The price of petrol at the pumps has risen substantially over the past few years. In the UK, according to the AA, the average price between January and June 2011 was 133.13p. In the same period in 2010 it was 116.68p; and in the same period in 2008 it was 109.00p.
Over the first six months of 2011, the amount of petrol sold fell by 5.2 per cent. This was on top of the decline in consumption over the previous four years. Between 2006 and 2010 consumption of petrol fell by 17.4%. The consumption of petrol and diesel are given in the following table.
UK consumption of petrol and diesel (tonnes millions)
What factors have caused a fall in consumption of petrol?
If you choose to spend a set amount on petrol, what is your price elasticity of demand?
What determines the price elasticity of demand for petrol?
Why has the consumption of diesel fallen less than that of petrol?
Under what circumstances would an increase in tax on road fuel of 3p per litre (as planned for January 2012), result in a decrease in tax revenue? Why would the price elasticity of demand for road fuel have to be significantly greater than 1 (ignoring the minus sign) and not merely above 1 for this to be the case?
Why is it likely that people’s price elasticity of demand for road fuel will become less elastic the more they have cut back on consumption?
Why is the demand for petrol likely to be more elastic with respect to (a) price, and (b) income over the longer term?
To what extent is the demand for road fuel a ‘derived demand’?
To what extent is the fall in the consumption of petrol a reflection of a movement along the demand curve for petrol or a shift in the demand curve? Explain.
Nokia is finding out just how competitive the phone industry is, as it sees its third quarter figures come in at a loss. Google and Apple have seen their market shares rise and this has had an adverse effect on the Finnish company, Nokia. This goes some way to backing up the job losses seen earlier in the year, when 7000 jobs were cut and there was a re-allocation of workers towards ‘smartphones’.
Despite Nokia’s disappointing results in this sector, it has seen growth in its sales of other more simple phones, illustrating its ability to focus on this aspect of the market. Its sales were higher than forecast at 107 million handsets in the third quarter, showing some signs of a changing trend for the firm. However, with competition ever increasing, Nokia will need to consider its future strategy very carefully.
With all the doom and gloom of recent economic data, including rising inflation and higher unemployment, there’s finally a small speck of light and that’s in the form UK retail sales. The latest data from the ONS suggests that sales in the UK in September were higher than previously forecast and reversed the 0.4% decline we saw in August. A big contributing factor to this positive data was a boost to online sales, but this small glimmer of hope is unlikely to be sufficient to keep the economy going – unless sales keep rising, we are unlikely to see any significant increase in economic growth.
The data, while positive, is still unlikely to have any impact on economic policy. The minutes from the Monetary Policy Committee showed that there was unanimous support for further quantitative easing, as the threat of weak growth and financial instability and uncertainty remains. An economist from Barclays Capital said:
‘We don’t think the recent strong growth in monthly sales is likely to be sustained…The environment for retailers is likely to remain challenging as consumer spending remains depressed driven by low confidence and slow earnings growth.’
The data from September is positive, but it does little to offset the decline in sales seen in August. It was revised down from 0.2% to 0.4% – some blame the hot weather, which discouraged consumers from hitting the high streets in preparation for the winter. The key data to look out for will be sales figures for the next few months. Only then will we have more of an indication about exactly which direction the economy is moving in. The following articles consider this latest economic data.
The global economic mood is darkening. Levels of consumer and producer confidence have declined and forecasts of economic growth are being downgraded. Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, stated that “this is the most serious financial crisis we’ve seen, at least since the 1930s, if not ever” (see).
So will slow recovery turn into a second recession (a double-dip)? And will recession turn into depression – the persistence of low or negative growth over a number of years? The following articles consider this frightening prospect and whether there are similarities with the Great Depression of the 1930s.
But let’s not be too downhearted. If we all are, the world could end up talking itself into depression. Consumers would seek to claw down their debts and cut back spending; producers would invest less as their confidence wanes; banks would be unwilling to lend. So is there any cause to be cheerful? Well, at least world leaders are increasingly aware of the possibility of world depression and minds are increasingly being focused on how to avoid the situation. The EU summit on 23 October and the G20 summit in Cannes on 3/4 November have EU sovereign debt problems and the global crisis at the centre of their agenda.
But if they do decide to act, what should they do? Is the answer a Keynesian stimulus to aggregate demand through fiscal policy and through further quantitative easing? Or is the approach to act more decisively to reduce sovereign debt and convince markets that governments are serious about tackling the problem – a policy response much more in accordance with new classical thinking and the type of policy that would be recommended by Thomas Sargent and Christopher Sims, winners of this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics?
In what ways is the current global economic situation similar to that in the early 1930s?
In what ways is it different? Do these differences provide more or less cause for hope for avoiding a global depression?
Explain the following quote from the first article above: “I think that we face the quite real prospect that the market is removed as the determining mechanism for setting the price of capital within the eurozone at the sovereign level.This would put internal credit creation back under the control of the state.”
How is the supply side of the economy relevant to (a) the short-run prospects for economic growth; (b) the long-run prospects?
If technological progess slows down, what will be the implications for employment and unemployment? Explain.
How is policy credibility relevant to the success of the decisions made at G20 and EU summits? (See last aricle above.) How would a Keynesian respond to the analysis of Sargent and Sims?
The total EU budget in 2010 was €123 billion. Just under half of this (€58 billion) was spent on supporting agriculture. The programme of support – the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – has changed over the years. For a start, despite its being a large proportion of the EU budget, this proportion has actually been falling. In 1980, the CAP accounted for 69% of the EU budget; in 1990 it was 60%; in 2000 it was 52%; in 2010 it was 47%.
The types of support have also changed. The main method in the past was effectively to set minimum prices for various foodstuffs and for Intervention Boards to buy up any surpluses that arose from such prices being above the market equilibrium. Massive food ‘mountains’ resulted. Sometimes these surpluses were dumped on the world market; sometimes they were thrown away; sometimes they were simply kept in storage. Export subsidies and import levies (taxes) were also used to reduce surpluses. This, of course, was highly damaging to farmers in many countries outside the EU, especially in various primary exporting developing countries.
Reforms have taken place in recent years. The most important has been to replace high intervention prices with direct payments to farmers unrelated to current output. Whilst such payments still provide a substantial outgoing from the EU budget, being unrelated to current output, they do not encourage farmers to produce more and thus do not generate surpluses. Prices in most cases are allowed to be determined by the market.
The EU has just announced further reforms. These include:
• Capping total CAP spending at current levels until 2020 • Capping the total payment to any one farm to €300,000 • Relating subsidies to acreage rather than previous output • Making 30% of the direct payments dependent on farmers meeting environmental criteria.
The following videos and articles examine the proposals and assess their likely benefits, their likely drawbacks and their likelihood of being implemented.
