Tag: international trade multiplier

In an interview with Joe Rogan for his podcast, The Joe Rogan Experience, just before the US election, Donald Trump stated that, “To me, the most beautiful word – and I’ve said this for the last couple of weeks – in the dictionary today and any is the word ‘tariff’. It’s more beautiful than love; it’s more beautiful than anything. It’s the most beautiful word. This country can become rich with the use, the proper use of tariffs.”

President-elect Trump has stated that he will impose tariffs on imports of 10% or 20%, with 60% and 100% tariffs on imports from China and Mexico, respectively. This protection for US industries, combined with lighter regulation, will, he claims, provide a stimulus to the economy and help create jobs. The revenues will also help to reduce America’s budget deficit.

But it is not that straightforward.

Problems with tariffs for the USA

Imposing tariffs is likely to reduce international trade. But international trade brings net benefits, which are distributed between the participants according to the terms of trade. This is the law of comparative advantage.

In the simple two-country case, the law states that, provided the opportunity costs of producing various goods differ between the two countries, both of them can gain from mutual trade if they specialise in producing (and exporting) those goods that have relatively low opportunity costs compared with the other country. The total production and consumption of the two countries will be higher.

So if the USA has a comparative advantage in various manufactured products and a trading partner has a comparative advantage in tropical food products, such as coffee or bananas, both can gain by specialisation and trade.

If tariffs are imposed and trade is thereby reduced between the USA and its trading partners, there will be a net loss, as production will switch from lower-cost production to higher-cost production. The higher costs of less efficient production in the USA will lead to higher prices for those goods than if they were imported.

At the same time, goods that are still imported will be more expensive as the price will include the tariff. Some of this may be borne by the importer, meaning that only part of the tariff is passed on to the consumer. The incidence of the tariff between consumer and importer will depend on price elasticities of demand and supply. Nevertheless, imports will still be more expensive, allowing the domestically-produced substitutes to rise in price too, albeit probably by not so much. According to work by Kimberly Clausing and Mary E Lovely for the Peterson Institute (see link in Articles below), Trump’s proposals to raise tariffs would cost the typical American household over $2600 a year.

The net effect will be a rise in inflation – at least temporarily. Yet one of Donald Trump’s pledges is to reduce inflation. Higher inflation will, in turn, encourage the Fed to raise interest rates, which will dampen investment and economic growth.

Donald Trump tends to behave transactionally rather than ideologically. He is probably hoping that a rapid introduction of tariffs will then give the USA a strong bargaining position with foreign countries to trade more fairly. He is also hoping that protecting US industries by the use of tariffs, especially when coupled with deregulation, will encourage greater investment and thereby faster growth.

Much will depend on how other countries respond. If they respond by raising tariffs on US exports, any gain to industries from protection from imports will be offset by a loss to exporters.

A trade war, with higher tariffs, will lead to a net loss in global GDP. It is a negative sum game. In such a ‘game’, it is possible for one ‘player’ (country) to gain, but the loss to the other players (countries) will be greater than that gain.

Donald Trump is hoping that by ‘winning’ such a game, the USA could still come out better off. But the gain from higher investment, output and employment in the protected industries would have to outweigh the losses to exporting industries and from higher import prices.

The first Trump administration (2017–21), as part of its ‘America First’ programme, imposed large-scale tariffs on Chinese imports and on steel and aluminium from across the world. There was wide-scale retaliation by other countries with tariffs imposed on a range of US exports. There was a net loss to world income, including US GDP.

Problems with US tariffs for the rest of the world

The imposition of tariffs by the USA will have considerable effects on other countries. The higher the tariffs and the more that countries rely on exports to the USA, the bigger will the effect be. China and Mexico are likely to be the biggest losers as they face the highest tariffs and the USA is a major customer. In 2023, US imports from China were worth $427bn, while US exports to China were worth just $148bn – only 34.6% of the value of imports. The percentage is estimated to be even lower for 2024 at around 32%. In 2023, China’s exports to the USA accounted for 12.6% of its total exports; Mexico’s exports to the USA accounted for 82.7% of its total exports.

It is possible that higher tariffs could be extended beyond China to other Asian countries, such as Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, India and Indonesia. These countries typically run trade surpluses with the USA. Also, many of the products from these countries include Chinese components.

As far as the UK is concerned, the proposed tariffs would cause significant falls in trade. According to research by Nicolò Tamberi at the University of Sussex (see link below in Articles):

The UK’s exports to the world could fall by £22 billion (–2.6%) and imports by £1.4 (–0.16%), with significant variations across sectors. Some sectors, like fishing and petroleum, are particularly hard-hit due to their high sensitivity to tariff changes, while others, such as textiles, benefit from trade diversion as the US shifts demand away from China.

Other badly affected sectors would include mining, pharmaceuticals, finance and insurance, and business services. The overall effect, according to the research, would be to reduce UK output by just under 1%.

Countries are likely to respond to US tariffs by imposing their own tariffs on US imports. World Trade Organization rules permit the use of retaliatory tariffs equivalent to those imposed by the USA. The more aggressive the resulting trade war, the bigger would be the fall in world trade and GDP.

The EU is planning to negotiate with Trump to avoid a trade war, but officials are preparing the details of retaliatory measures should the future Trump administration impose the threatened tariffs. The EU response is likely to be strong.

Articles

Questions

  1. Explain why, according to the law of comparative advantage, all countries can gain from trade.
  2. In what ways may the imposition of tariffs benefit particular sections of an economy?
  3. Is it in countries’ interests to retaliate if the USA imposes tariffs on their exports to the USA?
  4. Why is a trade war a ‘negative sum game’?
  5. Should the UK align with the EU in resisting President-elect Trump’s trade policy or should it seek independently to make a free-trade deal with the USA? is it possible to do both?
  6. What should China do in response to US threats to impose tariffs of 60% or more on Chinese imports to the USA?

China has been an economic powerhouse in recent decades – a powerhouse that has helped to drive the world economy through trade and both inward and outward investment. At the same time, its low-priced exports have helped to dampen world inflation. But is all this changing? Is China, to use President Biden’s words, a ‘ticking time bomb’?

China’s economic growth rate is slowing, with the quarterly growth in GDP falling from 2.2% in Q1 this year to 0.8% in Q2. Even though public-sector investment rose by 8.1% in the first six months of this year, private-sector investment fell by 0.2%, reflecting waning business confidence. And manufacturing output declined in August. But, despite slowing growth, the Chinese government is unlikely to use expansionary fiscal policy because of worries about growing public-sector debt.

The property market

One of the biggest worries for the Chinese economy is the property market. The annual rate of property investment fell by 20.6% in June this year and new home prices fell by 0.2% in July (compared with June). The annual rate of price increase for new homes was negative throughout 2022, being as low as minus 1.6% in November 2022; it was minus 0.1% in the year to July 2023, putting new-home prices at 2.4% below their August 2021 level. However, these are official statistics. According to the Japan Times article linked below, which reports Bloomberg evidence, property agents and private data providers report much bigger falls, with existing home prices falling by at least 15% in many cities.

Falling home prices have made home-owners poorer and this wealth effect acts as a brake on spending. The result is that, unlike in many Western countries, there has been no post-pandemic bounce back in spending. There has also been a dampening effect on local authority spending. During the property boom they financed a proportion of their spending by selling land to property developers. That source of revenue has now largely dried up. And as public-sector revenues have been constrained, so this has constrained infrastructure spending – a major source of growth in China.

The government, however, has been unwilling to compensate for this by encouraging private investment and has tightened regulation of the financial sector. The result has been a decline in new jobs and a rise in unemployment, especially among graduates, where new white collar jobs in urban areas are declining. According to the BBC News article linked below, “In July, figures showed a record 21.3% of jobseekers between the ages of 16 and 25 were out of work”.

Deflation

The fall in demand has caused consumer prices to fall. In the year to July 2023, they fell by 0.3%. Even though core inflation is still positive (0.8%), the likelihood of price reductions in the near future discourages spending as people hold back, waiting for prices to fall further. This further dampens the economy. This is a problem that was experienced in Japan over many years.

Despite slowing economic growth, Chinese annual growth in GDP for 2023 is still expected to be around 4.5% – much lower than the average rate for 9.5% from 1991 to 2019, but considerably higher than the average of 1.1% forecast for 2023 for the G7 countries. Nevertheless, China’s exports fell by 14.5% in the year to July 2023 and imports fell by 12.5%. The fall in imports represents a fall in exports to China from the rest of the world and hence a fall in injections to the rest-of-the-world economy. Currently China’s role as a powerhouse of the world has gone into reverse.

Articles

Questions

  1. Using PowerPoint or Excel, plot the growth rate of Chinese real GDP, real exports and real imports from 1990 to 2024 (using forecasts for 2023 and 2024). Use data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. Comment on the figures.
  2. Explain the wealth effect from falling home prices.
  3. Why may official figures understate the magnitude of home price deflation?
  4. Explain the foreign trade multiplier and its relevance to other countries when the volume of Chinese imports changes. What determines the size of this multiplier for a specific country?
  5. How does the nature of the political system in China affect the likely policy response to the problems identified in this blog?
  6. Is there any good news for the rest of the world from the slowdown in the Chinese economy?

In an attempt to prevent recession following the financial crisis of 2007–8, many countries adopted both expansionary monetary policy and expansionary fiscal policy – and with some success. It is likely that the recession would have been much deeper without such policies

But with growing public-sector deficits caused by the higher government expenditure and sluggish growth in tax receipts, many governments soon abandoned expansionary fiscal policy and relied on a mix of loose monetary policy (with ultra low interest rates and quantitative easing) but tight fiscal policy in an attempt to claw down the deficits.

But such ‘austerity’ policies made it much harder for loose monetary policy to boost aggregate demand. The problem was made worse by the attempt of both banks and individuals to ‘repair’ their balance sheets. In other words banks became more cautious about lending, seeking to build up reserves; and many individuals sought to reduce their debts by cutting down on spending. Both consumer spending and investment were slow to grow.

And yet government and central banks, despite the arguments of Keynesians, were reluctant to abandon their reliance solely on monetary policy as a means of boosting aggregate demand. But gradually, influential international institutions, such as the IMF (see also) and World Bank, have been arguing for an easing of austerity fiscal policies.

The latest international institution to take a distinctly more Keynesian stance has been the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In its November 2015 Economic Outlook it had advocated some use of public-sector investment (see What to do about slowing global growth?. But in its Interim Economic Outlook of February 2016, it goes much further. It argues that urgent action is needed to boost economic growth and that this should include co-ordinated fiscal policy. In introducing the report, Catherine L Mann, the OECD’s Chief Economist stated that:

“Across the board there are lower interest rates, except for the United States. It allows the authorities to undertake a fiscal action at very very low cost. So we did an exercise of what this fiscal action might look like and how it can contribute to global growth, but also maintain fiscal sustainability, because this is an essential ingredient in the longer term as well.

So we did an experiment of a two-year increase in public investment of half a percentage point of GDP per annum undertaken by all OECD countries. This is an important feature: it’s everybody doing it together – it’s a collective action, because it’s global growth that is at risk here – our downgrades [in growth forecasts] were across the board – they were not just centred on a couple of countries.

So what is the effect on GDP of a collective fiscal action of a half a percentage point of GDP [increase] in public investment in [high] quality projects. In the United States, the euro area, Canada and the UK, who are all contributors to this exercise, the increase in GDP is greater than the half percentage point [increase] in public expenditure that was undertaken. Even if other countries don’t undertake any fiscal expansion, they still get substantial increases in their growth rates…

Debt to GDP in fact falls. This is because the GDP effect of quality fiscal stimulus is significant enough to raise GDP (the denominator in the debt to GDP ratio), so that the overall fiscal sustainability [debt to GDP] improves.”

What is being argued is that co-ordinated fiscal policy targeted on high quality infrastructure spending will have a multiplier effect on GDP. What is more, the faster growth in GDP should outstrip the growth in government expenditure, thereby allowing debt/GDP ratios to fall, not rise.

This is a traditional Keynesian approach to tackling sluggish growth, but accompanied by a call for structural reforms to reduce inefficiency and waste and improve the supply-side of the economy.

Articles

Osborne urged to spend more on infrastructure by OECD Independent, Ben Chu (18/2/16)
OECD blasts reform fatigue, downgrades growth and calls for more rate cuts Financial Review (Australia), Jacob Greber (18/2/16)
OECD calls for less austerity and more public investment The Guardian, Larry Elliott (18/2/15)
What’s holding back the world economy? The Guardian, Joseph Stiglitz and Hamid Rashid (8/2/16)
OECD calls for urgent action to combat flagging growth Financial Times, Emily Cadman (18/2/16)
Central bankers on the defensive as weird policy becomes even weirder The Guardian, Larry Elliott (21/2/16)
Keynes helped us through the crisis – but he’s still out of favour The Guardian, Larry Elliott (7/2/16)
G20 communique says monetary policy alone cannot bring balanced growth
Reuters (27/2/15)

OECD publications
Global Economic Outlook and Interim Economic Outlook OECD, Catherine L Mann (18/2/16)
Interim Economic Outlook OECD (18/2/16)

Questions

  1. Draw an AD/AS diagram to illustrate the effect of a successful programme of public-sector infrastructure projects on GDP and prices.
  2. Draw a Keynesian 45° line diagram to illustrate the effect of a successful programme of public-sector infrastructure projects on actual and potential GDP.
  3. Why might an individual country benefit more from a co-ordinated expansionary fiscal policy of all OECD countries rather than being the only country to pursue such a policy?
  4. What determines the size of the multiplier effect of such policies?
  5. How might a new classical/neoliberal economist respond to the OECD’s recommendation?
  6. Why may monetary policy have ‘run out of steam’? Are there further monetary policy measures that could be adopted?
  7. Compare the relative effectiveness of increased government investment in infrastructure and tax cuts as alterative forms of expansionary fiscal policy.
  8. Should quantitative easing be directed at financing public-sector infrastructure projects? What are the benefits and problems of such a policy? (See the blog post People’s quantitative easing.)

First the IMF in its World Economic Outlook, then the European Commission in its Economic Forecasts (see also) and now the OECD in its Economic Outlook (see also) – all three organisations in the latest issues of their 6-monthly publications are predicting slower global economic growth than they did 6 months previously. This applies both to the current year and to 2016. The OECD’s forecast for global growth this year is now 2.9%, down from the 3.7% it was forecasting a year ago. Its latest growth forecast for 2016 is 3.3%, down from the 3.9% it was forecasting a year ago.

Various reasons are given for the gloomier outlook. These include: a dramatic slowdown in global trade growth; slowing economic growth in China and fears over structural weaknesses in China; falling commodity prices (linked to slowing demand but also as a result of increased supply); austerity policies as governments attempt to deal with the hangover of debt from the financial crisis of 2007/8; low investment leading to low rates of productivity growth despite technological progress; and general fears about low growth leading to low spending as people become more cautious about their future incomes.

The slowdown in trade growth (forecast to be just 2% in 2015) is perhaps the most worrying for future global growth. As Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, states in his remarks at the launch of the latest OECD Economic Outlook:

‘Global trade, which was already growing slowly over the past few years, appears to have stagnated and even declined since late 2014, with the weakness centering increasingly on emerging markets, particularly China. This is deeply concerning as robust trade and global growth go hand in hand. In 2015 global trade is expected to grow by a disappointing 2%. Over the past five decades there have been only five other years in which trade growth has been 2% or less, all of which coincided with a marked downturn of global growth.’

So what policies should governments pursue to stimulate economic growth? According to Angel Gurría:

‘Short-term demand needs to be supported and structural reforms to be pursued with greater ambition than is currently the case. Three specific actions are key:

•  First, we need to resist and turn back rising protectionism. Trade strengthens competition and investment and revs up the “diffusion machine” – the spread of new technologies throughout the economy – which will ultimately lift productivity.
•  Second, we need to step up structural reform efforts, which have weakened in recent years. And here, I mean the whole range of structural reforms – education, innovation, competition, labour and product market regulation, R&D, taxes, etc.
•  Third, there is scope to adjust public spending towards investment. If done collectively by all countries, if the sector and projects chosen have high multipliers, and if combined with serious structural reforms, stronger public investment can give a boost to growth and employment and not increase the relative debt burden.’

On this third point, the OECD Economic Outlook argues that ‘the rationale for such investments is that they could help to push economies onto a higher growth path than might otherwise be the case, at a time when private investment growth remains modest.’

Collective action to increase public investment can be expected to boost the initial domestic multiplier effects from the stimulus, since private investment and exports in each economy will benefit from stronger demand in other economies. …the multiplier effects from an investment-led stimulus are likely to be a little larger than from other forms of fiscal stimulus, since the former also has small, but positive, supply-side effects.

In other words, the OECD is calling for a relaxation of austerity policies, with public investment being used to provide a stimulus to growth. The higher growth will then lead to increased potential output, as well as actual output, and an increase in tax revenues.

These policy recommendations are very much in line with those of the IMF.

Videos and Webcasts
OECD warns of global trade slowdown, trims growth outlook again Reuters (9/11/15)
OECD returns to revisionism with growth downgrade Euronews, Robert Hackwill (9/11/15)
OECD: Weak China Import Growth Leads Trade Slowdown Bloomberg, Catherine L Mann, OECD Chief Economist (9/11/15)
OECD Economic Outlook: Moving forward in difficult times OECD PowerPoint presentation, Catherine L Mann, OECD Chief Economist (9/11/15)
Press Conference OECD, Angel Gurría and Álvaro Pereira (9/11/15)

Articles

OECD cuts world growth forecast Financial Times, Ferdinando Giugliano (9/11/15)
OECD rings alarm bell over threat of global growth recession thanks to China slowdown Independent, Ben Chu (10/11/15)
OECD cuts global growth forecasts amid ‘deep concern’ over slowdown BBC News (9/11/15)
OECD fears slowdown in global trade amid China woes The Guardian, Katie Allen (9/11/15)
The global economy is slowing down. But is it recession – or protectionism? The Observer, Heather Stewart and Fergus Ryan (14/11/15)
Global growth is struggling, but it is not all bad news The Telegraph, Andrew Sentance (13/11/15)

OECD Publications
Economic Outlook Annex Tables OCED (9/11/15)
Press Release: Emerging market slowdown and drop in trade clouding global outlook OCED (9/11/15)
Data handout for press OECD (9/11/15)
OECD Economic Outlook, Chapter 3: Lifting Investment for Higher Sustainable Growth OCED (9/11/15)
OECD Economic Outlook: Full Report OECD (9/11/15)

Questions

  1. Is a slowdown in international trade a cause of slower economic growth or simply an indicator of slower economic growth? Examine the causal connections between trade and growth.
  2. How worried should we be about disappointing growth in the global economy?
  3. What determines the size of the multiplier effects of an increase in public investment?
  4. Why are the multiplier effects of an increase in public-sector investment likely to be larger in the USA and Japan than in the UK, the eurozone and Canada?
  5. How can monetary policy be supportive of fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth?
  6. Under what circumstances would public-sector investment (a) stimulate and (b) crowd out private-sector investment?
  7. How would a Keynesian economist respond to the recommendations of the OECD?
  8. How would a neoclassical/neoliberal economist respond to the recommendations?
  9. Are the OECD’s recommendations in line with the Japanese government’s ‘three arrows‘?
  10. What structural reforms are recommended by the OECD? Are these ‘market orientated’ or ‘interventionist’ reforms, or both? Explain.

In a News Item of 1 October, Over the Cliff, we looked at the passing of the deadline that same day for Congress to agree a budget. We also looked at the looming deadline for Congress to agree a new higher ceiling for Federal Government debt, currently standing at $16.699 trillion. Without an agreement to raise the limit, the government will start becoming unable to pay some of its bills from around 17 October.

One week on and no agreement has been reached on either a budget or a higher debt ceiling.

Failure to agree on a budget has led to the ‘shut-down’ of government. Only essential services are being maintained; the rest are no longer functioning and workers have been sent home on ‘unpaid leave’. This has led to considerable hardship for many in the USA. It has had little effect, however, on the rest of the world, except for tourists to the USA being unable to visit various national parks and monuments.

Failure to raise the debt ceiling, however, could have profound consequences for the rest of the world. It could have large and adverse effects of global growth, global trade, global investment and global financial markets. The articles below explore some of these consequences.

U.S. Congress enters crucial week in budget, debt limit battles Reuters, Richard Cowan (7/10/13)
Debt ceiling: Understanding what’s at stake CBS Moneywatch, Alain Sherter (7/10/13)
Q&A: What is the US debt ceiling? BBC News, Ben Morris (3/10/13)
Five Reasons to Fear the Debt Ceiling Bloomberg (6/10/13)
A U.S. Default Seen as Catastrophe Dwarfing Lehma Bloomberg Businessweek, Yalman Onaran (6/10/13)
China tells US to avoid debt crisis for sake of global economy BBC News (7/10/13)
US shutdown is starting to hit business, says Commerce Secretary BBC News (6/10/13)
Why Australia should fear a US government default The Guardian, Greg Jericho (7/10/13)
Could the US default over just $6bn? BBC News, Linda Yueh (11/10/13)
IMF piles pressure on US to reconcile differences and prevent debt default The Guardian, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (10/10/13)
Republicans offer to raise US debt ceiling for six weeks The Telegraph, Peter Foster and Raf Sanchez (11/10/13)

Questions

  1. If a debt ceiling is reached, what does this imply for the budget deficit?
  2. How serious are the two current fiscal cliffs?
  3. How would a continuation of the partial government shut-down impact on the US private sector?
  4. What multiplier effects on the rest of the world are likely to arise from a cut in US government expenditure or a rise in taxes? What determines the size of these multiplier effects?
  5. Explain the likely effect of the current crisis on the exchange rate of the dollar into other currencies.
  6. Why might the looming problem of reaching the debt ceiling drive up long-term interest rates in the USA and beyond?