Tag: Moody’s

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France’s rising risk premium: converging with southern Europe

On 25 October 2024, Moody’s, one of the major credit ratings agencies, announced that it was downgrading France’s economic outlook to negative. This was its first downgrading of France since 2012. It followed a similar revision by Fitch’s, another ratings agency, on 11 October.

While Fitch’s announcement did not have a significant impact on the yields of French government bonds, expectations around Moody’s did. In the week preceding the announcement, the net increases in the yield on generic 10-year government debt was approximately 9 basis points (0.09 percentage points). On the day itself, the yield rose by approximately 5.6 basis points (0.056 percentage points).

The yield rose further throughout the rest of October, finishing nearly 0.25 percentage points above its level at the start of the month. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, these increases are part of a longer-term trend of rising yields for French government debt (click here for a PowerPoint).

The yield on 10-year French government debt began 2024 at 2.56% and had an upward trend for the first half of the year. The yield peaked at 3.34% on 1 July. It then fell back below 3% for a while. The negative economic outlook then pushed yields back above 3% and they finished October at 3.12%, half a percentage point above the level at the start of the year. This represents a significant increase in borrowing costs for the French government.

In this blog, we will explain why the changes in France’s economic outlook translate into increases in yields for French government bonds. We will also analyse why yields have increased and examine the prospects for the markets in French government bonds.

Pricing signals of bond yields

A bond is a tradable debt instrument issued by governments to finance budget deficits – the difference between tax receipts and spending. Like any financial instruments, investment in bonds involves a commitment of funds today in anticipation of interest payments through time as compensation, with a repayment of its redemption value on the date the bond matures.

Since the cash flows associated with holding a bond occur at different points in time, discounted cash flow analysis is used to determine its value. This gives the present value of the cash flows discounted at the appropriate expected rate of return. In equilibrium this will be equal to the bond’s market price, as the following equation shows.

Where:
    P = the equilibrium price of the bond
    C = cash coupon payments
    M = redemption value at maturity
    r = yield (expected rate of return in equilibrium.

Interest payments tend to be fixed at the time a bond is issued and reflect investors’ expected rate of return, expressed as the yield in bond markets. This is determined by prevailing interest rates and perceived risk. Over time, changes in interest rates and perceptions of risk will change the expected rate of return (yield), which will, in turn, change the present value of the cash flows, and hence fundamental value.

Prices move in response to changes in fundamental value and since this happens frequently, this means that prices change a lot. For bonds, as the coupon payments (C each year and the redemption price () are fixed, the only factor that can change is the expected rate of return (yield). This is reflected in the observed yield at each price.

If the expected rate of return rises, this increases the discount rate applied to future cash flows and reduces their present value. At the current price, the fixed coupon is not sufficient to compensate investors. So, investors sell the bonds and price falls until it reaches a point where the yield offered is equal to that required. The reverse happens if the expected rate of return falls.

The significant risk associated with bonds is credit default risk – the risk that the debt will not be repaid. The potential for credit default is a significant influence of the compensation investors require for holding debt instruments like bonds (ceteris paribus). An increase in expected credit default risk will increase the expected return (compensation). This will be reflected in a lower price and higher yield.

Normally, with the bonds issued by high-income countries, such as those in Europe and North America, the risk of default is extremely low. However, if a country’s annual deficits or accumulated debt increase to what markets consider to be unsustainable levels, the perceived risk of default may rise. Countries’ levels of risk are rated by international ratings agencies, such as Moody’s and Fitch. Investors pay a lot of attention to the information provided by such agencies.

Moody’s downgrade in its economic outlook for France from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ indicated weak economic performance and higher credit default risk. This revision rippled through bond markets as investors adjusted their views of the country’s economic risk. The rise in yields observed is a signal that bond investors perceive higher credit default risk associated with French government debt and are demanding a higher rates of return as compensation.

Why has France’s credit default risk premium risen now?

As we have seen, credit default risk is not normally considered a significant issue for sovereign borrowers like France. Some of the issue around perceived credit default risk for the French government relate to the size of the French government’s deficit and the projections for it. Following a spike in borrowing associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the annual government budget deficit and the overall level of debt as percentages of GDP have remained high. The annual deficit is projected to be 6% for 2024 and still 5% for 2025. The ratio of outstanding French government debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ballooned to 123% in 2020 and is still expected to be 115% by the end of 2025. France has been put on notice to reduce its debt towards the Eurozone limit of 60% of GDP.

Governments in France last achieved a balanced budget in 1974. They have run deficits ever since. Figure 2 illustrates the French government budget deficits from 1990 to 2023 (click here for a PowerPoint). The figure shows that France experienced deficits in the past similar to today’s. These, however, did not tend to worry bond markets too much.

So why are investors currently worried? This stems from France’s debt mountain and from concerns that the government will not be able to deal with it. Investors are concerned that both weak growth and increasingly volatile politics will thwart efforts to reduce debt levels.

Let’s take growth. Even by contemporary European standards, France’s growth prospects are anaemic. GDP is expected to grow by just 1.1% for 2024 and 1% for 2025. Both consumer and business confidence are low. None of this suggests a growth spurt soon which will boost the tax revenues of the French government sufficiently to address the deficit.

Further, political instability has grown due to the inconclusive parliamentary elections which Emmanuel Macron surprisingly called in July. No single political grouping has a majority and the President has appointed a Centrist Prime Minister, Michel Barnier (the former EU Brexit negotiator). His government is trying to pass a budget through the Assemblée Nationale involving a mixture of spending cuts and tax hikes which amount to savings of €60 billion ($66 billion). This is equivalent to 2% of GDP.

The parliamentary path of the budget bill is set to be torturous with both the left and right wing blocs in the Assemblée opposing most of the provisions. Debate in the Assemblée Nationale and Senate are expected to drag on into December, with the real prospect that the government may have to use presidential decree to pass the budget. Commentators argue that this will fuel further political chaos.

France looks more like Southern Europe

In the past, bond investors were more tolerant of France’s budget deficits. French government bonds were attractive options for investors wanting to hold euro-denominated bonds while avoiding riskier Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Since France has run persistent government deficits for a long time, it offered bond investors a more liquid market than more fiscally-parsimonious Northern European neighbours, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Consequently, France’s debt instruments offered a slight risk premium on the yields for those countries.

However, that has changed. France’s credit default risk premium is rising to levels comparable to its Southern neighbours. On 26 September 2024, the yield on generic French government 10-year debt rose above its Spanish equivalent for the first time since 2008.

As Figure 3 illustrates, this was the culmination of a trend evident throughout 2024, with the difference in yields between the two declining steadily (click here for a PowerPoint). At the start of the year, the yield on Spanish debt offered a 40 basis points premium over the French equivalent. By October, the yield on Spanish debt was consistently below that of French debt. All of this is due to bond investors’ rising expectations about France’s credit default risk. Now, France’s borrowing costs are not only above Spain, but also closer to those of Greece and Italy than of Germany.

Strikingly, Spain’s budget deficit was 3.5% in 2023 and is expected to narrow to 2.6% by 2025. The percentage of total debt to GDP is 104% and falling. Moreover, following Spain’s inconclusive election in 2023, the caretaker government put forward budgetary plans involving fiscal tightening without the need for legislation. This avoided the political wrangling France is facing.

For France, these developments raise the prospect of yields rising further as bond investors now see alternatives to French government debt in the form of Spain’s. This country have already undertaken the painful fiscal adjustments that France seems incapable of completing.

Articles

Data

Questions

  1. What is credit default risk?
  2. Explain why higher credit default risk is associated with higher yields on France’s government debt.
  3. Why would low economic growth worsen the government’s budget deficit?
  4. Why would political instability increase credit default risk?
  5. What has happened to investors’ perceptions of the risk associated with French government debt relative to Spain’s?
  6. How has this manifested itself in the relative yields of the two countries’ government debt?
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Moody Blues

Moody’s, one of the three main international credit rating agencies, has just downgraded the UK’s credit rating from the top Aaa rating to Aa1. The other two agencies, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch may follow suit as they have the UK’s triple A rating on ‘negative outlook’.

The reason for Moody’s decision can be see in its press statement:

The key interrelated drivers of today’s action are:
1. The continuing weakness in the UK’s medium-term growth outlook, with a period of sluggish growth which Moody’s now expects will extend into the second half of the decade;
2. The challenges that subdued medium-term growth prospects pose to the government’s fiscal consolidation programme, which will now extend well into the next parliament;
3. And, as a consequence of the UK’s high and rising debt burden, a deterioration in the shock-absorption capacity of the government’s balance sheet, which is unlikely to reverse before 2016.

The direct economic consequences of Moody’s action are likely to be minimal. People were excpecting a downgrade sooner or later for the reasons Moody’s quotes. Thus stock markets, bond markets and foreign exchange markets already reflect this. Indeed, in the first seven weeks of 2013, the sterling exchange rate index has depreciated by over 6%.

The political consequences, however, are likely to be significant. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Orborne, has put considerable emphasis on the importance of maintaining a triple A rating. He has seen it as a sign of the confidence of investors in the government’s policy of focusing on cutting the public-sector deficit and, ultimately, of cutting the public-sector debt as a proportion of GDP. His response, therefore, has been that the government will redouble its efforts to reduce the deficit.

Not surprisingly the Labour opposition claims the downgrading is evidence that the government’s austerity policies are not working. If the aim is to cut the deficit/GDP ratio, this is difficult if GDP is falling or just ‘flat lining’. A less aggressive austerity policy, it is argued, would allow growth to recover and this rise in the denominator would allow the deficit/GDP ratio to fall.

Latest forecasts are that government borrowing is set to rise. The average of 24 independent forecasts of the UK economy, published by the Treasury on 13/2/13, is that public-sector net borrowing will rise from £90.7bn in 2012/13 to £107bn in 2013/14. And the European Commission forecast of the UK economy is that the general government deficit will rise from 5.9% of GDP in 2012/13 to 7.0% of GDP in 2013/14.

So what will be the economic and political consequences of the loss of the triple A rating? What policy options are open to the government? The following articles explore these questions. Not surprisingly, they don’t all agree!

Downgrading Britain: The Friday night drop The Economist, Buttonwood’s notebook (23/2/13)
Rating downgrade: Q&A The Observer, Josephine Moulds (24/2/13)
Downgrade is Osborne’s punishment for deficit-first policy The Guardian, Phillip Inman (23/2/13)
Britain’s downgraded credit rating: Moody’s wake-up call must trigger a change of course The Observer (24/2/13)
Editorial: AAA loss is a sign of failure Independent (24/2/13)
It’s not the end of the world – but it’s the end of any false complacency Independent, Hamish McRae (24/2/13)
Moody’s downgrade will stiffen George Osborne’s resolve The Telegraph, Kamal Ahmed (23/2/13)
UK AAA downgrade: Budget is now George Osborne’s make or break moment The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (23/2/13)
Britain’s credit downgrade is a call to live within our means The Telegraph, Liam Halligan (23/2/13)
Britain will take years to earn back AAA rating, says Ken Clarke The Telegraph, Rowena Mason (24/2/13)

Questions

  1. How important are credit agencies’ sovereign credit ratings to a country (a) economically; (b) politically? Why may the political effects have subsequent economic effects?
  2. Explain the meaning of the terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ variables. In terms of the determination of economic growth, are government expenditure and tax revenue exogenous or endogenous variables? What are the implications for a policy of cutting the government deficit?
  3. Identify the reasons for the predicted rise in the public-sector deficit as a proportion of GDP. Which of these, if any, are ‘of the government’s own making’?
  4. In the absence of a change in its fiscal stance, what policies could the government adopt to increase business confidence?
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A positive ‘negative’?

A negative outlook for the UK economy – at least that’s what Moody’s believes. The credit rating agency has put the UK economy’s sovereign credit rating, together with 2 other European nations (France and Austria) on the ‘negative outlook’ list.

The UK currently has a triple A rating and we have been able to maintain this despite the credit crunch and subsequent recession. However, with weak economic data and the continuing crisis in the eurozone, Moody’s took the decision to give the UK a ‘negative outlook’, which means the UK, as well as France and Austria have about a 30% chance of losing their triple A rating in the next 18 months.

Both Labour and the Coalition government have claimed this decision supports their view of the economy. Labour says this decision shows that the economy needs a stimulus and the Coalition should change its stance on cutting the budget deficit. However, the Coalition says that it shows the importance the Credit ratings agencies attach to budget deficits. Indeed, Moody’s statement showed no signs that it feels the UK should ease up on its austerity measures. The statement suggested the reverse – that a downgrade would only occur if the outlook worsened or if the government eased up on its cuts. The Coalition’s focus on cutting the deficit could even be something that has prevented the UK being put on the ‘negative watch’ list, as opposed to the ‘negative outlook’ list. The former is definitely worse than the latter, as it implies a 50% chance of a downgrade, rather than the current 30%.

The triple A rating doesn’t guarantee market confidence, but it does help keep the cost of borrowing for the government low. Indeed, the UK government’s cost of borrowing is at an historic low. A key problem therefore for the government is that there is a certain trade-off that it faces. Moody’s says that 2 things would make the UK lose its rating – a worsening economic outlook or if the government eases on its austerity plans. However, many would argue that it is the austerity plans that are creating the bad economic outlook. If the cuts stop, the economy may respond positively, but the deficit would worsen, potentially leading to a downgrade. On the other hand, if the austerity plans continue and the economy fails to improve, a downgrade could also occur. The next few days will be crucial in determining how the markets react to this news. The following articles consider this issue.

The meaning of ‘negative’ for Mr Osborne and the UK BBC News, Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (14/2/12)
Relaxed markets remain one step ahead of Moody’s move The Telegraph, Philip Aldrick (14/2/12)
George Osborne tries to be positive on negative outlook for economy Guardian, Patrick Wintour (14/2/12)
Moody’s wants it may cut AAA-rating for UK and France Reuters, Rodrigo Campos and Walter Brandimarte (14/2/12)
Moody’s rating decision backs the Coalition’s path of fiscal consolidation The Telegraph, Damian Reece (14/2/12)
Moody’s rating agency places UK on negative outlook BBC News (14/2/12)
Britain defends austerity measures New York Times, Julia Werdigier 14/2/12)

Questions

  1. What does a triple A rating mean for the UK economy?
  2. Which factors will be considered when a ratings agency decides to change a country’s credit rating? What similarities exist between the UK, France and Austria?
  3. Which political view point do you think Moody’s decision backs? Do you agree with the Telegraph article that ‘Moody’s rating decision backs the Coalition’s path of fiscal consolidation’?
  4. If a country does see its credit rating downgraded, what might this mean for government borrowing costs? Explain why this might cause further problems for a country?
  5. How do you think markets will react to this news? Explain your answer.
  6. What action should the government take: continue to cut the deficit or focus on the economic outlook?
  7. Why has the eurozone crisis affected the UK’s credit rating?
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A Moody financial sector

With the UK economy already struggling, the atmosphere in the financial sector has just a bit moodier, as Moody’s have downgraded the credit rating of 12 financial firms in the UK, including Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland and Nationwide. The change in credit rating has emerged because of Moody’s belief that the UK government was less likely to support these firms if they fell into financial trouble. It was, however, emphasized that it did not “reflect a deterioration in the financial strength of the banking system.” The same can not be said for Portugal, who has similarly seen nine of their banks being downgraded due to ‘financial weakness’. George Osborne commented that it was down to the government no longer guaranteeing our largest banks, but he also said:

“I’m confident that British banks are well capitalised, they are liquid, they are not experiencing the kinds of problems that some of the banks in the eurozone are experiencing at the moment.”

Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland both saw falls in their shares following their downgraded credit rating. Other banks, including Barclays also saw their shares fall, despite not being downgraded. Perhaps another indication of the interdependence we now see across the world. In interviews, George Osborne has continued to say that he believes UK banks are secure and wants them to become more independent to try to protect taxpayer’s money in the event of a crisis. Moody’s explained its decision saying:

“Moody’s believes that the government is likely to continue to provide some level of support to systemically important financial institutions, which continue to incorporate up to three notches of uplift…However, it is more likely now to allow smaller institutions to fail if they become financially troubled. The downgrades do not reflect a deterioration in the financial strength of the banking system or that of the government.”

The above comment reflects Moody’s approach to downgrading UK banks – not all have seen the same credit rating cuts. RBS and Nationwide have gone down 2 notches, whilst Lloyds and Santander have only gone down by 1 notch. Markets across the world will continue to react to this development in the UK financial sector, so it is a story worth keeping up to date with. The following articles consider the Moody environment.

UK banks’ credit rating downgraded The Press Association (7/10/11)
UK financial firms downgraded by Moody’s rating agency BBC News (7/10/11)
Moody’s downgrades nine Portuguese banks Financial Times, Peter Wise (7/10/11)
Bank shares fall on Moody’s downgrade Telegraph, Harry Wilson (7/10/11)
Moody’s cuts credit rating on UK banks RBS and Lloyds Reuters, Sudip Kar-Gupta (7/10/11)
Moody’s downgrade: George Osborne says British banks are sound Guardian, Andrew Sparrow (7/10/11)
Whitehall fears new bail-out for RBS Financial Times, Patrick Jenkins (7/10/11)

Questions

  1. Do you think that Moody’s have over-reacted? Explain your answer.
  2. What factors would Moody’s have considered when determining whether to downgrade the credit rating of any given bank and by how much?
  3. Why did share prices of the affected firms fall following the downgrading? What does this suggest about the public’s confidence in the banks?
  4. Do you think it is the right move for the government to encourage UK banks to become more independent in a bid to protect taxpayer’s money should a crisis develop?
  5. How might this downgrading affect the performance of the UK economy for the rest of 2011? Explain your answer.
  6. What are the differences behind the downgrading of UK banks and Portuguese banks?