The article below looks at the economy of Brazil. The statistics do not look good. Real output fell last year by 3.8% and this year it is expected to fall by another 3.3%. Inflation this year is expected to be 9.0% and unemployment 11.2%, with the government deficit expected to be 10.4% of GDP.
The article considers Keynesian economics in the light of the case of Brazil, which is suffering from declining potential supply, but excess demand. It compares Brazil with the case of most developed countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Here countries have suffered from a lack of demand, made worse by austerity policies, and only helped by expansionary monetary policy. But the effect of the monetary policy has generally been weak, as much of the extra money has been used to purchase assets rather than funding a growth in aggregate demand.
Different policy prescriptions are proposed in the article. For developed countries struggling to grow, the solution would seem to be expansionary fiscal policy, made easy to fund by lower interest rates. For Brazil, by contrast, the solution proposed is one of austerity. Fiscal policy should be tightened. As the article states:
Spending restraint might well prove painful for some members of Brazilian society. But hyperinflation and default are hardly a walk in the park for those struggling to get by. Generally speaking, austerity has been a misguided policy approach in recent years. But Brazil is a special case. For now, anyway.
The tight fiscal policies could be accompanied by supply-side policies aimed at reducing bureaucracy and inefficiency.
Brazil and the new old normal: There is more than one kind of economic mess to be in The Economist, Free Exchange Economics (12/10/16)
- Explain what is meant by ‘crowding out’.
- What is meant by the ‘liquidity trap’? Why are many countries in the developed world currently in a liquidity trap?
- Why have central banks in the developed world found it difficult to stimulate growth with policies of quantitative easing?
- Under what circumstances would austerity policies be valuable in the developed world?
- Why is crowding out of fiscal policy unlikely to occur to any great extent in Europe, but is highly likely to occur in Brazil?
- What has happened to potential GDP in Brazil in the past couple of years?
- What is meant by the ‘terms of trade’? Why have Brazil’s terms of trade deteriorated?
- What sort of policies could the Brazilian government pursue to raise growth rates? Are these demand-side or supply-side policies?
- Should Brazil pursue austerity policies and, if so, what form should they take?
The UK has voted to leave the EU by 17 410 742 votes (51.9% or 37.4% of the electorate) to 16 141 241 votes (48.1% or 34.7% of the electorate). But what will be the economic consequences of the vote?
To leave the EU, Article 50 must be invoked, which starts the process of negotiating the new relationship with the EU. This, according to David Cameron, will happen when a new Conservative Prime Minister is chosen. Once Article 50 has been invoked, negotiations must be completed within two years and then the remaining 27 countries will decide on the new terms on which the UK can trade with the EU. As explained in the blog, The UK’s EU referendum: the economic arguments, there are various forms the new arrangements could take. These include:
‘The Norwegian model’, where Britain leaves the EU, but joins the European Economic Area, giving access to the single market, but removing regulation in some key areas, such as fisheries and home affairs. Another possibility is ‘the Swiss model’, where the UK would negotiate trade deals on an individual basis. Another would be ‘the Turkish model’ where the UK forms a customs union with the EU. At the extreme, the UK could make a complete break from the EU and simply use its membership of the WTO to make trade agreements.
The long-term economic effects would thus depend on which model is adopted. In the Norwegian model, the UK would remain in the single market, which would involve free trade with the EU, the free movement of labour between the UK and member states and contributions to the EU budget. The UK would no longer have a vote in the EU on its future direction. Such an outcome is unlikely, however, given that a central argument of the Leave camp has been for the UK to be able to control migration and not to have to pay contributions to the EU budget.
It is quite likely, then, that the UK would trade with the EU on the basis of individual trade deals. This could involve tariffs on exports to the EU and would involve being subject to EU regulations. Such negotiations could be protracted and potentially extend beyond the two-year deadline under Article 50. But for this to happen, there would have to be agreement by the remaining 27 EU countries. At the end of the two-year process, when the UK exits the EU, any unresolved negotiations would default to the terms for other countries outside the EU. EU treaties would cease to apply to the UK.
It is quite likely, then, that the UK would face trade restrictions on its exports to the EU, which would adversely affect firms for whom the EU is a significant market. Where practical, some firms may thus choose to relocate from the UK to the EU or move business and staff from UK offices to offices within the EU. This is particularly relevant to the financial services sector. As the second Economist article explains:
In the longer run … Britain’s financial industry could face severe difficulties. It thrives on the EU’s ‘passport’ rules, under which banks, asset managers and other financial firms in one member state may serve customers in the other 27 without setting up local operations. …
Unless passports are renewed or replaced, they will lapse when Britain leaves. A deal is imaginable: the EU may deem Britain’s regulations as ‘equivalent’ to its own. But agreement may not come easily. French and German politicians, keen to bolster their own financial centres and facing elections next year, may drive a hard bargain. No other non-member has full passport rights.
But if long-term economic effects are hard to predict, short-term effects are happening already.
The pound fell sharply as soon as the results of the referendum became clear. By the end of the day it had depreciated by 7.7% against the dollar and 5.7% against the euro. A lower pound will make imports more expensive and hence will drive up prices and reduce the real value of sterling. On the other had, it will make exports cheaper and act as a boost to exports.
If inflation rises, then the Bank of England may raise interest rates. This could have a dampening effect on the economy, which in turn would reduce tax revenues. The government, if it sticks to its fiscal target of achieving a public-sector net surplus by 2020 (the Fiscal Mandate), may then feel the need to cut government expenditure and/or raise taxes. Indeed, the Chancellor argued before the vote that such an austerity budget may be necessary following a vote to leave.
Higher interest rates could also dampen house prices as mortgages became more expensive or harder to obtain. The exception could be the top end of the market where a large proportion are buyers from outside the UK whose demand would be boosted by the depreciation of sterling.
But given that the Bank of England’s remit is to target inflation in 24 month’s time, it is possible that any spike in inflation is temporary and this may give the Bank of England leeway to cut Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25% or even 0% and/or to engage in further quantitative easing.
One major worry is that uncertainty may discourage investment by domestic companies. It could also discourage inward investment, and international companies many divert investment to the EU. Already some multinationals have indicated that they will do just this. Shares in banks plummeted when the results of the vote were announced.
Uncertainty is also likely to discourage consumption of durables and other big-ticket items. The fall in aggregate demand could result in recession, again necessitating an austerity budget if the Fiscal Mandate is to be adhered to.
We live in ‘interesting’ times. Uncertainty is rarely good for an economy. But that uncertainty could persist for some time.
Why Brexit is grim news for the world economy The Economist (24/6/16)
International banking in a London outside the European Union The Economist (24/6/16)
What happens now that Britain has voted for Brexit The Economist (24/6/16)
Britain and the EU: A tragic split The Economist (24/6/16)
Brexit in seven charts — the economic impact Financial Times, Chris Giles (21/6/16)
How will Brexit result affect France, Germany and the rest of Europe? Financial Times, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Stefan Wagstyl, Duncan Robinson and Richard Milne (24/6/16)
How global markets are reacting to UK’s Brexit vote Financial Times, Michael Mackenzie and Eric Platt (24/6/16)
Brexit: What happens now? BBC News (24/6/16)
How will Brexit affect your finances? BBC News, Brian Milligan (24/6/16)
Brexit: what happens when Britain leaves the EU Vox, Timothy B. Lee (25/6/16)
An expert sums up the economic consensus about Brexit. It’s bad. Vox, John Van Reenen (24/6/16)
How will the world’s policymakers respond to Brexit? The Telegraph, Peter Spence (24/6/16)
City of London could be cut off from Europe, says ECB official The Guardian, Katie Allen (25/6/16)
Multinationals warn of job cuts and lower profits after Brexit vot The Guardian, Graham Ruddick (24/6/16)
How will Brexit affect Britain’s trade with Europe? The Guardian, Dan Milmo (26/6/16)
Britain’s financial sector reels after Brexit bombshell Reuters, Sinead Cruise, Andrew MacAskill and Lawrence White (24/6/16)
How ‘Brexit’ Will Affect the Global Economy, Now and Later New York Times, Neil Irwin (24/6/16)
Brexit results: Spurned Europe wants Britain gone Sydney Morning Herald, Nick Miller (25/6/16)
Economists React to ‘Brexit’: ‘A Wave of Economic and Political Uncertainty’ The Wall Street Journal, Jeffrey Sparshott (24/6/16)
Brexit wound: UK vote makes EU decline ‘practically irreversible’, Soros says CNBC, Javier E. David (25/6/16)
One month on, what has been the impact of the Brexit vote so far? The Guardian (23/7/16)
- What are the main elements of a balance of payments account? Changes in which elements caused the depreciation of the pound following the Brexit vote? What elements of the account, in turn, are likely to be affected by the depreciation?
- What determines the size of the effect on the current account of the balance of payments of a depreciation? How might long-term effects differ from short-term ones?
- Is it possible for firms to have access to the single market without allowing free movement of labour?
- What assumptions were made by the Leave side about the economic effects of Brexit?
- Would it be beneficial to go for a ‘free trade’ option of abolishing all import tariffs if the UK left the EU? Would it mean that UK exports would face no tariffs from other countries?
- What factors are likely to drive the level of investment in the UK (a) by domestic companies trading within the UK and (b) by multinational companies over the coming months?
- What will determine the course of monetary policy over the coming months?
Project Syndicate is an organisation which produces articles on a range of economic, political and social topics written by eminent scholars, political and business leaders, policymakers and civic activists. It then makes these available to news media in more than 150 countries. Here we look at four such articles which assess the outlook for the European and global economies and even that of capitalism itself.
The general tone is one of pessimism. Despite unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing (QE) and negative nominal interest rates, the global recovery is anaemic. As the Nouriel Roubini articles states:
Unconventional monetary policies – entrenched now for almost a decade – have themselves become conventional. And, in view of persistent lacklustre growth and deflation risk in most advanced economies, monetary policymakers will have to continue their lonely fight with a new set of ‘unconventional unconventional’ monetary policies.
Perhaps this will involve supplying additional money directly to consumers and/or business in a so-called ‘helicopter drop’ of money. Perhaps it will be supplying money directly to governments to finance infrastructure projects – a policy dubbed ‘people’s quantitative easing‘. Perhaps it will involve taxing the holding of cash by banks to encourage them to lend.
The Hans-Werner Sinn article looks at some of the consequences of the huge amount of money created through QE and continuing to be created in the eurozone. Although it has not boosted consumption and investment nearly as much as desired, it has caused bubbles in various asset markets. For example, the property market has soared in many countries:
Property markets in Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg have practically exploded throughout the crisis, as a result of banks chasing borrowers with offers of loans at near-zero interest rates, regardless of their creditworthiness.
The German property boom could be reined in with an appropriate jump in interest rates. But, given the ECB’s apparent determination to head in the opposite direction, the bubble will only grow. If it bursts, the effects could be dire for the euro.
The Jean Pisani-Ferry article widens the analysis of the eurozone’s problems. Like Roubini, he considers the possibility of a helicopter drop of money, which “would be functionally equivalent to a direct government transfer to households, financed by central banks’ permanent issuance of money”.
Without such drastic measures he sees consumer and business pessimism (see chart) undermining recovery and making the eurozone vulnerable to global shocks, such as further weakening in China. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
Finally, Anatole Kaletsky takes a broad historical view. He starts by saying that “All over the world today, there is a sense of the end of an era, a deep foreboding about the disintegration of previously stable societies.” He argues that the era of ‘leaving things to the market’ is coming to an end. This was an era inspired by the monetarist and supply-side revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s that led to the privatisation and deregulation policies of Reagan, Thatcher and other world leaders.
But if the market cannot cope with the complexities of today’s world, neither can governments.
If the world is too complex and unpredictable for either markets or governments to achieve social objectives, then new systems of checks and balances must be designed so that political decision-making can constrain economic incentives and vice versa. If the world is characterized by ambiguity and unpredictability, then the economic theories of the pre-crisis period – rational expectations, efficient markets, and the neutrality of money – must be revised.
… It is obvious that new technology and the integration of billions of additional workers into global markets have created opportunities that should mean greater prosperity in the decades ahead than before the crisis. Yet ‘responsible’ politicians everywhere warn citizens about a ‘new normal’ of stagnant growth. No wonder voters are up in arms.
His solution has much in common with that of Roubini and Pisani-Ferry. “Money could be printed and distributed directly to citizens. Minimum wages could be raised to reduce inequality. Governments could invest much more in infrastructure and innovation at zero cost. Bank regulation could encourage lending, instead of restricting it.”
So will there be a new era of even more unconventional monetary policy and greater regulation that encourages rather than restricts investment? Read the articles and try answering the questions.
Unconventional Monetary Policy on Stilts Project Syndicate, Nouriel Roubini (1/4/16)
Europe’s Emerging Bubbles Project Syndicate, Hans-Werner Sinn (28/3/16)
Preparing for Europe’s Next Recession Project Syndicate, Jean Pisani-Ferry (31/3/16)
When Things Fall Apart Project Syndicate, Anatole Kaletsky (31/3/16)
- Explain how a ‘helicopter drop’ of money would work in practice.
- Why has growth in the eurozone been so anaemic since the recession of 2009/10?
- What is the relationship between tightening the regulations about capital and liquidity requirements of banks and bank lending?
- Explain the policies of the different eras identified by Anatole Kaletsky.
- Would it be fair to describe the proposals for more unconventional monetary policies as ‘Keynesian’?
- If quantitative easing was used to finance government infrastructure investment, what would be the effect on the public-sector deficit and debt?
- If the inflation of asset prices is a bubble, what could cause the bubble to burst and what would be the effect on the wider economy?
In the blog Japan’s interesting monetary policy as deflation fears grow we detailed the aggressive monetary measures of Japan’s central bank to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming again established. In January it introduced a negative interest rate on some deposits placed with it by commercial banks. This is in addition to it massive quantitative easing programme to boost the country’s money supply. Despite this, the latest consumer price inflation data show inflation now running at zero per cent.
As the chart shows, since the mid 1990s there have been protracted periods of Japanese price deflation (click here to download a PowerPoint file of the chart). In January 2013 Japan introduced a 2 per cent CPI inflation target. This was accompanied by a massive expansion of its quantitative easing programme, through purchases of government bonds from investors.
Following this substantial monetary loosening, buoyed too by a loosening of fiscal policy, the rate of inflation rose. It reached 3.7 per cent in May 2014.
However, through 2015 the rate of inflation began to fall sharply, partly the result of falling commodity prices, especially oil. The latest inflation data show that the annual rate of CPI inflation in January 2016 fell to zero percent. In other words, consumer prices were on average at the levels seen in January 2015.
The latest inflation numbers appear give further credence to the fear of the Bank of Japan that deflation is set to return. The introduction of a negative deposit rate was the latest move to prevent deflation. As well as encouraging banks to lend, the move is intended to affect expectations of inflation. By adopting such an aggressive monetary stance the central bank is looking to prevent a deflationary mindset becoming re-established. Hence, by increasing the expectations of the inflation rate and by raising wage demands the inflation rate will rise.
The loosening of monetary policy through a negative interest rate follows the acceleration of the quantitative easing programme announced in October 2015 to conduct Open Market Operations so as to increase the monetary base annually by ¥80 trillion.
The decline of Japan’s inflation rate to zero may yet mean that further monetary loosening might be called for. Eradicating a deflationary mindset is proving incredibly difficult. Where next for Japan’s monetary authorities?
Consumer Price Index Statistics Bureau of Japan
Japan’s inflation drops to zero in January MarketWatch, Takashi Nakamichi (25/2/16)
Japan inflation falls back to zero in January: govt AFP (26/2/16)
With pause in inflation, many brace for retreat Nikkei Asian Review (27/2/16)
Japan’s inflation rate has fallen again – to 0% Business Insider Australia, David Scutt (26/2/16)
Bank of Japan adopts negative interest rate policy CNBC, Nyshka Chandran (29/1/16)
Japan adopts negative interest rate in surprise move BBC News (29/1/16)
Bank of Japan shocks markets by adopting negative interest rates The Guardian, Justin McCurry (29/1/16)
Japan stuns markets by slashing interests rates into negative territory The Telegraph, Mehreen Khan (29/1/16)
Japan introduces negative interest rate to boost economy The Herald, (29/1/16)
- What is deflation?
- What are the dangers of deflation? Why is the Bank of Japan keen to avoid expectations of deflation becoming re-established?
- To what extent are national policy-makers able to exert pressure over the rate of inflation?
- What does a negative interest rate on deposits mean for depositors?
- What effect is the Bank of Japan hoping that a negative deposit rate will have on the Japanese economy? How would such effects be expected to occur?
- What effect might the Bank of Japan’s actions be expected to have on the structure of interest rates in the economy?
- How might the negative interest rate effect how people wish to hold their wealth?
Sustained economic growth in Japan remains elusive. Preliminary Quarterly Estimates of GDP point to the Japanese economy having contracted by 0.4 per cent in the final quarter of 2015. This follows on from growth of 0.3 per cent in the third quarter, a contraction of 0.3 per cent in the second and growth of 1 per cent in the first quarter. Taken as a whole output in 2015 rose by 0.4 per cent compared to zero growth in 2014. The fragility of growth means that over the past 20 years the average annual rate of growth in Japan is a mere 0.8 per cent.
Chart 1 shows the quarter-to-quarter change in real GDP in Japan since the mid 1990s (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). While economies are known to be inherently volatile the Japanese growth story over the past twenty or years so is one both of exceptional volatility and of repeated bouts of recession. Since the mid 1990s Japan has experienced 6 recessions, four since 2008.
Of the four recessions since 2008, the deepest was that from 2008 Q2 to 2009 Q1 which saw the economy shrink by 9.2 per cent. This was followed by a recession from 2010 Q4 to 2011 Q2 when the economy shrunk by 3.1 per cent, then from 2012 Q2 to 2012 Q4 when the economy shrunk by 0.9 per cent and from 2014 Q2 to 2014 Q3 when output fell another 2.7 per cent. As a result of these four recessionary periods the economy’s output in 2015 Q4 was actually 0.4 per cent less than in 2008 Q1.
Chart 2 shows the annual levels of nominal (actual) and real (constant-price) GDP in trillions of Yen (¥) since 1995. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). Over the period actual GDP has fallen from ¥502 trillion to ¥499 trillion (about £3 trillion at the current exchange rate) while GDP at constant 2005 prices has risen from ¥455 trillion to ¥528 trillion.
Chart 2 reveals an interesting phenomenon: the growth in real GDP at the same time as a fall in nominal GDP. So why has the actual value of GDP fallen slightly between 1995 and 2005? The answer is quite simple: deflation.
Chart 3 shows a protracted period of economy-wide deflation from 1999 to 2013. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). Over this period the GDP deflator fell each year by an average of 1.0 per cent. 2014 and 2015 saw a pick up in economy-wide inflation. However, the quarterly profile through 2015 shows the pace of inflation falling quite markedly. As we saw in Japan’s interesting monetary stance as deflation fears grow, policymakers are again concerned about the possibility of deflation and the risks that poses for growth.
As Chart 4 helps to demonstrate, a significant factor behind the latest slowdown in Japan’s growth is household spending. (Click here to download a PowerPoint of the chart). In 2015 household spending accounted for about 57 per cent by value of GDP in Japan. In the last quarter of 2015 real household spending fell by 0.9 per cent while across 2015 as a whole real household spending fell by 1.3 per cent. This follows on from a 0.8 per cent decrease in spending by households in 2014.
The recent marked weakening of household spending is a significant concern for the short term growth prospects of the Japanese economy. The roller coaster ride continues, unfortunately it appears that the ride is again downwards.
Quarterly Estimates of GDP Japanese Cabinet Office
Japan and the IMF IMF Country Reports
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OECD
Japan’s economy contracts in fourth quarter BBC News, (15/2/16)
Japanese economy shrinks again, raising expectations of more stimulus Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy shrinks again as Abenomics is blown off course Guardian, Justin McCurry (15/2/16)
Japan’s economy contracts in latest setback for Abe policies New Zealand Herald, (15/2/16)
Japan’s ‘Abenomics’ on the ropes as yen soars, markets plunge Daily Mail, (15/2/16)
Japan economy shrinks more than expected, highlights lack of policy options CNBC, Leika Kihara and Tetsushi Kajimoto (15/2/16)
- Why is the distinction between nominal and real important in analysing economic growth?
- How do we define a recession?
- Of what importance is aggregate demand to the volatility of economies?
- Why are Japanese policymakers concerned about the prospects of deflation?
- What policy options are available to policymakers trying to combat deflation?
- Why is the strength of household consumption important in affecting the path of an economy?
- Why has Japan experienced an increase in real GDP but a fall in nominal GDP between 1995 and 2015?