Tag: regulation

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming the way we live and work, with many of us knowingly or unknowingly using some form of AI daily. Businesses are also adopting AI in increasingly innovative ways. One example of this is the use of pricing algorithms, which use large datasets on market conditions to set prices.

While these tools can drive innovation and efficiency, they can also raise significant competition concerns. Subsequently, competition authorities around the world are dedicating efforts to understanding how businesses are using AI and, importantly, the potential risks its use may pose to competition.

How AI pricing tools can enhance competition

The use of AI pricing tools offers some clear potential efficiencies for firms, with the potential to reduce costs that can potentially translate into lower prices for consumers.

Take, for instance, industries with highly fluctuating demand, such as airlines or hotels. Algorithms can enable businesses to monitor demand and supply in real time and respond more quickly, which could help firms to respond more effectively to changing consumer preferences. Similarly, in industries which have extensive product ranges, like supermarkets, algorithms can significantly reduce costs and save resources that are usually required to manage pricing strategies across a large range of products.

Furthermore, as pricing algorithms can monitor competitors’ prices, firms can more quickly respond to their rivals. This could promote competition by helping prices to reach the competitive level more quickly, to the benefit of consumers.

How AI pricing tools can undermine competition

However, some of the very features that make algorithms effective can also facilitate anti-competitive behaviour that can harm consumers. In economic terms, collusion occurs when firms co-ordinate their actions to reduce competition, often leading to higher prices. This can happen both explicitly or implicitly. Explicit collusion, commonly referred to as illegal cartels, involves firms agreeing to co-ordinate their prices instead of competing. On the other hand, tacit collusion occurs when firms’ pricing strategies are aligned without a formal agreement.

The ability for these algorithms to monitor competitors’ prices and react to changes quickly could work to facilitate collusion, by learning to avoid price wars to maximise long-term profits. This could result in harm to consumers through sustained higher prices.

Furthermore, there may be additional risks if competitors use the same algorithmic software to set prices. This can facilitate the sharing of confidential information (such as pricing strategies) and, as the algorithms may be able to predict the response of their competitors, can facilitate co-ordination to achieve higher prices to the detriment of consumers.

This situation may resemble what is known as a ‘hub and spoke’ cartel, in which competing firms (the ‘spokes’) use the assistance of another firm at a different level of the supply chain (e.g. a buyer or supplier that acts as a ‘hub’) to help them co-ordinate their actions. In this case, a shared artificial pricing tool can act as the ‘hub’ to enable co-ordination amongst the firms, even without any direct communication between the firms.

In 2015 the CMA investigated a cartel involving two companies, Trod Limited and GB Eye Limited, which were selling posters and frames through Amazon (see linked CMA Press release below). These firms used pricing algorithms, similar to those described above, to monitor and adjust their prices, ensuring that neither undercut the other. In this case, there was also an explicit agreement between the two firms to carry out this strategy.

What does this mean for competition policy?

Detecting collusion has always been a significant challenge for the competition authorities, especially when no formal agreement exists between firms. The adoption of algorithmic pricing adds another layer of complexity to detection of cartels and could raise questions about accountability when algorithms inadvertently facilitate collusion.

In the posters and frames case, the CMA was able to act because one of the firms involved reported the cartel itself. Authorities like the CMA depend heavily on the firms involved to ‘whistle blow’ and report cartel involvement. They incentivise firms to do this through leniency policies that can offer firms reduced penalties or even complete immunity if they provide evidence and co-operate with the investigation. For example, GB eye reported the cartel to the CMA and therefore, under the CMA’s leniency policy, was not fined.

But it’s not all doom and gloom for competition authorities. Developments in Artificial Intelligence could also open doors to improved detection tools, which may have come a long way since the discussion in a blog on this topic several years ago. Competition Authorities around the world are working diligently to expand their understanding of AI and develop effective regulations for these rapidly evolving markets.

Articles

Questions

  1. In what types of markets might it be more likely that artificial intelligence can facilitate collusion?
  2. How could AI pricing tools impact the factors that make collusion more or less sustainable in a market?
  3. What can competition authorities do to prevent AI-assisted collusion taking place?

The UK government announced on 14 October 2024 in a ministerial statement that it intended to raise the threshold for the ring-fencing (separation) of retail and investment banking activities of large UK-based banks. These banks are known as ‘systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)’, which are currently defined as those with more than £25bn of core retail deposits. Under the new regulations, the threshold would rise from £25bn to £35bn.

Ring-fencing is the separation of one set of banking services from another. This separation can be geographical or functional. The UK adopted the latter approach, where ring-fencing is the separation of core retail banking services, such as taking deposits, making payments and granting loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from investment banking and international operations. The intention of ring-fencing was to prevent contagion – to protect essential retail banking services from the risks involved in investment banking activities.

Reducing regulation to increase competition

Raising the limit is intended to facilitate greater competition in the retail banking sector. In recent years, US banks, such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs, have been expanding their depositor base in the UK under their respective brands – Chase UK and Marcus.

These relatively small UK subsidiaries were not ring-fenced from their wider investment banking operations as their retail deposits were under (but not far under) the £25bn limit. However, this restricted their ability to increase market share further without bearing the additional regulatory burden associated with ring-fencing that much larger incumbents face. Raising the threshold would allow them to expand to the higher limit without the regulatory burden.

The proposals are part of a broader package of reforms aimed at reducing the regulatory burden on UK-based banks. The hope is that this will stimulate greater lending to SMEs to boost investment and productivity.

The proposals also include a new ‘secondary’ threshold. This will exempt banks providing primarily retail banking services from the rules governing the provision of investment banking accounts. This exemption will apply as long as their investment banking is less than 10% of their tier 1 capital. (Tier 1 capital is currently the buffer which banks are required to retain in case of a crisis.) The changes were the outcome of a review conducted in 2022 but had not been implemented by the previous government.

The announcement has sparked a debate about ring-fencing, with some commentators calling for it to be removed altogether. Therefore, it is timely to revisit the rationale for ring-fencing. This blog examines what ring-fencing is and why it was introduced, and explains the associated economic costs and benefits.

Why was ring-fencing introduced?

Ring-fencing was recommended by the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) in 2011 (see link below) and implemented through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013. The proposed separation of core retail banking services from investment banking were intended to address issues in banks which arose during the global financial crisis and which required substantial taxpayer bailouts. (See the 2011 blog, Taking the gambling out of high street banking (update).)

Following deregulation and liberalisation of financial services in the 1980s, many UK banks had extended their operations so that they combined domestic retail operations with substantial investment and international operations. The intention was to open up all dimensions of financial services to greater competition and allow banks to exploit economies of scope between retail and investment banking.

However, the risks associated with these services are very different but, in the period before the financial crisis, were provided alongside one another within banking groups.

One significant risk which was not fully recognised at the time was contagion – problems in one dimension of a bank’s activity could severely compromise its ability to provide services in other areas. This is what happened during the financial crisis. Many of the UK banks’ investment operations had made significant investments in off-balance sheet securitised debt instruments – CDOs being the most famous example. (See the 2018 blog, Lehman Brothers: have we learned the lessons 10 years on?.)

When that market crashed in 2007, several UK-based banks incurred significant losses, as did other banks around the world. Given their thin equity buffers and the inability to borrow due to a credit crunch, such banks found it impossible to bear these losses.

The UK government had to step in to save these institutions from failing. If it had not, there would have been significant economic and social costs associated with their inability to provide core retail banking functions. (See the 2017 blog, Ten years on.)

The Independent Commission proposed that ‘the risks inevitably associated with banking have to sit somewhere, and it should not be with taxpayers. Nor do ordinary depositors have the incentive (given deposit insurance to guard against runs) or the practical ability to monitor or bear those risks’ (p.9). Unstructured banks, with no separation of retail from investment activities, increase the potential for both of these stakeholder groups to bear the risks of investment banking.

Structural separation of retail and investment banking addresses this problem. First, separation should make it easier and less costly to resolve problems for banks that get into trouble, avoiding the need for taxpayer bailouts. Second, structural separation should help to insulate retail banking from external financial shocks, ensuring that customer deposits and essential banking services are protected.

Problems of ring-fencing

Ring-fencing has been subject to criticism, however, which has led to calls for it to be scrapped.

It must be noted that most of the criticism comes from banks themselves. They state that it required significant operational restructuring by UK banks subject to the regulatory framework which was complex and costly.

In addition, segregating activities can lead to inefficiencies, as banks may not be able to take full advantage of economies of scope between investment and retail banking. Furthermore, ring-fencing could lead to a misallocation of capital, where resources are trapped in one part of the bank and cannot be used to invest in other areas, potentially increasing the risks of the specific areas.

Assessing the new proposals

It is argued that the increased threshold proposed by the authorities may put UK institutions at a competitive disadvantage to outside entrants that are building market share from a low base. Smaller entrants do not have to engage in the costly restructuring that the larger UK incumbents have. They can exploit scope economies and capital mobility within their international businesses to cross-subsidise their retail services in the UK which incumbents with larger deposit-bases are not able to.

However, the UK market for retail banking has significant barriers to entry. Following the acquisition of Virgin Money by Nationwide, only six banking groups in the UK meet the current threshold (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, NatWest Group, Santander UK and TSB). Indeed, all of those have deposits well above the proposed £35bn threshold. Consequently, raising the threshold should not add significant compliance and efficiency costs, while the potential benefits of greater competition for depositors and SMEs could be a substantial boost to investment and productivity. Furthermore, if the new US entrants do suffer problems, it will not be UK taxpayers who will be liable.

Have we been here before?

In many ways, ring-fencing is a throwback to a previous age of regulation.

One of the most famous Acts of Congress relating to finance and financial markets in the USA is the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The Act was passed in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street crash and the onset of the Great Depression in the USA. That witnessed significant bank failures across the country and problems were traced back to significant losses made by banks in their lending to investors during the speculative frenzy that preceded the stock market crash of 1929.

To prevent a repeat of the contagion and ensure financial stability, Glass-Steagall legislated to separate retail banks and investment banks.

In the UK, such separation had long existed due to the historical restrictions placed on investment banks operating in the City of London. In the late 20th century, the arguments for separation became outweighed by arguments for the liberalisation of markets to improve efficiency and competition in financial services. Banking was increasingly deregulated and separation disappeared as retail banks increasingly engaged in investment activities.

That cycle of deregulation reached its nadir in 2007 with the international financial crisis. The need to bail out banks made it clear that the supposed synergies between investment and retail banking were no compensation for the high costs of contagion in the financial system.

Regulators must be wary of calls for the removal of ring-fencing. Sir John Vickers (chairman of the independent commission on banking) highlighted the need to protect depositors, and more importantly taxpayers, from risks in banking. It is the banks that should bear the risks and manage them accordingly. Ultimately, it is up to the banks to do that better.

Articles

Bank annual reports

Access these annual reports to check the deposit base of these UK banks:

Information

Report

  • Final Report: Recommendations
  • The Independent Commission on Banking, Sir John Vickers (Chair), Clare Spottiswoode, Martin Taylor, Bill Winters and Martin Wolf (September 2011)

Questions

  1. How did the structure of UK banks cause contagion risk in the period before the global financial crisis?
  2. How does ring-fencing aim to address this and protect depositors and taxpayers?
  3. Use the links to the annual reports of the covered banks to assess the extent of deposits held by the institutions in 2023. How far above the proposed buffer do the banks sit?
  4. Use your answer to 3) and economic concepts to analyse the impact on competition in the UK market for retail deposits of raising the threshold.
  5. What are the risks for financial stability of raising the threshold?

The global battle for fuel is expected to peak this winter. The combination of rising demand and a tightening of supply has sparked concerns of shortages in the market. Some people are worried about another ‘winter of discontent’. Gas prices have risen fivefold in Europe as a whole.

In the UK, consumers are likely to find that the natural gas needed to heat their homes this October will cost at least five times more than it did a year ago. This surge in wholesale gas prices has seen several UK energy suppliers stop trading as they are unable to make a profit. This is because of an energy price cap for some consumers and various fixed price deals they had signed with their customers.

There are thus fears of an energy crisis in the UK, especially if there is a cold winter. There are even warnings that during a cold snap, gas supply to various energy-intensive firms may be cut off. This comes at a time when some of these industries are struggling to make a profit.

Demand and supply

The current situation is a combination of long- and short-term factors. In spring 2020, the demand for gas actually decreased due to the pandemic. This resulted in low gas prices, reduced UK production and delayed maintenance work and investment along global supply chains. However, since early 2021, consumer demand for gas has soared. First, there was an increased demand due to the Artic weather conditions last winter. This was then followed by heatwaves in the USA and Europe over the summer, which saw an increase in the use of air conditioning units. With the increased demand combined with calm weather conditions, wind turbines couldn’t supply enough power to meet demand.

There has also been a longer-term impact on demand throughout the industry due to the move to cleaner energy. The transitioning to wind and solar has seen a medium-term increase in the demand for gas. There is also a long-term impact of the target for net zero economies in the UK and Europe. This has hindered investors’ willingness to invest in developing supplies of fossil fuels due the fact they could become obsolete over the next few decades.

Nations have also been unable to build up enough supplies for winter. This is partly due to Europe’s domestic gas stocks having declined by 30% per cent in the past decade. This heightened situation is leading to concerns that there will be black-outs or cut-offs in gas this winter.

Importation of gas

A concern for the UK is that it has scant storage facilities with no long-term storage. The UK currently has very modest amounts of storage – less than 6% of annual demand and some five times less than the average in the rest of Europe. It has been increasingly operating a ‘just-in-time model’, which is more affected by short-term price fluctuations in the wholesale gas market. With wind power generation remaining lower than average during summer 2021, more gas than usual has been used to generate electricity, leaving less gas to go into storage.

However, some argue that the problem is not just the UK’s physical supply of gas but demand for gas from elsewhere. Around half of the UK’s supply comes from its own production sites, while the rest is piped in from Europe or shipped in as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the USA, Qatar and Russia. In 2019, the UK imported almost 20% of its gas through LNG shipments. However, Asian gas demand has grown rapidly, expanding by 50% over the past decade. This has meant that LNG has now become much harder to secure.

The issue is the price the UK has to pay to continue receiving these supplies. Some in the gas industry believe the price surge is only temporary, caused by economic disruptions, while many others say it highlights a structural weakness in a continent that has become too reliant on imported gas. It can be argued that the gas crisis has highlighted the lack of a coherent strategy to manage the gas industry as the UK transitions to a net zero economy. The lack of any industry investment in new capacity suggests that there is currently no business case for new long-term storage in the UK, especially as gas demand is expected to continue falling over the longer term.

Impact on consumers and industry

Gas prices for suppliers have increased fivefold over the past year. Therefore, many companies face a considerable rise in their bills. MSome may need to reduce or pause production – or even cease trading – which could cause job losses. Alternatively, they could pass on their increased costs to customers by charging them higher prices. Although energy-intensive industries are particularly exposed, every company that has to pay energy bills will be affected. Due to the growing concerns about the security of winter gas supplies those industries reliant on gas, such as the fertiliser industry, are restricting production, threatening various supply chains.

Most big domestic gas suppliers buy their gas months in advance, meaning they will most likely pass on the higher price rises they have experienced in the past few months. The increased demand and decreased supply has already meant meant that customers have faced higher prices for their energy. The UK has been badly hit because it’s one of Europe’s biggest users of natural gas – 85% of homes use gas central heating – and it also generates a third of the country’s electricity.

The rising bills are particularly an issue for those customers on a variable tariff. About 15 million households have seen their energy bills rise by 12% since the beginning of October due to the rise in the government’s energy price cap calculated by the regulator, Ofgem. A major concern is that this increase in bills comes at a time when the need to use more heating and lighting is approaching. It also coincides with other price rises hitting family budgets and the withdrawal of COVID support schemes.

Government intervention – maximum pricing

If the government feels that the equilibrium price in a particular market is too high, it can intervene in the market and set a maximum price. When the government intervenes in this way, it sets a price ceiling on certain basic goods or services and does not permit the price to go above that set limit. A maximum price is normally set for reasons of fairness and to benefit consumers on low incomes. Examples include energy price caps to order to control fuel bills, rent controls in order to improve affordability of housing, a cap on mobile roaming charges within the EU and price capping for regional monopoly water companies.

The energy price cap

Even without the prospect of a colder than normal winter, bills are still increasing. October’s increase in the fuel cap means that many annual household fuel bills will rise by £135 or more. The price cap sets the maximum price that suppliers in England, Wales and Scotland can charge domestic customers on a standard, or default tariff. The cap has come under the spotlight owing to the crisis among suppliers, which has seen eleven firms fold, with more expected.

The regulator Ofgem sets a price cap for domestic energy twice a year. The latest level came into place on 1 October. It is a cap on the price of energy that suppliers can charge. The price cap is based on a broad estimate of how much it costs a supplier to provide gas and electricity services to a customer. The calculation is mainly made up of wholesale energy costs, network costs such as maintaining pipes and wires, policy costs including Government social and environmental schemes, operating costs such as billing and metering services and VAT. Therefore, suppliers can only pass on legitimate costs of supplying energy and cannot charge more than the level of the price cap, although they can charge less. A household’s total bill is still determined by how much gas and electricity is used.

  • Those on standard tariffs, with typical household levels of energy use, will see an increase of £139.
  • People with prepayment meters, with average energy use, will see an annual increase of £153.
  • Households on fixed tariffs will be unaffected. However, those coming to the end of a contract are automatically moved to a default tariff set at the new level.

Ordinarily, customers are able to shop around for cheaper deals, but currently, the high wholesale prices of gas means that cheaper deals are not available.

Despite the cap limiting how much providers can raise prices, the current increase is the biggest (and to the highest amount) since the cap was introduced in January 2019. As providers are scarcely making a profit on gas, there are concerns that a further increase in wholesale prices will cause more suppliers to be forced out of business. Ofgem said that the cap is likely to go up again in April, the next time it is reviewed.

Conclusion

The record prices being paid by suppliers and deficits in gas supply across the world have stoked fears that the energy crisis will get worse. It comes at a time when households are already facing rising bills, while some energy-intensive industries have started to slow production. This has started to dent optimism around the post-pandemic economic recovery.

Historically, UK governments have trusted market mechanisms to deliver UK gas security. However, consumers are having to pay the cost of such an approach. The price cap has meant the UK’s gas bills have until now been typically lower than the EU average. However, the rise in prices comes on top of other economic problems such as labour shortages and increasing food prices, adding up to an unwelcome rise in the cost of living.

Video

Articles

UK government/Ofgem

Questions

  1. Using a supply and demand diagram, illustrate what has happened in the energy market over the past year.
  2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of government intervention in a free market?
  3. Explain why it is necessary for the regulator to intervene in the energy market.
  4. Using the concept of maximum pricing, illustrate how the price cap works.

For many goods and services, economists argue that relatively unregulated markets often do a pretty good job in delivering desirable outcomes from society’s view point.

However, for these desirable outcomes to occur, certain conditions need to be present. One of these is that all the benefits and costs of consuming and producing the good/service must be experienced/incurred by the buyers and sellers directly involved in the transaction: i.e. there are no externalities. The market can still work effectively if people outside of the transaction are affected (i.e. third parties) but the impact occurs through the price mechanism.

The fast fashion industry

Fast fashion refers to designs and trends that rapidly pass from catwalks and designers to retailers. The clothes sell for low prices and in high quantities. The business model relies on regular purchases and impulse buying. It is particularly popular in the UK where annual clothing consumption per capita is significantly greater than in other European countries – 26.7kg vs 16.7kg in Germany and 14.5kg in Italy. On average, people in the UK have 115 items of clothing. Unsurprisingly, 30 per cent of these garments have not been worn for at least 12 months.

Externalities in fast fashion

There is lots of evidence that the fast fashion market fails to meet the condition of no externalities. Instead, it generates lots of external costs across its whole supply chain that do not affect third parties through the price mechanism. For example:

  • Growing cotton requires large amounts of water. Some estimates suggest that on average it takes 10 000 litres of water to cultivate just one kilogram of cotton. As water is a common resource (rival and non-excludable), its use in cotton production can exceed socially desirable levels. This can have serious consequences for both the quantity of drinking and ground water and can lead to previously fertile land being transformed into arid regions that are too dry to support vegetation.
  • Growing cotton also uses large amounts of pesticide. Some estimates suggest that 6 per cent of global pesticide production is applied to cotton crops. Extended contact with these chemicals can cause illness and infertility. It also has a negative impact on the long-term productivity of the soil. For example, the chemicals destroy microorganisms, plants and insects and so decrease biodiversity.
  • The manufacture of synthetic fibres such as polyester has a smaller negative impact on the use of water and land than the cultivation of a natural fibre such as cotton. However, because it is derived from oil, its manufacture generates more CO2 emissions. One study compared the CO2 emissions from producing the same shirt using polyester and cotton. The former generated 5.5kg whereas the latter produced 2.1kg.
  • The waste water from the use of solvents, bleaches and synthetic dyes in the manufacture of textiles/garments often flows untreated into local rivers and water systems. This is especially the case in developing countries. Estimates suggest that this is responsible for between 17 and 20 per cent of industrial global water pollution.
  • There are excessive levels of textile waste. This can be split into producer waste and consumer waste. Producer waste consists of 10–15 per cent of the fabric used in the manufacture of garments that ends up on the cutting room floor. It also includes deadstock – unsold and returned garments. For example, Burberry admitted that in 2017 it incinerated £28.6 million of unsold stock. In the same year, UK consumers disposed of 530 000 tonnes of unwanted clothing, shoes, bags and belts. This all went for landfill and incineration.
  • Textiles are one of the major sources of microplastic pollution and contribute 35 per cent (190 000 tonnes) of microplastic pollution in the oceans. A 6kg domestic wash can release as many as 700 000 synthetic fibres.

Addressing the externalities

The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee published a report on the fashion industry in February 2019. One of its key recommendations was that the tax system should be reformed so that it rewards fashion companies that design products with lower environmental impacts.

The UK government has tended to focus on the use of plastic rather than textiles. For example, it introduced a charge for single use carrier bags as well as banning the use of microbeads in rinse-off personal products and plastic straws/stirrers.

In April 2022, a new tax is being introduced in the UK on the plastic packaging of finished goods that is either manufactured in the UK or imported from abroad. The rate, set at £200 per metric tonne, will apply to packaging that contains less than 30 per cent of recycled plastic.

One specific proposal made by the Environmental Audit Committee was for the government to consider extending this new tax to textiles that contain less than 50 per cent recycled polyester. A recent study found that just under 50 per cent of clothes for sale on leading online websites were made entirely from new plastics.

The committee also called for the introduction of an extended producer responsibility scheme. This would make textile businesses responsible for the environmental impact of their products: i.e. they would have to contribute towards the cost of collecting, moving, recycling and disposing of their garments. It could involve the payment of an up-front fee, the size of which would depend on the environmental impact of the product.

In its Waste Prevention Programme for England published in March 2021, the government announced plans to consult with stakeholders about the possibility of introducing an ‘extended producer responsibility scheme’ in the textile industry. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee is also carrying out a follow-up inquiry to its 2019 report.

Articles

Government and Parliament documents and reports

Questions

  1. Using the concepts of rivalry and excludability, define the concept of a common resource.
  2. Explain the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and how it might apply to the use of water in the cultivation of cotton.
  3. Draw a diagram to illustrate how negative externalities in consumption and production lead to inefficient levels of output in an unregulated competitive market.
  4. Using a diagram, explain how imposing a tax on producers of textile products that contain less than 50 per cent recycled polyester could reduce economic inefficiency.
  5. Explain the potential limitations of using taxation/regulation to address the pollution issues created by the fast fashion sector.

The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published the first part of its latest seven-yearly Assessment Report (AR6) on global warming and its consequences (see video summary). The report was prepared by 234 scientists from 66 countries and endorsed by 195 governments. Its forecasts are stark. World temperatures, already 1.1C above pre-industrial levels, will continue to rise. This will bring further rises in sea levels and more extreme weather conditions with more droughts, floods, wildfires, hurricanes and glacial melting.

The IPCC looked at a number of scenarios with different levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Even in the most optimistic scenarios, where significant steps are taken to cut emissions, global warming is set to reach 1.5C by 2040. If few or no cuts are made, global warming is predicted to reach 4.4C by 2080, the effects of which would be catastrophic.

The articles below go into considerable detail on the different scenarios and their consequences. Here we focus on the economic causes of the crisis and the policies that need to be pursued.

Global success in reducing emissions, although partly dependent on technological developments and their impact on costs, will depend largely on the will of individuals, firms and governments to take action. These actions will be influenced by incentives, economic, social and political.

Economic causes of the climate emergency

The allocation of resources across the world is through a mixture of the market and government intervention, with the mix varying from country to country. But both market and government allocation suffer from a failure to meet social and environmental objectives – and such objectives change over time with the preferences of citizens and with the development of scientific knowledge.

The market fails to achieve a socially efficient use of the environment because large parts of the environment are a common resource (such as the air and the oceans), because production or consumption often generates environmental externalities, because of ignorance of the environmental effects of our actions, and because of a lack of concern for future generations.

Governments fail because of the dominance of short-term objectives, such as winning the next election or appeasing a population which itself has short-term objectives related to the volume of current consumption. Governments are often reluctant to ask people to make sacrifices today for the future – a future when there will be a different government. What is more, government action on the environment which involves sacrifices from their own population, often primarily benefit people in other countries and/or future generations. This makes it harder for governments to get popular backing for such policies.

Economic systems are sub-optimal when there are perverse incentives, such as advertising persuading people to consume more despite its effects on the environment, or subsidies for industries producing negative environmental externalities. But if people can see the effects of global warming affecting their lives today, though fires, floods, droughts, hurricanes, rising sea levels, etc., they are more likely to be willing to take action today or for their governments to do so, even if it involves various sacrifices. Scientists, teachers, journalists and politicians can help to drive changes in public opinion through education and appealing to people’s concern for others and for future generations, including their own descendants.

Policy implications of the IPCC report

At the COP26 meeting in Glasgow in November, countries will gather to make commitments to tackle climate change. The IPCC report is clear: although we are on course for a 1.5C rise in global temperatures by 2040, it is not too late to take action to prevent rises going much higher: to avoid the attendant damage to the planet and changes to weather systems, and the accompanying costs to lives and livelihoods. Carbon neutrality must be reached as soon as possible and this requires strong action now. It is not enough for government to set dates for achieving carbon neutrality, they must adopt policies that immediately begin reducing emissions.

The articles look at various policies that governments can adopt. They also look at actions that can be taken by people and businesses, actions that can be stimulated by government incentives and by social pressures. Examples include:

  • A rapid phasing out of fossil fuel power stations. This may require legislation and/or the use of taxes on fossil fuel generation and subsidies for green energy.
  • A rapid move to green transport, with investment in charging infrastructure for electric cars, subsidies for electric cars, a ban on new petrol and diesel vehicles in the near future, investment in hydrogen fuel cell technology for lorries and hydrogen production and infrastructure, cycle lanes and various incentives to cycle.
  • A rapid shift away from gas for cooking and heating homes and workplaces and a move to ground source heating, solar panels and efficient electric heating combined with battery storage using electricity during the night. These again may require a mix of investment, legislation, taxes and subsidies.
  • Improvements in energy efficiency, with better insulation of homes and workplaces.
  • Education, public information and discussion in the media and with friends on ways in which people can reduce their carbon emissions. Things we can do include walking and cycling more, getting an electric car and reducing flying, eating less meat and dairy, reducing food waste, stopping using peat as compost, reducing heating in the home and putting on more clothes, installing better insulation and draught proofing, buying more second-hand products, repairing products where possible rather than replacing them, and so on.
  • Governments requiring businesses to conduct and publish green audits and providing a range of incentives and regulations for businesses to reduce carbon emissions.

It is easy for governments to produce plans and to make long-term commitments that will fall on future governments to deliver. What is important is that radical measures are taken now. The problem is that governments are likely to face resistance from their supporters and from members of the public and various business who resist facing higher costs now. It is thus important that the pressures on governments to make radical and speedy reductions in emissions are greater than the pressures to do little or nothing and that governments are held to account for their actions and that their actions match their rhetoric.

Articles

Report

Questions

  1. Summarise the effects of different levels of global warming as predicted by the IPCC report.
  2. To what extent is global warming an example of the ‘tragedy of the commons’?
  3. How could prices be affected by government policy so as to provide an incentive to reduce carbon emissions?
  4. What incentives could be put in place to encourage people to cut their own individual carbon footprint?
  5. To what extent is game theory relevant to understanding the difficulties of achieving international action on reducing carbon emissions?
  6. Identify four different measures that a government could adopt to reduce carbon emissions and assess the likely effectiveness of these measures.