Tag: externalities

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The second-hand market and GDP

This Christmas, more people are considering giving second-hand (or ‘pre-loved’) goods as presents. This allows them to afford better-quality presents and to save money at a time when a large proportion of the population are finding that their finances are stretched. This continues a trend towards buying second-hand products – a trend driven by the rise of various online retailers, such as Vinted and Preloved, and a growing online presence of charity shops, as well as extensive use of established platforms, such as Facebook Marketplace, eBay, Depop, Gumtree and Nextdoor.

Clearly, people gain from buying and selling second-hand items – part of the ‘circular economy’. But what are the implications for gross domestic product (GDP)? After all, GDP is one of the main indicators of the size of an economy, and growth in GDP is probably the most widely-used measure of economic progress. Are second-hand transactions captured in GDP?

If you directly sell your own second-hand items, this does not count towards GDP. There is no new product being made. The items are only counted when they are first produced. Any service you provide to the purchaser (and to yourself) is in a similar category to housework, childcare, DIY and other services that people provide to themselves, household members and friends. But like such services, there is a strong argument that they should be.

Likewise, the environmental benefits (positive externalities) of recycling products, rather than throwing them away or hoarding them, are not counted. In fact, if reusing products causes fewer new products to be made, this would be counted as subtracting from GDP.

If, however, you set up a business by buying and selling second-hand items, the service you provide would contribute towards GDP. What would be counted would the value added to the product – captured through the difference in the purchase and selling prices. In fact, HMRC has warned people that buying and selling second-hand items is taxable, as it counts as self-employment for tax purposes. But it is only this value added that counts. If you buy an item on Vinted, only the value added by Vinted counts towards GDP.

As no production takes place, the purchase of second-hand items adds either nothing to GDP or just the service of a retailer. It is effectively just a transfer of goods and money. If buying second-hand items means that you buy fewer new ones, then that would cause GDP to fall if the response of firms is to produce fewer newer items. However, the person selling the second-hand items will gain revenue, which could be used to buy new items. If that increased production, that would boost GDP. The net effect on GDP of this transfer of goods and money in the second-hand market will be pretty small.

Yet, clearly, the second-hand market provides a welfare gain to both sellers and purchasers – a gain that is likely to grow as the use of second-hand markets increases. At Christmas time, it provides a timely warning of the limitations of using GDP to measure wellbeing.

Articles

Questions

  1. What other items or activities affecting human wellbeing are not counted in GDP?
  2. Name some goods and services that are produced, and hence are included in GDP, but which can be classed as ‘bads’.
  3. For what reasons might a country have a high GDP per capita but a poor average level of wellbeing?
  4. How might GDP figures be adjusted for international comparison purposes?
  5. Would it be possible to adjust GDP figures to take account of externalities in production (negative and positive)? If so, how?
  6. Production involves human costs. To what extent does GDP take this into account?
  7. What is meant by the circular economy? How might you have a ‘circular’ Christmas?
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Minimum pricing for alcohol

The debate about a minimum price for alcohol continues to be prompted by concerns over high levels of drinking, its effect on public health and public order, and a widespread belief that most of the alcohol that contributes to drunken behaviour is irresponsibly priced and sold. Minimum pricing for alcohol, although considered a radical intervention, is not a new policy. A minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland in 2018, in Wales in 2020, in the Republic of Ireland in 2022 and looks likely to be introduced in Northern Ireland.

Despite more countries following Scotland’s lead, there are no current plans to consider an application of an MUP in England. However, with recent increases in the MUP in Scotland and the findings of a five-year review in Wales, it would suggest that this policy will continue to be at the forefront of discussions of how to tackle impacts of alcohol consumption.

Reasons and options for intervention

The main goal of introducing a minimum unit price for alcohol is to tackle unwanted consequences from the consumption of alcohol. While many people consume alcoholic drinks safely without any problems, some patterns of alcohol use are associated with significant physical, mental and social harm.

It costs UK society more than £27 billion a year through a combination of health, crime, workplace and social welfare costs. Therefore, some governments in the British Isles have deemed it necessary to intervene in this market to reduce alcohol-related harm and protect the health of those regularly drinking more than the recommended 14 units per week.

Research has shown that making alcohol less affordable can reduce consumption and hence related harms. The World Health Organization considers minimum pricing one of its ‘best buys’ for tackling harmful alcohol use.

There are three main policy options that aim to reduce the consumption of alcohol by making alcohol less affordable. One is to tax alcoholic drinks; the second is to set a minimum price per unit of alcohol; the third is to ban the sale of alcohol drinks below cost price (the level of alcohol duty plus VAT).

The policy option of an MUP has been adopted by Scotland, Wales and the Republic of Ireland; England has opted to use a ban on selling alcohol below the level of alcohol duty plus VAT (since 28 May 2014).

What is a minimum price?

The introduction by the government of a minimum price for a product means that it cannot legally be sold below that price. It can be set in order to achieve certain economic or social objectives that are not currently being achieved at equilibrium in the market. In order for the policy to have an effect, the minimum price must be set above the equilibrium price. This price floor then prevents prices from falling too low and settling back at equilibrium below the MUP.

A common misconception is that introducing a minimum price for alcohol is a form of taxation. However, this is not the case. Implementing an MUP means that any extra money from higher prices goes to the retailers and producers, not to the government.

Why choose a minimum price floor?

The policy has two main objectives. The first is to protect the interests of drinkers who may make poor decisions on their own behalf. This may be from lack of information, social pressures or a disregard for their own long-term health or welfare.

The second objective is to reduce the external costs placed on health services, the police, the criminal justice system, on fellow citizens or employers. There are also longer-term external costs when alcohol abuse impacts on productivity or leads to repeated absences from work.

It is argued that MUP intervention can encourage positive changes in behaviour of both consumers and producers. It can target harmful excessive drinking, while leaving the more moderate drinker relatively unaffected.

A positive impact on consumers is the possible changes in demand. People who previously consumed cheap, and often strong, drinks, such as cheap cider, will find that their marginal private cost of consuming alcohol has increased. Depending on the price elasticity of demand, their consumption will decrease and there will be a reduction in alcohol-related violence and other external costs. A positive impact on producers is that it can encourage drinks manufacturers themselves to reduce the alcohol content of their products and, therefore, limit any increase in price passed on to the consumer.

How it differs in the different parts of the British Isles

While minimum alcohol pricing is in place in several countries, policies differ. In terms of the British Isles, in 2018 Scotland became the first country to introduce a national minimum price for all types of alcohol. Two years later, Wales followed suit. The Republic of Ireland introduced minimum pricing in January 2022, while Northern Ireland has been engaged in consultation on the policy for several years. The following table shows when MUP was introduced and at what rates.

Has the MUP been effective?

Wales has reached the five-year review point since the MUP was introduced. Many of the findings within the Welsh evaluation have strong resonance with those elsewhere, particularly those of the final Scottish evaluation. There have been five main findings:

  • Implementation has been smooth. Retailers have largely complied with the law, and enforcement has been effective.
  • Certain cheap alcohol products have disappeared. Large bottles of strong cider, for example, are now rare. There have also been shifts in promotions and product availability.
  • There are indications that overall alcohol consumption in Wales has declined. While it is difficult to measure directly, purchasing data suggests a reduction.
  • Concerns about unintended consequences have not materialised significantly. Predictions of a rise in home brewing, substance switching, shoplifting and cross-border purchasing have not been widely observed.
  • Some drinkers have changed their purchasing habits. A minority have switched from cider to wine or spirits as price differences narrowed. Others, particularly those on low incomes, experienced further struggles in financially maintaining their drinking habits.

There was also a study published last year (2024) in the journal Economic Inquiry, looking at the impacts of the policy during lockdown restrictions. The study showed that the introduction of MUP in Wales resulted in a 15% increase in transaction prices and a sharp reduction in the amount of alcohol bought, around 20%, with an overall drop in expenditure per customer compared to England over the same period.

However, it should be noted that the COVID pandemic disrupted drinking habits and the availability of alcohol. In addition, evaluating the overall effects of the policy has been complex with other economic factors, including the cost-of-living crisis, also influencing affordability.

Is it a fair policy?

A counter argument to applying a price intervention on alcohol is that it may have unintended private and external costs. One argument claims that young people could decide to switch to cheaper non-alcoholic drugs instead. Alternatively, they may seek to purchase alcohol on illegal shadow markets.

Critics of the policy argue that it negatively impacts those who consume alcohol responsibly, especially families on average or below-average incomes. The wine and spirits industry tried to lobby against the Scottish government, arguing that it is inconsistent with the operation of the free market and that the intervention creates a barrier to trade. They claim that lower sales of alcoholic drinks will cost jobs in the UK, both in manufacturing and from reduced revenues of corner shops, pubs and other retailers.

There is also an argument that relying solely on an MUP targets the affordability of drinking rather than addressing all aspects of alcohol harm. Therefore, this policy is not necessarily effective in achieving all the government’s goals. Critics argue that this policy should be one component of a more comprehensive strategy delivery, which might include education, restricting the availability of alcohol, banning advertising, increasing alcohol duty, etc.

Conclusion

Although there are currently no plans to implement an MUP in England, there is ongoing pressure for the Government to consider adopting one. In the Autumn of 2024, Lord Darzi carried out an independent investigation of the NHS in England. This investigation into the NHS highlighted the ‘alarming’ death toll in England caused by cheap drink (see link below). This led public health leaders to call for action to increase the price of cheap alcohol in supermarkets and off-licences.

However, the policy itself is not without its critics, especially those citing continued trends in actual numbers of alcohol-related deaths. Therefore, it is suggested that the policy needs to be accompanied by well-funded treatment and support services for people experiencing alcohol-related difficulties. If combined with other policy measures and social support, it has the potential to contribute significantly to reductions in alcohol-related harm.

Despite reservations, overall a minimum price per unit of alcohol is viewed by many as a justified intervention and is well supported by evidence. It has been accepted that a minimum price is required to reduce consumption closer towards the social optimum and in order to bring about change in consumer and producer behaviour. Given the evidence provided from current MUP countries and ongoing discussions of alcohol-related deaths in England, health officials believe a review is almost certain, even though the current government reportedly ruled out minimum unit pricing shortly after winning power.

Articles

Reports

Questions

  1. Using a supply and demand diagram, discuss the effect of introducing a minimum price per unit of alcohol.
  2. How is the price elasticity of demand for alcoholic drinks relevant to determining the success of minimum pricing?
  3. Compare the effects on alcohol consumption of imposing a minimum unit price of alcohol with a ban the sale of alcohol below cost price. What are the revenue implications of the two policies for the government?
  4. What negative externalities occur as a result in the over consumption of alcohol? How could a socially efficient price for alcohol be determined?
  5. Could alcohol consumption be described as a ‘de-merit good’? Explain.
  6. Rather than targeting the price of alcohol, what other policies could the government introduce to tackle over consumption of alcohol?
  7. What will determine the number of people travelling across borders within the UK (i.e. from Scotland or Wales to England) to buy cheaper alcoholic drinks?
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Vetting vets

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is proposing to launch a formal Market Investigation into anti-competitive practices in the UK’s £2bn veterinary industry (for pets rather than farm animals or horses). This follows a preliminary investigation which received 56 000 responses from pet owners and vet professionals. These responses reported huge rises in bills for treatment and medicines and corresponding rises in the cost of pet insurance.

At the same time there has been a large increase in concentration in the industry. In 2013, independent vet practices accounted for 89% of the market; today, they account for only around 40%. Over the past 10 years, some 1500 of the UK’s 5000 vet practices had been acquired by six of the largest corporate groups. In many parts of the country, competition is weak; in others, it is non-existent, with just one of these large companies having a monopoly of veterinary services.

This market power has given rise to a number of issues. The CMA identifies the following:

  • Of those practices checked, over 80% had no pricing information online, even for the most basic services. This makes is hard for pet owners to make decisions on treatment.
  • Pet owners potentially overpay for medicines, many of which can be bought online or over the counter in pharmacies at much lower prices, with the pet owners merely needing to know the correct dosage. When medicines require a prescription, often it is not made clear to the owners that they can take a prescription elsewhere, and owners end up paying high prices to buy medicines directly from the vet practice.
  • Even when there are several vet practices in a local area, they are often owned by the same company and hence there is no price competition. The corporate group often retains the original independent name when it acquires the practice and thus is is not clear to pet owners that ownership has changed. They may think there is local competition when there is not.
  • Often the corporate group provides the out-of-hours service, which tends to charge very high prices for emergency services. If there is initially an independent out-of-hours service provider, it may be driven out of business by the corporate owner of day-time services only referring pet owners to its own out-of-hours service.
  • The corporate owners may similarly provide other services, such as specialist referral centres, diagnostic labs, animal hospitals and crematoria. By referring pets only to those services owned by itself, this crowds out independents and provides a barrier to the entry of new independents into these parts of the industry.
  • Large corporate groups have the incentive to act in ways which may further reduce competition and choice and drive up their profits. They may, for example, invest in advanced equipment, allowing them to provide more sophisticated but high-cost treatment. Simpler, lower-cost treatments may not be offered to pet owners.
  • The higher prices in the industry have led to large rises in the cost of pet insurance. These higher insurance costs are made worse by vets steering owners with pet insurance to choosing more expensive treatments for their pets than those without insurance. The Association of British Insurers notes that there has been a large rise in claims attributable to an increasing provision of higher-cost treatments.
  • The industry suffers from acute staff shortages, which cuts down on the availability of services and allows practices to push up prices.
  • Regulation by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (RCVS) is weak in the area of competition and pricing.

The CMA’s formal investigation will examine the structure of the veterinary industry and the behaviour of the firms in the industry. As the CMA states:

In a well-functioning market, we would expect a range of suppliers to be able to inform consumers of their services and, in turn, consumers would act on the information they receive.

Market failures in the veterinary industry

The CMA’s concerns suggest that the market is not sufficiently competitive, with vet companies holding significant market power. This leads to higher prices for a range of vet services. However, the CMA’s analysis suggests that market failures in the industry extend beyond the simple question of market power and lack of competition.

A crucial market failure is asymmetry of information. The veterinary companies have much better information than pet owners. This is a classic principal–agent problem. The agent, in this case the vet (or vet company), has much better information than the principal, in this case the pet owner. This information can be used to the interests of the vet company, with pet owners being persuaded to purchase more extensive and expensive treatments than they might otherwise choose if they were better informed.

The principal–agent problem also arises in the context of the dependant nature of pets. They are the ones receiving the treatment and, in this context, are the principals. Their owners are the ones acquiring the treatment for them and hence are the pets’ agents. The question is whether the owners will always do the best thing for their pets. This raises philosophical questions of animal rights and whether owners should be required to protect the interests of their pets.

Another information issue is the short-term perspective of many pet owners. They may purchase a young and healthy pet and assume that it will remain so. However, as the pet gets older, it is likely to face increasing health issues, with correspondingly increasing vet bills. But many owners do not consider such future bills when they purchase the pet. They suffer from what behavioural economists call ‘irrational exuberance’. Such exuberance may also occur when the owner of a sick pet is offered expensive treatment. They may over-optimistically assume that the treatment will be totally successful and that their pet will not need further treatment.

Vets cite another information asymmetry. This concerns the costs they face in providing treatment. Many owners are unaware of these costs – costs that include rent, business rates, heating and lighting, staff costs, equipment costs, consumables (such as syringes, dressings, surgical gowns, antiseptic and gloves), VAT, and so on. Many of these costs have risen substantially in recent months and are reflected in the prices pet owners are charged. With people experiencing free health care for themselves from the NHS (or other national provider), this may make them feel that the price of pet health care is excessive.

Then there is the issue of inequality. Pets provide great benefits to many owners and contribute to owners’ well-being. If people on low incomes cannot afford high vet bills, they may either have to forgo having a pet, with the benefits it brings, or incur high vet bills that they ill afford or simply go without treatment for their pets.

Finally, there are the external costs that arise when people abandon their pets with various health conditions. This has been a growing problem, with many people buying pets during lockdown when they worked from home, only to abandon them later when they have had to go back to the office or other workplace. The costs of treating or putting down such pets are born by charities or local authorities.

The CMA is consulting on its proposal to begin a formal Market Investigation. This closes on 11 April. If, in the light of its consultation, the Market Investigation goes ahead, the CMA will later report on its findings and may require the veterinary industry to adopt various measures. These could require vet groups to provide better information to owners, including what lower-cost treatments are available. But given the oligopolistic nature of the industry, it is unlikely to lead to significant reductions in vets bills.

Articles

CMA documents

Questions

  1. How would you establish whether there is an abuse of market power in the veterinary industry?
  2. Explain what is meant by the principal–agent problem. Give some other examples both in economic and non-economic relationships.
  3. What market advantages do large vet companies have over independent vet practices?
  4. How might pet insurance lead to (a) adverse selection; (b) moral hazard? Explain. How might (i) insurance companies and (ii) vets help to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard?
  5. Find out what powers the CMA has to enforce its rulings.
  6. Search for vet prices and compare the prices charged by at least three vet practices. How would you account for the differences or similarities in prices?