Keynes referred to the ‘paradox of thrift’ (see, for example, Box 17.5 on page 492 of Sloman and Wride, Economics, 7th edition). The paradox goes something like this: if individuals save more, they will increase their consumption possibilities in the future. If society saves more, however, this may reduce its future income and consumption. Why should this be so? Well, as people in general save more, they will spend less. Firms will thus produce less. What is more, the lower consumption will discourage firms from investing. Thus, through both the multiplier and the accelerator, GDP will fall.
What we have in the paradox of thrift is an example of the ‘fallacy of composition’ (see Sloman and Wride, Box 3.7 on page 84). What applies at the individual level will not necessarily apply at the aggregate level. The paradox of thrift applied in the Great Depression of the 1930s. People cutting back on consumption drove the world economy further into depression.
Turn the clock forward some 80 years. On 26/27 June 2010, leaders of the G20 countries met in Canada to consider, amongst other things, how to protect the global economic recovery while tackling the large public-sector deficits. These deficits have soared as a result of two things: (a) the recession of 2008/9, which reduced tax revenues and resulted in more people claiming benefits, (b) the expansionary fiscal policies adopted to bring countries out of recession.
But the leaders were divided on how much to cut now. Some, such as the new Coalition government in the UK, want to cut the deficit quickly in order to appease markets and avert a Greek-style crisis and a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to service the debt. Others, such as the Obama Administration in the USA, want to cut more slowly so as not to put the recovery in jeopardy. Nevertheless, cuts were generally agreed, although agreement about the timing was more vague.
So where is the fallacy of composition? If one country cuts, then it is possible that increased demand from other countries could drive recovery. If all countries cut, however, the world may go back into recession. What applies to one country, therefore, may not apply to the world as a whole.
Let’s look at this in a bit more detail and consider the individual elements of aggregate demand. If there are to be cuts in government expenditure, then there has to be a corresponding increase in aggregate demand elsewhere, if growth is to be maintained. This could come from increased consumption. But, with higher taxes and many people saving more (or reducing their borrowing) for fear of being made redundant or, at least, of having a cut in their incomes, there seems to be little sign that consumption will be the driver of growth.
Then there is investment. But, fearing a ‘double-dip recession’, business confidence is plummeting (see) and firms are likely to be increasingly reluctant to invest. Indeed, after the G20 summit, stock markets around the world fell. On 29 June, the FTSE 100 fell by 3.10% and the main German and French stock market indices, the Dax and the Cac 40, fell by 3.33% and 4.01% respectively. This was partly because of worries about re-financing the debts of various European countries, but it was partly because of fears about recovery stalling.
The problem is that cuts in government expenditure and rises in taxes directly affect the private sector. If government capital expenditure is cut, this will directly affect the construction industry. Even if the government makes simple efficiency savings, such as reducing the consumption of paper clips or paper, this will directly affect the private stationery industry. If taxes are raised, consumers are likely to buy less. Under these circumstances, no wonder many industries are reluctant to invest.
This leaves net exports (exports minus imports). Countries generally are hoping for a rise in exports as a way of maintaining aggregate demand. But here we have the fallacy of composition in its starkest form. If one country exports more, then this can boost its aggregate demand. But if all countries in total are to export more, this can only be achieved if there is an equivalent increase in global imports: after all, someone has to buy the exports! And again, with growth faltering, the global demand for imports is likely to fall, or at best slow down.
The following articles consider the compatibility of cuts and growth. Is there a ‘paradox of cuts’ equivalent to the paradox of thrift?
Articles
Osborne’s first Budget? It’s wrong, wrong, wrong! Independent on Sunday, Joseph Stiglitz (27/6/10)
Strategy: Focus switches from exit to growth Financial Times, Chris Giles (25/6/10)
Once again we must ask: ‘Who governs?’ Financial Times, Robert Skidelsky (16/6/10)
Europe’s next top bailout… MoneyWeb, Guy Monson and Subitha Subramaniam (9/6/10)
Hawks hovering over G20 summit Financial Times (25/6/10)
G20 applauds fiscal austerity but allows for national discretion Independent, Andrew Grice and David Usborne (28/6/10)
To stimulate or not to stimulate? That is the question Independent, Stephen King (28/6/10)
Now even the US catches the deficit reduction habit Telegraph, Jeremy Warner (28/6/10)
George Osborne claims G20 success Guardian, Larry Elliott and Patrick Wintour (28/6/10)
G20 accord: you go your way, I’ll go mine Guardian, Larry Elliott (28/6/10)
G20 summit agrees on deficit cuts by 2013 BBC News (28/6/10)
IMF says G20 could do better BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (27/6/10)
Are G20 summits worth having? What should the G20’s top priority be? (Economics by invitation): see in particular The G20 is heading for a “public sector paradox of thrift”, John Makin The Economist (25/6/10)
Why it is right for central banks to keep printing Financial Times, Martin Wolf (22/6/10)
In graphics: Eurozone in crisis: Recovery Measures BBC News (24/6/10)
A prophet in his own house The Economist (1/7/10)
The long and the short of fiscal policy Financial Times, Clive Crook (4/7/10)
G20 Communiqué
The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration (27/6/10) (see particularly paragraph 10)
Questions
- Consider the arguments that economic growth and cutting deficits are (a) complementary aims (b) contradictory aims.
- Is there necessarily a ‘paradox of cuts’? Explain.
- How is game theory relevant in explaining the outcome of international negotiations, such as those at the G20 summit?
- Would it be wise for further quantitative easing to accompany fiscal tightening?
- What is the best way for governments to avoid a ‘double-dip recession’?
For some, thoughts will have turned to events on football pitches in South Africa. Perhaps though we should spare a thought for the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, who is likely to be concerned by his own team’s recent performance in missing the inflation rate target! Mervyn’s resulting ‘yellow card’ involves writing a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer every time the annual rate of CPI (Consumer Price Index) inflation deviates by more than one percentage point from the government’s central target of 2%. Unfortunately for the Governor, since the turn of the year, only in February has the annual rate of CPI inflation failed to exceed 3%. And, even that was within in a whisker of missing the goal since the rate of inflation squeaked in at 3%. Perhaps February was more a case of hitting the post!
As all sports fans know, a run of disappointing results can lead to dissent amongst players and supporters alike. We can see from the minutes of June’s meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee the extent of the debate over the persistence of inflation. The debate included discussions concerning the impact of the expected fiscal consolidation measures (the MPC met before the Budget), the public’s higher inflation rate expectations, the price of oil and other commodities and the margin of spare capacity in the economy (the output gap). The minutes reveal that one member of the MPC, Andrew Sentance, voted for an increase in interest rates believing that inflation had been particularly resilient in the aftermath of the recession.
We now have new forecaster in town: The Office of Budget Responsibility. In our blog article Who’d be a forecaster? A taxing time for the new OBR we looked at the growth forecasts produced by the Office of Budget Responsibility taking into account the Budget Measures of 22 June. The June 2010 OBR Budget forecasts also contain predictions for CPI inflation. So what do the OBR say?
The OBR predicts that the annual rate of CPI inflation will stay around 3% in the near term. It is now slightly more pessimistic about the prospects for inflation beyond the near term than it was in its pre-Budget forecasts. More specifically, it says that CPI inflation will ‘decline more gradually’ than first thought because of the rise in the standard rate of VAT to 20% in January 2001 and its belief that oil prices will be higher than originally envisaged. The OBR is forecasting the average price of a barrel of oil in 2010/11 to be $78 rising to $82 in 2011/12.
Going further ahead, the OBR expects the rate of inflation to fall back to ‘a little under 2 per cent in early 2012’. It argues that this will reflect the unwinding of the VAT effect, and, significantly, the downward pressure on prices from the larger negative output gap that will result from the fiscal consolidation measures in the Budget. In other words, the expectation is that there will be greater slack or spare capacity in the economy which will help to subdue price pressures.
If the OBR is right, the Governor may have more letter-writing to do in the near term and perhaps well into 2011. But, the fiscal consolidation measures should, once the impact of the VAT rise on the inflation figures ‘drops out’, see the rate of inflation fall back. Perhaps then, the final whistle can be blown on the Governor’s inflation troubles. In the mean time it will be interesting to see how MPC members take on board, in their deliberations over interest rates, the Budget measures and the OBR’s own thoughts on inflation. Could interest rates be rising shortly despite fiscal consolidation? Let Mervyn and his team play on!
OBR Forecasts
Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (22/6/10)
Pre-Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (14/6/10)
Monetary Policy Committee
Overview of the Monetary Policy Committee
Monetary Policy Committee Minutes
Inflation Data
Latest on inflation Office for National Statistics (15/6/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Statistical Bulletin, May 2010 Office for National Statistics (15/6/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Time Series Data Office for National Statistics
For CPI (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) data for EU countries, see:
HICP European Central Bank
Articles
MPC minutes reveal Bank split on inflation risk Financial Times, Daniel Pimlott (23/6/10)
Bank of England minutes reveal surprise split on interest rates Guardian, Katie Allen (23/6/10)
Instant view: Bank split 7-1 on June vote Reuters UK (23/6/10)
Now even the Bank isn’t sure it can bring down inflation Independent, Sean O’Grady (24/6/10)
An inflation hawk hovers over the Bank of England Guardian, Nils Pratley (24/6/10)
Questions
- Explain why an output gap – the amount of spare capacity in the economy – might impact on price pressures.
- What impact would you expect the rise in the standard rate of VAT next January to have on the CPI (price level) and on the CPI inflation rate? What about the following year?
- Some economists believe that by being more aggressive in cutting the fiscal deficit, interest rates will be lower than they otherwise would have been. Evaluate this argument.
- Now for your turn to be a member of the MPC and to decide on interest rates! How would you vote next month? Are you a ‘dove’ or a ‘hawk’?
Under its terms of reference the new Office for Budget Responsibility is required to provide updated forecasts for the economy and the public finances at the time of each Budget in order take into account the impact of those measures contained in the Budget. Here we consider those economic forecasts contained in the June 2010 OBR Budget Forecast relating to economic growth. In particular, we consider the OBR’s interpretation of how growth is likely to be affected by the policy measures unveiled by George Osborne in his first Budget as Chancellor of Exchequer on 22 June.
The OBR forecasts that the UK economy will grow by 1.2% in 2010 and by a further 2.3% in 2011. These estimates are lower than those published by the OBR in its Pre-Budget Forecast published on 14 June. The Pre-Budget Forecasts predicted growth of 1.3% in 2010 and 2.6% in 2011. The downward revisions reflect the OBR’s assertion that the Budget’s measures to meet the Government’s fiscal mandate and, hence the resultant fiscal consolidation package, will weaken aggregate demand.
In terms of the components of aggregate demand, the fiscal consolidation will mean restraints on government spending (G) and, if the OBR is right, lower growth in household consumption (C). Lower consumption growth is expected as a result of reduced growth in household incomes and the rise in the standard rate of Value Added Tax next January from 17½% to 20%.
The OBR now forecasts that real household consumption will grow by just 0.2% in 2010, following last year’s contraction of 3.2%, and by 1.3% in 2011. General government final consumption – the Government’s expenditure on current goods and services – is forecast to grow in real terms by 1.7% this year before falling by 1.1% next year. The forecasts for general government capital spending are for a real fall of 4.9% this year, following last year’s rise of 15.7%, followed by a sizeable 19% decline in 2011.
A more positive note emerging from the OBR forecasts relates to capital expenditure by businesses. The measures to reform corporation tax, which include a reduction in the main rate of corporation tax from 28 per cent to 24 per cent over four years beginning with a one per cent reduction from April 2011, are predicted to have a favourable effect on investment. Business investment is forecast to rise in real terms by 1.4% this year, following last year’s fall of 19.3%, and to rise again in 2011 by 8.1%.
The projections for growth from 2013 are now stronger than in the OBR’s Pre-Budget Forecast with the economy portrayed as adjusting more quickly at this point towards its potential output. Potential output is the level of output level when the economy’s resources are operating at ‘normal capacity utilisation’. But, in 2015, which is at the end of the OBR’s five year forecast period, the UK economy is still forecast to be experiencing a negative output gap. In other words, actual output will still be less than potential output.
To help paint a picture of how the economy’s output will adjust towards its potential level consider the OBR estimates for the output gap. The OBR estimates that in financial year 2009-10 the economy’s output was 4.1% below its potential. This negative output gap is now expected to be reduced to 3.7% of potential output in 2010-11, to 2.8% in 2012-13 and to 0.9% of potential output in 2015-16.
Office for Budget Responsibility
OBR home page
Office for Budget Responsibility Terms of Reference
Documents
Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (22/6/10)
Pre-Budget Forecast June 2010 OBR (14/6/10)
Budget 2010 HM Treasury (22/6/10)
Articles
OBR endorses Budget but faces questions over its own predictions Telegraph, Philip Alrdrick (23/6/10)
UK growth forecasts could be revised again, says Sir Alan Budd Citywire, Deborah Hyde (23/6/10)
OBR says growth will take bigger hit Financial Times, Norma Cohen (22/6/10)
Budget 2010: Government cuts will slow economic recovery, says watchdog Telegraph, James Kirkup (23/6/10)
Highlights from the Budget BBC News (22/6/10)
Budget statement: George Osborne’s speech in full BBC Democracy Live (22/6/10)
Questions
- What do you understand by the concept of aggregate demand?
- What are the component expenditures of aggregate demand? Which of these do you think is the largest in value terms?
- The OBR is forecasting the household sector’s disposable income to grow in real terms this year by 0.2% and by 1.2% next year. Why then is the OBR identifying weaker consumer demand as a result of the Budget measures as a major reason for revising down its predictions for economic growth?
- The OBR argues that the fiscal consolidation measures will have a ‘direct effect’ on household incomes and so on spending, but that this will be ‘partially offset by a decline in saving’. Why might the OBR be arguing that a fiscal consolidation will lead to a decline in saving? Evaluate the OBR’s arguments.
- What do you understand by the concept of an output gap? What does a negative output gap signify?
- To see the sorts of problems that forecasters commonly face, try identifying reasons why the output gap could be eliminated more quickly or less quickly as a result of the Budget measures.
There is a new craze sweeping across nations. We might call it the Consolidation Conga! Across the world, and, in particular Europe, government after government seems to be announcing plans to cut its budget deficit. But, with so much focus on governments’ plans for fiscal consolidation it would be all too easy to ignore evidence of consolidation in other sectors too. In the UK, the household sector continues to show a zest for the consolidation of its own finances.
Figures from the Bank of England show that during April net unsecured lending, i.e. lending through credit cards, overdrafts and personal loans less repayments, was again in negative territory, this time to the tune of £136 million. This means that the repayment of unsecured debt exceeded new unsecured lending by £136 million. When an allowance is made for unsecured debt ‘written off’ by financial institutions, we find that the stock of unsecured debt fell by £827 million.
April’s fall in the stock of unsecured debt means that the household sector’s stock of unsecured debt has now fallen for 11 months in a row. Over this period the stock of unsecured debt has fallen by £11.47 billion or by 4.9%. Some of this fall is clearly attributable to the ‘writing off’ of bad debts since net unsecured lending has been negative in only 6 of these 11 months. However, this should not detract from our central message of a consolidation by households of their finances. Indeed, the sum of net unsecured lending over these 11 months is -£459 million. In other words, over the period from June 2009 to April 2010 the household sector made a net repayment of unsecured debt of some £459 million.
While the stock of unsecured debt has fallen by £11.47 billion since last June to stand at £220.77 billion in April 2010, the household sector’s overall stock of debt has fallen too, although only by £178 million to £1,459.5 billion. The much smaller decrease in total debt reflects an increase in the stock of mortgage debt by £11.291 billion over the same period. But, there are two points to make here. Firstly, it is difficult to over-play the fact that the overall stock of household debt has fallen. If we look at the Bank of England’s monthly series which goes back to April 1993, the first monthly fall in the total stock of debt did not occur until October 2008. In other words, the norm has simply been for total household debt to increase.
The second point to make is that the growth in secured debt has slowed markedly. The stock of secured debt in April was only 0.9% higher than a year earlier. But, more than this, the Bank of England’s Housing Equity Withdrawal numbers show that since the second quarter of 2008 the household sector’s stock of secured borrowing has increased by less than we would have expected given the additional housing investment, i.e. money spent on moving costs, the purchase of newly built properties or expenditure on major home improvements. This has resulted in what we know as negative Housing Equity Withdrawal (HEW). This again is evidence that households too are consolidating.
The desire for the household sector to consolidate and to reduce its exposure to debt is pretty understandable, especially given these uncertain times. But, as we discuss in Has the tide turned for Keynesianism?, there are dangers for national and global aggregate demand of mass consolidation. It remains to be seen if we can really afford for so many to be dancing the Consolidation Conga!
Articles
Housing market on a knife edge with no sign of sustained recovery in lending Independent, David Prosser (3/6/10)
UK mortgage lending edges higher BBC News (2/6/10)
Mortgage data raise housing recovery fears Financial Times, Norma Cohen (2/6/10)
Mixed lending data point to stagnant housing markets Reuters (2/6/10)
Mortgage approvals slightly higher Press Association (3/6/10)
Data
Lending to individuals Bank of England
Monetary and Financial Statistics (Bankstats) Bank of England (See Tables A5.1 to A5.7, in particular)
Housing equity withdrawal (HEW) statistical releases Bank of England
Questions
- What does a negative net lending figure indicate?
- If net lending is negative does this mean that the stock of debt is falling?
- What factors might be driving households to consolidate their finances?
- Discuss the potential economic benefits and dangers of households consolidating their finances.
- Of what significance is the extent of the household sector’s consolidation of its finances for: (i) the government and (ii) the Bank of England?
The latest inflation release from the Office for National Statistics shows the annual rate of CPI inflation for April at 3.7%, up from 3.4% in March. In other words, the average price of a basket of consumer goods – the Consumer Price Index – was 3.7% higher in April than in the same month last year. In three of the last four months, the rate of inflation has been in letter-writing territory, i.e. more than 1 percentage point away from the government’s central inflation rate target of 2%. Of course, this time it was George Osborne, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was the recipient of the obligatory explanatory letter from Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England.
Over the past six months the average annual rate of rate of consumer price inflation in the UK has been 3.1%. It is, therefore, no surprise that there is considerable debate amongst commentators about the need for the Bank to raise interest rates. Part of the debate concerns the extent to which the Bank is right to argue that the current inflationary pressures are essentially short term and, according to May’s letter from the Governor to the Chancellor ‘are masking the downward pressure on inflation from the substantial margin of spare capacity in the economy’.
The Bank points to the impact on the inflation figures of what we might term ‘one-off effects’. These include, for instance, the restoration in January of the standard rate of VAT to 17½% and the raising in the Budget in March of certain excise duties (commodity taxes), such as those on alcoholic beverages and on petrol. The Bank also points to the effects from the weakening of Sterling, specifically on the prices of imports, and from the increase over the past year in the price of oil because of higher demand on the back of the global economic recovery. Again, the Bank continues to argue that these pressures should weaken over the next 12 months.
As you might expect of the economics profession, there are others who argue that the Bank is being somewhat complacent over the prospects for inflation. Of course, these are incredibly uncertain times. In effect, the Bank is having to assess, on the one hand, the significance of cost pressures, such as those emanating from oil and other commodity prices, and, on the other hand, the future strength of aggregate demand, particularly in response to the likely fiscal tightening, not only in the UK, but in many other parts of the world too.
While economists will always hold divergent views on the prospects for inflation and, more generally, the economy, we may see another debate reignited in the months ahead: the debate over the extent to which the government’s powers over both fiscal and monetary policy are constrained.
Since 1997, the Bank of England has had a clear mandate to target the rate of inflation. But, to what extent might this mandate cause tensions between fiscal and monetary policy in the months ahead given the government’s plans for fiscal consolidation? In particular, with a tightening of fiscal policy, so as to reduce the size of the government’s budget deficit, will the Bank of England be able to maintain low interest rates and thereby help to sustain aggregate demand? This will, of course, depend on the path of inflation and, importantly, the sources of inflation. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to see whether the clear, if limited, remit of the Bank of England places pressure on the UK’s macroeconomic policy framework in these difficult economic times.
Articles
UK inflation hits 17 month-high BBC News (18/5/10)
A tale of two zones BBC News blogs: Stephanomics, Stephanie Flanders (18/5/10)
Shock rise in inflation risks higher rates and unemployment Independent, Sean O’Grady (19/5/10)
Q&A: Unpleasant surprise for Threadneedle St Financial Times, Chris Giles (18/5/10)
Inflation rise see King rebuked Financial Times, Chris Giles (19/5/10)
UK inflation fears Financial Times (18/5/10)
Inflation: mercury rising Guardian (19/5/10)
The elephant in the room just got bigger Times Online, David Wighton (19/5/10)
Weak pound and tax rises lift inflation to a 17-month high (including video) Times Online, Grainne Gilmore (19/5/10)
Data
Latest on inflation Office for National Statistics (18/5/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Statistical Bulletin, April 2010 Office for National Statistics (18/5/10)
Consumer Price Indices, Time Series Data Office for National Statistics
For CPI (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) data for EU countries, see:
HICP European Central Bank
Questions
- What do you understand by cost-push and demand-pull inflation? To what extent are each of these significant in explaining the current rise in the rate of inflation?
- Outline the potential advantages and disadvantages of granting the Bank of England independence to set interest rates in meeting an inflation rate target.
- If the Bank of England’s remit were relaxed, say to include targeting output growth too, how might this affect its response to rising cost-push inflation? What about rising demand-pull inflation?
- Distinguish between a rise in the level of consumer prices and a rise in the rate of consumer price inflation.
- Describe the likely impact of an increase in the standard rate of VAT on the average consumer price level and on the annual rate of consumer price inflation both in the short term and in the longer term.