Large European banks call for further integration, but is it in consumers’ interests?
Those of a certain age may remember the fanfare which heralded the introduction of the Single European market (SEM) on 1 January 1993. It promised the removal of internal barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital and people. One sector that was noticeably absent from the single market, however, was banking.
Moves towards banking union only started after the global financial crisis in 2008. However, as a report published on the 2 September 2025 by the Association of Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) highlights, the institutional frameworks of banking in the EU are still deeply fragmented – the promised integration through the European Banking Union (EBU) is still incomplete. This has put European banks at a competitive disadvantage in global markets compared with rivals from the USA and Asia, thereby reducing their profitability and growth prospects. The report called on the European Central Bank (ECB) and national regulatory authorities to remove hurdles to cross-border banking services in the EU. This would enhance the strategic position of European banks.
In this blog we will trace the development of the EBU and analyse the current state of integration. We discuss the AFME proposals for achieving greater integration and highlight their benefits for large banks. We also analyse the barriers which limit full integration and examine the risks that retail customers might see few benefits from the proposed changes.
What is meant by European Banking Union (EBU)?
The 1993 Single European Market (SEM) in goods and services removed internal barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital and people within the EU. As part of this, there were harmonised standards and regulations for goods and services, no capital controls, mutual recognition of professional qualifications and common regulations on consumer protection, product safety, environmental protection and labour rights.
This integration of previously restricted domestic markets was designed to boost economic growth, employment and competitiveness by increasing trade and investment flows. Offering consumers greater choice would expose firms to greater competition. This would drive down prices and encourage greater efficiency and innovation. It has generally achieved these goals across many industries.
However, banking was excluded from integration. The 1985 White Paper, Completing the Internal Market, proposed the liberalisation of financial services, but banking remained regulated at the national level. This was influenced by interrelated economic, political and institutional forces, national sovereignty and political sensitivities, fragmented regulation and concerns about risk.
Even as the EU moved towards economic and monetary union (EMU) during the 1990s, there was no discussion of integration for the banking industry. However, that changed following the 2008 financial crisis and 2011 eurozone crisis. Both episodes exposed vulnerabilities in the EU banking system which required taxpayer support. It was proposed that deeper integration of the banking sector would ensure its stability and resilience. This stimulated moves towards European Banking Union (EBU), starting with the European Council agreeing its creation in 2012. There are three institutional pillars to the Union:
- The Single Supervisory Mechanism (2014) for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) ensures consistent oversight. SIFIs are banks with over €30 billion of liabilities or 20% of national GDP.
- The Single Resolution Mechanism (2016) manages the orderly resolution of failing banks with minimal costs to taxpayers. There is a central board for resolution decisions and a fund financed by the banking industry to support resolution actions.
- A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (still under negotiation) is proposed to protect depositors uniformly across the banking union against bank default.
The Union is intended to operate under a harmonised set of EU laws, known as the ‘Single Rulebook’, which includes implementing the BASEL III capital requirements, regulating national deposit insurance and setting rules for managing failing banks.
What is the state of integration at present?
Moves towards European Banking Union (EBU) have contributed to enhancing the resilience of the European banking system. This was one of its major objectives. European banks are much more secure having increased capital and liquidity levels, reduced credit risks and become less reliant on state-aid. They are also less profitable.
The AFME report points to remaining gaps in Banking Union which raise the cost for banks offering cross-border retail banking within the EU and limit the incentive to do so. The report identifies four such gaps.
1. Ring fencing. Although there is a single supervisory mechanism for large systemically important institutions, since the financial crisis national regulators have implemented ‘ring-fencing’. This aims to protect retail banking activities from riskier investment banking. Ring-fencing retains liquidity, dividends and other bank assets within national borders to protect their retail banking sectors from contagion. The ECB estimates €225 billion of capital and €250 billion of liquidity is trapped by such national restrictions. Further, unharmonized and unpredictable use of capital buffers adds complexity for capital management at a multinational level. This particularly impacts large institutions. Banks’ cross-border activities are impeded since they are restricted in the way they can use capital and liquidity across the bloc.
The report argues that the stringent requirements of the ECB and the multiple layers of macroprudential requirements imposed at national level have led to an unnecessarily high level of capital. This disadvantages large European banks compared to their international competitors.
2. Impediments to cross-border M&As in banking within the EU. This is due to cumbersome authorisation processes, involving multiple authorities at both national and supra-national level. Further, national authorities may interfere in the process of M&As in a bid to prevent domestic banks being acquired by ones from other parts of the EU. A recent example is UniCredit’s bid for Germany’s Commerzbank, which the German government opposes. These characteristics restrict opportunities for consolidation and efficiency gains for European banks.
The AFME report estimates that once eurozone banks grow beyond €450 billion in total assets, they suffer from negative synergies putting them at a competitive disadvantage to global competitors. Indeed, US banks are able to leverage scale economies from their domestic market to enter large EU markets. An example is JP Morgan’s entry into multiple EU markets through its Chase brand.
3. Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) are complex and lack transparency. This makes it difficult for banks to predict future commitments. The fund itself and its target level were determined at a time when banks had low buffers. Since then, European banks have raised their loss absorbing capacity and the AFME report proposes that further increases in contributions to the fund need to be carefully considered and reviewed.
4. The Deposit Guarantee Scheme remains unimplemented and there are still differences in national schemes. This situation creates uncertainty for banks, which would like the European scheme for large systemically important institutions to be implemented fully.
These AFME proposals focus on the aspects of banking union which benefit large European institutions in their strategic competition with global rivals. These aspects would create ‘European’ banks as opposed to ‘national’ ones. This would give them the scale to be ‘champions’ in global competition. In particular, the large banks want lower capital requirements and the relaxation of national ring-fencing for retail banking to allow them greater freedom to achieve scale and scope economies across the bloc.
To what extent this will benefit retail customers, however, is debateable.
Will retail banking customers benefit?
Retail banking across Europe remains deeply fragmented, with significant price differentials from country to country. The following table illustrates pricing differentials for two retail products – loans and mortgages – across a sample of EU countries for July 2025.
The data show a range of average interest rates offered across the countries with a range of 5.03% for loans to households and 0.92% for new mortgages. These price differentials reflect a broad array of factors, not least the different institutional legal and risk characteristics of the national markets. They also reflect varying degrees of competition and the lack of cross-border trade in retail banking products. Retail banking remains a largely domestic industry within the EU. Cross-border banking services remain a marginal activity with non-domestic retail deposits rising by just 0.5% and non-domestic retail loans rising by just 0.3% between 2016 and 2024.
There are both natural and policy-induced barriers, which means that retail banking will remain largely segmented by nation.
On the demand-side, retail banking is largely a relational rather than a transactional service, with consumption taking place over a long time-period with significant financial risks attached. Even with deposit insurance and a lender of last resort (the central bank), consumers exhibit significant loss aversion in their use of retail banking services. Consequently, trust and confidence are important characteristics for consumers and that means they are likely to prefer to use familiar domestic institutions.
Further, perceptions about switching costs mean that consumers are reluctant to change suppliers. Such costs are exacerbated by language, cultural and legal differences between European countries, which can make the perceived costs of banking beyond national boundaries prohibitively expensive and create a preference for local institutions.
Consumer preferences can also create idiosyncratic market structures for retail banking services in particular countries. For instance, in several countries across the EU, notably Germany, mutualised credit unions account for significant shares of retail banking. This may limit the potential for foreign banks to penetrate Europe’s largest market.
There are also policy-induced obstacles to cross-border retail banking which operate on the demand-side. These include discriminatory tax treatment of foreign financial services which deters their purchase by consumers. Further, there are still eight different currencies used in the EU across the 27 member states (Denmark, Poland and Sweden are three significant examples). This creates costs and risks associated with currency exchange for consumers that may deter their use of cross-border deposits and loans. The full adoption of a single currency across the EU seems a long way off, which will limit the potential for a single banking market, particularly in the retail segment.
Retail banking as a public utility
Some argue that retail banking is a public utility and should be regulated as such. It has a simple business model, taking deposits, making payments and making loans. Like other utilities, such as water and energy, retail banking is an essential service for the smooth functioning of the economy and society. Like other utilities, bank failures create severe problems for the economy and society.
Since the financial crisis, stability in retail banking has been much more highly valued. In the period preceding the crisis, banks had used retail deposits to cross-subsidise their risky investment banking. The bank failures that resulted from this had severe economic consequences. The danger today is that by relaxing capital and liquidity restrictions too much, large banks may once again engage in risky behaviour, subsidised by retail banking – for example, by engaging in cross-border M&As. These may benefit their shareholders but provide little benefit to retail customers.
Further, allowing these large banks freedom to move funds around the bloc may lead to capital being concentrated in the most profitable markets, leaving less profitable markets / countries underserved. Retail banking, as a public utility, should be required to provide services there.
Who ultimately benefits?
The integration of banking services in the EU has progressed since the financial crisis, producing a more resilient system. However, there are features of retail banking which mean that integration which benefits consumers may be difficult to achieve.
Addressing the policy gaps identified by the AFME report may benefit large European banks by facilitating the scale economies to make them competitive internationally. However, until consumers are prepared, or able, to source banking services beyond national borders, they will see little benefit from European Banking Union (EBU) through lower prices and/or better service. The nature of retail banking in the EU suggests that this is unlikely any time soon.
Furthermore, since retail banking exhibits features of a public utility, regulators need to be wary of permitting the type of behaviour by large institutions which creates dangerous systemic risk. The worry is that, in the drive to create ‘European Champions’ in banking, regulators ignore the potential impact on retail customers.
Articles
- European banks push for lower cross-border hurdlesutting lenders at disadvantage to US rivals
- Why UK banks are like public utilities – and should be regulated as such
- Why banking needs to be treated as a public utility
Financial Times, Martin Arnold (2/9/25)
LSE blogs, Phil Molyneux (17/10/17)
The Economic Times (India), Somnath Mukherjee (5/3/18)
Book
- An Introduction to Banking (3rd edition), Chapter 14
Pearson, Barbara Casu, Claudia Girardone and Philip Molyneux (2021)
Report
- Banking Union: measuring progress and identifying implementation gaps
- AFME report identifies Banking Union challenges holding back EU bank consolidation
- Europe’s Banking Union: Still unfinished business?
Association for Financial Markets in Europe (September 2025)
AFME Press Release (2/9/25)
Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS), Elisabeth Krecké (2/7/25)
Data and Information
- ECB Data Portal
- What is the banking union?
European Central Bank
Business, Economy, Euro DG (European Commission)
Questions
- Using an average cost (AC) schedule, illustrate the efficiency benefits for large European banks from banking union.
- Analyse the sources of efficiency gains that European banks can gain from cross-border M&As.
- Explain how European retail banking customers could gain from such efficiency.
- Analyse why they may not.
- Analyse whether retail banking in Europe needs to be regulated as a public utility.
The UK government announced on 14 October 2024 in a ministerial statement that it intended to raise the threshold for the ring-fencing (separation) of retail and investment banking activities of large UK-based banks. These banks are known as ‘systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)’, which are currently defined as those with more than £25bn of core retail deposits. Under the new regulations, the threshold would rise from £25bn to £35bn.
Ring-fencing was recommended by the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) in 2011 (see link below) and implemented through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013. The proposed separation of core retail banking services from investment banking were intended to address issues in banks which arose during the global financial crisis and which required substantial taxpayer bailouts. (See the 2011 blog, 
When that market crashed in 2007, several UK-based banks incurred significant losses, as did other banks around the world. Given their thin equity buffers and the inability to borrow due to a credit crunch, such banks found it impossible to bear these losses.
It must be noted that most of the criticism comes from banks themselves. They state that it required significant operational restructuring by UK banks subject to the regulatory framework which was complex and costly.
One of the most famous Acts of Congress relating to finance and financial markets in the USA is the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The Act was passed in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street crash and the onset of the Great Depression in the USA. That witnessed significant bank failures across the country and problems were traced back to significant losses made by banks in their lending to investors during the speculative frenzy that preceded the stock market crash of 1929.