On 25 October 2024, Moody’s, one of the major credit ratings agencies, announced that it was downgrading France’s economic outlook to negative. This was its first downgrading of France since 2012. It followed a similar revision by Fitch’s, another ratings agency, on 11 October.
While Fitch’s announcement did not have a significant impact on the yields of French government bonds, expectations around Moody’s did. In the week preceding the announcement, the net increases in the yield on generic 10-year government debt was approximately 9 basis points (0.09 percentage points). On the day itself, the yield rose by approximately 5.6 basis points (0.056 percentage points).
The yield rose further throughout the rest of October, finishing nearly 0.25 percentage points above its level at the start of the month. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, these increases are part of a longer-term trend of rising yields for French government debt (click here for a PowerPoint).
The yield on 10-year French government debt began 2024 at 2.56% and had an upward trend for the first half of the year. The yield peaked at 3.34% on 1 July. It then fell back below 3% for a while. The negative economic outlook then pushed yields back above 3% and they finished October at 3.12%, half a percentage point above the level at the start of the year. This represents a significant increase in borrowing costs for the French government.
In this blog, we will explain why the changes in France’s economic outlook translate into increases in yields for French government bonds. We will also analyse why yields have increased and examine the prospects for the markets in French government bonds.
Pricing signals of bond yields
A bond is a tradable debt instrument issued by governments to finance budget deficits – the difference between tax receipts and spending. Like any financial instruments, investment in bonds involves a commitment of funds today in anticipation of interest payments through time as compensation, with a repayment of its redemption value on the date the bond matures.
Since the cash flows associated with holding a bond occur at different points in time, discounted cash flow analysis is used to determine its value. This gives the present value of the cash flows discounted at the appropriate expected rate of return. In equilibrium this will be equal to the bond’s market price, as the following equation shows.
Where:
P = the equilibrium price of the bond
C = cash coupon payments
M = redemption value at maturity
r = yield (expected rate of return in equilibrium.
Interest payments tend to be fixed at the time a bond is issued and reflect investors’ expected rate of return, expressed as the yield in bond markets. This is determined by prevailing interest rates and perceived risk. Over time, changes in interest rates and perceptions of risk will change the expected rate of return (yield), which will, in turn, change the present value of the cash flows, and hence fundamental value.
Prices move in response to changes in fundamental value and since this happens frequently, this means that prices change a lot. For bonds, as the coupon payments (C each year and the redemption price () are fixed, the only factor that can change is the expected rate of return (yield). This is reflected in the observed yield at each price.
If the expected rate of return rises, this increases the discount rate applied to future cash flows and reduces their present value. At the current price, the fixed coupon is not sufficient to compensate investors. So, investors sell the bonds and price falls until it reaches a point where the yield offered is equal to that required. The reverse happens if the expected rate of return falls.
The significant risk associated with bonds is credit default risk – the risk that the debt will not be repaid. The potential for credit default is a significant influence of the compensation investors require for holding debt instruments like bonds (ceteris paribus). An increase in expected credit default risk will increase the expected return (compensation). This will be reflected in a lower price and higher yield.
Normally, with the bonds issued by high-income countries, such as those in Europe and North America, the risk of default is extremely low. However, if a country’s annual deficits or accumulated debt increase to what markets consider to be unsustainable levels, the perceived risk of default may rise. Countries’ levels of risk are rated by international ratings agencies, such as Moody’s and Fitch. Investors pay a lot of attention to the information provided by such agencies.
Moody’s downgrade in its economic outlook for France from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’ indicated weak economic performance and higher credit default risk. This revision rippled through bond markets as investors adjusted their views of the country’s economic risk. The rise in yields observed is a signal that bond investors perceive higher credit default risk associated with French government debt and are demanding a higher rates of return as compensation.
Why has France’s credit default risk premium risen now?
As we have seen, credit default risk is not normally considered a significant issue for sovereign borrowers like France. Some of the issue around perceived credit default risk for the French government relate to the size of the French government’s deficit and the projections for it. Following a spike in borrowing associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the annual government budget deficit and the overall level of debt as percentages of GDP have remained high. The annual deficit is projected to be 6% for 2024 and still 5% for 2025. The ratio of outstanding French government debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ballooned to 123% in 2020 and is still expected to be 115% by the end of 2025. France has been put on notice to reduce its debt towards the Eurozone limit of 60% of GDP.
Governments in France last achieved a balanced budget in 1974. They have run deficits ever since. Figure 2 illustrates the French government budget deficits from 1990 to 2023 (click here for a PowerPoint). The figure shows that France experienced deficits in the past similar to today’s. These, however, did not tend to worry bond markets too much.
So why are investors currently worried? This stems from France’s debt mountain and from concerns that the government will not be able to deal with it. Investors are concerned that both weak growth and increasingly volatile politics will thwart efforts to reduce debt levels.
Let’s take growth. Even by contemporary European standards, France’s growth prospects are anaemic. GDP is expected to grow by just 1.1% for 2024 and 1% for 2025. Both consumer and business confidence are low. None of this suggests a growth spurt soon which will boost the tax revenues of the French government sufficiently to address the deficit.
Further, political instability has grown due to the inconclusive parliamentary elections which Emmanuel Macron surprisingly called in July. No single political grouping has a majority and the President has appointed a Centrist Prime Minister, Michel Barnier (the former EU Brexit negotiator). His government is trying to pass a budget through the Assemblée Nationale involving a mixture of spending cuts and tax hikes which amount to savings of €60 billion ($66 billion). This is equivalent to 2% of GDP.
The parliamentary path of the budget bill is set to be torturous with both the left and right wing blocs in the Assemblée opposing most of the provisions. Debate in the Assemblée Nationale and Senate are expected to drag on into December, with the real prospect that the government may have to use presidential decree to pass the budget. Commentators argue that this will fuel further political chaos.
France looks more like Southern Europe
In the past, bond investors were more tolerant of France’s budget deficits. French government bonds were attractive options for investors wanting to hold euro-denominated bonds while avoiding riskier Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Since France has run persistent government deficits for a long time, it offered bond investors a more liquid market than more fiscally-parsimonious Northern European neighbours, such as Germany and the Netherlands. Consequently, France’s debt instruments offered a slight risk premium on the yields for those countries.
However, that has changed. France’s credit default risk premium is rising to levels comparable to its Southern neighbours. On 26 September 2024, the yield on generic French government 10-year debt rose above its Spanish equivalent for the first time since 2008.
As Figure 3 illustrates, this was the culmination of a trend evident throughout 2024, with the difference in yields between the two declining steadily (click here for a PowerPoint). At the start of the year, the yield on Spanish debt offered a 40 basis points premium over the French equivalent. By October, the yield on Spanish debt was consistently below that of French debt. All of this is due to bond investors’ rising expectations about France’s credit default risk. Now, France’s borrowing costs are not only above Spain, but also closer to those of Greece and Italy than of Germany.
Strikingly, Spain’s budget deficit was 3.5% in 2023 and is expected to narrow to 2.6% by 2025. The percentage of total debt to GDP is 104% and falling. Moreover, following Spain’s inconclusive election in 2023, the caretaker government put forward budgetary plans involving fiscal tightening without the need for legislation. This avoided the political wrangling France is facing.
For France, these developments raise the prospect of yields rising further as bond investors now see alternatives to French government debt in the form of Spain’s. This country have already undertaken the painful fiscal adjustments that France seems incapable of completing.
Articles
Data
Questions
- What is credit default risk?
- Explain why higher credit default risk is associated with higher yields on France’s government debt.
- Why would low economic growth worsen the government’s budget deficit?
- Why would political instability increase credit default risk?
- What has happened to investors’ perceptions of the risk associated with French government debt relative to Spain’s?
- How has this manifested itself in the relative yields of the two countries’ government debt?
The French have elected Emmanuel Macron as their new President. He claims to be from the economic centre. But just what does this imply for his vision of how the French economy should be run? What policies is he likely to put in place? Can these policies rightly be described as ‘centrist’? In practice, some of his policies are advocated by the centre right and some by the centre left.
He wants to institute policies that are pro business and will have the effect of stimulating private investment, increasing productivity and resulting in faster economic growth.
His pro-business policies include: reducing corporation tax from its current 33.3% to 25%, the hope being that firms will invest the money that this will free up; reducing labour taxes on companies for employing low-wage workers; making the current 35-hour working week less rigid by giving firms greater ability to negotiate special arrangements with trade unions.
Other policies drawn from the centre right include reducing the size of the state. Currently, general government spending in France, at 56.5% of GDP, is the highest of the G7 countries. Italy’s is the next highest at 49.6%, followed by Germany at 44.3%, Canada at 40.8%, the UK at 39.4%, Japan at 36.8% and the USA at 35.2%. President Macron wants to reduce the figure for France to 52% over his five-year term. 
This will be achieved by cutting 120,000 public-sector jobs and reducing state spending by €60bn. He plans, thereby, to reduce the general government deficit from its 2016 level of 3.4% of GDP to 1% by 2022 and reduce the general government debt from 96.0% of GDP to 93.2% over the same period.
Drawing from centre-left policies he plans to increase public investment by €50bn, including €15bn on training, €15bn on green energy and €5bn each on transport, health, agriculture and the modernisation of public administration. But as this additional expenditure is less than the planned savings through greater efficiency and as GDP is projected to grow, this is still consistent with achieving a reduction in the general government deficit as a percentage of GDP. He has also pledged to extend welfare spending. This will include making the self-employed eligibile for unemployment benefits.
M Macron isalso strongly supportive of France’s membership of the EU and the euro. Nevertheless he wants the EU to be reformed to make it more efficient and achieve significant cost savings.
Articles
Macronomy: What are Emmanuel Macron’s economic plans? BBC News, Simon Atkinson (8/5/17)
Factbox: Emmanuel Macron’s presidential election policies Reuters, Brian Love (14/4/17)
What Analysts Are Saying About Macron’s Victory Bloomberg, Chris Anstey (8/5/14)
The Main Points of Emmanuel Macron’s Economic Programme NDTV, India (9/5/14)
Can Emmanuel Macron solve France’s economic riddle? The Guardian, Larry Elliott (30/4/17)
Why Emmanuel Macron’s bid to haul France out of its economic malaise will be harder than he thinks The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan and Tim Wallace (30/4/17)
Macron’s policies on Europe, trade, immigration and defence Financial Times, Hannah Murphy (7/5/17)
French presidential election: Investors, economists and strategists react to Macron’s victory Independent, Josie Cox (8/5/17)
Questions
- Compare the performance of the French, German and UK economies over the past 10 years.
- Why does France have much lower levels of inequality and much higher productivity than the UK?
- How would (a) a neoliberal and (b) Keynesian economist explain the slow growth performance of France?
- Give some other examples of centre-right economic policies that could be pursued by a centrist government.
- Give some other examples of centre-left economic policies that could be pursued by a centrist government.
- How do M Macron’s policies differ from those of the (a) Conservative, (b) Labour and (c) Liberal Democrat parties in the manifestos for the 2017 General Election in the UK?
- What economic difficulties is M Macron likely to find in carrying out his policies?
- Would you describe M Macron’s macroeconomic policies as demand-side or supply -side policies? Explain.
- What specific economic policies does France want Germany to pursue?
The French economy is flatlining. It has just recorded the second quarter of zero economic growth, with growth averaging just 0.02% over the past 12 months. What is more, the budget deficit is rising, not falling. In April this year, the French finance minister said that the deficit would fall from 4.3% in 2013 to 3.8% in 2014 and to the eurozone ceiling of 3% in 2015. He is now predicting that it will rise this year to 4.4% and not reach the 3% target until 2017.
The deficit is rising because a flatlining economy is not generating sufficient tax revenues. What is more, expenditure on unemployment benefits and other social protection is rising as unemployment has risen, now standing at a record 10.3%.
And it is not just the current economic situation that is poor; the outlook is poor too. The confidence of French companies is low and falling, and investment plans are muted. President Hollande has pledged to cut payroll taxes to help firms, but so far this has not encouraged firms to invest more.
So what can the French government do? And what can the EU as a whole do to help revive not just the French economy but most of the rest of the eurozone, which is also suffering from zero, or near zero, growth?
There are two quite different sets of remedies being proposed.
The first comes from the German government and increasingly from the French government too. This is to stick to the austerity plans: to get the deficit down; to reduce the size of government in order to prevent crowding out; and to institute market-orientated supply-side policies that are business friendly, such as reducing business regulation. Business leaders in France, who generally back this approach, have called for reducing the number of public holidays and scrapping the maximum 35-hour working week. They are also seeking reduced business taxes, financed by reducing various benefits.
Increasingly President Hollande is moving towards a more business-friendly set of policies. Under his government’s ‘Responsibility Pact’, a €40 billion package of tax breaks for business will be financed through €50 billion of cuts in public spending. To carry through these policies he has appointed an ex-investment banker, Emmanuel Macron, as economy minister. He replaces Arnaud Montebourg, who roundly criticised government austerity policy and called for policies to boost aggregate demand.
This brings us to the alternative set of remedies. These focus on stimulating aggregate demand through greater infrastructure investment and cutting taxes more generally (not just for business). The central argument is that growth must come first and that this will then generate the tax revenues and reductions in unemployment that will then allow the deficit to be brought down. Only when economic growth is firmly established should measures be taken to cut government expenditure in an attempt to reduce the structural deficit.
There are also compromise policies being proposed from the centre. These include measures to stimulate aggregate demand, mainly through tax cuts, accompanied by supply-side policies, whether market orientated or interventionist.
As Europe continues to struggle to achieve recovery, so the debate is getting harsher. Monetary policy alone may not be sufficient to bring recovery. Although the ECB has taken a number of measures to stimulate demand, so far they have been to little avail. As long as business confidence remains low, making increased liquidity available to banks at interest rates close to zero will not make banks more willing to lend to business, or businesses more willing to borrow. Calls for an end, or at least a temporary halt, to austerity are thus getting louder. At the same time, calls for sticking to austerity and tackling excessive government spending are also getting louder.
Articles
Hollande entrusts French economy to ex-banker Macron Reuters, Ingrid Melander and Jean-Baptiste Vey (26/8/14)
France’s new Minister of the Economy Emmanuel Macron described by left-wingers as a ‘copy-and-paste Tony Blair’ Independent, John Lichfield (28/8/14)
Merkel praises France’s economic reform plans after Berlin talks with PM Valls Deutsche Welle (22/9/14)
French economy flat-lines as business activity falters Reuters, Leigh Thomas (23/9/14)
French public finances: Rétropédalage The Economist (13/9/14)
French employer group urges ‘shock therapy’ for economy Reuters (24/9/14)
Last chance to save France: loosen 35-hour week and cut public holidays, say bosses The Telegraph (24/9/14)
‘Sick’ France’s economy is stricken by unemployment ‘fever’ The Telegraph (17/9/14)
France’s economics ills worsen but all remedies appear unpalatable The Observer, Larry Elliott and Anne Penketh (31/8/14)
The Fall of France The New York Times, Paul Krugman (28/8/14)
Why Europe is terrified of deflation Salon, Paul Ames (20/9/14)
Europe’s Greater Depression is worse than the 1930s The Washington Post, Matt O’Brien (14/8/14)
Worse than the 1930s: Europe’s recession is really a depression The Washington Post, Matt O’Brien (20/8/14)
Eurozone business growth slows in September, PMI survey finds BBC News (23/9/14)
Europe must ‘boost demand’ to revive economy, US warns BBC News (21/9/14)
Valls says France would never ask Germany to solve its problems Reuters, Annika Breidthardt and Michelle Martin (23/9/14)
The euro-zone economy: Asset-backed indolence The Economist (11/9/14)
Data
Annual macro-economic database (AMECO) Economic and Financial Affairs DG, European Commission
Business and Consumer Surveys Times Series Economic and Financial Affairs DG, European Commission
StatExtracts OECD
Statistics database European Central Bank
Questions
- What types of supply-side reforms would be consistent with the German government’s vision of solving Europe’s low growth problem?
- How could a Keynesian policy of reflation be consistent with getting France’s deficit down to the 3% of GDP limit as specified in the Stability and Growth Pact (see)?
- What is meant by (a) financial crowding out and (b) resource crowding out? Would reflationary fiscal policy in France lead to either form of crowding out? How would it be affected by the monetary stance of the ECB?
- Give examples of market-orientated and interventionist supply-side policies.
- What is meant by the terms ‘cyclical budget deficit’ and ‘structural budget deficit’. Could demand-side policy affect the structural deficit?
- Using the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Surveys find our what has happened to business and consumer confidence in France over the past few months.
- How important is business and consumer confidence in determining economic growth in (a) the short term and (b) the long term?
Nearly two years ago, France lost its triple A credit-rating and the news has only got worse. Unemployment has risen and economic growth in France has remained low and this is one of the reasons why France’s credit rating has been downgraded further from AA+ to AA. A high credit rating doesn’t guarantee market confidence, but it does help to keep the cost of borrowing for the government low. Thus, this downgrading could spell trouble for French borrowing costs.
Standard and Poor’s (S&P), who downgraded the French credit rating, is expecting government debt to rise to 86% of gross domestic product and believes that unemployment will remain above 10% until 2016. While the French government has put various reforms in place to boost the struggling economy, S&P don’t believe they are sufficient and have been very public in criticising the government’s effort. They were quoted as saying:
We believe the French government’s reforms to taxation, as well as to product, services and labour markets, will not substantially raise France’s medium-term growth prospects and that on-going high unemployment is weakening support for further significant fiscal and structural policy measures.
Following the downgrading, the return for those investors purchasing French debt did begin to rise, echoing the theory that the cost of borrowing would rise. 
The yield on French government 10-year bonds increased from 2.158% to 2.389%. The outlook given to France by S&P was ‘stable’, implying that there is a relatively low chance that S&P would change France’s credit-rating again in the next two years.
Many were surprised at the downgrading of France’s credit rating, but this may be the nudge that President Hollande needs to push through extensive labour market reforms with the aim of reducing unemployment and generating growth in the economy. Despite this latest move by S&P, the other credit rating agencies have yet to take similar action. Perhaps they are more convinced by the Finance Minister, Pierre Moscovici who claims that France’s debt is ‘one of the safest and most liquid in the world.’ He commented that:
They are underestimating France’s ability to reform, to pull itself up … During the last 18 months the government has implemented major reforms aimed at improving the French economic situation, restoring its public finances and its competitiveness.
It will take some time for the full impact of this development in France’s economy to become apparent. The cost of borrowing has already risen only time will tell what will happen to market confidence over the coming weeks. However, what is certain is that pressure is already mounting on Francois Hollande. The following articles consider the French economy.
France told to reform labour market after second credit rating downgrade The Guardian, Phillip Inman (8/13/13)
France’s credit rating cut by S&P to AA BBC News (8/11/13)
S&P lowers France rating on reform doubts, markets unfazed Reuters, Nicholas Vinocur (8/11/13)
Hollande approval rating slumps as France downgraded The Telegraph, James Titcomb (8/11/13)
S&P cuts France’s credit rating by one notch to double-A Wall Street Journal, William Horobin (8/11/13)
Five charts that show the state of the French economy The Telegraph (8/11/13)
France rating downgrade heaps pressure on Francois Hollande Financial Times, Michael Stothard (8/11/13)
Questions
- What does a double A rating mean for the French economy?
- Which factors will be considered when a ratings agency decides to change a country’s credit rating?
- France’s unemployment rate is one of the key factors that S&P has considered. Why is France’s unemployment rate so high? Which type(s) of unemployment are increasing?
- Use a diagram to illustrate the unemployment that France is facing.
- If a country does see its credit rating downgraded, what might this mean for government borrowing costs? Explain why this might cause further problems for a country?
- Markets have been ‘unfazed’ by the downgrade. How do you think markets will react to over the coming weeks? Explain your answer.
- What action could the French government take to ensure that S&P is the only ratings agency that downgrades their credit rating?
The latest growth data for the UK is somewhat difficult to interpret. It’s positive, but not that positive. The Conservatives say it shows that the economy is moving in the right direction. Labour suggests it is evidence that the Coalition’s policies are not working. With a return to positive growth, the UK has avoided the triple dip recession and here we take a closer look at the economic performance of other key nations.
In the final quarter of 2012, the US economy grew at 0.4%, but in the 3 months to March 2013, economic growth in America picked up to 2.5%. Consumer spending significantly increased, growing at an annualized rate of 3.2%, according to the Commerce Department. This figure helped boost the growth rate of the US economy, as consumer spending accounts for around two thirds of economic activity.
However, the growth figure was lower than expected, in part due to lower government spending. Furthermore, there are suggestions that the positive consumer spending figures are merely a positive blip and spending will fall as the US economy moves through 2013.
If this does prove to be the case in the USA, it will do little to further boost UK economic growth, which was recorded at 0.3% for the first 3 months of 2013. The Chancellor has said that the growth figures are encouraging and are evidence that the government’s policies are working.
Today’s figures are an encouraging sign the economy is healing … Despite a tough economic backdrop, we are making progress. We all know there are no easy answers to problems built up over many years, and I can’t promise the road ahead will always be smooth, but by continuing to confront our problems head on, Britain is recovering and we are building an economy fit for the future.
While the USA and UK have recorded positive growth, expectations of growth throughout Europe remain uncertain. Spain has revised its forecasts downwards for 2013, expecting the economy to shrink by over 1%. Even after 2013, growth is expected to remain very weak, forecast to be 0.5% in 2014 and 0.9% in 2015. To make matters worse, Spain’s unemployment continues to move in the wrong direction, with data for the first 3 months of 2013, recording an unemployment rate of 27.2% – the highest on record.
However, it’s not just Spanish unemployment that is on the rise. Figures for March show that in France, 3.2 million people were out of work, a 1.2 % rise compared to February. In the UK, 2.56 million people were recorded as unemployed, representing just under 8% of the working population. The German economy continues to outperform its European partners, but eurozone growth continues to look weak for the rest of 2013.
Despite much bad news in Europe, growth in other parts of the world remains buoyant. South Korea has recorded economic growth that is at its highest level in 2 years. Economic growth was just under 1%, but construction and investment both increased, perhaps a sign of an economy starting its recovery.
The Chinese economy has seemed relatively unaffected by the economic downturn, yet its economic growth has slowed. Averaging over 10% per annum for the last decade, the growth for January – March 2013 was only 7.7%. This is a decline on the previous 3 months and is lower than expected. If the Chinese economy does begin to slow (relatively speaking), this could present the global economic recovery with an unwelcome obstacle.
Many Western economies are reliant on exports to boost their growth figures and with such high demand in China, this is a key export market for many countries. If the Chinese economy continues to slow, consumer spending may even fall and this could mean a reduction in Chinese imports: that is, a reduction in other countries’ exports to China. However, for China’s competitors, the news is better, as with China’s move from a low to middle-income country, other countries will now see an opportunity to grasp a competitive advantage in the production of cheaper products. David Rees from Capital Economics said:
Trade data show that Chinese imports of commodities, and industrial metals in particular, have been falling in recent months … That is bad news for those emerging markets in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa that predominately export commodities to China. It is not all bad news … To the extent that China’s structural slowdown reflects its transition from low to middle-income status, opportunities will present themselves for other EMs as China moves up the value chain. We are particularly upbeat on the manufacturing-based economies of South East Asia, along with Mexico, Poland, and Turkey.
News is better in Japan, where growth forecasts have been raised to 2.9% over the same period and the economy is expected to grow by 1.5% throughout both 2013 and 2014. Furthermore, suggestions that inflation may also reach 0.7% have boosted confidence. This might be the end of Japan’s troubles with deflation.
So, we have something of a mixed picture across the world, although the IMF predicts a global rate of growth of 3.5% for 2013, which would be an improvement on 2012 figures. The following articles consider the global situation.
Spain slashes economic growth forecast Sky News (26/4/13)
UK avoids triple-dip recession with better than expected 0.3% GDP growth The Guardian, Heather Stewart (26/4/13)
US economy grows 2.5% on buoyant consumer spending BBC News (26/4/13)
Poor French and Spanish jobs data but UK economy returns to growth – as it happened The Guardian, Graeme Wearden and Nick Fletcher (25/4/13)
UK economy avoids tiple-dip recession with 0.3pc GDP growth The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (25/4/13)
South Korea economic growth hits two year high BBC News (25/4/13)
S. Korea economy grows at the fastest pace in two years Bloomberg, Eunkyung Seo (25/4/13)
Spain revises down its economic forecast BBC News (26/4/13)
US economy sees broad growth Financial Times, Robin Harding (25/4/13)
Germany’s private sector shrinks as Eurozone decline continues – as it happened The Guardian, Graeme Wearden and Nick Fletcher (23/4/13)
China economic growth lower than forecast BBC News (15/4/13)
China’s slowing economy: what you need to know Bloomberg Business Week, Dexter Roberts (25/4/13)
Modest Growth Pickup in 2013, Projects IMF International Monetary Fund (23/1/13)
Questions
- How is economic growth measured?
- What is meant by a triple-dip recession?
- What has caused the small increase in growth in the UK? Do you think this signifies the start of the economic recovery?
- In the USA, what has caused the growth rate to reach 2.5% and why is it lower than expected?
- Why are growth rates in countries across the world relevant for UK forecasts of economic growth?
- Which factors have allowed the Chinese economy to achieve average growth rates above 10% for the past decade?
- Using an AD/AS diagram, illustrate the desired impact of the Coalition’s policies to boost economic growth.
- With unemployment rising in countries like Spain and France, how might Eurozone growth be affected in the coming months?
- Japanese growth is looking positive and inflation is expected to reach about 0.7%. Why is it that Japan has suffered from deflation for so many years and why is this a problem?
