Tag: aggregate supply

If aggregate demand were to expand, would there be sufficient spare capacity to allow aggregate supply to expand to meet the additional demand? This is the question addressed by the podcast and article below.

If there is plenty of spare capacity, policies to increase aggregate demand could help to take up the slack and thereby achieve economic growth – at least as long as spare capacity remains. In other words, in the short run the aggregate supply curve may be horizontal or only gently upward sloping at the current point of intersection with the aggregate demand curve. This is illustrated by point a in the diagram. A rightward shift in the aggregate demand curve would cause a movement along the aggregate supply curve to a new higher level of real national income (Y).

If, however, there is little or no spare capacity, an increase in nominal aggregate demand is likely to be purely inflationary, or virtually so. This would the case at point b in the diagram. Real national income cannot expand beyond the full-capacity level, YFC. Under such circumstances, any attempt by the government to stimulate economic growth should focus on the supply side and attempt to shift the aggregate supply curve to the right. Examples of supply-side policy include incentives to encourage research and development, incentives for the private sector to invest in new capacity and direct public investment in infrastructure.

Unemployment is not just caused by a lack of aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply. It may be the result of a mismatching of labour supply with the demand for labour. People may have the wrong qualifications or not be where the jobs are. Unemployment may co-exist with quite high levels of vacancies. There may be vacancies for highly qualified scientists, technicians or craftspeople and unemployment of people with low skills or skills no longer in high demand. The same may apply to capital equipment. There may be a shortage of high-tech equipment or equipment to produce goods in high demand and redundant older equipment or equipment in areas of declining demand.

Part of a comprehensive set of policies to tackle unemployment and achieve economic growth would be to focus on the whole balance of the economy and the matching of the demand and supply of inputs.

Podcast
Is there ‘spare capacity’ in the economy? BBC Today Programme, Evan Davis and Andrew Sentance (4/12/12)

Article
OBR’s supply pessimism could be the ruin of this government The Telegraph, Roger Bootle (25/11/12)

Data
Claimant count and vacancies dataset ONS (14/11/12)
Labour Market Statistics, November 2012 ONS (14/11/12)
Actual weekly hours worked ONS (14/11/12)
Usual weekly hours worked ONS (14/11/12)

Questions

  1. Distinguish between ‘unemployment’, ‘underemployment’ and ‘disguised unemployment’?
  2. To what extent does the level of unemployment provide a good measure of spare capacity?
  3. Is the UK economy suffering from a deflationary gap? If so, how would you measure the size of that gap?
  4. If there is substantial spare capacity, is expansionary fiscal policy the best means of achieving economic growth?
  5. What policies are likely to have both a positive supply-side effect and a positive demand-side effect?
  6. What constraints does the government face in attempting to boost aggregate demand?
  7. Why might policies designed to stimulate aggregate demand also increase supply capacity?
  8. What policies would you recommend for tackling the mismatching of the demand and supply of inputs?

Many developing Asian countries have experienced rapid and yet relatively stable economic growth over a number of years. In other words, this has not been a short-term unsustainable boom associated with the expansionary phase of the business cycle – with aggregate demand expanding more rapidly than aggregate supply. Rather it is the result of a rapid growth in aggregate supply.

Over the period from 2000 to 2011, several Asian countries experienced average annual growth rates of over 4% and some, such as China and India, much more than that, as the following table shows. The table also shows forecasts for the period from 2012 to 2017. The high forecast growth rates are based on a continuing rapid growth in aggregate supply as the countries invest in infrastructure and adopt technologies, many of which have already been developed elsewhere.

Average annual economic growth rates

2000–11 2012–17
China 10.2 8.4
India 7.2 6.3
Lao 7.1 7.9
Vietnam 7.1 6.5
Indonesia 5.2 6.5
Malaysia 5.0 4.9
Philippines 4.7 4.9
Thailand 4.0 5.1

Source: World Economic Outlook Database IMF (October 2012)

But for aggregate supply to continue growing rapidly there must also be a stable growth in aggregate demand. With the recession in the developed world, some of the more open economies of Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore themselves suffered a slowdown or recession as demand for their exports fell. The Malaysian economy, for example, contracted by 1.5% in 2009.

Given the continuing macroeconomic problems in the developed world, many Asian countries are seeing the need to rebalance their economies away from a heavy reliance on exports. China, for example, is putting more emphasis on domestic-led demand growth. Others, such as Indonesia, have already embarked on this route. As The Economist article states:

Household consumption contributed half of the growth of just over 6% Indonesia enjoyed in the year to the third quarter (its eighth consecutive quarter of growth at that pace). Exports have fallen from about 35% of GDP ten years ago to less than a quarter in 2011. Developing Asia’s combined current-account surplus, which reflects its dependence on foreign demand, more than halved from 2008 to 2011 and is expected to fall further this year.

The continuing success story of many developing Asian economies thus lies in a balance of supply-side policies that foster continuing rapid investment and demand-side policies that create a stable monetary and fiscal environment. A crucial question here is whether they can emulate the ‘Great Moderation’ experienced by the Western economies from the mid-1990s to 2007, without creating the conditions for a crash in a few years time – a crash caused by excessive credit and an excessively deregulated financial system that was building up greater and greater systemic risk.

Articles
Asia’s great moderation The Economist (10/11/12)
Asia Seen Nearing End of Slowdown on China Recovery: Economy Bloomberg, Karl Lester M. Yap and Michael J. Munoz (15/11/12)
An Insider’s China M&A Notes: What Economic Slowdown? CFO Innovation, Peter Hall and Yuan Peng, The Valence Group (31/10/12)
Building a stronger Asia The Star (Malaysia), Cecilia Kok (24/11/12)

Data and reports
World Economic Outlook Database IMF (October 2012)
OECD: south-east Asian economic outlook to return to pre-crisis levels Guardian datablog, Nick Mead (18/11/12)
Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013, Executive Summary OECD (18/11/12)
Asia Economic Outlook BBVA Research (Q3 2012)

Questions

  1. Why have developing Asian countries experienced much more rapid rates of economic growth than developed countries?
  2. In what ways are the structures of developing Asian economies likely to change in the coming years?
  3. What factors would support their continuing to achieve both rapid and stable economic growth in the coming years?
  4. What factors might prevent them from achieving both rapid and stable economic growth in the coming years?
  5. What structural policies are likely to enhance productivity?
  6. What is the Asean Economic Community? How will this benefit its member countries?

If one person saves more, then it will increase that person’s consumption possibilities in the future. If, however, everyone saves more, and hence spends less, then businesses will earn less and are likely to respond by producing less if the decline in aggregate demand continues. Hence if a country saves more, people could be worse off. That’s the paradox of thrift.

There is considerable debate around the world at the moment about the desirability of austerity policies. The debate has become more intense with the worsening economic outlook in many European countries and with the election in France of François Hollande who rejects many of the austerity measures of his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy.

But can further stimulus be given to aggregate demand without causing a further worsening of countries’ public-sector debt positions and causing a fall in confidence in financial markets? And how would that impact on investment?

And in the meantime, as the economic outlook darkens, people are trying to save more, despite low interest rates. The paradox of thrift seems to be getting more acute. (Click here for a PowerPoint of the chart.)

Articles

How National Belt-Tightening Goes Awry New York Times, Robert J. Shiller (19/5/12)
Japan disease is spreading: High risk and low returns Firstpost (India), Vivek Kaul (17/5/12)
The Solution can not be More Debt Huffington Post, Jill Shaw Ruddock (29/5/12)
Crediting debt Breaking Views, Edward Hadas (30/5/12)
Green investments can overcome the paradox of thrift New Statesman, Dimitri Zenghelis (7/6/12)
Austerity has never worked Guardian, Ha-Joon Chang (4/6/12)
The False Choice Between Austerity And Growth Forbes (24/5/12)
It’s not a case of austerity v stimulus for Europe Guardian, Paul Haydon (1/6/12)

Data

UK households’ saving ratio: series NRJS ONS
Household saving rates for OECD countries StatExtracts: OECD

Questions

  1. Why may we be experiencing a paradox of thrift at the current time?
  2. What are the arguments for the use of fiscal and monetary policies to expand aggregate demand at the current time?
  3. What are the arguments against the use of fiscal and monetary policies to expand aggregate demand at the current time?
  4. Can economic growth be stimulated by a redistribution of aggregate demand and, if so, in what way?
  5. Can green investment overcome the paradox of thrift?
  6. To what extent are demand-side and supply-side policies (a) complementary; (b) contradictory? Or, to put the question another way, to what extent may policies to encourage growth in the long term damage growth in the short term and vice versa?

On Tuesday 29 November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered his Autumn Statement. This presented the outlook for the UK economy, with forecasts supplied by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). It also contained details of government fiscal measures to tackle various macroeconomic problems, including economic slowdown and high levels of national debt.

The outlook for the UK economy came as no surprise. Things are looking much bleaker than a few months ago. The OBR, along with other forecasters, has downgraded its predictions of the UK’s growth rate. Although it is still forecasting positive growth of 0.9% this year and 0.7% in 2012, these rates are well below those it predicted just eight months ago. In March it forecast growth rates of 1.7% for 2011 and 2.5% for 2012.

To make things worse, its growth forecasts are based on the assumptions that the eurozone crisis will be resolved with little or no effect on the UK. But even if that were so, the debt reduction plans in the eurozone are likely to drive the eurozone back into recession. This, in turn, will impact on UK exports, more than 50% of which go to eurozone countries.

The OBR forecasts that national debt will be 67% of GDP this year and will rise to 78% by 2014/15 but then start to fall. Government borrowing is forecast to be £127bn this year, falling to £120bn in 2012/13 and then more substantially each year after that to £24bn in 2016/17.

So what measures were included in the Autumn Statement? These are detailed in the articles below, but the key ones were:

• a programme of credit easing, which will underwrite up to £40bn in low-interest loans for small and medium-sized businesses.
• £5bn of public money to be invested in infrastrucuture projects and a further £5bn in the next spending round. Agreement had been reached with two groups of pension funds to invest a further £20bn of private money in infrastructure projects.
• an additional £1.2bn for capital investment in schools.
• A cap on public-sector pay increases of 1% per year for the two years after the current two-year pay freeze.

The following videos and articles give details of the forecasts and the measures and give reactions from across the political spectrum.

Webcasts

George Osborne: Key points from chancellor’s speech BBC News, Andrew Neil 29/11/11)
Autumn Statement 2011: George Osborne – my plan to ‘see Britain through The Telegraph on YouTube (29/11/11)
UK economy slows to crawl Reuters (29/11/11)
George Osborne’s autumn statement – video analysis Guardian, Larry Elliott (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement: Osborne reveals state of UK economy BBC News, Nick Robinson (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement: Why is the deficit not shrinking? BBC News, Hugh Pym (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement: Robinson, Flanders and Peston analysis BBC News, Nick Robinson, Stephanie Flanders and Robert Peston (29/11/11)
Can the UK economy be ‘re-balanced’? BBC Newsnight, Paul Mason (29/11/11)

Articles
Autumn Statement 2011: main points The Telegraph, Rachel Cooper (29/11/11)
The Autumn Statement at a glance WalesOnline, Rhodri Evans (30/11/11)
Autumn Statement Summary 2011 TaxAssist Accountants (29/11/11)
Into the storm The Economist (3/13/11)
A battalion of troubles The Economist (3/12/11)
Weapons of mass construction The Economist (3/12/11)
Mr Osborne’s unwelcome statement BBC News, Stephanie Flanders (29/11/11)
£30bn of extra cuts keep Osborne on track, just BBC News, Paul Mason (29/11/11)
Autumn Statement 2011: Commentators give their verdict The Telegraph (30/11/11)
Autumn Statement 2011: concern remains but ‘Plan A-plus’ welcomed The Telegraph, Graham Ruddick (29/11/11)
Autumn statement: George Osborne’s cutting fantasy is over Guardian, Robert Skidelsky (29/11/11)
Hoarding for the apocalypse? I really wouldn’t blame you Guardian, Zoe Williams (30/11/11)

Reports and data
Autumn Statement 2011 – documents HM Treasury (29/11/11)
Economic and fiscal outlook – November 2011 Office for Budget Responsibility (29/11/11)
Autumn statement 2011: the key data you need to understand George Osborne’s speech Guardian DataBlog (29/11/11)
How much will the autumn statement cost and how will the economy change? Guardian DataBlog (29/11/11)

Questions

  1. Compare the OBR’s March and November 2011 forecasts.
  2. What factors explain the differences in the two sets of forecasts?
  3. For what reasons might national debt in the future turn out to be higher or lower than that forecast by the OBR?
  4. What will be the impact on aggregate demand of the measures announced in the Autumn Statement?
  5. What will be the impact on aggregate supply of the measures announced in the Autumn Statement?
  6. Why may a recession impact not just on aggregate demand but also on long-term aggregate supply?
  7. Why may increased pessimism by both consumers and producers make it more difficult for the government to meet its macroeconomic objectives?