Deloitte recently published its 24th Annual Review of Football Finance and it contained some surprising results. Historically, most teams in the English Premier League (EPL) have made accounting losses with any increases in revenues being offset by higher wage costs. However, this report found that in 2013–14 most teams in the EPL actually made accounting profits.
The Deloitte’s review reported that the combined operating profits of clubs in the EPL increased from £82 million in 2012–13 to £614 million on 2013–14 – an enormous increase of 649%. Nearly all of the teams (19 out of 20) in the league made an operating profit while 14 also reported pre-tax profits. Dan Jones, head of Deloitte’s Sports Business Group, commented that:
“The change in club profitability in 2013–14 was more profound than anything we could have forecast.”
Why has the profitability of teams in the EPL suddenly improved so dramatically? One important factor was the significant increase in revenue. The combined income of the teams was £3.26 billion in 2013–14 – an increase of £735 million, or 29% on the previous year. Although match-day and commercial revenue both increased, the majority of this growth in income (nearly 80%) came from the sale of broadcast rights. The 2013–14 season was the first year of a new three-year contract that raised over £1.7 billion per year from the sale of these rights in both the UK and overseas.
However, clubs in the EPL have received big increases in revenue from TV deals before and still made substantial accounting losses. For example, the broadcasting contract that ran from 2010–13 generated over £1.1 billion per season – a £243 million per annum increase on the previous deal. Significantly, in the first year of this deal (2010–11), 81% of this increase in revenue went straight into higher player salaries, whereas in 2013–14 this figure was only 16%. The ratio of wages to turnover also fell from 71% in 2012–13 to 58% in 2013–14
So why did a smaller proportion of the increase in revenue go to the players compared with previous years? The explanation appears to be the impact of two new controls and regulations that were implemented by the EPL at the beginning of the 2013–14 season.
One of these has received considerable media attention and is similar to UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations. The Profitability and Sustainability Rules allow the clubs to make a maximum cumulative loss of £105 million over three seasons before having to face sanctions from the league. The size of the permissible loss is significantly higher than in the UEFA regulations.
The other control that has received far less attention is called Short-Term Cost Control (STCC). This regulation places limits on the extent to which clubs can increase their total wage bill. It operates from 2013–14 to 2015&ndash16: i.e. it covers the same three years as the current TV deal. For the 2013–14 season it worked in the following way.
If teams had a wage bill of less than £52 million they faced no restrictions on their spending on players’ salaries. Only Crystal Palace (£46 million) and Hull City (£43 million) fell into this category. Unsurprisingly, the five biggest spending clubs, Man Utd, Man City, Chelsea, Arsenal and Liverpool, had much greater wage bills of £215m, £205m, £192m, £166m and £144m respectively.
Any of the 18 teams that exceeded the £52m limit would still not face sanctions if their wage bill increased by £4 million or less. For example, Stoke City’s wage bill only increased from £60m to £61m, while Tottenham Hotspur’s increased from £96m to £100m. Some clubs actually managed to reduce their total wage bill, including the champions, Manchester City, which managed to lower its from £233m to £215m.
However, there were still 12 teams with a total wage bill that was greater than £52 million in 2013–14 and which had increased by more than £4 million on the previous year. For these teams not to face any sanctions, they had to prove to the EPL that any of the increase above £4 million was either due to player contracts entered into before January 2013 or could by financed from the following two sources.
• Club Own Revenue Uplift
• Profit from player transfers
Whereas the profit from player transfers is straightforward, the ‘Club Own Revenue Uplift’ requires some explanation, as it excludes a very important part of teams’ incomes – Central Fund payments.
Some revenues earned by clubs in the EPL are referred to as ‘Central Fund payments’. These are, in effect, income payments from money that is raised centrally by the EPL on behalf of the clubs and then distributed to the teams using an agreed formula. The majority of the revenue generated under this category is from the broadcast deals, although some commercial income, such as the sponsorship of the league, also falls under this category. For some teams the money raised from Central Fund payments makes up the majority of their revenue.
‘Club Own Revenue’ in STCC calculations refers to all revenues other than those from Central Fund payments. This includes a number of income streams that the club has more direct control over. They include:
• Gate money/other match-day revenue
• Commercial deals negotiated by the individual club
• Income from playing in European competitions, including TV revenue.
The uplift refers to increases in revenue from these sources compared to 2012–13.
For example, assume a club has made no profit from its transfer dealing and did not enter into any significant player contracts prior to January 2013. If this club’s wage bill increased from £100m in 2012–13 to £110m in 2013–14 then it would have to provide evidence to show that £6m of this increase could be financed from growth in its Club Own Revenue. In other words, it would have to demonstrate how its income from gate money, commercial deals and playing in Europe was at least £6m higher in 2013–14 than it had been in 2012–13.
It will be interesting to see if (1) the profitability of the clubs continues to improve in future years and (2) the STCC regulations are extended when the new broadcast deal comes into effect in 2016–17.
The EPL Proves Cost Control Works The Judge 13 (4/6/15)
English Premier League clubs made more revenue than Spain and Italy’s clubs combined UK Business Insider, Lianna Brinded (4/6/15)
Premier League football club revenues and profits soar BBC News, Bill Wilson (4/6/15)
Deloitte Premier League list: Clubs’ revenue boom to £3.3billion as Tottenham record highest ever pre-tax profits after Gareth Bale transfer The Independent, Joanna Bourke (4/6/15)
Annual Review of Football Finance 2015 Premier League clubs generate over £3bn revenue in season of records Deloitte (4/6/15)
Premier League top of the rich list with record income of £3.26bn The Guardian, David Conn (4/6/15)
- What is the difference between an operating profit and a pre-tax profit?
- If a club reports that it is making an accounting profit, does this mean that it must be making an economic profit? Explain your answer.
- Give some examples of the economic costs of running a football club that might not be included in accounting calculations of profit.
- How is the profit/loss from player transfers calculated?
- Explain why the current rules may give teams that play in European competitions a competitive advantage.
They may not have been happy about it but the executives of Manchester City have finally agreed a settlement with UEFA after it was judged that the club had broken Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. The club had initially indicated that they might take their case to the Club Financial Control Body’s adjudicatory chamber. For details about FFP, see previous article on the website: What does ‘fair play’ mean for the big teams in Europe?They have also now accepted the sanctions for breaking these rules which appear to be very similar in magnitude to those imposed on Paris St-Germain. UEFA have also judged that seven other clubs have failed to meet their financial requirements.
Why did Manchester City fail the FFP rules when they appeared to be so confident that they would meet them? To understand this requires some discussion of a number of exemptions put in place by UEFA in the implementation of the FFP guidelines.
One of the key aims of FFP is to force the clubs who compete in European competitions to break even. However UEFA allow clubs to make some losses before any sanctions are applied. For the current monitoring period the clubs are allowed to make a cumulative loss of up to €45 million (approximately £37 million) over a two year period from 2011-2013 before any penalties are imposed. This permitted loss is referred to by UEFA as the ‘acceptable deviation’ from breaking even.
Manchester City reported losses in their financial accounts of £97million in 2011-12 and £51.6 million in 2012-13. At first sight this cumulative loss of nearly £149 million over the two year period would suggest that the club failed to meet the FFP regulations by a wide margin i.e. £112 million over the acceptable deviation. However the size of either the profit or loss reported in a club’s final accounts is different from the figure that is used by UEFA when assessing whether the teams have met the FFP criteria. UEFA exclude any costs incurred by the clubs on
– Youth development and community projects
– Building/developing their stadiums
Imagine a situation where after deducting these costs, Manchester City’s losses fell to £75 million in 2011-12 and £35 million in 2012-13. Once again it would still look as if they have failed to meet the FFP guidelines by a large margin. However there is another set of costs that can be excluded if a number of conditions are met. These are the wage costs in 2011-12 of those players who had signed contracts with the club before 1st June 2010. This exemption was introduced by UEFA because a number of clubs complained that they would struggle to meet the rules because of the nature of the players’ contracts. It is quite common for these to be of a 4 or 5 year duration. The teams argued that they were already committed to paying some players very large salaries in 2011-12 because of deals that were agreed long before the FFP rules were introduced. UEFA accepted this argument but only allowed the wage costs to be exempted from the FFP calculations on two conditions:
1. The club could show that the size of its losses were falling over time and that they had a clear strategy in place so that they would be able to comply with FFP regulations in future years.
2. The cumulative loss in excess of the acceptable deviation was caused by losses incurred in the 2011-12 period.
As there is a downward trend in the size of the losses being made by Manchester City they would appear to meet the first condition. It would also be important for them to convince UEFA that they had policies in place to reduce the losses below the permitted levels in the future. In the example above the second criterion is also met as the loss in 2012-13 of £35 million was lower than the acceptable deviation of £37 million. Therefore the reason why the cumulative permitted loss would be broken is because of the impact of the £75 million loss in 2011-12.
However there is another element to the second condition. The club also has to show that the sole reason for the loss in 2011-12 was because of the wage costs they were already committed to – i.e. from the contracts signed before the 1st June 2010. If these wage costs are smaller than the losses reported in that period then they cannot be exempted from the FFP calculations as they can only partly explain the loss.
Reports in the press have suggested that approximately £80 million of Manchester City’s wage bill in 2011-12 was caused by contracts that were signed with players before the 1st June 2010. If this was true then in the example above they would have met the FFP requirements as the £80 million of wages could fully account for the £75 million loss in the 2011-12 season. This would mean that the £80 million could be exempted from the FFP calculation and City would have made a cumulative loss of £35 million which was less than the acceptable deviation of £37 million.
If the wages paid to the players from the contracts signed prior to 1st June 2010 could not fully account for the losses in 2011-12 then they could not be deducted in the FFP calculations. For example imagine if after deducting the costs of youth/community projects and infrastructure spending that Manchester City’s loss had been £85 million in 2011-12 instead of £75 million. The wages bill of £80 million could not fully account for this loss of and hence the £80 million wage bill would be counted in the calculations. The cumulative loss would now be £120 million (£85 million + £35 million) and the acceptable deviation would have been exceeded by £83 million.
Unfortunately for Manchester City this appears to be more or less what happened. As part of the FFP process UEFA also examined deals struck between the club and other organisations in which the owner had an interest. These are referred to by UEFA as Related Party Transactions (RPTs). It would seem that the accountants at UEFA came to the conclusion that some of these RPTs were at above market prices. Interestingly some press reports have indicated that the £35 million a year deal with Etihad was judged to be fine. It was a number of secondary sponsorship deals which were considered to be above fair market values. Once adjustments were made to take account of this it looks as if the re-calculated losses for 2011-12 were greater than the £80 million of wages. With these wage costs not exempted from the calculation, Manchester City have been judged to have missed the FFP conditions by a wide margin.
The following quote is taken from a statement released by the club:
At the heart of the discussions is a fundamental disagreement between the club’s and UEFA’s respective interpretations of the FFP regulations on players purchased before 2010.
The following sanctions have been imposed:
– A £49 million fine to be withheld from UEFA prize money over the next three seasons. (£32 million is suspended and depends on their financial performance in future years)
– A limit on the squad size for the Champions League – 21 instead of 25 players
– Spending limited on transfers this summer to £49 million plus any revenue received in transfer fees from the sale of players
– A freeze on the wage bill of the Champions League squad for the next two seasons
It will be interesting to see if these penalties significantly constrain Manchester City’s ability to compete with the other big teams in Europe next season.
Manchester City accept world-record £50m fine for breach of Uefa Financial Fair Play rules The Telegraph, (16/5/14)
Manchester City facing £50m fine for breaching Uefa’s Financial Fair Play regulations The Telegraph, (6/5/14)
A beginner’s guide to UEFA’s financial fair play regulations SB Nation, (30/04/14)
Financial Fair Play Explained Financial Fair Play 2012
Man City to act swiftly in transfer market – Khaldoon Al Mubarak BBC Sport, (20/5/14)
Manchester City fined and squad capped for FFP breach BBC Sport, (16/5/14)
Manchester City facing Uefa sanctions over finances BBC Sport, (6/5/14)
Paris St-Germain’s £167m deal fails Uefa financial fair play rules BBC Sport, (1/5/14)
Manchester City and PSG breach Uefa FFP rules BBC Sport, (28/4/14)
Financial Fair Play: What rules have Manchester City broken and what are the likely sanctions? The Mirror, (6/5/14)
We’re innocent! Manchester City on the attack over FFP penalties The Express, (21/5/14)
Man City facing double UEFA punishment for breaching financial fair play rules talkSPORT, (6/5/14) .
- What are barriers to entry? Give 4 examples.
- What impact do barriers to entry have on a market? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
- To what extent do you think that the UEFA Fair Play Rules act as a barrier to entry?
- What impact do you think the FFP rules will have on the marginal revenue product of the most talented players? Draw a diagram to illustrate your answer.
- Can you think of any methods that a club might use to try and circumvent a rule that attempts to restrict the size of its wage bill.
Officials of the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) of UEFA met on Tuesday 15th April and Wednesday 16th April to decide the fate of a number of European clubs. The job of the CFCB is to implement UEFA’s Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) are said to be nervously awaiting the outcome of these meetings.
UEFA’s FFP rules apply to teams who want to play in either the Champions League or the Europa League. In order to be eligible to compete in these competitions teams not only have to perform well in their domestic league they also have to obtain a license from UEFA. The application process normally takes place midway through the current season for entry into either the Champions League or Europa League for the following season.
UEFA’s FFP rules cover a broad range of issues such as requirements for clubs to pay taxes, transfer fees and players’ wages on time in order to receive a license. However it is the ‘Break Even’ requirement that has caught the attention of a number of economists. This provision limits the size of the financial losses that team can incur before they become subject to sanctions from UEFA. Some of the stated aims of the policy are to:
– Introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances
– Encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues
– Encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football
– Protect the long term viability and sustainability of European club football.
The Royal Economic Society held a special session on the potential impact of the ‘Break Even’ requirement at its annual conference in April of this year.
One key way in which the UEFA rules differ from the rules imposed in the Championship in England is that the financial performance of the clubs is judged over a 2/3 year period rather than just one. The initial assessment period is over 2 seasons – 2011-12 to 2012-13. After this the monitoring period is over 3 seasons. Teams can make an initial loss of €5 million in total over the first two year period but this can increase to a maximum permitted loss €45 million over the two years – approximately £37 million – if the team’s owner is willing to fund this loss out of their own money. Certain categories of expenditure are exempt such as the cost of building a new stadium/stand or spending on youth development and the local community.
Manchester City made a total financial loss of £149 million over the last two seasons, far in excess of the permitted £37million, but these losses are falling which may count in their favour. They made losses of £97.9 million in 2012 and £51.6 million in 2013. Also some of the club’s expenditure will have been on some of the exempted categories so that the actual losses subject to FFP will be lower. Chelsea made a profit of £1.4million in 2011-12 and a loss of £49.4million in 2012-13. Although the losses over the two seasons were greater than £37 million, once adjustments were made for exempted expenditures the club was within the maximum permitted loss so was not subject to a full investigation.
In order to implement its FFP regulations UEFA created the Club Financial Control Body (CFCB). The CFCB has two departments – an investigatory chamber and an adjudicatory chamber. The investigatory chamber does the bulk of the work by investigating the accounts of all the 237 clubs that play in UEFA competitions. It was initially reported that the accounts of 76 clubs were being investigated in some detail because it was thought that they might have failed to meet FFP guidelines. However after further investigations in February it was reported that this number had fallen to below 20 teams. The investigatory panel met on Tuesday 15th April and Wednesday 16th April in order to make its final decisions which will be announced May 5th. The body can choose from one of the four following options in each case:
– Dismiss the case
– Agree a settlement with the club – effectively putting it on probation
– Reprimand and fine the club up to €100,000
– Refer the club to the CFCB adjudicatory chamber
The last option is the most serious as the adjudicatory chamber has the power to issue more serious penalties such as
– A deduction of points from the group stages of UEFA competitions.
– Withholding of revenues from UEFA competitions.
– Restrictions on the number of players that a club can register for participation in UEFA competitions.
– Disqualification from future UEFA competitions.
One issue that concerned UEFA was the possibility that very wealthy team owners might try to artificially inflate the revenues their club’s generate so as to circumvent the rules and make it look as if the team was meeting the FFP guidelines. In particular deals might be struck between other organisations that the club owner has an interest in and the football club at rates far in excess of the normal market level. For example some concerns have been expressed about the nature of the back-dated sponsorship deal of £167 million/year signed by PSG with the Qatar Tourism Authority. PSG are owned by Qatar Sport Investment which itself is a joint venture between the Qatari government and the Qatari Olympic Committee. The CFCB have said that they will analyse these types of deals and adjust club accounts if necessary so that they reflect true market rates.
May 5th could prove to be a very significant day for some of the biggest and most wealthy clubs in Europe.
The Economics of “Financial Fair Play” (FFP) in European Soccer (EJ Special Session) Royal Economic Society (7/4/14)
UEFA probes ‘fewer than 20’ clubs over financial fair play rules Sky Sports, (14/4/14)
Manchester City confident of satisfying Uefa financial fair play rules The Guardian (15/4/14)
Uefa’s Financial Fair Play rules explained The Telegraph (15/4/14)
Man City sweating over sanctions as UEFA prepare to rule over excessive spending Daily Mail (15/4/14)
How Bosman’s lawyer is plotting another football revolution BBC Sport (2/10/13)
Manchester City await fate as Uefa’s financial rules kick in BBC Sport (16/4/14)
Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain face financial fair play fate The Guardian (14/4/14) .
- In standard economic theory it is assumed that both consumers and producers act rationally. What precisely does this mean?
- One of the stated aims of UEFA FFP is to ‘introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances’. Why might the owners of a football club act in an irrational way?
- Consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of assessing the financial performance of a team over 3 years as opposed to 1 year.
- One of the major arguments made against the UEFA FFP rules is that they will lead to a ‘fossilisation’ of the existing market i.e. the current top clubs are more likely to maintain their leadership. Explain the logic of this argument in more detail.
- Which of the possible sanctions for breaking FFP regulations do you think would hit the clubs the hardest in terms of the revenue they would lose? i.e. Which of the sanctions would they most like to avoid?
Later this afternoon I’ll be going down to watch my beloved Leicester City. Our first home match drew a crowd of just over 21,500. This was perhaps a little disappointing for the first home match of the season. Normally, supporters’ spirits are high are the start of the season, we all go down to the ground with renewed optimism, and so ‘first match’ crowds are high. But, this year a number had not come along and the problem was not confined to my club. Just down the road in Coventry, their first match against fellow Midlanders Derby County drew a crowd of only a little over 13,000. While this match was televised by SKY, the attendance is likely to have disappointed many at this historic club. Up by the River Tees, Midllesbrough’s first home match drew a record low league crowd of 14,633 and led manager Gordon Strachan to blame poor crowds on the recession. But, while some clubs are struggling to get supporters through the turnstiles, others seemed rather more immune from the affects of the economic climate. Manchester United’s first home match drew a near-capacity 75,221, despite being a televised match on a Monday night, while Arsenal’s first home match against newly promoted Blackpool drew a capacity crowd of 60,032.
These contrasting experiences amongst football clubs raise some important questions about the nature of demand for attending football matches. Perhaps a good place to start for any chief executive thinking about the demand for their club’s matches is to actually step back and consider about how supporters derive satisfaction from attending matches. This satisfaction from consuming something is also known by economists as ‘utility’. In understanding how supporters derive utility clubs may gain some really useful information when pricing season tickets or match-day tickets.
Well, let’s start with me! I am a fox (a Leicester supporter) through and through and so it’s about an emotional attachment. I was first taken down to Filbert Street by Grandfather in the early 1980s. We were soundly beaten on the day by Notts County on the day. But, while I was gutted, I was supporting my team! I derive a lot of my satisfaction from supporting my home-town team. I guess that makes me what we might term a ‘core supporter’. It’s important for clubs to have a sense of their core support because these are likely to be supporters who are least sensitive to pricing. In other words, this group of supporters is more likely to exhibit a price inelastic demand.
So, a happy chief executive of a football club is likely to be one with a sizeable core support. Another way of looking at this, which is not always popular amongst football traditionalists, is to think of a football club as a brand. A popular, sought-after brand gives the supplier a greater degree of power over pricing. The greater the attachment to the brand the greater the power to set price. While for me the attachment comes from the geography of my birth, for others the attachment comes from being associated with success. This helps to explain the attachment of so many supporters to what we refer to as ‘the big clubs’. Therefore, success can help generate supporter-attachment which can therefore be ‘priced-in’ by clubs when determining the pricing structure for matches and season tickets.
But, not everybody is attached to a team out of loyalty to their town or city or because of its success. For others, the utility from attending matches could come from a variety of sources. A ‘floating supporter’ is therefore likely to be more choosey and pricing needs to try and take this into account. For these supporters it might be a question of who the two teams on show are on a particular day. This helps, in part, to understand why local derbies are generally well attended – but why they are also relatively expensive to attend. It might also be the case that particular matches allow supporters to see a ‘superstar’. If a certain player or club is in town then prices at the turnstiles are likely to reflect this.
What we have suggested here is that in beginning to understand the demand for attending football matches, clubs need to build up a profile of their supporters and their potential supporters. We have focused on how supporters derive satisfaction from watching football and how this affects what they are willing to pay. Yet they need to do more than this, including building up a profile of the economic, social and geographic demographics of supporters. As Gordon Strachan points out, supporters are not immune to economic conditions and football clubs can’t be either. Therefore, clubs will also need to have a sense of how income-sensitive is the demand for attending their matches. The economic climate means that many in football, especially those at clubs involved in setting prices, may need to give considerable thought to the demand function for attending live football matches. May be an economist really could help in the board rooms of many football clubs. While I may not make the board room at the Walkers Stadium later, I will be in the crowd!
Boro boss Strachan blames recession for poor crowds BBC News (22/8/10)
Premier League fun for all – at a cost BBC Sport, Matt Slater’s Blog (27/8/10)
Inside football with Rob Tanner: Where have all the fans gone Leicester Mercury, Rob Tanner (27/8/10)
- What do you understand by term ‘utility’? Think of any two products or services and draw up a list of how you derive utility from them?
- What do you understand by the terms ‘price elasticity of demand’ and ‘income elasticity of demand’? Try applying these concepts to the demand to attend matches at any two football clubs that you might be aware of.
- Are football clubs price-takers or price-makers when determining match prices? Is this true of all clubs?
- Imagine that a club is promoted to the top league in its country for the first ever time. How will this affect the position and slope of its demand curve for season tickets?