A key determinant of our economy’s rate of growth over the year ahead is likely to be the behaviour of households and, in particular, the rate of growth in consumer (or household) spending. In other words, your appetite for spending will help to determine how quickly the economy grows. The importance of household spending for the economy is straightforward to understand given that it accounts for roughly two-thirds of the total demand for firms’ goods and services, i.e. two-thirds of aggregate demand. In its November 2011 Economic and Fiscal Outlook the Office for Budget Responsibility presents it forecasts for economic growth and household spending. The following table summarises these forecasts.
The OBR are forecasting that household spending will fall in real terms in 2011 by 1.1 per cent and grow by only 0.2 per cent in 2012. This is not good news for retailers nor, of course, for the economy. The drag on consumer spending growth is largely attributed to expected falls in real disposable (after-tax) incomes in both 2011 and 2012. In 2011, the household sector’s real income is forecast to decline by 2.3 per cent and then by a further 0.3 per cent in 2012.
The OBR’s figures on spending growth critically depend on the ability of households to absorb the negative shock to their real income. Empirical evidence tends to show that household spending growth is less variable than that in income and that households try and smooth, if they can, their spending. This means that the marginal propensity of households to consume out of changes to their income is below 1 in the short-run. In fact, the shorter the period of time over which we analyse income and consumption changes the smaller the consumption responses become. This is consistent with the idea that households are consumption-smoothers disliking excessively volatile spending patterns. In other words, the size of our monthly shop will usually vary less than any changes in our real income.
Of course, consumption-smoothing cannot be taken for granted. Households need the means to be able to smooth their spending given volatile and, in the current context, declining real incomes. Some economic theorists point to the importance of the financial system in enabling households to smooth their spending. In effect, households move their resources across time so that their current spending is not constrained solely by the income available to them in the current time period. This could mean in the face of falling real income perhaps borrowing against future incomes (moving forward in time expected incomes) or drawing down past savings.
The ability of households to move future incomes forward to the present has probably been impaired by the financial crisis. Banks are inevitably less cautious in their lending and therefore households are unable to borrow as much and so consume large amounts of future income today. In other words, households are credit-constrained. Furthermore, it is likely that households are somewhat uneasy about borrowing in the current climate, certainly any substantial amounts. Uncertainty tends to increase the stock of net worth a household would like to hold. A household’s net worth is the value of its stock of physical assets (largely housing wealth) and financial assets (savings) less its financial liabilities (debt). If households feel the need for a larger buffer stock of wealth to act as a sort of security blanket, they will not rush to acquire more debt (even if they could) or to draw down their savings.
The impairment of the financial system and the need for a buffer stock are two impediments to households smoothing their spending. They tend to make consumption more sensitive to income changes and so with falling incomes make it more likely that consumption will fall too. There are other related concerns too about the ability and willingness of consumers to smooth spending. Uncertainty arising from the volatility of the financial markets imposes liquidity constraints because households become less sure about the value of those savings products linked to the performance of equity markets. Consequently, they become less certain about the money (liquidity) that could be raised by cashing-in such products and so are more cautious about spending. Similarly, the falls in house prices have reduced the ability of households to extract housing equity to support spending. Indeed, with fewer transactions in the housing market the household sector is extracting less housing equity because it has been quite common, at least in the past, for households to over-borrow when moving and use the excess money borrowed to fund spending.
In short, there are many reasons to be cautious about the prospects for household spending. The expected decline in real income again in 2012 will ‘hit’ consumer spending. The question is how big this ‘hit’ will be and crucially on the extent to which households will be able to absorb it and keep spending.
What do you understand by a consumption function? What variables would you include in such a function?
Using the figures in the table in the text above, calculate ‘rough’ estimates of the income elasticity of consumption for each year. Why are these estimates only ‘rough’ approximations of the income elasticity of consumer spending?
Draw up a list of factors that are likely to affect the strength of consumer spending in 2012. Explain how similar or different these factors are likely to have been to those that may affect spending during periods of strong economic growth.
Explain what you understand by the term consumption-smoothing. Explore how households can smooth their spending and the factors that are likely to both help and prevent them from doing so.
What do you understand by the net worth of housholds? Try drawing up a list of factors that could affect the net worth of households and then analyse how they might affect consumer spending.
You’ve probably heard of Groupon. If you join its emailing list, the company will send you daily details of deals in your area that it has negotiated with local retailers. If you want to take advantage of any particular deal, you sign up for it online and if enough people do so to reach a minimum number agreed with the retailer, Groupon will bill your credit card. You then download the voucher and use it to purchase you discounted item or service. Discounts are often substantial – 50% or more.
But are these deals as good as they seem? On 2 December, the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority took the decision to refer Groupon UK to the Office of Fair Trading, following 48 breaches of the advertising code of practice in eleven months. It referred complaints about Groupon’s:
• Failure to conduct promotions fairly, such as not making clear significant terms and conditions • Failure to provide evidence that offers are available • Exaggeration of savings claims
And it was not just consumers who had complained. Many retailers found that so many people signed up for certain deals and the discounts were so great, with Groupon often charging the retailer half the discounted price, that retailers made substantial losses on the deals. One example was a cupcake maker, Rachel Brown, who runs the Need a Cake bakery in Reading, Berkshire. She had to bake so many extra cupcakes below cost that profits for the year were wiped out.
So what is the nature of this market failure and how appropriate are the competition authorities for dealing with it? The following webcasts and articles look at the issues. They also consider the growing problems Groupon faces in the market from new competitors.
It has not been good news recently for Groupon and it’s hardly surprising that, following Groupon’s flotation on the Nasdaq stock exchange in the USA last month, and an initial surge in the share price, its shares have since fallen by over 40%.
What market failings are there in the discount voucher market?
What to retailers gain from dealing with companies such as Groupon?
Do small businesses have anyone other than themselves to blame if they make a loss from doing a deal with Groupon?
What should be the role of the competition authorities in the discount voucher market?
Is Groupon’s business model ‘doomed to failure’ and if so why?
Does Groupon have a ‘first-mover advantage’?
Are there any barriers to entry of new firms into the discount voucher market? If so, what are they? What are the implications of your answer for the future of Groupon?
Twice a year, directly after the government’s Spring Budget and Autumn Statement, the Institute for Fiscal Studies gives its verdict on the performance of the economy and the government’s economic policies – past and planned. This year is no exception. After the Chancellor had delivered his Autumn Statement, the next day the IFS published its analysis. And what grim reading it makes.
• Real average (mean) incomes in 2011 will have fallen by 3%. • Between 2009/10 and 2012/13, real median household incomes will have fallen by 7.4% • Over the same period, real mean household income will have fallen by 4.7% – easily the biggest 3-year drop since records began in the mid 1950s. • Real mean household incomes will be no higher in 2015/16 than in 2002/03. • The poorest will be hardest hit by the measures announced in the Autumn Statement. • Infrastructure spending of £4bn to £5bn will only go some way offsetting the effects of £17bn capital spending cuts over the Parliament. • The economy will be 3.5% smaller in 2016 than thought in March. • The structural budget deficit is 1.6% higher than thought in March. • That will extend to 6 years the period over which total spending will have been cut year on year.
Referring to this last point, Paul Johnson, director of the IFS, said in his Opening Remarks, “One begins to run out of superlatives for describing quite how unprecedented that is. Certainly there has been no period like it in the UK in the last 60 years.” Referring to the fall in real incomes, he said, “Again we are running out of superlatives to describe just how extraordinary are some of these changes.”
Commentators have referred to the “lost decade” where the average Briton will not have seen an increase in real income.
Why is it likely that the median real income will have fallen by more than the mean real income?
Why is the structural deficit now estimated to be some 1.6 percentage points higher than was estimated by the OBR back in March 2011?
How could the structural deficit be affected by a prolonged recession? Is this a case of hysteresis?
What are the government’s fiscal rules?
Is the IFS predicting that the rules will be met? What might adversely affect this prediction?
If technological progress is allowing a continuous increase in potential real GDP, why will median real incomes have fallen over the 13 years between 2002/03 and 2015/16? What might have affected long-term aggregate supply adversely?
On Tuesday 29 November, the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered his Autumn Statement. This presented the outlook for the UK economy, with forecasts supplied by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). It also contained details of government fiscal measures to tackle various macroeconomic problems, including economic slowdown and high levels of national debt.
The outlook for the UK economy came as no surprise. Things are looking much bleaker than a few months ago. The OBR, along with other forecasters, has downgraded its predictions of the UK’s growth rate. Although it is still forecasting positive growth of 0.9% this year and 0.7% in 2012, these rates are well below those it predicted just eight months ago. In March it forecast growth rates of 1.7% for 2011 and 2.5% for 2012.
To make things worse, its growth forecasts are based on the assumptions that the eurozone crisis will be resolved with little or no effect on the UK. But even if that were so, the debt reduction plans in the eurozone are likely to drive the eurozone back into recession. This, in turn, will impact on UK exports, more than 50% of which go to eurozone countries.
The OBR forecasts that national debt will be 67% of GDP this year and will rise to 78% by 2014/15 but then start to fall. Government borrowing is forecast to be £127bn this year, falling to £120bn in 2012/13 and then more substantially each year after that to £24bn in 2016/17.
So what measures were included in the Autumn Statement? These are detailed in the articles below, but the key ones were:
• a programme of credit easing, which will underwrite up to £40bn in low-interest loans for small and medium-sized businesses. • £5bn of public money to be invested in infrastrucuture projects and a further £5bn in the next spending round. Agreement had been reached with two groups of pension funds to invest a further £20bn of private money in infrastructure projects. • an additional £1.2bn for capital investment in schools. • A cap on public-sector pay increases of 1% per year for the two years after the current two-year pay freeze.
The following videos and articles give details of the forecasts and the measures and give reactions from across the political spectrum.
Most people are risk-averse: we like certainty and are generally prepared to pay a premium for it. The reason is that certainty gives us positive marginal utility and so as long as the price of insurance (which gives us certainty) is less than the price we place on certainty, we will be willing to pay a positive premium. By having insurance, we know that should the unexpected happen, someone else will cover the risk. As long as there are some risk-averse people, there will always be a demand for insurance.
However, will private companies will be willing to supply it? For private market insurance to be efficient, 5 conditions must hold:
1. Probabilities must be independent
2. Probabilities must be less than one
3. Probabilities must be known or estimable
4. There must be no adverse selection
5. There must be no moral hazard
If these conditions hold or if there are simple solutions, then insurance companies will be willing and able to provide insurance at a price consumers are willing to pay.
There are many markets where we take out insurance – some of them where insurance is compulsory, including home and car insurance. However, one type of insurance that is not compulsory is that for cyclists. No insurance is needed to cycle on the road, but with cycle use increasing and with that the number of accidents involving cyclists also increasing, the calls for cyclists to have some type of insurance is growing. If they are hit by someone without insurance and perhaps suffer from a loss of income; or if they cause vehicle damage, they will receive no compensation. However, whilst the risk of accident is increasing for cyclists, they are still statistically less likely to cause an accident than motorists. Perhaps a mere £30 or £40 per year for a policy is a price worth paying to give cyclists certainty. At least, this is what the Association of British Insurers (ABI) is claiming – hardly surprising when their members made a combined loss of £1.2 billion!
With each of the above conditions required for private insurance to be possible, explain why each must hold.
What do we mean by no moral hazard and no adverse selection? Why would their existence prevent a private company from providing insurance?
Using the concept of marginal utility theory, explain why there is a positive demand insurance.
What might explain why cyclists are less likely to take out insurance given your answer to the above question?
Do you think cyclist insurance should be compulsory? If governments are trying to encourage more sustainable transport policy, do you think this is a viable policy?
