A common practice of international investors is to take part in the so-called ‘carry trade’. This involves taking advantage of nominal interest rate differences between countries. For example, assume that interest rates are low in Japan and high in the USA. It is thus profitable to borrow yen in Japan at the low interest rate, exchange it into US dollars and deposit the money at the higher interest rate available in the USA. If there is no change in the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen, the investor makes a profit equal to the difference in the interest rates.
Rather than depositing the money in a US bank account, an alternative is to purchase US bonds or other assets in the USA, where the return is again higher than that in Japan.
If, however, interest-rate differentials narrow, there is the possibility of the carry trade ‘unwinding’. Not only may the carry trade prove unprofitable (or less so), but investors may withdraw their deposits and pay back the loans. This, as we shall, can have adverse consequences on exchange rates.
The problem of an unwinding of the carry trade is not new. It worsened the underlying problems of the financial crisis in 2008. The question today is whether history is about to repeat itself with a new round of unwinding of the carry trade threatening economic growth and recovery around the world.
We start by looking at what happened in 2008.
The carry trade and the 2008 financial crisis
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, current account deficit countries, such as the UK, USA and Australia, typically had relatively high interest rates, while current account surplus countries such as Japan and Switzerland had relatively low ones. Figure 1 shows central bank interest rates from 2005 to the current day (click here for a PowerPoint).
The carry trade saw investors borrowing money in Japan and Switzerland, exchanging it on the foreign exchange market, with the currency then deposited in the UK, USA and Australia. Hundreds of billions worth of dollars were involved in this carry trade.
If, however, the higher interest rates in the UK and other deficit countries were simply to compensate investors for the risk of currency depreciation, then there would be no excessive inflow of finance. The benefit of the higher interest rate would be offset by a depreciating currency. But the carry trade had the effect of making deficit currencies appreciate, thereby further boosting the carry trade by speculation of further exchange rate rises.
Thus the currencies of deficit countries appreciated, making their goods less competitive and worsening their current account deficit. Between 1996 and 2006, the average current account deficits as a percentage of GDP for Australia, the USA and the UK were close to 4½, 4 and 2, respectively. Between January 1996 and December 2006, the broad-based real exchange rate index of the Australian dollar appreciated by 17%, of the US dollar by 4% and of sterling by some 23%.
Currencies of surplus countries depreciated, making their goods more competitive and further boosting their current account surpluses. For example, between 2004 and 2006 the average current account surpluses as a percentage of GDP for Japan and Switzerland were 3½ and 13, respectively. Their short-term interest rates averaged a mere 0.1% and 1.0% respectively (compared with 3.4%, 4.7% and 5.7% for the USA, the UK and Australia). Yet between January 2004 and December 2006, the real exchange rate index of the yen depreciated by 21%, while that of the Swiss franc depreciated by 6%.
With the credit crunch of 2007/8, the carry trade unwound. Much of the money deposited in the USA had been in highly risky assets, such as sub-prime mortgages. Investors scrambled to sell their assets in the USA, UK and the EU. Loans from Japan and Switzerland were repaid and these countries, seen as ‘safe havens’, attracted deposits. The currencies of deficit countries, such as the UK and USA, began to depreciate and those of surplus countries, such as Japan and Switzerland, began to appreciate. Between September 2007 and September 2008, the real exchange rate indices of the US dollar and sterling depreciated by 2% and 13% respectively; the yen and the Swiss franc appreciated by 3% and 2¾%.
This represented a ‘double whammy’ for Japanese exporters. Not only did its currency appreciate, making its exports more expensive in dollars, euros, pounds, etc., but the global recession saw consumers around the world buying less. As a result, the Japanese economy suffered the worst recession of the G7 economies.
The carry trade in recent months
Since 2016, there has been a re-emergence of the carry trade as the Fed began raising interest rates while the Bank of Japan kept rates at the ultra low level of –0.1% (see Figure 1). The process slowed down when the USA lowered interest rates in 2020 in response to the pandemic and fears of recession. But when the USA, the EU and the UK began raising rates at the beginning of 2022 in response to global inflationary pressures, while Japan kept its main rate at –0.1%, so the carry trade resumed in earnest. Cross-border loans originating in Japan (not all of it from the carry trade) had risen to ¥157tn ($1tn) by March 2024 – a rise of 21% from 2021.
The process boosted US stock markets and contributed to the dollar appreciating against the yen (see Figure 2: click here for a PowerPoint).
Although this depreciation of the yen helped Japanese exports, it also led to rising prices. Japanese inflation rose steadily throughout 2022. In the 12 months to January 2022 the inflation rate was 0.5% (having been negative from October 2020 to August 2021). By January 2023, the annual rate had risen to 4.3% – a rate not seen since 1981. The Bank of Japan was cautious about raising interest rates to suppress this inflation, however, for fear of damaging growth and causing the exchange rate to appreciate and thereby damaging exports. Indeed, quarterly economic growth fell from 1.3% in 2023 Q1 to –1.0% in 2023 Q3.
But then, with growth rebounding and the yen depreciating further, in March 2024 the Bank of Japan decided to raise its key rate from –0.1% to 0.1%. This initially had the effect of stabilising the exchange rate. But then with the yen depreciating further and inflation rising from 2.5% to 2.8% in May and staying at this level in June, the Bank of Japan increased the key rate again at the end of July – this time to 0.25% – and there were expectations that there would be another rise before the end of the year.
At the same time, there were expectations that the Fed would soon lower its main rate (the Federal Funds Rate) from its level of 5.33%. The ECB and the Bank of England had already begun lowering their main rates in response to lower inflation. The carry trade rapidly unwound. Investors sold US, EU and UK assets and began repaying yen loans.
The result was a rapid appreciation of the yen as Figure 3 shows (click here for a PowerPoint). Between 31 July (the date the Bank of Japan raised interest rates the second time) and 5 August, the dollar depreciated against the yen from ¥150.4 to ¥142.7. In other words, the value of 100 yen appreciated from $0.66 to $0.70 – an appreciation of the yen of 6.1%.
Fears about the unwinding of the carry trade led to falls in stock markets around the world. Not only were investors selling shares to pay back the loans, but fears of the continuing process put further downward pressure on shares. From 31 July to 5 August, the US S&P 500 fell by 6.1% and the tech-heavy Nasdaq by 8.0%.
As far as the Tokyo stock market was concerned, the appreciation of the yen sparked fears that the large Japanese export sector would be damaged. Investors rushed to sell shares. Between 31 July and 5 August, the Nikkei 225 (the main Japanese stock market index) fell by 19.5% – its biggest short-term fall ever (see Figure 4: click here for a PowerPoint).
Although the yen has since depreciated slightly (a rise in the yen/dollar rate) and stock markets have recovered somewhat, expectations of many investors are that the unwinding of the yen carry trade has some way to go. This could result in a further appreciation of the yen from current levels of around ¥100 = $0.67 to around $0.86 in a couple of years’ time.
There are also fears about the carry trade in the Chinese currency, the yuan. Some $500 billion of foreign currency holdings have been acquired with yuan since 2022. As with the Japanese carry trade, this has been encouraged by low Chinese interest rates and a depreciating yuan. Not only are Chinese companies investing abroad, but foreign companies operating in China have been using their yuan earnings from their Chinese operations to invest abroad rather than in China. The Chinese carry trade, however, has been restricted by the limited convertibility of the yuan. If the Chinese carry trade begins to unwind when the Chinese economy begins to recover and interest rates begin to rise, the effect will probably be more limited than with the yen.
Articles
- A popular trading strategy just blew up in investors’ faces
CNN, Allison Morrow (7/8/24)
- The big ‘carry trade’ unwind is far from over, strategists warn
CNBC, Sam Meredith (13/8/24)
- Unwinding of yen ‘carry trade’ still threatens markets, say analysts
Financial Times, Leo Lewis and David Keohane (7/8/24)
- The yen carry trade sell-off marks a step change in the business cycle
Financial Times, John Plender (10/8/24)
- Forbes Money Markets Global Markets React To The Japanese Yen Carry Trade Unwind
Forbes, Frank Holmes (12/8/24)
- 7 unwinding carry trades that crashed the markets
Alt21 (26/1/23)
- A carry crash also kicked off the global financial crisis 17 years ago — here’s why it’s unlikely to get as bad this time
The Conversation, Charles Read (9/8/24)
- What is the Chinese yuan carry trade and how is it different from the yen’s?
Reuters, Winni Zhou and Summer Zhen (13/8/24)
- Carry Trade That Blew Up Markets Is Attracting Hedge Funds Again
Yahoo Finance/Bloomberg, David Finnerty and Ruth Carson (16/8/24)
- Currency Carry Trades 101
Investopedia, Kathy Lien (9/8/24)
- Carry Trades Torpedoed The Market. They’re Still Everywhere.
Finimize, Stéphane Renevier (13/8/24)
Questions
- What factors drive the currency carry trade?
- Is the carry trade a form of arbitrage?
- Find out and explain what has happened to the Japanese yen since this blog was written.
- Find out and explain some other examples of carry trades.
- Why are expectations so important in determining the extent and timing of the unwinding of carry trades?
The pound has fallen to its lowest rate against the euro since July 2013 and the lowest rate against the US dollar since 1985. Since August 2015, the pound has depreciated by 23.4% against the euro and 22.2% against the dollar. And since the referendum of 23 June, it has depreciated by 15.6% against the euro and 17.6% against the dollar.
On Sunday 2 October, at the start of the Conservative Party conference, the Prime Minister announced that Article 50, which triggers the Brexit process, would be invoked by the end of March 2017. Worries about what the terms of Brexit would look like put further pressure on the pound: the next day it fell by around 1% and the next day by a further 0.5%.
Then, on 6 October, it was reported that President Hollande was demanding tough Brexit negotiations and the pound dropped significantly further. By 7 October, it was trading at around €1.10 and $1.22. At airports, currency exchange agencies were offering less than €1 per £ (see picture).
With the government implying that Brexit might involve leaving the Single Market, the pound continued falling. On 12 October, the trade-weighted index reached its lowest level since the index was introduced in 1980: below its trough in the depth of the 2008 financial crisis and below the 1993 trough following Britain’s ejection from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992.
So just why has the pound fallen so much, both before and after the Brexit vote? (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) And what are the implications for the economy?
The articles explore the reasons for the depreciation. Central to these are the effects on the balance of payments from a possible decline in inward investment, lower interest rates leading to a net outflow of currency on the financial account, and stimulus measures, both fiscal and monetary, leading to higher imports.
Worries about the economy were occurring before the Brexit vote and this helped to push sterling down in late 2015 and early 2016, as you can see in the chart. This article from The Telegraph of 14 June 2016 explains why.
Despite the short-run effects on the UK economy of the Brexit vote not being as bad as some had predicted, worries remain about the longer-term effects. And these worries are compounded by uncertainty over the Brexit terms.
A lower sterling exchange rate reduces the foreign currency price of UK exports and increases the sterling price of imports. Depending on price elasticities of demand, this should improve the current account of the balance of payments.
These trade effects will help to boost the economy and go some way to countering the fall in investment as businesses, uncertain over the terms of Brexit, hold back on investment in the UK.
Articles
Pound Nears Three-Decade Low as May Sets Date for Brexit Trigger Bloomberg, Netty Idayu Ismail and Charlotte Ryan (3/10/16)
Sterling near 31-year low against dollar as May sets Brexit start dat Financial Times, Michael Hunter and Roger Blitz (3/10/16)
Sterling hits three-year low against the euro over Brexit worries The Guardian, Katie Allen (3/10/16)
Pound sterling value drops as Theresa May signals ‘hard Brexit’ at Tory conference Independent, Zlata Rodionova (3/10/16)
Pound falls as Theresa May indicates Brexit date BBC News (3/10/16)
The pound bombs and stocks explode over fears of a ‘hard Brexit’ Business Insider UK, Oscar Williams-Grut (3/10/16)
Pound Will Feel Pain as Brexit Clock Ticks Faster Wall Street Journal, Richard Barley (3/10/16)
British Pound to Euro Exchange Rate’s Brexit Breakdown Slows After Positive Manufacturing PMI Halts Decline Currency Watch, Joaquin Monfort (3/10/16)
7 ways the fall in the value of the pound affects us all Independent (4/10/16)
The pound and the fury: Brexit is making Britons poorer, and meaner The Economist, ‘Timekeeper’ (11/10/16)
Is the pound headed for parity v US dollar and euro? Sydney Morning Herald, Jessica Sier (5/10/16)
Flash crash sees the pound gyrate in Asian trading BBC News (7/10/16)
Flash crash hits pound after Hollande remarks Deutsche Welle (7/10/16)
Sterling mayhem gives glimpse into future Reuters, Swaha Pattanaik (7/10/16)
Sterling takes a pounding The Economist, Buttonwood (7/10/16)
Government must commit to fundamental reform The Telegraph, Andrew Sentance (7/10/16)
Data
Interest & exchange rates data – Statistical Interactive Database Bank of England
Questions
- Why has sterling depreciated? Use a demand and supply diagram to illustrate your argument.
- What has determined the size of this depreciation?
- What is meant by the risk premium of holding sterling?
- To what extent has the weaker pound contributed to the better economic performance than was expected immediately after the Brexit vote?
- What factors will determine the value of sterling over the coming months?
- Who gain and who lose from a lower exchange rate?
- What is likely to happen to inflation over the coming months? Explain and consider the implications for monetary and fiscal policy.
- What is a ‘flash crash’. Why was there a flash crash in sterling on Asian markets on 7 October 2016? Is such a flash crash in sterling likely to occur again?
Newspaper headlines this week read that the UK’s balance of trade deficit has widened to £34.8bn, the largest since 2010. And when you exclude services, the trade in goods deficit, at £119.9bn is the largest ever in nominal terms and is also likely to be the largest as a percentage of GDP.
So far so bad. But when you look a little closer, the picture is more mixed. The balance of trade deficit (i.e. on both goods and services) narrowed each quarter of 2014, although the monthly figure did widen in December 2014. In fact the trade in goods deficit increased substantially in December from £9.3bn to £10.2bn.
At first sight the widening of the trade deficit in December might seem surprising, given the dramatic drop in oil prices. Surely, with demand for oil being relatively inelastic, a large cut in oil prices should significantly reduce the expenditure on oil? In fact the reverse happened. The oil deficit in December increased from £598m to £940m. The reason is that oil importing companies have been stockpiling oil while low prices persist. Clearly, this is in anticipation that oil prices will rise again before too long. What we have seen, therefore, is a demand that is elastic in the short run, even though it is relatively inelastic in the medium run.
But the trade deficit is still large. Even when you strip out oil, the deficit in December still rose – from £8.7bn to £9.2bn. There are two main reasons for this deterioration.
The first is a strong pound. The sterling exchange rate index rose by 1.8% in December and a further 0.4% in January. With quantitative easing pushing down the value of the euro and loose monetary policies in China and Australia pushing down the value of their currencies, sterling is set to appreciate further.
The second is continuing weakness in the eurozone and a slowing of growth in some major developing countries, including China. This will continue to dampen the growth in UK exports.
But what of the overall current account? Figures are at present available only up to 2014 Q3, but the picture is bleak (see the chart). As the ONS states:
The current account deficit widened in Q3 2014, to 6.0% of nominal Gross Domestic Product GDP, representing the joint largest deficit since Office for National Statistics (ONS) records began in 1955.
This deterioration in performance can be partly attributed to the recent weakness in the primary income balance [see]. This also reached a record deficit in Q3 2014 of 2.8% of nominal GDP; a figure that can be primarily attributed to a fall in UK residents’ earnings from investment abroad, and broadly stable foreign resident earnings on their investments in the UK
The primary income account captures income flows into and out of the UK economy, as opposed to current transfers (secondary income) from taxes, grants, etc. The large deficit reflects a decline in the holding by UK residents of foreign assets from 92% of GDP in 2008 to 67% by the end of 2014. This, in turn, reflects the poorer rate of return on many of these assets. By contrast, the holdings of UK assets by foreign residents has increased. They have been earning a higher rate of return on these assets than UK residents have on foreign assets. And so, despite UK interest rates having fallen, as the quote above says, foreign residents’ earnings on their holding of UK assets has remained broadly stable.
Articles
UK trade deficit last year widest since 2010 BBC News (6/2/15)
UK’s trade deficit widens to 2010 high as consumers take advantage of falling oil The Telegraph, Peter Spence (6/2/15)
UK trade deficit widens to four-year high The Guardian, Katie Allen (6/2/15)
UK trade deficit hits four-year high Financial Times, Ferdinando Giugliano (6/2/15)
Data
Balance of Payments ONS (topic link)
Summary: UK Trade, December 2014 ONS (6/2/15)
Current account, income balance and net international investment position ONS (23/1/15)
Pink Book – Tables ONS
Questions
- Distinguish between he current account, the capital account and the financial account of the balance of payments.
- If the overall balance of payments must, by definition, balance, why does it matter if the following are in deficit: (a) trade in goods; (b) the current account; (b) income flows?
- What would cause the balance of trade deficit to narrow?
- Discuss what policies the government could pursue to reduce the size of the current account deficit? Distinguish between demand-side and supply-side policies.
- Why has the sterling exchange rate index been appreciating in recent months?
- What do you think is likely to happen to the sterling exchange rate index in the coming months? Explain.
One effect of an expansionary monetary policy is a depreciation of the exchange rate. Take the case of countries using a combination of a reduction in central bank interest rates and quantitative easing (QE). A fall in interest rates will encourage an outflow of finance; and part of the money created through quantitative easing will be used to purchase foreign assets. Both create an increased demand for foreign currencies and drive down the exchange rate.
The latest case of expansionary monetary policy is that employed by the ECB. After months of promising to ‘do whatever it takes’ and taking various steps towards full QE, the ECB finally announced a large-scale QE programme on 22 January 2015.
With people increasingly predicting QE and with the ECB reducing interest rates, so the euro depreciated. Between March 2014 and 21 January 2015, the euro depreciated by 20.2% against the dollar and the euro exchange rate index depreciated by 9.7%. With the announced programme of QE being somewhat larger than markets expected, in the week following the announcement the euro fell a further 2.3% against the dollar, and the euro exchange rate index also fell by 2.3%. The euro is now at its lowest level against the US dollar since April 2003 (see chart).
The depreciation of the euro will be welcome news for eurozone exporters. It makes their exports cheaper in foreign currency terms and thus makes their exports more competitive. 
Similarly Japanese exporters were helped by the depreciation of the yen following the announcement on 31 October 2014 by the Bank of Japan of an increase in its own QE programme. The yen has depreciated by 7.7% against the dollar since then.
But every currency cannot depreciate against other currencies simultaneously. With any bilateral exchange rate, the depreciation of one currency represents an appreciation of the other. So just as the euro and yen have depreciated against the dollar, the dollar has appreciated against the euro and yen. This has made US goods less competitive relative to eurozone and Japanese goods.
The danger is that currency wars will result, with monetary policy being used in various countries to achieve competitive depreciations. Already, the Swiss have been forced, on 15 January, to remove the cap with the euro at SF1 – €0.833. Since then the Swiss franc has appreciated by some 15% to around SF1 – €0.96. Will the Swiss now be forced to relax their monetary policy?
The Danish and Canadian central banks have cut their interest rates, hoping to stem an appreciation of their currencies. On 28 January, the Monetary Authority of Singapore sold Singapore dollars to engineer a depreciation. The Singapore dollar duly fell by the most in over four years.
But are these policies simply beggar-my-neighbour policies? Is it a zero-sum game, where the gains to the countries with depreciating currencies are exactly offset by losses to the those with appreciating ones? Or is there a net gain from overall looser monetary policy at a time of sluggish growth? Or is there a net loss from greater currency volatility, which will create greater uncertainty and dampen cross-border investment? The following article explore the issues.
Articles
Massive Devaluation of the Euro Seeking Alpha, Sagar Joshi (26/1/15)
Devaluation and discord as the world’s currencies quietly go to war The Observer (25/1/15)
Why is dollar strong vs. 18 trillion of USA’s debt? Pravda, Lyuba Lulko (26/1/15)
Central Bankers Ramp Up Currency Wars Wall Street Journal, Anjani Trivedi, Josie Cox and Carolyn Cui (28/1/15)
The Raging Currency Wars Across Europe The Market Oracle, Gary_Dorsch (29/1/15)
Why ECB action is likely to stoke global currency wars Financial Times, Ralph Atkins (22/1/15)
Euro slides as ECB launches QE Financial Times (22/1/15)
Will Australia join the Currency Wars? The Daily Reckoning, Australia, Greg Canavan (23/1/15)
Australia’s central bank cuts rates to record low; currency plunges and stocks spike The Telegraph (3/2/15)
Singapore loosens monetary policy Financial Times, Jeremy Grant (28/1/15)
Currency Wars Have a Nuclear Option Bloomberg, Mark Gilbert (12/2/15)
Questions
- Explain how quantitative easing results in depreciation. What determines the size of the depreciation?
- How is the USA likely to react to an appreciation of the dollar?
- In the UK, who will benefit and who will lose from the depreciation of the euro?
- What are the global benefits and costs of a round of competitive depreciations?
- How does the size of the financial account of the balance of payments affect the size of a depreciation resulting from QE?
- What determines a country’s exchange-rate elasticity of demand for exports? How does this elasticity of demand affect the size of changes in the current account of the balance of payments following a depreciation?
- Might depreciation of their currencies reduce countries’ commitment to achieving structural reforms? Or might it ‘buy them time’ to allow them to introduce such reforms in a more carefully planned way and for such reforms to take effect? Discuss.
The latest balance of payments data for the UK show that in the final two quarters of 2013 the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was the highest ever recorded. In quarter 3 it was 5.6% of GDP and in quarter 4 it was 5.4% of GDP. The previous highest quarterly figures were 5.3% in 1988 Q4 and 5.2% in 1989 Q3. The average current account deficit from 1960 to 2013 has been 1.1% of GDP and from 1980 to 2013 has been 1.6% of GDP.
The current account has four major components: the balance on goods, the balance on services, the balance on current transfers and the balance on income flows (e.g. investment income). The chart below shows the annual balances of each of these components, plus the overall current account balance, from 1960 to 2013.
There are large differences in the balances of these four and the differences seem to be widening. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)
Traditionally the balance on goods has been negative. In 2013 Q3 the deficit on goods reached a record 7.3% of GDP. It fell back somewhat in Q4 to 6.5%, still significantly above the average since 2000 of 5.5%. With the economy still recovering slowly, it would normally be expected that the trade deficit would be low. However, the high exchange rate has made it difficult for UK exporters to compete. Also with consumer confidence returning, imports are rising, again boosted by the high exchange rate, which makes imports cheaper.
The services balance, by contrast, is typically in surplus. In the final two quarters of 2013, the surpluses were 4.9% and 5.1% of GDP respectively. These compare with an average of 3.3% since 2000. It seems that the service sector, which includes banking, insurance, consultancy, advertising, accountancy, law, etc., is much more able to compete in a global environment.
The balance of current transfers to and from such bodies as the EU and UN have traditionally been negative, although as a proportion of GDP this has gradually widened in recent years. In 2013 the deficit was 1.7% compared with an average of 1.0% since 2000.
The most dramatic change has been in income flows and particularly those from investment. Before the crash in late 2008, the returns to many of the risky investments abroad made by UK financial institutions were very high. Income flows in the 12 months 2007 Q4 to 2008 Q3 averaged a surplus of 2.8% of GDP. They stayed positive, albeit at lower levels, until 2012 Q1, but then became negative as UK institutions reduced their exposure to overseas investments and as earnings in the UK by overseas investors increased. In the last two quarters of 2013, the deficits on income flows were 1.4% and 2.5% of GDP respectively.
How do these figures accord with the Chancellor’s desire to rebalance the economy towards exports? In terms of services, the export performance is good. In terms of goods, however, exports actually fell in the last two quarters from £78.4bn to £74.8bn. Although imports fell too in the final quarter, there is a danger that, with recovery and a high pound, these could begin to rise rapidly
So should the Bank of England attempt to bring the sterling exchange rate down? After all, the exchange rate index has risen from 79.1 in March 2013 to 85.9 in February 2014 (an appreciation of 8.6%). But if it did want to do so, what could it do? The traditional methods of reducing Bank rate and increasing the money supply are not open to it at the present time: Bank rate, at 0.5%, is already about as low as it could go and the Bank has ruled out any further quantitative easing.
The articles consider the latest balance of payments figures and their implications for the economy and for economic policy
Articles
UK current account deficit far bigger than forecast The Guardian, Katie Allen (28/3/14)
UK current account deficit near record high at £22.4bn BBC News (28/3/14)
UK current account gap second widest on record The Telegraph, Szu Ping Chan (28/3/14)
When will the UK pay its way? BBC News, Robert Peston (28/3/14)
Current account deficit crisis creeping up on UK can no longer be ignored The Guardian, Larry Elliott (30/3/14)
Data
Balance of Payments, Q4 and annual 2013 ONS (28/3/14)
Statistical Interactive Database – interest & exchange rates data Bank of England
Questions
- If the current account is in deficit, how is the overall balance of payments in balance (i.e. is in neither deficit nor surplus)?
- If the current account is in record deficit, why has sterling appreciated over recent months? What effect is this appreciation likely to have on the balance on trade in goods and services?
- Why has the balance on investment income deteriorated? In what ways could this be seen as a ‘good thing’?
- To what extent do the balance of payments figures show a rebalancing of the economy in the way the Chancellor would like?
- What could the Bank of England do to bring about a depreciation of sterling?
- What would be the benefits and costs of a depreciation of sterling?
- Why do investors overseas seem so willing to lend to the UK, thereby producing a large surplus on the financial account?
