Tag: automatic stabilisers

In his blog, The bond roller coaster, John looks at the pricing of government bonds and details how, in recent times, governments wishing to borrow by issuing new bonds are having to offer higher coupon rates to attract investors. The interest rate hikes by central banks in response to global-wide inflationary pressures have therefore spilt over into bond markets. Though this evidences the ‘pass through’ of central bank interest rate increases to the general structure of interest rates, it does, however, pose significant costs for governments as they seek to finance future budgetary deficits or refinance existing debts coming up to maturity.

The Autumn Statement in the UK is scheduled to be made on 22 November. This, as well as providing an update on the economy and the public finances, is likely to include a number of fiscal proposals. It is thus timely to remind ourselves of the size of recent discretionary fiscal measures and their potential impact on the sustainability of the public finances. In this first of two blogs, we consider the former: the magnitude of recent discretionary fiscal policy changes.

First, it is important to define what we mean by discretionary fiscal policy. It refers to deliberate changes in government spending or taxation. This needs to be distinguished from the concept of automatic stabilisers, which relate to those parts of government budgets that automatically result in an increase (decrease) of spending or a decrease (increase) in tax payments when the economy slows (quickens).

The suitability of discretionary fiscal policy measures depends on the objectives they trying to fulfil. Discretionary measures can be implemented, for example, to affect levels of public-service provision, the distribution of income, levels of aggregate demand or to affect longer-term growth of aggregate supply. As we shall see in this blog, some of the large recent interventions have been conducted primarily to support and stabilise economic activity in the face of heightened economic volatility.

Discretionary fiscal measures in the UK are usually announced in annual Budget statements in the House of Commons. These are normally in March, but discretionary fiscal changes can be made in the Autumn Statement too. The Autumn Statement of October 2022, for example, took on significant importance as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jeremy Hunt, tried to present a ‘safe pair hands’ following the fallout and market turbulence in response to the fiscal statement by the former Chancellor, Kwasi Kwarteng, on 23 September that year.

The fiscal impulse

The large-scale economic turbulence of recent years associated first with the global financial crisis of 2007–9 and then with the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis, has seen governments respond with significant discretionary fiscal measures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, examples of fiscal interventions in the UK included the COVID-19 Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), grants for retail, hospitality and leisure businesses, the COVID-19 Job Retention Scheme (better known as the furlough scheme) and the Self-Employed Income Support Scheme.

The size of discretionary fiscal interventions can be measured by the fiscal impulse. This captures the magnitude of change in discretionary fiscal policy and thus the size of the stimulus. The concept is not to be confused with fiscal multipliers, which measure the impact of fiscal changes on economic outcomes, such as real national income and employment.

By measuring fiscal impulses, we can analyse the extent to which a country’s fiscal stance has tightened, loosened, or remained unchanged. In other words, we are attempting to capture discretionary fiscal policy changes that result in structural changes in the government budget and, therefore, in structural changes in spending and/or taxation.

To measure structural changes in the public-sector’s budgetary position, we calculate changes in structural budget balances.

A budget balance is simply the difference between receipts (largely taxation) and spending. A budget surplus occurs when receipts are greater than spending, while a deficit (sometimes referred to as net borrowing) occurs if spending is greater than receipts.

A structural budget balance cyclically-adjusts receipts and spending and hence adjusts for the position of the economy in the business cycle. In doing so, it has the effect of adjusting both receipts and spending for the effect of automatic stabilisers. Another way of thinking about this is to ask what the balance between receipts and spending would be if the economy were operating at its potential output. A deterioration in a structural budget balance infers a rise in the structural deficit or fall in the structural surplus. This indicates a loosening of the fiscal stance. An improvement in the structural budget balance, by contrast, indicates a tightening.

The size of UK fiscal impulses

A frequently-used measure of the fiscal impulse involves the change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit.

A primary deficit captures the extent to which the receipts of the public sector fall short of its spending, excluding its spending on debt interest payments. It essentially captures whether the public sector is able to afford its ‘new’ fiscal choices from its receipts; it excludes debt-servicing costs, which can be thought of as reflecting fiscal choices of the past. By using a cyclically-adjusted primary deficit we are able to isolate more accurately the size of discretionary policy changes. Chart 1 shows the UK’s actual and cyclically-adjusted primary deficit as a share of GDP since 1975, which have averaged 1.3 and 1.1 per cent of GDP respectively. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

The size of the fiscal impulse is measured by the year-on-year percentage point change in the cyclically-adjusted public-sector primary deficit as a percentage of potential GDP. A larger deficit or a smaller surplus indicates a fiscal loosening (a positive fiscal impulse), while a smaller deficit or a larger surplus indicates a fiscal tightening (a negative fiscal impulse).

Chart 2 shows the magnitude of UK fiscal impulses since 1980. It captures very starkly the extent of the loosening of the fiscal stance in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.) In 2020 the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to potential output ratio rose from 1.67 to 14.04 per cent. This represents a positive fiscal impulse of 12.4 per cent of GDP.

A tightening of fiscal policy followed the waning of the pandemic. 2021 saw a negative fiscal impulse of 10.1 per cent of GDP. Subsequent tightening was tempered by policy measures to limit the impact on the private sector of the cost-of-living crisis, including the Energy Price Guarantee and Energy Bills Support Scheme.

In comparison, the fiscal response to the global financial crisis led to a cumulative increase in the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit to potential GDP ratio from 2007 to 2009 of 5.0 percentage points. Hence, the financial crisis saw a positive fiscal impulse of 5 per cent of GDP. While smaller in comparison to the discretionary fiscal responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was, nonetheless, a sizeable loosening of the fiscal stance.

Sustainability and well-being of the public finances

The recent fiscal interventions have implications for the financial well-being of the public-sector. Not least, the financing of the positive fiscal impulses has led to a substantial growth in the accumulated size of the public-sector debt stock. At the end of 2006/7 the public-sector net debt stock was 35 per cent of GDP; at the end of the current financial year, 2023/24, it is expected to be 103 per cent.

As we saw at the outset, in an environment of rising interest rates, the increase in the public-sector debt to GDP ratio creates significant additional costs for government, a situation that is made more difficult for government not only by the current flatlining of economic activity, but by the low underlying rate of economic growth seen since the financial crisis. The combination of higher interest rates and lower economic growth has adverse implications for the sustainability of the public finances and the ability of the public sector to absorb the effects of future economic crises.

Articles

Report

  • IFS Green Budget
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson and Ben Zaranko (eds) (October 2023)

Data

Questions

  1. Explain what is meant by the following fiscal terms: (a) structural deficit; (b) automatic stabilisers; (c) discretionary fiscal policy; (d) primary deficit.
  2. What is the difference between current and capital public expenditures? Give some examples of each.
  3. Consider the following two examples of public expenditure: grants from government paid to the private sector for the installation of energy-efficient boilers, and welfare payments to unemployed people. How are these expenditures classified in the public finances and what fiscal objectives do you think they meet?
  4. Which of the following statements about the primary balance is FALSE?
    (a) In the presence of debt interest payments a primary deficit will be smaller than a budget deficit.
    (b) In the presence of debt interest payments a primary surplus will be smaller than a budget surplus.
    (c) The primary balance differs from the budget balance by the size of debt interest payments.
    (d) None of the above.
  5. Explain the difference between a fiscal impulse and a fiscal multiplier.
  6. Why is low economic growth likely to affect the sustainability of the public finances? What other factors could also matter?

Latest figures suggest that Japan could be entering a ‘double-dip’ or ‘W-shaped’ recession. In the second quarter of 2009, Japan managed to achieve a modest 0.9% growth after four quarters of contraction. Growth then accelerated to 1.2% in the third quarter. It now seems likely, however, that the fourth quarter could see a contraction of the economy again – or at best a slow-down in growth. Prices are falling as demand remains stagnant, and this deflation could encourage people to hold back from spending as they wait for prices to fall further.

As the British government announces planned spending cuts to tackle the rapidly mounting public-sector deficit and debt, so Japan has just announced a massive further fiscal stimulus of ¥7.2 trillion (£50 billion) or 1.5% of GDP. Although Japan’s public-sector deficit is no longer the highest of the G7 countries – 7.4% of GDP, compared with 12.6% for the UK, 11.4% for the USA and 8.2% for France (see OECD Economic Outlook November 2009, summary of projections – its debt, currently at 190% of GDP, is by far the highest of the G7 countries (this compares with 115% for Italy, 76% for France, 73% for Germany, 69% for the UK and 65% for the USA).

More than half of the fiscal stimulus will go on increases in government expenditure, especially on public works. However, much of the spending is in the form of a transfer to regional governments, which would otherwise be forced to make spending cuts because of falling tax revenues. So is the stimulus too much, too little, or of little relevance? Read the linked articles below, which consider the issues.

Japan growth estimate slashed Sydney Morning Herald (9/12/09)
Double dip could be taking shape for Japanese economy Market Watch, Lisa Twaronite (9/12/09)
Japan to boost recovery with giant stimulus plan Sydney Morning Herald, Kyoko Hasegawa (8/12/09)
Japan steps up stimulus spending Sydney Morning Herald (8/12/09)
Japan public debt to hit record this fiscal year AsiaOne News (Singapore) (8/12/09)
Japan govt unveils $81 bln economic stimulus Economic Times of India (8/12/09)
Japan’s economic growth figure lowered BBC News (9/12/09)
Japan agrees $81bn stimulus package BBC News (8/12/09)
Japan unveils $80bn of direct spending in $274bn stimulus package Telegraph (8/12/09)
It is Japan we should be worrying about, not America Telegraph (1/11/09)
Japan keeps pouring money into its ailing economy Times Online, Leo Lewis (9/12/09)
Japan’s Leader Promotes $81 Billion Stimulus Plan New York Times, Hiroko Tabuchi (8/12/09)
Japan sets out $81bn stimulus plan Financial Times, Mure Dickie (8/12/09)
Fiscal challenges ahead The Asahi Shimbun (Japan) (8/12/09)
Bond jitters as Japan launches yet another stimulus plan Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (8/12/09)
New Stimulus Won’t Save Japan From Deflation, Soaring Deficit Money Morning, Jason Simpkins (8/12/09)

Questions

  1. Use the threshold concepts of stocks and flows to explain the difference between public-sector deficits and public-sector debt.
  2. Why might an economy go into a ‘double-dip’ or ‘W-shaped’ recession?
  3. For what reasons might this latest stimulus package be regarded as (a) too large and (b) too small to tackle Japan’s macroeconomic problems?
  4. Discuss the proposed policy of banning firms from hiring temporary workers.
  5. Why does deflation (in the sense of falling prices) create a problem for governments?
  6. What are the implications for the market for Japanese government bonds of the latest stimulus package?

In a recession, the government’s budget will go into cyclical deficit as tax revenue falls and government spending on unemployment and other benefits rises. Provided the deficit is purely cyclical, it can be seen as desirable since it acts as an automatic fiscal stabiliser, boosting aggregate demand and helping to pull the economy out of recession. Once the economy returns to potential national income (i.e. a zero output gap), the deficit would disappear. At potential national income (Yp), government expenditure (including benefits) will equal tax revenue. The budget is in balance.

Again, provided that the deficit is only cyclical, discretionary expansionary fiscal policy that further deepens the deficit will not be a problem for public finances in the future. Once the economy pulls out of recession, the discretionary policy can be relaxed and the higher national income will eliminate the cyclical deficit.

But the problem the Chancellor of the Exchequer faced in the Budget (on 22/4/09) was not just one of tackling the recession. The UK economy has seen a massive growth in the structural deficit. His forecast is for the total deficit to be £175bn in 2009. But, according to calculations by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, even when the recession is over and the output gap has been closed, there will still be an annual deficit of around £140bn. This is not cyclical; it’s structural.

So why is there this huge structural deficit? And what is the solution? Will the solution slow down recovery? The following articles look at the issues.

Budget 2009: Tightening the Squeeze? Institute for Fiscal Studies (23/4/09)
We should start by admitting we’ve failed as an economy: Hamish McRae Independent (22/4/09)
Budget 2009: Experts cast long shadow over Darling’s sunny outlook Guardian (23/4/09)
Budget 2009: Economist warns of spending cuts and tax rises Guardian (23/4/09)
The chancellor’s Budget dilemma: Stephanie Flanders BBC News (23/4/09)

For a global perspective on structural deficits, see:
Why the ‘green shoots’ of recovery could yet wither Financial Times (22/4/09)

Outlines of the main Budget measures can be found at:
Budget 2009: Need to know Times Online (23/4/09)
At-a-glance: Budget 2009 BBC News (22/4/09)

Full details for the Budget can be found from the Treasury’s Budget site

Questions

  1. Explain the terms ‘cyclical deficit’ and ‘structural deficit’.
  2. Draw a diagram showing how government expenditure (including benefits) and tax revenue vary with national income. The diagram should show the sitation with no structural deficit: i.e. the two lines should cross at potential national income. Illustrate (a) a cyclical deficit where actual national income is below potential national income (a negative output gap) and (b) a cyclical surplus where actual national income is above potential income (a positive output gap).
  3. Now, on the same diagram, shift the two lines to illustrate a situation of structural deficit.
  4. Consider whether the government should attempt to increase or reduce the budget deficit at a time of recession.
  5. Why has the structural deficit become so severe over the past year?
  6. How quickly should the government set about tackling the structural deficit?