Tag: regulation

With news of the economy contracting in the previous quarter, it was perhaps a surprise to some that BSkyB has seen growth in its customer numbers to above 10 million: much of this increase due to growth in broadband numbers. In the second half of 2010, BSkyB reported that revenues increased by 15% to £3.2bn and their pre-tax profits were also on the way up to £467m. These latest figures are likely to put increasing pressure on News Corp’s takeover bid for the shares they do not own in BSkyB (61%), as share prices increase by 2%. Last summer, a bid of 700p per share was rejected and while both companies did agree to work together to determine if a future merger was viable, these higher share prices put BSkyB in a much stronger position.

However, before anything else happens, Rupert Murdoch’s company is waiting for regulatory approval from Ofcom for this takeover. BBC reports sugges that Ofcom has made an:

“unambiguous recommendation that News Corp’s plan to acquire all of BSkyB should be referred to the Competition Commission for further investigation.”

The Culture Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, has spoken of his intention to refer this potential merger to the Competition Commission, following Ofcom’s recommendation. There are concerns about the impact on competition and Rupert Murdochs’ increased influence over public opinion, if this merger were to go ahead. Any delays in finalizing a deal could benefit BSkyB, if their financial performance continues. Analysts suggest that the delay could be 6 months, while any investigation takes place. If profits continue to rise, share prices may also go up, requiring higher and higher bids by News Corp. Watch this space!

BSkyB profits soar 26% to £520m putting pressure on NewsCorp to increase takeover bid Daily Mail (27/1/11)
BSkyB reports big jump in profits BBC News (27/1/11)
BSkyB spends £7m on News Corp bid Guardian, Mark Sweney (27/1/11)
BSkyB result to highlight pressure on News Corp Reuters, Kate Holton (26/1/11)
HD TV, broad demand boosts BSkyB Telegraph (27/1/11)
News Corp bud for Sky should go to Competition Commission, recommends Ofcom Telegraph (27/1/11)
Call off the hunt Financial Times (20/1/11)
Numis raises BSkyB on expected News Corp deal delay Reuters (21/1/11)

Questions

  1. Explain what type of merger it would be between News Corp and BSkyB.
  2. What are the arguments (a) for the merger and (b) against the merger? Consider the impact on the public, the competitors, the workers etc.
  3. What is the role of Ofcom and the Competition Commission? How do their responsibilities differ?
  4. As demand for Sky’s products increases, what could we expect to see in terms of price? Now explain why your answer may not happen!
  5. Why have BSkyB’s share prices been affected? Is it the demand of supply of shares that has changed? Illustrate your answer on a diagram.

We have covered the issue of bank bonuses in previous blogs. See for example: Banking on bonuses? Not for much longer (November 2009); “We want our money back and we’re going to get it” (President Obama) (January 2010); and Payback time (Updated April 2010). But the issue has not been resolved. Despite public outrage around the world over the behaviour of banks that caused the credit crunch and about banks having to be bailed out with ‘taxpayers money’ and, as a result, people facing tax rises and cuts in public-sector services and jobs, bankers’ pay and bonuses are soaring once more. The individuals who caused the global economic crisis seem immune to the effects of their actions. But are things about to change?

The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has confirmed tough new guidelines on bank bonuses applying to all banks operating in the EU. The CEBS’s prime purpose in recommending restricting bonuses is to reduce the incentive for excessive and dangerous risk taking. As it states in paragraph 1 of the Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices:

Whilst institutions’ remuneration policies were not the direct cause of this crisis, their drawbacks, nonetheless, contributed to its gravity and scale. It was generally recognized that excessive remuneration in the financial sector fuelled a risk appetite that was disproportionate to the loss-absorption capacity of institutions and of the financial sector as a whole.

The guidelines include deferring 40–60% of bonuses for three to five years; paying a maximum of 50% of bonuses in cash (the remainder having to be in shares); setting a maximum bonus level as a percentage of an individual’s basic pay; appointing remuneration committees that are truly independent; publishing the pay and bonuses of all senior managers and ‘risk takers’. Although they are only recommendations, it is expected that bank regulators across the EU will implement them in full.

So will they be effective in curbing the pay and bonuses of top bank staff? Will they curb excessive risk taking? Or will banks simply find ways around the regulations? The following articles discuss these issues

Articles
Bankers’ bonuses to face strict limits in Europe BBC News, Hugh Pym (10/12/10)
Bankers’ bonuses to face strict limits in Europe BBC News (10/12/10)
Europe set to link banking bonuses to basic salaries The Telegraph, Louise Armitstead (10/12/10)
Some bankers may escape EU cash bonus limit moneycontrol.com (India) (11/12/10)
Banks to sidestep bonus crackdown by raising salaries Guardian, Jill Treanor (10/12/10)
Bonuses: When bank jobs pay Guardian (11/12/10)
Bank bonuses (portal page) Financial Times

Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)
CEBS home page
CEBS has today published its Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (CP42) CEBS news release (10/12/10)
Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (10/12/10)

Questions

  1. What are main objectives of the CEBS guidelines?
  2. Assess the arguments used by the banking industry in criticising the guidelines.
  3. In what ways can the banks get around these new regulations (assuming the guidelines are accepted by EU banking regulators)?
  4. What conditions would have to met for a remuneration committee to be truly independent?
  5. How likely is it that countries outside the EU will adopt similar regulations? How could they be persuaded to do so?

Everyone knows about ‘Google’ – a search engine. But, if you’ve happened to google ‘Google’ recently, you’ll be aware that it is being investigated by the European Commission, following claims by other search engines that it is abusing its dominant position.

It is not against the law to have a monopoly, but anti-trust legislation does make it illegal to abuse that dominant position. Those making the complaints argue that Google manipulates its search results and puts competing services further down the page whenever you search for something. The investigation has been launched following:

“complaints by search service providers about unfavourable treatment of their services in Google’s unpaid and sponsored search results coupled with an alleged preferential placement of Google’s own services.”

Google operates two services: unpaid results and ads. The investigation will aim to see whether the method that Google uses to generate unpaid results is to the detriment of its competitors. The following articles look at this issue.

EU to launch Google search investigation Guardian, Mark Sweney (30/11/10)
EU launches antitrust probe into alleged Google abuse BBC News (30/11/10)
EU launches investigation into allegations that Google abuses its dominance of internet search Telegraph, Rupert Neate (30/11/10)
Google faces European Competition Inquiry BBC News (24/02/10)
EU launches Google investigation after complaints Reuters (30/11/10)

Questions

  1. What are the characteristics of a monopoly? Why is it argued to be against the consumer’s interest?
  2. To what extent does Google have a monopoly over internet searches?
  3. What is the purpose of the investigation into Google? If Google is found guilty of ‘abusing its dominant position’, what action could be taken?
  4. Why is competition argued to be a good thing? Could the EU’s investigation actually not be in the interests of the public?

There has been a 38% increase in profit margins made by energy companies in the last 2 months and it is this which has prompted an investigation by Ofgem, the electricity and gas market regulator in the UK. Alistair Buchanan, Ofgem’s chief executive, said:

“With Britain facing an investment bill of £20bn over the next 10 years, consumers have the right to expect that the energy retail market is providing them with value for money. Our analysis published today shows an increase in company margins from £65 to £90 at a time of rising energy prices, which causes Ofgem to rightly ask if companies are playing it straight with consumers.”

Three of the big six suppliers have recently announced price rises and the fast-track review by Ofgem will consider whether consumers should be better protected. Scottish Power has increased gas prices by 2% and electricity prices by nearly 9%, meaning some customers may pay an extra £138 per year. British Gas is also planning on raising prices from December 10th, with gas and electricity bills expected to increase by 7%. Scottish and Southern Energy said it will increase domestic gas tariffs by 9.4%. EDF has promised a price freeze – at least until after the winter and nPower and E.ON are yet to announce their plans, but we can expect some form of a price rise.

While the review won’t make any difference to customer bills in the short term, Ofgem does have the power to make some changes to the way the companies are run. It is also expected that Ofgem will ask for more legislative support from the government and the Competition Commission. Although there are several suppliers in the energy market, each has market power and their dominance is preventing new firms from entering. As Adam Scorer, Director of Reputation and Impact at Consumer Focus, said:

“They do not feel the hot breath of competition on their necks.”

Articles

Energy firms facing gas and electricity price review BBC News (26/11/10)
Energy firms face new Ofgem enquiry over price rises and increased profits Telegraph, Andrew Hough (26/11/10)
Ofgem promises review as energy firms boost profit margins 38% Guardian, Jill Treanor (26/11/10)
Fuel bills: turning up the heat Guardian (27/11/10)
Energy firms face profit rise probe The Press Association (26/11/10)
Scepticism greets energy price probe Financial Times, David Blair (26/11/10)
UK utilities face review after recent price hikes Reuters (26/11/10)
UK to review retail energy market after price rises Bloomberg, Business Week, Kari Lundgren (26/11/10)
Has the toothless energy regulator learnt how to bite? Independent on Sunday, Julian Knight (28/11/10)
How to beat the energy price rise Telegraph (20/11/10)
Ofgem must mean business this time Herald (27/11/10)

Ofgem Press Release
Ofgem to review the effectiveness of the retail energy market to see if further action is needed to protect consumers Ofgem (26/11/10)

Questions

  1. What type of market structure is the UK energy market?
  2. The BBC News article talks about barriers preventing new competitors from entering the market. What types of barriers exist in this sector?
  3. What is a profit margin?
  4. What is likely to be the impact on family income following such price rises? Illustrate this on a diagram.
  5. Britain faces a £200 billion bill to invest in updating the energy network. What sort of updates are being referred to?
  6. What power do regulators such as Ofgem actually have? Why won’t they be able to change the amount that consumers pay?

Under the Basel II arrangements, banks were required to maintain particular capital adequacy ratios (CARs). These were to ensure that banks had sufficient capital to allow them to meet all demands from depositors and to cover losses if a borrower defaulted on payment. Basel II, it was (wrongly) thought would ensure that the banking system could not collapse.

There were three key ratios. The first was an overall minimum CAR of 8%, measured as Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets. As Economics 7th edition page 509 explains:

Tier 1 capital includes bank reserves (from retained profits) and ordinary share capital, where dividends to shareholders vary with the amount of profit the bank makes. Such capital thus places no burden on banks in times of losses as no dividend need be paid. What is more, unlike depositors, shareholders cannot ask for their money back. Tier 2 capital consists largely of preference shares. These pay a fixed rate of interest and thus do continue to place a burden on the bank even when losses are made (unless the bank goes out of business).

Risk-weighted assets are the value of assets, where each type of asset is multiplied by a risk factor. Under the internationally agreed Basel II accord, cash and government bonds have a risk factor of zero and are thus not included. Inter-bank lending between the major banks has a risk factor of 0.2 and is thus included at only 20 per cent of its value; residential mortgages have a risk factor of 0.35; personal loans, credit-card debt and overdrafts have a risk factor of 1; loans to companies carry a risk factor of 0.2, 0.5, 1 or 1.5, depending on the credit rating of the company. Thus the greater the average risk factor of a bank’s assets, the greater will be the value of its risk weighted assets, and the lower will be its CAR.

The second CAR was that Tier 1 capital should be at least 4% of risk weighted assets.

The third CAR was that equity capital (i.e. money raised from the issue of ordinary shares) should be at least 2% of risk weighted assets. This is known as the ‘core capital ratio’.

Before 2008, it was thought by most commentators that these capital adequacy ratios were sufficiently high. But then the banking crisis erupted. Banks were too exposed to sub-prime debt (i.e. debt that was excessively risky, such as mortgages on property at a time when property prices were rapidly declining). Much of this debt was disguised by being bundled up with other securities in what were known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy: the largest bankruptcy in history, with Lehmans owing $613 billion. Although its assets had a book value of $639, these were insufficiently liquid to enable Lehmans to meet the demands of its creditors.

The collapse of Lehmans sent shock waves around the world. Banks across the globe came under tremendous pressure. Many held too much sub-prime debt and had insufficient capital to meet creditors’ demands. As a result, they had to be bailed out by their governments. Clearly the Basel II regulations were too lax.

For several months there have been discussions about new tighter regulations and, on 12 September 2010, central bankers from the major countries met in Basel, Switzerland, and agreed the Basel III regulations. Although the overall CAR (Tier 1 and 2) was kept at 8%, the Tier 1 ratio was raised from 4% to 6% and the core Tier 1 ratio was raised from 2% to 4.5%, to be phased in by 2015. In addition there were two ‘buffers’ introduced.

As well as having to maintain a core Tier 1 ratio of 4.5%, banks would also have to hold a ‘conservation buffer’ of 2.5%. “The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions.” In effect, then, the core Tier 1 ratio will rise from 2% to 7% (i.e. 4.5% minimum plus a buffer of 2.5%).

The other buffer is a ‘countercyclical buffer’. This will be “within a range of 0% – 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital and will be implemented according to national circumstances.” The idea of this buffer is to allow banks to withstand volatility in the global economy. It will be phased in between 2016 and 2019.

The Basel III agreement will still need to be ratified by the G20 countries meeting at Seoul on 10 and 11 November this year. That meeting will also consider other elements of bank regulation.

So will these extra capital requirements be sufficient to allow banks to withstand any future crisis? The following articles discuss this question.

Articles
Global bankers agree new capital reserve rules BBC News (12/9/10)
Q&A: Basel rules on bank capital – who cares? BBC News, Laurence Knight (13/9/10)
Basel III and Sound Banking New American, Charles Scaliger (17/9/10)
Wishy-washy rules might come back to haunt regulators Financial Times, Patrick Jenkins (18/9/10)
Basel III proposal released Newsweek, Joel Schectman (17/9/10)
New Bank Rules May Not Prevent More Meltdowns FXstreet, Henrik Arnt (16/9/10)
Basel III CBS Money Watch, Mark Thoma (14/9/10)
Basel III: To lend or not to lend Investment Week, Martin Morris (16/9/10)
Taming the banks The Economist (16/9/10)
Basel’s buttress The Economist (16/9/10)
Do new bank-capital requirements pose a risk to growth? The Economist, guest contributions
Myners: New rules ‘ignore bank liquidity’ BBC Today Programme, Robert Peston and Lord Myners (18/9/10)

Official press releases and documents
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards Bank for International Settlements Press Release (12/9/10)
The Basel iii Accord Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA)
Details of the new capital requirements Bank for International Settlements
Details of the phase-in arrangements Bank for International Settlements

Questions

  1. What impact will a higher capital adequacy ratio have on banks’ behaviour?
  2. For what reasons may the Basel III regulations be considered too lax?
  3. When there is an increase in deposits into the banking sector, banks can increase loans by a multiple of this. This bank deposits multiplier is the inverse of the liquidity ratio. Is there a similar bank capital multiplier and, if so, what determines its size?
  4. Why will Basel III be phased in over a number of years? Is this too long?