat News Release (13/5/11)
Real GDP growth rate for EU countries and applicant countries, EEA countries and USA and Japan Eurostat

Questions

  1. What has contributed to the German, French and Greek economies surging ahead?
  2. Why is there such a north-south divergence in growth within the eurozone?
  3. What is the most suitable monetary policy for those countries growing more strongly?
  4. What is the best direction for interest rates and hence the value of the euro for countries, such as Spain, Italy and Portugal?
  5. ’The UK economy would be in a worse position if it were a member of the eurozone’. What are the arguments (a) for and (b) against this statement?
  6. What is the relationship between interest rates, the exchange rate and growth?