We have learnt a lot this week about the appetite of households for spending. And, it appears that they are not particularly hungry. On Monday, the Quarterly National Accounts for Q1 revealed that, in real terms, household sector spending fell by 0.1% in the quarter despite disposable income growing by 2.1%. Today, we have learnt that households have continued to increase the amount of equity in their homes. The Housing Equity Withdrawal (HEW) figures for Q1 show that households increased their stake in housing by some £3.2 billion.
Housing Equity Withdrawal occurs when lending secured on dwellings increases by more than the investment in the housing stock. Housing investment relates largely to the purchase of brand new homes and to major home improvements, but also includes housing moving costs such as legal fees. What the Bank of England does is to compare these levels of housing investment with the amount of additional secured lending. If the Bank of England finds that additional secured lending is equal to the amount of housing investment then HEW is zero. If it is positive, then additional secured lending is greater than the levels of housing investment. This would show that the household sector was extracting equity from the housing stock and using mortgage lending to fund consumption, to purchase financial assets or to pay off unsecured debts, like credit cards.
But, the point here is that HEW is actually negative and has been so since the second quarter of 2008. Negative HEW means that housing investment levels are greater than the levels of new secured borrowing. In other words, household are increasing their housing equity. But, there is a cost to this choice because by doing so households are using money that could otherwise be assigned for spending or purchasing financial assets. One way of measuring the potential extent of foregone consumption is to note that the Bank estimates that the level of equity injected into housing in Q1 was equivalent to 1.3% of disposable income. Since Q2 2008 households have injected equity into housing to the tune of £38.34 billion, which is equivalent to 1.97% of disposable income, some of which might have otherwise been used to fund spending.
The negativity of HEW is not that surprising. In difficult economic times many of us might be tempted, if we can, to reduce our exposure to debt. Low interest rates may also be inducing households to pay off debt either because the interest rates on saving products are low and unattractive or because the size of mortgage payments for those on now lower variable rate mortgages gives them income with which to pay debt off. The bottom line is that after many years happily spending, households appear to be dining off a different menu.
Articles
Homeowners raise stakes in homes, says Bank of England BBC News (15/7/10)
Mortgage debt drops £3.2 billion Independent, Nicky Burridge (15/7/10)
Drop in outstanding mortgage debt UK Press Association (15/7/10)
Equity withdrawal still negative Financial Times, Cara Waters (15/7/10)
Saving may cause a double-dip recession Telegraph, Harry Wallop (13/7/10)
Data
Housing equity withdrawal (HEW) statistical releases Bank of England
Quarterly National Accounts, 1st Quarter 2010 ONS
Questions
- What do you understand by the term ‘housing equity withdrawal’?
- Compare the possible implications for consumer spending of positive HEW and negative HEW.
- What factors do you think lie behind the eight consecutive quarters of negative HEW?
- Why might a low interest rate environment affect the incentive to withdrawal housing equity? What other variables might also affect levels of HEW?
- How does HEW affect the net worth of households?
The sun may have been shining of late across the UK, but there are increasing signs that economic sentiment is deteriorating, more especially amongst consumers. The EU’s economic sentiment index for the UK fell for the first time since November of last year and is now just a little below its long-run average.
The EU’s economic sentiment index is a composite indicator of confidence in that it captures confidence levels amongst both consumers and businesses. While overall sentiment actually increased in each month from December of last year through to this May, the decline in consumer confidence in the UK is now well established having fallen each month since March.
We might expect the falls in consumer confidence to be reflecting the prevailing economic environment and, in particular, the increasing number of people unemployed. However, since the sentiment survey contains forward-looking questions too, it may be that declining consumer sentiment reflects concerns amongst households about the impact of fiscal consolidation measures. These consumer expectations could be important in affecting consumer behaviour today. It could be very important to track consumer confidence in the coming months, especially in light of the measures announced in the Budget of 22 June (which occurred after June’s polling of consumers) and subsequent announcements too.
Interestingly, declining levels of consumer confidence in the UK had until June been offset by rising confidence amongst businesses. However, confidence across most sectors of industry deteriorated in June. In particular, confidence amongst manufacturers fell back very sharply. Bucking the trend were businesses in the service sector who reported feeling more confident than at any time since March 2008. However, given waning sentiment elsewhere, one would expect this to be relatively short-lived.
The profile of the average economic sentiment indicator across all 27 member states of the EU is broadly similar to that for the UK. It exhibits a sharp and continuous rise from the historic lows of the indicator recorded in March 2009, but fell back, although very slightly, in June. The improvement in sentiment amongst business has been especially marked. Sentiment too had been improving amongst consumers, but recent evidence points to consumer confidence easing, although not quite to the extent seen here in the UK.
There are, of course, some notable national trends in sentiment across EU countries. It will come as little surprise to know that in Greece the economic sentiment indicator has, in recent months, been at historic lows. If you are looking for countries where sentiment is above average, then perhaps try, amongst others, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Germany!
Articles
Euro economic sentiment near-static RTE (29/6/10)
Eurozone confidence unchanged Bloomberg Business Week, Associated Press (29/6/10)
Eurozone economic sentiment picks up Financial Times, Stanley Pignal (29/6/10)
FTSE loses more than 3% as Wall Street slides on confidence data Guardian (Market Forces Blog) (29/6/10)
How long can the housing market avoid a crash? Independent, Sean O’Grady (30/6/10) (Article stresses link between confidence and the housing market)
Data
Business and Consumer Surveys The Directorate General for Economics and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Consumer Confidence Nationwide Building Society
Questions
- Think about your confidence in your own financial situation. Draw up a list of those factors that might affect this confidence. How might this list change if you were thinking about the level of confidence across all consumers?
- Why might confidence amongst UK consumers have been falling well before that amongst businesses? Do you think such divergences can persist for any length of time?
- What factors do you think might be particularly important in affecting the sentiment amongst consumers and businesses in the weeks and months ahead?
- Imagine that you are given a choice of plotting a chart over time of the economic sentiment indicator and either the level of real GDP or the rate of growth in real GDP. Which plot would you go for and why?
- Perhaps the key question of all! Do you think economists can learn anything from tracking the patterns in economic sentiment?
For some, thoughts will have turned to events on football pitches in South Africa. Perhaps though we should spare a thought for the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, who is likely to be concerned by his own team’s recent performance in missing the inflation rate target! Mervyn’s resulting ‘yellow card’ involves writing a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer every time the annual rate of CPI (Consumer Price Index) inflation deviates by more than one percentage point from the government’s central target of 2%. Unfortunately for the Governor, since the turn of the year, only in February has the annual rate of CPI inflation failed to exceed 3%. And, even that was within in a whisker of missing the goal since the rate of inflation squeaked in at 3%. Perhaps February was more a case of hitting the post!
As all sports fans know, a run of disappointing results can lead to dissent amongst players and supporters alike. We can see from the minutes of June’s meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee the extent of the debate over the persistence of inflation. The debate included discussions concerning the impact of the expected fiscal consolidation measures (the MPC met before the Budget), the public’s higher inflation rate expectations, the price of oil and other commodities and the margin of spare capacity in the economy (the output gap). The minutes reveal that one member of the MPC, Andrew Sentance, voted for an increase in interest rates believing that inflation had been particularly resilient in the aftermath of the recession.
We now have new forecaster in town: The Office of Budget Responsibility. In our blog article Who’d be a forecaster? A taxing time for the new OBR we looked at the growth forecasts produced by the Office of Budget Responsibility taking into account the Budget Measures of 22 June. The June 2010 OBR Budget forecasts also contain predictions for CPI inflation. So what do the OBR say?
The OBR predicts that the annual rate of CPI inflation will stay around 3% in the near term. It is now slightly more pessimistic about the prospects for inflation beyond the near term than it was in its pre-Budget forecasts. More specifically, it says that CPI inflation will ‘decline more gradually’ than first thought because of the rise in the standard rate of VAT to 20% in January 2001 and its belief that oil prices will be higher than originally envisaged. The OBR is forecasting the average price of a barrel of oil in 2010/11 to be $78 rising to $82 in 2011/12.
Going further ahead, the OBR expects the rate of inflation to fall back to ‘a little under 2 per cent in early 2012’. It argues that this will reflect the unwinding of the VAT effect, and, significantly, the downward pressure on prices from the larger negative output gap that will result from the fiscal consolidation measures in the Budget. In other words, the expectation is that there will be greater slack or spare capacity in the economy which will help to subdue price pressures.
If the OBR is right, the Governor may have more letter-writing to do in the near term and perhaps well into 2011. But, the fiscal consolidation measures should, once the impact of the VAT rise on the inflation figures ‘drops out’, see the rate of inflation fall back. Perhaps then, the final whistle can be blown on the Governor’s inflation troubles. In the mean time it will be interesting to see how MPC members take on board, in their deliberations over interest rates, the Budget measures and the OBR’s own thoughts on inflation. Could interest rates be rising shortly despite fiscal consolidation? Let Mervyn and his team play on!
OBR Forecasts
Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (22/6/10)
Pre-Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (14/6/10)
Monetary Policy Committee
Overview of the Monetary Policy Committee
Monetary Policy Committee Minutes
Inflation Data
Latest on inflation Office for National Statistics (15/6/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Statistical Bulletin, May 2010 Office for National Statistics (15/6/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Time Series Data Office for National Statistics
For CPI (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) data for EU countries, see:
HICP European Central Bank
Articles
MPC minutes reveal Bank split on inflation risk Financial Times, Daniel Pimlott (23/6/10)
Bank of England minutes reveal surprise split on interest rates Guardian, Katie Allen (23/6/10)
Instant view: Bank split 7-1 on June vote Reuters UK (23/6/10)
Now even the Bank isn’t sure it can bring down inflation Independent, Sean O’Grady (24/6/10)
An inflation hawk hovers over the Bank of England Guardian, Nils Pratley (24/6/10)
Questions
- Explain why an output gap – the amount of spare capacity in the economy – might impact on price pressures.
- What impact would you expect the rise in the standard rate of VAT next January to have on the CPI (price level) and on the CPI inflation rate? What about the following year?
- Some economists believe that by being more aggressive in cutting the fiscal deficit, interest rates will be lower than they otherwise would have been. Evaluate this argument.
- Now for your turn to be a member of the MPC and to decide on interest rates! How would you vote next month? Are you a ‘dove’ or a ‘hawk’?
Under its terms of reference the new Office for Budget Responsibility is required to provide updated forecasts for the economy and the public finances at the time of each Budget in order take into account the impact of those measures contained in the Budget. Here we consider those economic forecasts contained in the June 2010 OBR Budget Forecast relating to economic growth. In particular, we consider the OBR’s interpretation of how growth is likely to be affected by the policy measures unveiled by George Osborne in his first Budget as Chancellor of Exchequer on 22 June.
The OBR forecasts that the UK economy will grow by 1.2% in 2010 and by a further 2.3% in 2011. These estimates are lower than those published by the OBR in its Pre-Budget Forecast published on 14 June. The Pre-Budget Forecasts predicted growth of 1.3% in 2010 and 2.6% in 2011. The downward revisions reflect the OBR’s assertion that the Budget’s measures to meet the Government’s fiscal mandate and, hence the resultant fiscal consolidation package, will weaken aggregate demand.
In terms of the components of aggregate demand, the fiscal consolidation will mean restraints on government spending (G) and, if the OBR is right, lower growth in household consumption (C). Lower consumption growth is expected as a result of reduced growth in household incomes and the rise in the standard rate of Value Added Tax next January from 17½% to 20%.
The OBR now forecasts that real household consumption will grow by just 0.2% in 2010, following last year’s contraction of 3.2%, and by 1.3% in 2011. General government final consumption – the Government’s expenditure on current goods and services – is forecast to grow in real terms by 1.7% this year before falling by 1.1% next year. The forecasts for general government capital spending are for a real fall of 4.9% this year, following last year’s rise of 15.7%, followed by a sizeable 19% decline in 2011.
A more positive note emerging from the OBR forecasts relates to capital expenditure by businesses. The measures to reform corporation tax, which include a reduction in the main rate of corporation tax from 28 per cent to 24 per cent over four years beginning with a one per cent reduction from April 2011, are predicted to have a favourable effect on investment. Business investment is forecast to rise in real terms by 1.4% this year, following last year’s fall of 19.3%, and to rise again in 2011 by 8.1%.
The projections for growth from 2013 are now stronger than in the OBR’s Pre-Budget Forecast with the economy portrayed as adjusting more quickly at this point towards its potential output. Potential output is the level of output level when the economy’s resources are operating at ‘normal capacity utilisation’. But, in 2015, which is at the end of the OBR’s five year forecast period, the UK economy is still forecast to be experiencing a negative output gap. In other words, actual output will still be less than potential output.
To help paint a picture of how the economy’s output will adjust towards its potential level consider the OBR estimates for the output gap. The OBR estimates that in financial year 2009-10 the economy’s output was 4.1% below its potential. This negative output gap is now expected to be reduced to 3.7% of potential output in 2010-11, to 2.8% in 2012-13 and to 0.9% of potential output in 2015-16.
Office for Budget Responsibility
OBR home page
Office for Budget Responsibility Terms of Reference
Documents
Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (22/6/10)
Pre-Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (14/6/10)
Budget 2010 HM Treasury (22/6/10)
Articles
OBR endorses Budget but faces questions over its own predictions Telegraph, Philip Alrdrick (23/6/10)
UK growth forecasts could be revised again, says Sir Alan Budd Citywire, Deborah Hyde (23/6/10)
OBR says growth will take bigger hit Financial Times, Norma Cohen (22/6/10)
Budget 2010: Government cuts will slow economic recovery, says watchdog Telegraph, James Kirkup (23/6/10)
Highlights from the Budget BBC News (22/6/10)
Budget statement: George Osborne’s speech in full BBC Democracy Live (22/6/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by the concept of aggregate demand?
- What are the component expenditures of aggregate demand? Which of these do you think is the largest in value terms?
- The OBR is forecasting the household sector’s disposable income to grow in real terms this year by 0.2% and by 1.2% next year. Why then is the OBR identifying weaker consumer demand as a result of the Budget measures as a major reason for revising down its predictions for economic growth?
- The OBR argues that the fiscal consolidation measures will have a ‘direct effect’ on household incomes and so on spending, but that this will be ‘partially offset by a decline in saving’. Why might the OBR be arguing that a fiscal consolidation will lead to a decline in saving? Evaluate the OBR’s arguments.
- What do you understand by the concept of an output gap? What does a negative output gap signify?
- To see the sorts of problems that forecasters commonly face, try identifying reasons why the output gap could be eliminated more quickly or less quickly as a result of the Budget measures.
The latest ONS labour market release reveals that in the three months to April the number of people unemployed in the UK was 2.472 million, up by 23,000 on the previous three months (i.e. the three months to January). The rate of unemployment – the number of people unemployed expressed as a percentage of those economically active – nudged upwards to 7.9% from 7.8% in the previous three months.
In a previous article A labour challenge for Osborne we considered the possibility that some of the emerging patterns in the labour market numbers could act as an impediment on the future potential output of the UK economy. The latest figures seem to offer little obvious comfort in this respect. Here, we note three causes for possible concern.
Firstly, we note the continued rise in inactivity. Of those of working age, inactivity rose by a further 29,000 in three months to April to stand at 8.186 million. This is an historic high and equates to 21.5% of the potential working population.
Secondly, we note the continued rise in long-term unemployment. The number of people unemployed for more than one year rose by 85,000 in the three months to April to stand at 772,000. This compares with 399,000 in the same three month period in 2007, just as the first clear signs of the impending financial crisis were being drawn to the public’s attention. In other words, this measure of long-term unemployment has effectively doubled since the financial crisis. But, more than this, 31.2% of those unemployed have been so for at least one year.
Thirdly, we note the high levels of youth unemployment. In the three months to April the number of unemployed people aged 18-24 was 713,000. This was down on the previous three months, but by a mere 2,000. The unemployment rate amongst 18-24 year-olds is 17.3% which is more than double the overall unemployment rate of 7.9%.
Aside from the very obvious personal costs of unemployment and of inactivity, each of these labour market issues poses important economic challenges for the country and its policy-makers. These are difficult challenges at the best of times. But, they could hardly be more difficult given the current national and international economic environment and, of course, the tendency for fiscal consolidation both at home and abroad.
Articles
Unemployment: public sector feels the pain as jobless hits 2.47 million Telegraph, Harry Wallop (16/6/10)
Unemployment: what the experts say Guardian (16/6/10)
Unemployment rises as public sector shrinks Financial Times, Brian Groom (16/5/10)
UK unemployment rises to 2.47 million BBC News (16/6/10)
Unemployment levels a ‘challenge’ for government: Interview with Work and Pensions minister, Chris Grayling BBC News (16/6/10)
Data
Latest on employment and unemployment Office for National Statistics (16/6/10)
Labour Market Statistics, June 2010 Office for National Statistics (16/6/10)
Labour market statistics portal Office for National Statistics
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- Evaluate the possible consequences for the UK economy, both now and in the future, of: (i) high and rising levels of inactivity; (ii) high and rising levels of long-term unemployment; and (iii) high levels of youth unemployment.
- Again, thinking about the issues of labour market activity, the duration of unemployment and youth unemployment, what policy recommendations would you make in trying to tackle them?
- If you were writing this blog in a year’s time, what would you expect will have happened to levels or rates of inactivity, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment? Explain your answer.
- Again, if you were writing this blog in a year’s time, would you expect to find any other emerging patterns in labour market statistics? Explain your answer.