Category: Essentials of Economics 9e

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Competition policy – the evolving approach towards firms that misuse market power

The enforcement of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by the European Commission (EC) tends to focus on exclusionary abuses by firms with significant market power. Exclusionary abuses are actions that limit or prevent competition, as opposed to exploitative abuses that directly harm the consumer, such as charging high prices.

The treatment of exclusionary abuses has evolved over time. Initially, the approach towards enforcement was form-based (i.e. the nature of the abuses), but this changed when the EC produced new guidelines in 2009 which signalled a move to a more effects-based approach.

The EC plans to produce a new set of guidelines in 2025 and published a draft version in August 2024 as part of the consultation process with businesses and other stakeholders. These draft guidelines indicate a partial shift back to a form-based approach. Any moves in this direction made by the EC are likely to influence both national-level competition authorities and the courts.

The form-based approach to policy enforcement

A form-based approach to the enforcement of Article 102 assumes that certain types of business conduct are inherently anti-competitive except in very exceptional circumstances. In other words, there is a presumption that the characteristics or form of the behaviour mean that it must have a negative impact on competition and consumer welfare in virtually all real-world cases.

With a form-based approach to enforcement there is no requirement for the authorities to carry out detailed case-specific analyses of business conduct as part of an investigation. This had been the approach adopted by the EC before 2009. It is possible, however, that the same form of business conduct could have anti-competitive effects in some market situations but pro-competitive effects in others. The EC was criticised for not making enough allowance for the chances of this happening.

The effects-based approach to policy enforcement

In response to this criticism the European Union published a new set of guidelines in 2009 which signalled that the enforcement of Article 102 was moving to a more effects-based approach. The effects-based approach uses economic analysis to assess the impact of a dominant firm’s conduct on a case-by-case basis. Context-specific evidence is examined by the competition authorities to see if the behaviour effectively excludes rival businesses from the market that are just as efficient as the dominant firm.

The use of economics in this effects-based approach gradually increased over time. Initially, the analysis was predominately based on theoretical arguments, but increasingly cases included sophisticated analysis of market-specific evidence using econometric models and market simulations. This, however, led to the following issues.

  • The increasing use of complex economic analysis makes it more difficult to meet the evidentiary standards of the courts and prove a case. As the effects-based approach places a greater burden on the competition authorities to meet these evidentiary standards (i.e. provide evidence of case-specific anti-competitive effects of the conduct) it disproportionality affects their ability to prove cases.
  • Businesses with significant market power are more likely to make large profits and so have access to greater resources than government-funded competition authorities. Therefore, they will be able to employ more economic consultants with the relevant technical expertise to (a) carry out the analysis and (b) communicate the findings effectively in a court case

This led to concerns that the competition authorities were losing cases where there was strong evidence of exclusionary conduct by the dominant firm.

In response to these concerns, the EC announced in 2023 that it would be revising its 2009 guidelines to improve enforcement of Article 102.

The draft guidelines

The draft guidelines published in August 2024 split different types of potentially anti-competitive conduct by dominant firms into three categories.

The first category includes types of conduct where there is a strong presumption of anti-competitive effects: i.e. the sole purpose of the business behaviour is to restrict competition. These types of conduct are referred to as a ‘naked restriction’ and the documentation provides the following three examples:

  • making payments to customers (typically other businesses) on the condition that they cancel or postpone the launch of a product that uses inputs produced by the dominant firm’s rivals;
  • threatening to withdraw discounts offered to suppliers unless they agree to supply the dominant firm’s product in place of a similar product produced by a rival firm;
  • actively dismantling infrastructure used by a rival firm.

The guidelines indicate a form-based approach will be taken when investigating these types of conduct as the EC will not have to provide any case-specific evidence of anti-competitive effects. A business under investigation can challenge the presumption of anti-competitive effects with appropriate evidence, but the guidelines make it clear that this would only succeed in exceptional circumstances. In other words, it is highly unlikely that the conduct could ever be justified on pro-competitive grounds.

The second category of anti-competitive conduct includes actions that are also presumed to have a negative impact on competition. The presumption, however, is not as strong as with naked restrictions, so firms have a better chance of proving pro-competitive effects.

There is a form-based element towards this second category of conduct as the EC will not have to provide any initial case specific evidence of anti-competitive effects. But, if a business under investigation does submit evidence to challenge the presumption of anti-competitive effects, the EC must demonstrate that (a) it has fully assessed this evidence and (b) the evidence is insufficient to prove that the conduct does have pro-competitive effects. As part of this process, the EC can provide its own case-specific evidence. Therefore, for this second category of conduct, the initial burden of proof effectively shifts from the competition authority to the firm under investigation, making it more of a form-based approach. However, if the firm uses relevant evidence to appeal its case, the burden shifts back to the competition authority and becomes a more effects-based approach.

The third category includes types of conduct where the EC must initially provide case-specific evidence that it reduces competition. For this category of conduct, the approach towards enforcement remains the same as in the 2009 guidelines and an effects-based approach is adopted.

It will be interesting to see the extent to which the final guidelines (a) follow the approach outlined in the draft guidance and (b) influence the enforcement of Article 102 by the EC and other national-level competition authorities.

Articles

Questions

  1. What exactly does it mean if a firm has ‘significant’ market power?
  2. What methods do competitions authorities use to assess whether a firm has a dominant market position?
  3. Explain the difference between conduct by dominant firm that is (a) an exploitative abuse of its market power and (b) an exclusionary abuse of its market power.
  4. Explain why a form-based approach towards the enforcement of competition policy is more likely to lead to Type 1 errors (false positives), whereas an effects-based approach is more likely to lead to Type 2 errors (false negatives).
  5. Provide some examples of exclusionary abuses that are not considered to be naked restrictions.
  6. Competition policy guidance documents commonly refer to ‘competition on the merits’. What is the precise meaning of this term?
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New UK trade deals

The UK signed three trade deals in May – one with the USA, one with India and one with the EU. It is hoped by the government that these trade deals will provide a welcome boost to the UK economy.

The deal with the USA reduced tariffs on UK car exports to the USA from 27.5% to 10%, and on steel and aluminium exports from 25% to 0%. Pharmaceutical exports would also get more favourable treatment and there would be ‘reciprocal market access on beef’ (but with no lowering of food standards). Nevertheless, President Trump’s baseline tariff of 10% on most goods remains, as with other countries. However, a ruling by the US Court of International Trade has found that the Trump’s use of emergency powers to justify the sweeping use of tariffs is wrong. The Trump administration is appealing against the ruling and until the appeal is heard, the tariffs have been reinstated. Also, on May 30, the Trump administration announced that tariffs on steel and aluminium imports would rise from 25% to 50%. It remained to be seen whether this would affect the deal to reduce the rate to zero for British steel and aluminium imports.

The deal with India involves a reduction in tariffs on UK exports – some to zero – and simplified trade rules, faster customs clearance, less paperwork and the freedom for UK businesses to provide telecommunications and construction services. In return, tariffs will be reduced to zero on 99% of Indian exports to the UK. The UK government estimates that deal will result in trade between the two countries increasing by over 30%, with the UK’s GDP expanding by around 0.1 percentage points per year.

UK-EU trade

Perhaps the most significant new trade deal, however, is with the EU. This is a major advance on the current post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Under the TCA, there are no tariffs or quotas on UK goods exports to the EU or EU goods exports to the UK. However, to ensure that it is EU and UK business that benefits from these ‘trade preferences’, firms must show that their products fulfil ‘rules of origin’ requirements.

Under rules of origin requirements, when a good is imported into the UK from outside the EU and then has value added to it by processing, packaging, cleaning, remixing, preserving, refashioning, etc., it can only count as a UK good if sufficient value or weight is added. The proportions vary by product, but generally goods must have approximately 50 per cent UK content (or 80 per cent of the weight of foodstuffs) to qualify for tariff-free access to the EU. As a result, many goods exported to the EU with a proportion of imported components face tariffs.

Also, the TCA does not include free trade in services. The UK is a major exporter of services, including legal, financial, accounting, IT and engineering. It has a positive trade in services balance with the EU, unlike its negative trade in goods balance. Although some of the barriers which apply to other non-EU countries have been reduced for the UK in the TCA, UK service providers still face barriers which impose costs. For example, some EU countries limit the time that businesspeople providing services can stay in their countries to six months in any twelve. Also, since Brexit, UK artists and musicians have faced restrictions when touring and working in the EU. They can only work up to 90 out of every 180 days. This causes problems for longer tours and for musicians and crew who work in multiple bands or orchestras.

Perhaps the greatest barrier to trade under the TCA has been the large range of non-tariff measures (NTMs), such as customs checks, rules-of-origin and other paperwork, meeting various regulations and standards, and sanitary and phytosanitary checks on foodstuffs, plants and animals. Both the OBR and the Bank of England estimate that these post-Brexit trade restrictions are reducing UK GDP by around 4% and will continue to do so unless trade with the EU becomes freer.

The new UK-EU trade deal

The deal struck in mid-May reduces many of the administrative barriers to trade. Perhaps the most significant are the border checks on food, animal and plant shipments to and from the EU. Many of these checks will be scrapped. The new sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement allows many UK food products to be exported that previously were banned or proved too administratively costly. To achieve this free movement, the UK will generally follow EU standards, or similar standards so as to avoids harming EU trade. UK food exporters have generally welcomed the deal.

British steel exports to the EU will be protected from new EU rules and tariffs. This should save UK steel some £25m per year. Also, the EU has agreed to recognise UK carbon emissions caps, meaning that UK exports to the EU will avoid around £800m of carbon border taxes.

The post-Brexit fishing deal between the UK and EU, which saw a reduction of 25% in EU fishing quotas in UK waters, will be extended for another 12 years. Many UK fishers, however, had hoped for scrapping EU access to UK waters. The deal also allows various sea foods, including certain shellfish, to be exported to the EU for the first time since Brexit.

Other elements of the deal include a new security and defence partnership, the use of e-gates for UK travellers to the EU and an agreement to work towards a young person’s mobility scheme, allowing young people from the UK/EU to work and travel freely in the EU/UK again for a period of time.

The elements of the deal concerned with trade represent freer trade, but not totally free trade. The UK is not rejoining the customs union or single market. Nevertheless, strong supporters of Brexit have criticised the deal as a movement towards greater alignment of standards and thus a dilution of UK sovereignty. Supporters of greater alignment, on the other hand, argue that the deal does not go far enough and that even freer trade and less red tape would bring greater benefits to the UK.

Articles

UK-US trade deal

UK-India trade deal

UK-EU trade deal

Questions

  1. Outline the main elements of (a) the UK-US trade deal, (b) the UK-India trade deal and (c) the UK-EU trade deal. How much is it claimed that each deal will add to UK GDP?
  2. What trade barriers remain in each of the three deals?
  3. What elements are missing from the UK-EU trade deal that campaigners have been pushing for?
  4. Under what circumstances do free trade deals lead to (a) trade creation; (b) trade diversion?
  5. Would you expect the UK-EU trade deal on balance to lead to trade creation or trade diversion? Explain why.
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President Reagan on tariffs

In a 1987 address to the US nation, Republican President Ronald Reagan discussed the question of tariffs. His message was clear.

You see, at first, when someone says, ‘Let’s impose tariffs on foreign imports,’ it looks like they’re doing the patriotic thing by protecting American products and jobs. And sometimes for a short while it works – but only for a short time. What eventually occurs is:

First, homegrown industries start relying on government protection in the form of high tariffs. They stop competing and stop making the innovative management and technological changes they need to succeed in world markets.
 
And then, while all this is going on, something even worse occurs: high tariffs inevitably lead to retaliation by foreign countries and the triggering of fierce trade wars. The result is more and more tariffs, higher and higher trade barriers, and less and less competition. So, soon, because of the prices made artificially high by tariffs that subsidise inefficiency and poor management, people stop buying.
 
Then the worst happens: markets shrink and collapse; businesses and industries shut down; and millions of people lose their jobs.
 
The memory of all this occurring back in the thirties made me determined when I came to Washington to spare the American people the protectionist legislation that destroys prosperity.
 
Now, it hasn’t always been easy. There are those in this Congress, just as there were back in the ’30s, who want to go for the quick political advantage, who will risk America’s prosperity for the sake of a short-term appeal to some special interest group, who forget that more than five million American jobs are directly tied to the foreign export business and additional millions are tied to imports.
 
For those of us who lived through the Great Depression, the memory of the suffering it caused is deep and searing. And today, many economic analysts and historians argue that high tariff legislation, passed back in that period called the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, greatly deepened the Depression and prevented economic recovery.

He returned to the topic of tariffs in November 1988, when he reflected on the benefits of free and fair trade and the dangers of protectionism.

Here in America, as we reflect on the many things we have to be grateful for, we should take a moment to recognize that one of the key factors behind our nation’s great prosperity is the open trade policy that allows the American people to freely exchange goods and services with free people around the world. The freedom to trade is not a new issue for America.

In 1776 our Founding Fathers signed the Declaration of Independence, charging the British with a number of offenses, among them, and I quote, ‘cutting off our trade with all parts of the world’.
 
And that same year, a Scottish economist named Adam Smith launched another revolution with a book entitled ‘The Wealth of Nations’, which exposed for all time the folly of protectionism. Over the past 200 years, not only has the argument against tariffs and trade barriers won nearly universal agreement among economists but it has also proven itself in the real world, where we have seen free-trading nations prosper while protectionist countries fall behind.
 
America’s most recent experiment with protectionism was a disaster for the working men and women of this country. When Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930, we were told that it would protect America from foreign competition and save jobs in this country – the same line we hear today. The actual result was the Great Depression, the worst economic catastrophe in our history; one out of four Americans were thrown out of work. Two years later, when I cast my first ballot for President, I voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who opposed protectionism and called for the repeal of that disastrous tariff.
 
Ever since that time, the American people have stayed true to our heritage by rejecting the siren song of protectionism. In recent years, the trade deficit led some misguided politicians to call for protectionism, warning that otherwise we would lose jobs. But they were wrong again. In fact, the United States not only didn’t lose jobs, we created more jobs than all the countries of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan combined. The record is clear that when America’s total trade has increased, American jobs have also increased. And when our total trade has declined, so have the number of jobs.
 
Part of the difficulty in accepting the good news about trade is in our words. We too often talk about trade while using the vocabulary of war. In war, for one side to win, the other must lose. But commerce is not warfare. Trade is an economic alliance that benefits both countries. There are no losers, only winners. And trade helps strengthen the free world.
 
Yet today protectionism is being used by some American politicians as a cheap form of nationalism, a fig leaf for those unwilling to maintain America’s military strength and who lack the resolve to stand up to real enemies – countries that would use violence against us or our allies. Our peaceful trading partners are not our enemies; they are our allies.
 
We should beware of the demagogs who are ready to declare a trade war against our friends – weakening our economy, our national security, and the entire free world – all while cynically waving the American flag. The expansion of the international economy is not a foreign invasion; it is an American triumph, one we worked hard to achieve, and something central to our vision of a peaceful and prosperous world of freedom.
 
After the Second World War, America led the way to dismantle trade barriers and create a world trading system that set the stage for decades of unparalleled economic growth. And in one week, when important multilateral trade talks are held in Montreal, we will be in the forefront of efforts to improve this system. We want to open more markets for our products, to see to it that all nations play by the rules, and to seek improvement in such areas as dispute resolution and agriculture. We also want to bring the benefits of free trade to new areas, including services, investment, and the protection of intellectual property. Our negotiators will be working hard for all of us.
 
Yes, back in 1776, our Founding Fathers believed that free trade was worth fighting for. And we can celebrate their victory because today trade is at the core of the alliance that secure the peace and guarantee our freedom; it is the source of our prosperity and the path to an even brighter future for America.

The questions below address whether these radio addresses by President Reagan are relevant in today’s context of the imposition of tariffs by President Trump.

Videos of Radio Addresses

Articles and postings

Questions

  1. Summarise Ronald Reagan’s arguments.
  2. How would Donald Trump reply to these arguments?
  3. Can tariffs ever be justified on efficiency grounds?
  4. Can tariffs be justified as a bargaining ploy? Can they be used as a means of achieving freer and fairer trade?
  5. Find out why the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was introduced in 1930 and what were its consequences.
  6. How does the World Trade Organization seek to promote freer and fairer trade? How does it resolve trade disputes?
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From swiping right to swiping out: the economics of the dating app decline

According to Ofcom’s November 2024 Online Nation report (see report linked below), UK adults are falling out of love with dating apps. Use of the top three platforms in the UK (Tinder, Hinge, and Bumble) is declining, even though most users are juggling multiple apps at once. So, what’s going on? Economics may have some valuable insights to help explain the decline.

Too much choice

First, dating platforms don’t function like typical commodity markets, where prices adjust until supply and demand balance. Instead, dating can be seen as what economists call a ‘matching market’, where success depends on mutual interest, not on a specific price. So even with thousands of potential matches, forming actual connections remains difficult, and more choice doesn’t necessarily translate into better outcomes.

In fact, more choice can backfire. The paradox of choice, a behavioural economics concept, suggests that too many options can lead to choice paralysis. Instead of feeling empowered by an abundance of potential partners, users can feel overwhelmed, unsure, and often less satisfied with whatever choice they end up making (if they make one at all).

So, while we often think of dating apps, like many other platforms, benefiting from positive network effects, where more users increase the platform’s value by offering more potential matches, this can also have negative effects. Swiping through endless profiles and repeating the same small talk, can turn dating into a chore rather than an exciting opportunity.

Adverse selection

What makes this even harder is that users can’t easily distinguish between who’s genuinely looking for the same thing you are, and who’s just there to pass the time. This information asymmetry leads to the adverse selection problem – a concept famously explored by economist George Akerlof in his 1970 paper ‘The Market for Lemons’ (see link below). He showed how lack of information about product quality can cause high-quality sellers to exit, resulting in market failure where the market becomes dominated by low-quality goods (i.e. ‘lemons’).

A similar dynamic can play out on dating apps. If users believe most profiles are unserious or not genuine, they become less willing to engage, or even stay on the platform. Meanwhile, the most genuine users may give up altogether, worsening the quality of the pool and discouraging others.

In economics, there are some well-known ways in which the problem of adverse selection could be overcome. One such possibility is through signalling, where the more informed person tries to reveal important information to the uninformed person. Indeed, platforms have experimented with signalling mechanisms, like verification tools for example. Paid subscriptions have also been implemented, which could help to some extent (assuming that those who are willing to pay are those who are genuine and serious about finding a match). But these solutions only go so far, and with fewer users paying to signal intent, the problem persists.

Lack of innovation

This ties into the wider revenue model of dating apps. Unlike many apps that rely on revenue from advertising on one side of the market to offer the app free to consumers on the other side, dating platforms often rely more on revenue through monthly subscriptions and paid upgrades. But with fewer users willing to pay, these platforms may be under pressure. This financial pressure may also affect their ability to innovate or improve the service.

In fact, in the dating app world, there is another reason why platforms may not be innovating as much as they should, aside from simply trying to convince their users to pay for a better service. While it seems like there’s endless choice in the dating app world, much of the market is controlled by a single company, InterActiveCorp (IAC), which owns Tinder, Hinge, Match.com and more. With limited competition, there’s less incentive to compete on quality.

Worse still, dating apps face a unique business problem: if their service works too well, users leave and delete the app. So, there may be a built-in tension between helping users succeed and keeping them swiping.

The outlook for dating apps

So, is the decline in dating app use just temporary, or the start of something bigger? Time will tell. However, from an economics perspective, there is a noticeable shift in demand towards substitutes, such as organised in-person social events and activities, which encourages more and more of these opportunities to emerge. This shift may reflect changing preferences and the costs (in terms of time and emotional energy) that users are willing to invest in online dating.

At the same time, AI already plays a key role in dating apps, and new possibilities seem to be emerging. For example, we could see a bigger rollout of AI-driven chatbots that facilitate conversations or even interact on behalf of users. This could make it easier to connect with potential matches and might help in addressing some of the other issues discussed above.

Articles

Video

Report

Questions

  1. How might ‘signalling’ and ‘screening’ be used to create new features or services that could help overcome the adverse selection problem in this market?
  2. Can you think of any other ways in which the adverse selection problem could be overcome in this context?
  3. Draw a diagram to illustrate the two-sided nature of the dating app market, making clear where there may be positive or negative network effects.
  4. How else might dating app platforms be making revenue that allows them to offer the app to users at no charge?
  5. Is the dating app market competitive? You might consider factors such as the availability of substitutes, barriers to entry and innovation.
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‘Liberation day’: or start of a Trump slump?

On April 2nd, Donald Trump announced sweeping new ‘reciprocal’ tariffs. These would be in addition to 25% tariffs on imports of cars, steel and aluminium already announced and any other tariffs in place on individual countries, such as China. The new tariffs would apply to US imports from every country, except for Canada and Mexico where tariffs had already been imposed.

The new tariffs would depend on the size of the country’s trade in goods surplus with the USA (i.e. the USA’s trade in goods deficit with that country). The bigger the percentage surplus, the bigger the tariff. But, no matter how small a country’s surplus or even if it runs a deficit (i.e. imports more goods from the USA than it sells), it would still face a minimum 10% ‘baseline’ tariff.

President Trump stated that these tariffs are to counter what he claims as unfair trade practices inflicted on the USA. People had been expecting that these tariffs would reflect the tariffs applied by other countries on US goods and possibly also non-tariff barriers, such as the ban on chlorine-washed chicken or hormone-injected beef in the EU and UK. But, by basing them on the size of a country’s trade surplus, this meant imposing them on many countries with which the USA has a free-trade deal with no tariffs at all.

The table gives some examples of the new tariff rates. The largest rates would apply to China and south-east Asian countries, which supply low-priced products, such as clothing, footwear and electronics to the US market. In China’s case, it would a reciprocal tariff rate of 34% plus the previously imposed tariff rate of 20%, giving a massive 54%.

What is more, the ‘de minimis’ exemption will be scrapped for packages sent by private couriers. This had exempted goods of $800 or less sent direct to consumers from China and other countries from companies such as Temu and Alibaba. It is also intended to cut back on packages of synthetic opioids sent from these countries.

Since ‘liberation day’, President Trump has made several changes to these tariff rates. On 9 April he ‘paused’ the implementation of the tariffs above the 10% rate pending trade discussions with individual countries. However, in the case of China, there have been tit-for-tat tariff increases, so that by the end of April, the US tariff rate on Chinese imports was a massive 145% and the Chinese rate on US imports was 125%. The two countries seemed locked in a high-stakes game of chicken.

The US formula for reciprocal tariffs

As we have seen, the proposed (and then paused) reciprocal tariffs do not reflect countries’ tariff rates on the USA. Instead, rates for countries running a trade in goods surplus with the USA (a US trade deficit with these countries) are designed to reflect the size of that surplus as a percentage of their total imports from the USA. The White House has published the following formula.


where:

When the two elasticities are multiplied together this gives 1 and so can be ignored. As there was no previous ‘reciprocal’ tariff, the rise in the reciprocal tariff rate is the actual reciprocal tariff rate. The formula for the reciprocal tariff rate thus becomes the percentage trade surplus of that country with the USA: (exports – imports) / imports, expressed as a percentage. This is then rounded up to the nearest whole number.

President Trump also stated that countries would be given a discount to show US goodwill. This involves halving the rate from the above formula and then rounding up to the nearest whole number.

Take the case of China. China’s exports of goods to the USA in 2024 were $439bn, while its imports of goods from the USA were $144bn, giving China a trade surplus with the USA of $295bn. Expressing this as a percentage of exports gives ($295/$439 × 100)/2 = 33.6%, rounded up to 34%. For the EU, the formula gives ($227bn/$584bn × 100)/2 = 19.4%, rounded up to 20%.

Questioning the value of φ. Even if you accept the formula itself as the basis for imposing tariffs, the value of the second term in the denominator, φ, is likely to be seriously undervalued. The term represents the elasticity of import prices with respect to tariff changes. It shows the proportion of a tariff rise that is passed on to consumers, which is assumed to be just one quarter, with producers bearing the remaining three quarters. In reality, it is highly likely that most of the tariff will get passed on, as it was with the tariffs applied in Donald Trump’s first presidency.

If the value for φ were 1 (i.e. all the tariff passed on to the consumer), the formula would give a ‘reciprocal tariff’ of just one quarter of that with a value of φ of 0.25. The figures in the table above would look very different. If the rates were then still halved, all countries with a tariff below 40% (such as the EU, Japan or India) would instead face just the baseline tariff of 10%. What is more, China’s rate would be reduced from 54% to 30% (the original 20% plus the baseline of 10%). Cambodia’s would be reduced to 13%. Even if the halving discount were no longer applied, the rates would still be only half of those shown in the table (and 37% for China).

Are the tariffs justified?

Even if a correct value of φ were used, a percentage trade surplus is a poor way of measuring the protection used by a country. Many countries running a trade surplus with the USA are low-income countries with low labour costs. They have a comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods. That allows such goods to be purchased at low cost by Americans. Their trade surplus may not be a reflection of protection at all.

Also, if protection is to be used to reflect the trade imbalance with each country, then why impose a 10% baseline on countries, like the UK, with which the USA has a trade surplus? By the Trump administration’s logic, it ought to be subsidising UK imports or accepting of UK tariffs on imports of US goods.

But President Trump also wants to address the USA’s overall trade deficit. The US balance of trade in goods deficit was $1063bn in 2023 (the latest year for a full set of figures). But the overall balance of payments must balance. There were thus surpluses elsewhere on the balance of payments account (and some other deficits). There was a surplus on the services account of $278bn and on the financial account of $924bn. In other words, inward investment to the USA (both direct and portfolio) and the acquisition of dollars by other countries as a reserve asset were very large and helped to drive up the exchange rate. This made US goods less competitive and imports relatively cheaper.

The USA has a large national debt of some $36 trillion of which some $9 trillion is owed to foreign investors (people, institutions or countries). Servicing the debt pushes up US interest rates. This helps to maintain a high exchange rate, thereby making imports cheaper and worsening the trade deficit. The fiscal burden of servicing the debt also crowds out US government expenditure on items such as defence, education, law and order and infrastructure. President Trump hopes that tariffs will bring in additional revenue to help finance the deficit.

Effects on the USA

If the tariffs reduce spending on imports and if other countries do not retaliate, then the US balance of trade should improve. However, a tariff is effectively a tax on imported goods. It is charged to the importing company not to the manufacturer abroad. As we saw in the context of the false value for φ, most of the tariff will be passed on to American consumers. Theoretically the incidence of the tariff is shared between the supplier and the purchaser, but in practice, most of the higher cost to the importer will be passed on to the consumer. As with other taxes, the effect is to transfer money from the consumer to the government, making people poorer but giving the government extra revenue. This revenue will be dollars, not foreign currency.

As some of the biggest price rises will be for cheap manufactured products, such as imports from China, and various staple foodstuffs, the effects could be felt disproportionately by the poor. Higher import prices will allow domestic producers competing with these imports to raise their prices too. The tariffs are thus likely to be inflationary. But because the inflation would be the result of higher costs, not higher demand, this could lead to recession as real incomes fell.

American resources will be diverted by the tariffs from sectors in which the USA has a comparative advantage, such as advanced manufactured goods and services, to more basic products. Tariffs on cheap imports will make domestic versions of these products more profitable: even though they are more costly to produce, they will be sold at a higher price.

The tariffs will also directly affect goods produced by US companies. The reason is that many use complex supply chains involving parts produced abroad. Take the case of Apple. Even though it is an American company which designs its products in California, the company sources parts from several Asian countries and has factories in Vietnam, China, India, and Thailand. These components will face tariffs and thus directly affect the price of iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, etc. Similarly affected are other US tech hardware manufacturers, US car manufactures, clothing and footwear producers, such as The Gap and Nike, and home goods producers.

Monetary policy response. How the Fed would respond is not clear. Higher inflation and lower growth, or even a recession, produces what is known as ‘stagflation’: inflation combined with stagnation. Many countries experienced stagflation following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when higher commodity prices led to soaring inflation and economic slowdown. There was a cost-of-living crisis.

If a central bank has a simple mandate of keeping inflation to a target, higher inflation would be likely to lead to higher interest rates, making recession even more likely. It is the inflation of the two elements of stagflation (inflation and stagnation) that is addressed. The recession is thus likely to be deepened by monetary policy. But as the Fed has a dual mandate of controlling inflation but also of maximising employment, it may choose not to raise interest rates, or even to lower them, to get the optimum balance between these two targets.

If other countries retaliate by themselves raising tariffs on US exports and/or if consumers boycott American goods and services, this will further reduce incomes in the USA. Just two days after ‘liberation day’, China retaliated against America’s 34% additional tariff on Chinese imports by imposing its own 34% tariff on US imports to China.

A trade war will make the world poorer, especially the USA. Investors know this. In the two days following ‘liberation day’, stock markets around the world fell sharply and especially in the USA. The Dow Jones was down 9.3% and the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite was down 11.4%.

Effects on the rest of the world

The effects of the tariffs on other countries will obviously depend on the tariff rate. The countries facing the largest tariffs are some of the poorest countries which supply the USA with simple labour-intensive products, such as garments, footwear, food and minerals. This could have a severe effect on their economies and cause rapidly increasing poverty and hardship.

If countries retaliate, then this will raise prices of their imports from the USA and hurt their own domestic consumers. This will fuel inflation and push the more seriously affected countries into recession.

If the USA retaliates to this retaliation, thereby further escalating the trade war, the effects could be very serious. The world could be pushed into a deep recession. The benefits of trade, where all countries can gain by specialising in producing goods with low opportunity costs and importing those with high domestic opportunity costs, would be seriously eroded.

What President Trump hopes is that the tariffs will put him in a strong negotiating position. He could offer to reduce or scrap the tariffs on a particular country in exchange for something he wants. An example would be the offer to scrap or reduce the baseline 10% tariff on UK exports and/or the 25% tariff on UK exports of cars, steel and aluminium. This could be in exchange for the UK allowing the importation of US chlorinated chicken or abolishing the digital services tax. This was introduced in 2020 and is a 2% levy on tech firms, including big US firms such as Amazon, Alphabet (Google), Meta and X.

It will be fascinating but worrying to see how the politics of the trade war play out.

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Questions

  1. What is the law of comparative advantage? Does this imply that free trade is always the best alternative for countries?
  2. From a US perspective, what are the arguments for and against the tariffs announced by President Trump on 2 April 2025?
  3. What response to the tariffs is in the UK’s best interests and why?
  4. Should the UK align with the EU in responding to the tariffs?
  5. What is meant by a negative sum game? Explain whether a trade war is a negative sum game. Can a specific ‘player’ gain in a negative sum game?
  6. What happened to stock markets directly following President Trump’s announcement and what has happened since? Explain you findings.