Tag: inflation

Inflation across the world has been rising. This has been caused by a rise in aggregate demand as the global economy has ‘bounced back’ from the pandemic, while supply-chain disruptions and tight labour markets constrain the ability of aggregate supply to respond to the rise in demand.

But what of the coming months? Will supply become more able to respond to demand as supply-chain issues ease, allowing further economic growth and an easing of inflationary pressures?

Or will higher inflation and higher taxes dampen real demand and cause growth, or even output, to fall? Are we about to enter an era of ‘stagflation’, where economies experience rising inflation and economic stagnation? And will stagnation be made worse by central banks which raise interest rates to dampen the inflation but, in the process, dampen spending.

Despite the worries of central banks, with inflation being higher than forecast a few months ago, forecasts (e.g. the OECD’s) are still for inflation to peak fairly soon and then to fall back to around 2 to 3 per cent by the beginning of 2023 – close to central bank target rates.

In the UK, annual CPI inflation reached 5.4% in December 2021. The UK Treasury’s January 2022 new monthly forecasts for the UK economy by 15 independent institutions give an average forecast of 4.0% for CPI inflation for 2022. In the USA, annual consumer price inflation reached 7 per cent in December 2021, but is forecast to fall to just over the target rate of 2% by the end of 2022.

If central banks respond to the current high inflation by raising interest rates more than very slightly and by stopping quantitative easing (QE), or even engaging in quantitative tightening (selling assets purchased under previous QE schemes), there is a severe risk of a sharp slowdown in economic activity. Household budgets are already being squeezed by the higher prices, especially energy and food prices. And people will face higher taxes as governments seek to reduce their debts, which soared with the Covid support packages during the pandemic.

The Fed has signalled that it will end its bond buying (QE) programme in March 2022 and may well raise interest rates at the same time. Quantitative tightening may then follow. But although GDP growth is still strong in the USA, Fed policy and stretched household budgets could well see spending slow and growth fall. Stagflation is less likely in the USA than in the UK and many other countries, but there is still the danger of over-reaction by the Fed given the predicted fall in inflation.

But there are reasons to be confident that stagflation can be avoided. Supply-chain bottlenecks are likely to ease and are already showing signs of doing so, with manufacturing production recovering and hold-ups at docks easing. The danger may increasingly become one of demand being excessively dampened rather than supply being constrained. Under these circumstances, inflation could rapidly fall, as is being forecast.

Nevertheless, as Covid restrictions ease, the hospitality and leisure sector is likely to see a resurgence in demand, despite stagnant or falling real disposable incomes, and here there are supply constraints in the form of staffing shortages. This could well lead to higher wages and prices in the sector, but probably not enough to prevent the fall in inflation.

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Questions

  1. Under what circumstances would stagflation be (a) more likely; (b) less likely?
  2. Find out the causes of stagflation in the early/mid-1970s.
  3. Argue the case for and against the Fed raising interest rates and ending its asset buying programme.
  4. Why are labour shortages likely to be higher in the UK than in many other countries?
  5. Research what is likely to happen to fuel prices over the next two years. How is this likely to impact on inflation and economic growth?
  6. Is the rise in prices likely to increase or decrease real wage inequality? Explain.
  7. Distinguish between cost-push and demand-pull inflation. Which of the two is more likely to result in stagflation?
  8. Why are inflationary expectations a major determinant of actual inflation? What influences inflationary expectations?

Inflation has been rising around the world as a combination of a recovery in demand and supply-chain issues have resulted in aggregate demand exceeding aggregate supply. Annual consumer price inflation at the beginning of 2022 is around 2.5% in China, 3.5% in Sweden, 5% in the eurozone, Canada and India, 6% in the UK and South Africa, 7% in the USA and 7.5% in Mexico. In each case it is forecast to go a little higher before falling back again.

Inflation in Turkey

In Turkey inflation is much higher. The official annual rate of consumer price inflation in December 2021 was 36.1%, sharply up from 21.3% in November. But according to Turkey’s influential ENAGrup the December rate was much higher still at 82.8%. Official producer price inflation was 79.9% and this will feed through into official consumer price inflation in the coming weeks.

The rise in inflation has hit the poor particularly badly. According to the official statistics, in the year to December 2021, domestic energy prices increased by 34.2%, food by 44.7% and transport by 53.7%. In response, the government has raised the minimum wage by nearly 50% for 2022.

Causes of high and rising inflation

Why is Turkey’s inflation so much higher than in most developed and emerging economies and why has it risen so rapidly? The answer is that aggregate demand has been excessively boosted – well ahead of the ability of supply to respond. This has driven inflation expectations.

Turkey’s leader, President Erdoğan, in recent years has been seeking to stimulate economic growth through a mixture of supply-side, fiscal and monetary policies. He has hoped that the prospect of high growth would encourage both domestic and inward investment and that this would indeed drive the high growth he seeks. To encourage investment he has sought to reduce the reliance on imports through various measures, such as public procurement favouring domestic firms, tax reliefs for business and keeping interest rates down. He has claimed that the policy is focused on investment, production, employment and exports, instead of the ‘vicious circle of high interest rates and low exchange rates’.

With the pandemic, fiscal policy was largely focused on health, social security and employment measures. Such support was aided by a relatively healthy public finances. General government debt was 32% of GDP in 2020. This compares with 74% for the EU and 102% for the G7. Nevertheless, the worsening budget deficit has made future large-scale expenditure on public infrastructure, tax cuts for private business and other supply-side measures more difficult. Support for growth has thus fallen increasingly to monetary policy.

The Turkish central bank is not independent, with the President firing senior officials with whom he disagrees over monetary policy. The same applies to the Finance Ministry, with independently-minded ministers losing their jobs. Monetary and exchange rate policy have thus become the policy of the President. And it is here that a major part of the current problem of rising inflation lies.

Monetary and exchange rate policy

Despite rising inflation, the central bank has reduced interest rates. At its monthly meeting in September 2021, the Turkish central bank reduced its key rate from 19% to 18% and then to 16% in October, to 15% in November and 14% in December. These unprecedented rate cuts saw a large increase in the money supply. M1 rose by 11.7% in November alone; the annual growth rate was 59.5%. Broad money (M2 and M3) similarly rose. M3 grew by an annual rate of 51% in November 2021. The cut in interest rates and rise in money supply led to a rise in nominal expenditure which, in turn, led to higher prices.


The cut in interest rates and rise in nominal aggregate demand led to a large depreciation in the exchange rate. On 1 September 2021, 100 Turkish lira exchanged for $12.05. By 11 January 2022 the rate had fallen to $7.22 – a 40.1% depreciation. This depreciation, in turn, further stoked inflation as the lower exchange rate pushed up the price of imported goods. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Attempts were made to stem this fall in the lira on 20 December, by which point 100 lira were trading for just $5.50 (see chart) and speculation against the lira was gathering momentum. President Erdoğan announced a scheme to protect lira deposits against currency volatility, guaranteeing lira deposits in hard currency terms. The mechanism adopted was a rise in the interest rate on lira deposits with a maturity of 3 to 12 months, thereby encouraging people to lock in deposits for the medium term and not, therefore, to use them to speculate against the lira by buying other currencies. Other interest rates would be unaffected. At the same time the central bank used foreign currency reserves to engage in large-scale purchases of the lira on the foreign exchange market.

The lira rallied. By 23 December, 100 lira were trading for $8.79. But then selling of the lira began again and, as stated above, by early January 100 lira had fallen to $7.22. The underlying problem of excess demand and high inflationary expectations had not been solved.

It remains to be seen whether the President will change his mind and decide that the central bank needs to raise interest rates to reduce inflation and restore confidence.

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Questions

  1. Until the pandemic, the Turkish economy could be seen as a success story. Why?
  2. What supply-side policies did Turkey pursue?
  3. Use either an aggregate demand and supply diagram or a dynamic aggregate demand and supply (DAD/DAS) diagram to explain what has happened to inflation in Turkey in the past few months.
  4. Explain the thinking behind the successive cuts in interest rates since September 2021.
  5. Why did the measures introduced on 20 December 2021 only temporarily halt the depreciation of the lira?
  6. Choose a country with a higher rate of inflation than Turkey (see second data link above). Find out the causes of its high rate. Are they similar to those in Turkey?

During the pandemic, millions of people’s wages in the UK were paid by the government to prevent the closure of businesses and a surge in unemployment. The furlough scheme officially came to an end in September 2021. However, with the spread of the Omicron variant and the fear of further restrictions being put in place, there has been a call by many to re-introduce the furlough scheme.

The furlough scheme

The furlough scheme began when the government brought in, what was officially called the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) in early 2020. This was when the pandemic first forced businesses across the country to close. The scheme worked by paying part of employees’ wages, preventing the need for businesses to make their staff redundant, therefore avoiding a rapid rise in unemployment along with the associated costs. It also avoided the financial and emotional costs of firing and then rehiring workers post pandemic. Under the scheme, furloughed workers received 80% of their wages, up to £2500 a month, if they couldn’t work because of the impact of coronavirus. Employees were able to maintain the security of employment and the payments helped furloughed workers pay their bills.

The scheme saw billions of pounds spent paying the wages of employees whose firms were forced to close temporarily. It could be argued that the expense of the scheme was a huge disadvantage. However, the alternative would have been for the government to pay unemployment-related benefits. Despite the furlough scheme being deemed necessary, it was not without its drawbacks for the structure of businesses. Rather than businesses adapting to changes in the economy and consumer demands, they could decide to claim the money and avoid the need to restructure. There was also concern about the length of the furlough scheme and the ability of businesses to bounce back post-pandemic.

Since the start of the scheme, the specifics of what was paid and who received it changed over time, especially once the economy started opening again. Initial steps were made to allow part-time return to work and the scheme started to wind down over the summer of 2021, with the government covering less of the wages and businesses covering more. From July, employers had to provide 10% of the wages of their furloughed staff, with the government paying the rest. This then increased to 20% in August with the CJRS coming to a complete end on 30 September 2021. At this point, there were around 1.6 million employees still receiving payment from the scheme.

Impact on Employment

With the end to the furlough scheme in September 2021, there were concerns that this would lead to a large number of redundancies. However, data indicate that has not happened and there is a record number of job vacancies. Official figures show that UK employment rose in October, confirming the strength of the labour market. The Office for National Statistics stated that the employment rate rose to 75.5% in the three months to October, up 0.2 percentage points on the previous quarter. This is believed to be driven by a rise in part-time work, which had dropped sharply during the pandemic. However, it is important to note that the strength in these numbers was prior to the emergence of the Omicron variant.

Omicron

In November, the government had ruled out once again bankrolling people’s wages at enormous expense. However, the Chancellor is now under pressure to respond to the latest announcements around the ever-changing landscape of the pandemic. The fast-spreading mutation of the Covid-19 virus, Omicron, is posing a fresh threat to the economy.

On the 8 December, the Prime Minister announced new ‘Plan B’ Covid rules for England. As part of these new rules to limit the spread of Omicron, people are being asked to work from home again if possible and face masks are compulsory in most public places. Covid passes or a negative Covid test result are also needed to get into nightclubs and large venues.

Scotland and Wales have brought in further restrictions. Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, has asked people to limit socialising to three households at a time in the run-up to Christmas. Shops and hospitality venues in Scotland must bring back physical distancing and screens. In Wales, nightclubs will close after 26 December and social distancing will be reintroduced in shops.

Although the hospitality industry and retail sector remain open, they are facing a slump in trade thanks to the new restrictions and worries among the general public. With the work-from-home guidance and advice from health officials that people should limit their social interactions, pubs and restaurants have seen widespread cancellations in the run-up to Christmas. Trade is suffering and these mass cancellations come at a time when these sectors were hoping for bumper trade after a dismal last couple of years.

In light of these concerns, ministers are now being urged to guarantee support in case businesses have to shut. Despite the indication that it would be highly unlikely that the UK would experience a full return to the restrictions seen at previous stages of the crisis, the International Monetary Fund has stated that the UK government should be drawing up contingency plans. The IMF has called for a mini-furlough scheme in the event that the Omicron variant forces the government to close parts of the economy. The idea is that the mini-furlough scheme would see a limited version of the multi-billion-pound job subsidy scheme being rolled out if firms are forced to close.

There are strong calls for there to be targeted support, which this mini-furlough scheme could offer. The Resolution Foundation argued in mid-December that a furlough scheme tied solely to the hospitality industry would help prevent job loses in an industry that is currently suffering once again. It calculated that the cost of a hospitality-only furlough scheme would be £1.4 billion a month if it were pitched at the original level of 80% of wage support. If a January to March sector-specific scheme were to be introduced it is estimated to cost around £5 billion, a small cost in comparison to £46 billion spent on furlough so far.

Inflation

Any reintroduction of a furlough scheme would be a jolt for the government. This would mean a return to the 2020-style arguments around protecting livelihoods and businesses, a contrast to the recent messaging from the Treasury of restoring public finances. There is also concern about how this will all impact on current growth predictions and inflation concerns. The IMF expects the growth of the UK economy to be 6.8% in 2021 and 5% in 2022. However, the drawback from this is that the recovery would also be accompanied by rising inflation. It has been suggested, therefore, that interest rate increases from the Bank of England would be needed to keep inflation under control, while at the same time being not so great as to kill off growth.

It was widely expected that the Bank of England would again put off a rate hike in order to wait to see the economic impact of Plan B restrictions. However, on Thursday 16 December, interest rates were raised for the first time in more than three years. Despite the fears that Omicron could slow the economy by causing people to spend less, Bank Rate was raised from 0.1% to 0.25% . This came in the wake of data showing prices climbing at the fastest pace for 10 years.

Next Steps?

Government finances would take another huge hit if the furlough scheme were revived. But a version of such a scheme is likely to be necessary to avert an unemployment crisis and the attendant costs.

However, in resisting further measures, the government has argued that it has already acted early to help control the virus’s spread by rapidly rolling out booster jabs, while avoiding unduly damaging economic and social restrictions.

The government also argues that some of the measures from the total £400 billion Covid support package since the start of the pandemic will continue to help businesses into Spring 2022. Such measures include government-backed loans for small- and medium-sized businesses until June 2022, a reduction in VAT from 20% to 12.5% until March 2022 and business rates relief for eligible retail, hospitality, and leisure businesses until March 2022. Talks are ongoing with hospitality and and other business organisations directly affected by Covid restrictions.

The British Chambers of Commerce has argued that current measures are not enough and has called for VAT on hospitality and tourism to be cut back to its emergency rate of 5% and for the 100% business rates relief for retailers to return. The CBI has also called for any unspent local authority grants to be spent now to help affected firms and that further help, including business rates relief, should be on the table if restrictions continue after the government’s 5 January review date. The IMF said that with strong policy support, the economy had proved resilient, but it stressed that a return of some of the measures that prevented mass unemployment and large-scale business failures might soon be needed.

Conclusion

Infections caused by the new Omicron variant are rising rapidly, doubling every two to three days. It is expected to become the dominant variant in the UK soon with health officials warning it may be the most significant threat since the start of the pandemic. However, it is not yet known what the full extent of the impact of this new variant on the NHS will be, leaving the severity of future restrictions uncertain.

But what is evident is that the course of the pandemic has changed and there is a growing case for the government to start planning for new support packages. Although a reintroduction of the furlough scheme was hoped not to be needed on the path out of the pandemic, a short detour may be required in the form of a mini-furlough scheme. The size and reach of any support put in place will depend upon any further restrictions on economic activity.

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Questions

  1. Should the level of support for business return to the levels in place earlier in 2021?
  2. What measures could a government put in place to curtail the spread of the Omicron variant that have only a minimal impact on business and employment?
  3. Compare the UK measures to curtail the spread of the virus with those used in some other European countries.
  4. What are the arguments for and against (a) re-introducing the furlough scheme as it was earlier in 2021; (b) introducing a version restricted to the hospitality sector?

Inflation has surged worldwide as countries have come out of their COVID-19 lockdowns. The increases in prices combined with supply-chain problems has raised questions of what will happen to future prices and whether it will feed further inflation cycles.

Inflation targeting

Inflation is a key contributor to instability in an economy. It measures the rate of increases in prices over a given period of time and indicates what will happen to the cost of living for households. Because of its importance, many central banks aim to keep inflation low and steady by setting a target. The Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, and the European Central Bank all aim to keep inflation low at a target rate of 2 per cent.

Inflation-rate targeting has been successfully practised in a growing number of countries over the past few decades. However, measures to combat rising inflation typically contract the economy through reducing real aggregate demand (or at least its rate of growth). This is a concern when the economy is not experiencing a strong economic performance.

Current outlook

Globally, rising inflation is causing concern as a surge in demand has been confronted by supply bottlenecks and rising prices of energy and raw materials. As the world emerges from the COVID-19 lockdowns, global financial markets have been affected in recent months by concerns around inflation. They have also been affected by the prospect of major central banks around the world being forced into the early removal of pandemic support measures, such as quantitative easing, before the economic recovery from the coronavirus is complete.

The Chief Economist at the Bank of England has warned that UK inflation is likely to rise ‘close to or even slightly above 5 per cent’ early next year, as he said the central bank would have a ‘live’ decision on whether to raise interest rates at its November meeting. Although consumer price inflation dipped to 3.1 per cent in September, the Bank of England has forecast it to exceed 4 per cent by the end of the year, 2 percentage points higher than its target. UK banks and building societies have already started to increase mortgage rates in response to rising inflation, signalling an end to the era of ultra-low borrowing costs and piling further pressure on household finances.

In the USA, shortages throughout the supply chains on which corporate America depends are also causing concern. These issues are translating into widespread inflationary pressure, disrupting operations and forcing companies to raise prices for customers. Pressure on every link in the supply chain, from factory closures triggered by COVID-19 outbreaks to trouble finding enough staff to unload trucks, is rippling across sectors, intensifying questions about the threat that inflation poses to robust consumer spending and rebounding corporate earnings. Reflecting concern over weaker levels of global economic growth despite rising inflationary pressures, US figures published at the end of October showed the world’s largest economy added just 194 000 jobs in September, far fewer than expected.

There are also fears raised over high levels of corporate debt, including in China at the embattled property developer Evergrande, where worries over its ability to keep up with debt payments have rippled through global markets. There are major concerns that Evergrande could pose risks to the wider property sector, with potential spill-overs internationally. However, it is argued that the British banking system has been shown in stress tests to be resilient to a severe economic downturn in China and Hong Kong.

Central bank responses

The sharpest consumer-price increases in years have evoked different responses from central banks. Many have raised interest rates, but two that haven’t are the most prominent in the global economy: the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. These differences in responses reflect differing opinions as to whether current price increases will feed further inflation cycles or simply peter out. For those large central banks, they are somewhat relying on households keeping faith in their track record of keeping inflation low. There is also an expectation that there are enough underutilised workers to ensure that wage inflation is kept low.

However, other monetary authorities worry that they have not yet earned the record of keeping inflation low and are concerned about the risk of wage inflation. In addition, in poorer countries there is a larger share of spending that goes on essentials such as food and energy. These have seen some of the highest price increases, so policy makers are going to be keen to stamp down on the inflation.

The Federal Reserve is expected to announce that it will start phasing out its $120bn monthly bond-buying programme (quantitative easing) as it confronts more pronounced price pressures and predictions that interest rates will be lifted next year. However, no adjustments are expected to be made to the Fed’s main policy rate, which is tethered near zero. Whilst financial markets are betting on an rise in Bank Rate by the Bank of England as early as next month, spurred by comments from Governor Andrew Bailey in mid-October that the central bank would ‘have to act’ to keep a lid on inflation.

Outlook for the UK

The Bank of England’s Chief Economist, Huw Pill, has warned that high rates of inflation could last longer than expected, due to severe supply shortages and rising household energy bills. He said inflationary pressures were still likely to prove temporary and would fall back over time as the economy adjusted after disruption caused by COVID and Brexit. However, he warned there were growing risks that elevated levels of inflation could persist next year.

The looming rise in borrowing costs for homeowners will add further pressure to family finances already stretched by higher energy bills and surging inflation. According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, it is expected that households will face years of stagnating living standards, with predictions showing that households would on average be paying £3000 more each year in taxes by 2024/25, with the biggest impact felt by higher earners.

Investors are also reacting to concerns and have pulled $9.4bn out of UK-focused equity funds this year after hopes that a COVID-19 vaccination drive will fuel a vigorous economic recovery were overshadowed by questions about slow growth and high inflation. It is suggested that there is a general sense of caution about the UK when it comes to investing globally, driven by monetary, fiscal and trade uncertainties.

Given all the elements contributing to this outlook, The IMF has forecast that the UK will recover more slowly from the shocks of coronavirus than other G7 nations, with economic output in 2024 still 3 per cent below its pre-pandemic levels. Financial markets are predicting the Bank of England will lift interest rates as soon as the next MPC meeting. And while supply-chain bottlenecks and rising commodity prices are a global trend, the Bank’s hawkish stance has increased the possibility of a sharper slowdown in Britain than other developed markets, some analysts have said.

What next?

Some of the major central banks are poised to take centre stage when announcing their next monetary action, as it will reveal if they share the alarm about surging inflation that has gripped investors. Markets are betting that the Bank of England will begin raising interest rates, with Bank Rate expected to rise to around 1.25 per cent by the end of next year (from the current 0.1 per cent).

It is thought that the Fed will not raise interest rates just yet but will do so in the near future. Markets, businesses, and households globally will be waiting on the monetary decisions of all countries, as these decisions will shape the trajectory of the global economy over the next few years.

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Questions

  1. What is the definition of inflation?
  2. How is inflation measured?
  3. Using a diagram to aid your answers, discuss the difference between cost-push and demand-pull inflation.
  4. What are the demand-side and cost-side causes of the current rising inflation?
  5. Explain the impact an increase in interest rates has on the economy.

The UK government has made much of its spending commitments in the UK Budget and Spending Review delivered on 27 October 2021. Spending on transport infrastructure, green energy and health care figured prominently. The government claimed that these were to help achieve its objectives of economic growth, carbon reduction and ‘levelling up’. This means that government expenditure will be around 42% of GDP for the five years from 2022 (from 1988 to 2000 it averaged 36%). Although it temporarily rose to 52% in 2020/21, this was the result of supporting the economy through the pandemic. But does this mean that the government is now a ‘Keynesian’ one?

When the economy is in recession, as was the case in 2020 with the effects of the pandemic, increased government expenditure financed by borrowing rather than taxation is the classic Keynesian remedy to boost aggregate demand and close the output gap. The increased injection of spending works through the multiplier process to raise equilibrium national income and reduce unemployment.

But is this the objective of the extra spending announced in October 2021? To answer this, it is important to look at forecasts for the state of the economy with no change in government policy and at the balance of government expenditure and taxation resulting from the Budget. The first chart shows public sector net borrowing from 2006/7 and forecast to 2026/7. The green and red lines from 2021/22 onwards give the PSNB forecasts with and without the October 2021 measures.

As you can see, there was a large increase in the PSNB in 2020/21, reflecting the government’s measures to support firms and workers during the pandemic. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) This was very much a Keynesian response, where a large budget deficit was necessary to support aggregate demand. It was also to protect the supply side of the economy by enabling firms to survive.

But could the October 2021 announcements also be seen as a Keynesian response to the macroeconomic situation? If we redraw Chart 1, focusing just on the forecast period and adjust the vertical scale, we can see that the measures have a net effect of increasing the PSNB and thus acting as a stimulus to aggregate demand. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) The figures are shown in the following table, which shows the totals from Table 5.1 in the Autumn Budget and Spending Review 2021 document:

Effects of Spending Review and Budget 2021 on PSNB (+ = increase in PSNB)

At first sight, it would seem that the Budget was mildly expansionary. To see how much so, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) measures the ‘fiscal stance’ using the ‘cyclically adjusted primary deficit (CAPD)’. This is PSNB minus interest payments and minus expenditures and tax revenues that fluctuate with the cycle and which therefore act as automatic stabilisers. The OBR’s forecast of the CAPD shows it to be expansionary, but decreasing over time. In 2021/22, there is forecast to be a net injection of around 3.2% (excluding ‘virus-related’ support), falling to 2.7% in 2022/23 and then gradually to around 0.6% by 2026/27. So it does seem that fiscal policy remains expansionary throughout the period, but less and less so.

But this alone does not make it ‘Keynesian’. A Keynesian Budget would be one that uses fiscal policy to adjust aggregate demand (AD) according to whether AD is forecast to be deficient or excessive without the Budget measures. To operate a Keynesian Budget, it would be necessary to forecast the output gap without any policy measures. If was forecast to be negative (a deficiency of demand, with equilibrium output below the potential level), then an expansionary policy should be pursued by raising government expenditure, cutting taxes or some combination of the two. If it was forecast to be positive (an excess demand, with equilibrium output above the potential level), then a contractionary/deflationary policy should be pursued by cutting government expenditure, raising taxes or some combination of the two.

So what is the forecast for the output gap? The OBR states that, after being negative in 2020
(–0.4% of potential GDP), it has risen substantially to 0.9% in 2021 with the rapid bounce back from the pandemic. But it is forecast to remain positive, albeit declining, until reaching zero in 2025. This is illustrated in Chart 3. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) So fiscal policy remains mildly expansionary until 2025, after having provided a considerable stimulus in 2021.

This is not normally what a Keynesian economist would recommend. Fiscal policy should be designed to achieve a zero output gap. With the output gap being substantially positive in 2021, there is a problem of excess demand. This can be seen in supply-chain difficulties and labour shortages in certain areas and higher inflation, with CPI inflation predicted by the OBR to rise to 4.4 per cent in 2022. The combination of higher prices, the rise in national insurance from April 2022 by 1.25 percentage points and the freezing of income tax personal allowances will squeeze living standards. And the cancelling of the £20 per week uplift to Universal Credit and no increase in its rate for the unemployed will put particular pressure on some of the poorest people.

The government is hoping that the rise in government expenditure will have beneficial supply-side effects and increase potential national income. The aim is to create a high-wage, high-skilled, high-productivity economy though investment in innovation, infrastructure and skills. As the OBR states, ‘The rebounding economy has provided the Chancellor with a Budget windfall that he has added to with tax rises that lift the tax burden to its highest since the early 1950s’.

It remains to be seen whether the extra spending on education, training, infrastructure and R&D will be sufficient to achieve the long-term growth the Chancellor is seeking. The OBR is forecasting very modest growth into the longer term when the bounce back has worked through. Real GDP is forecast to grow on average by just 1.5% per year from 2024 to 2026. What is more, the OBR sees permanent scarring effects of around 2% of GDP from the pandemic and around 4% of GDP from Brexit.

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Questions

  1. What do you understand by ‘fiscal stance’?
  2. What are ‘automatic fiscal stabilisers? How might they affect GDP over the next few years?
  3. If the government had chosen to pursue a zero output gap from 2022/23 onwards, how would this have affected the balance between total government expenditure and taxation in the 2021 Budget and Spending Review?
  4. Provide a critique of the Budget from the left.
  5. Provide a critique of the budget from the right.
  6. Was this a ‘Green Budget’?
  7. Is the Budget following the ‘golden rule’ of fiscal policy?
  8. Look through Table 5.1 in the Budget and Spending Review document (linked below). Which of the measures will have the most substantial effect on aggregate demand?