Towards the end of each month the European Commission for Economic and Financial Affairs publishes its economic sentiment index for each EU country, including the UK, along with average scores for the EU and for the countries using the euro. September’s release showed sentiment in the UK amongst consumers and businesses to have weakened more than in any other EU country. The index fell from a score of 102.3 to 100.2, where 100 represents an equal number of optimistic and pessimistic responses.
In itself the score seems to suggest that there remains some degree of economic confidence here in the UK. So should we be concerned? Well, the direction of the sentiment index is very likely to be of some concern and something that policy-makers will be keeping a keen eye on. Furthemore, the direction of sentiment in the UK is contrary, perhaps surprisingly so you might think, to that in most EU countries. The EU-average score, for instance, rose from 103.1 to 103.4, its highest since March 2008. From this we can infer not only that more people in the survey are optimistic than pessimistic but also that sentiment is becoming more positive (slightly). In Germany the economic sentiment index rose between August and September from 111.2 to 113.2, its highest since February 1991, with sentiment rising across consumers and all sectors of business.
If we delve a little deeper into the UK sentiment figures we see that the weakening of economic confidence is greatest amongst retailers. To a large extent this reflects an erosion of the significant increase in sentiment reported by retailers in the summer months. It also appears to reflect something of a lagged response to the waning sentiment amongst consumers. The figures for consumer confidence showed a ‘bounce’ in confidence during the spring, but September’s consumer confidence level was the lowest since June 2009 when the economy was still in recession.
One of the tasks facing policy-makers and economists is to try to predict what these economic sentiment figures might mean for economic activity. In particular, to what extent do these figures have significance for the future decisions made by households and businesses? Surprisingly, relatively little column space is given to measures of confidence and to the EU’s Economic Sentiment Index in particular.
It’s probably fair to say too that, as economists, we are a long way from fully understanding the role that confidence plays in affecting individual behaviour or indeed the variables that impact on confidence. It was once suggested to me (Dean), for instance, that changes in UK consumer confidence might be closely related to changes in housing wealth. Further, we economists struggle to understand what these survey measures of economic confidence are actually capturing, since the surveys comprise a multitude of questions, which, in the case of consumers for instance, ask them to compare their current financial situation with that in the past as well as to predict how it will evolve over the coming months.
Despite our imperfect understanding of the role played by confidence and how we can measure it, there is considerable interest amongst policy-makers, economic think-tanks and economic forecasters. For example, earlier this week a statement following an IMF Mission to the UK indentified ‘sizeable’ downside risks to the UK economy’s recovery, including what it termed ‘the continued fragility of confidence’. Could the release just a few days later from the EU reporting a decline in economic sentiment in the UK be timely?
Articles
Eurozone optimism nears three-year high Financial Times, Ralph Atkins and David Oakley (29/9/10)
EU economic, business indicators improve again The Sofia Echo (29/9/10)
Eurozone Sept. economic sentiment strongest since 2008 RTT News (29/9/10)
EU September economic morale unexpectedly improves MarketNews.com (29/9/10)
Data
Business and Consumer Surveys The Directorate General for Economics and Financial Affairs, European Commission
Consumer Confidence Nationwide Building Society
Questions
- Do you think economic sentiment or economic confidence is a worthwhile concept for economists and policy-makers to analyse?
- Draw up a series of factors that you think might affect the economic sentiment amongst consumers. Are there any factors that might be peculiar to the UK? Then repeat the exercise for businesses.
- Why do you think there is a ‘fragility of confidence’ in the UK? What might explain the stronger confidence levels in other EU countries, such as Germany?
One of the key problems faced by all countries over the past three years has been a lack of consumer demand. Firms face demand from a number of sources and when the domestic economy is struggling and domestic demand is weak, a key source of demand will be from abroad. By this, we are of course referring to exports. However, it was not just one country that plunged into recession: the global economy was affected. So, when one country was suffering from a weak domestic market, it turned to its export market and hence to other countries for demand. However, with these economies also suffering from recession, the export market was unable to offer any significant help. In order to boost exports, governments have tried to make their export markets more competitive and one method is to cut the value of the currency. Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Columbia and Taiwan are just some of the countries using this strategy.
Following these interventions, the Brazilian finance minister has commented that a new trade war has begun. Speaking to a group of industrial leaders in Sao Paulo, Mr. Mantega said:
‘We’re in the midst of an international currency war. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.’
As more and more governments intervene in the currency market in a bid to boost exports, those refraining from intervening will suffer. Furthermore, interest rates throughout the developed world have remained low, as central banks continue their attempts to boost economics. However, this has led vast amounts of money to be transferred into countries, such as Brazil, where there is a better supply of high-yield assets. This has worsened the state of affairs in Brazil, as the Brazilian currency is now thought to be the most heavily over-valued currency in the world. This adversely affects Brazil’s export market and its trade balance. The following articles look at the lastest developments in this new ‘war’.
Articles
Currencty ‘war’ warning from Brazil’s finance minister BBC News (28/9/10)
Brazil warns of world currency war Telegraph (28/9/10)
Brazil warns of world currency ‘war’ Associated Press (28/9/10)
Brazil defends exporters in global currency battle Reuters (15/9/10)
Kan defends Japan’s intervention in the currency markets Associated Press (25/9/10)
US and China are still playing currency Kabuki Business Insider, Dian L. Chu (21/9/10)
How to stop a currency war The Economist (14/10/10)
What’s the currency war about? BBC News, Laurence Knight (23/10/10)
Exchange rate data
Exchange rate X-rates.com
Statistical Interactive Database – interest and exchange rates data Bank of England
Currencies BBC News
Currency converter Yahoo Finance
Questions
- Demand for a firm’s products comes from many sources. What are they? Illustrate this on a diagram.
- Why is a weak currency good for the export market?
- How will a country’s trade balance be affected by the value of its currency?
- Explain the process by which investors putting money into high-yield assets in countries like Brazil leads to currency appreciation.
- What are the options open to a government if it wants to devalue its currency? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each method?
One of the structural problems facing the UK economy is that people have been borrowing too much and saving too little. As a result, vast numbers of people have been living on credit and accumulating large debts, and many people have little in the way of savings when they retire.
So should the government or Bank of England be encouraging people to save? Not according to Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England – at least not in the short term. While acknowledging that people should be saving more over the long term, he argues that the main purpose of the historically low Bank Rate since the beginning of 2009 has been to encourage people to spend, thereby boosting the economy. In other words, if the purpose of a loose monetary policy is to increase aggregate demand and stimulate the economy, then what is needed is increased consumption and reduced saving, not increased saving.
In the following webcast, Charles Bean gives his views about interest rates and counters the criticism that savers are being pid too little interest. He argues that for many the solution is to start drawing on some of their capital – not a solution that most savers find very appealing!
Webcast
Bank of England: savers should eat into cash Channel 4 News, Faisal Islam (27/9/10)
Articles
Savers told to stop moaning and start spending Telegraph, Robert Winnett and Myra Butterworth (28/9/10)
Bean Says Bank of England Trying to Get Reasonable Economic Activity Level Bloomberg, Scott Hamilton and Gonzalo Vina (27/9/10)
Spend, spend, spend, demands Bank of England deputy governor Investment & Business News , Tom Harris (28/9/10)
Data
International saving data (see Table 23) Economic Outlook, OECD
AMECO on line (see tables in section 15.3) AMECO, Economic and Financial Affairs (European Commission)
Economic and Labour Market Review (see Table 1.07) National Statistics
Questions
- What is meant by the ‘paradox of thrift’?
- Reconcile the argument that it is in the long-term interests of the UK economy for people to save more with the Bank of England’s current intention that people should save less?
- Is there a parallel argument about fiscal policy and government spending (see the news item The ‘paradox of cuts’?)
- What are the determinants of saving?
- Look at the data links above and compare the UK’s saving rate with that of other countries.
- What has happened to the UK saving rate over the past four years? Attempt an explanation of this.
With the full impact of the fiscal austerity measures yet to come, the fall in unemployment revealed in the latest ONS labour market release is probably a lull before the storm. Nonetheless, in the three months to July unemployment fell by 8,000 to 2.467 million, while the rate of unemployment – the number of people unemployed expressed as a percentage of those economically active – fell from 7.9% from 7.8%. But, within the ONS release we again saw an increase in the number of people who are long-term unemployed.
The number of people aged 16 or over who have been unemployed for at least 12 months stood at 797,000 in the three months to July. This represents an increase of 15,000 over the previous 3 months. While the pace of increase appears to have slowed – the number had risen by 100,000 in the three months to April – the pool of people who can be described as long-term unemployed is undoubtedly of much concern. To put this number into perspective, it means that of the 2.467 million people unemployed 32.3% have been so for at least a year. In effect, one-third of the pool of unemployed can now be thought of as long-term unemployed.
Of the long-term unemployed, 547,000 or 69% are male. This is the highest number of males described as long-term unemployed since the three months to May 1997 – the month when the Labour government of Tony Blair came to power. But, the historical context for female long-term unemployment is even bleaker. A further increase of 4,000 over the 3 months to July means that the number of females who are long-term unemployed has risen to 250,000. The last time long-term female unemployment was higher than this was in the three months to September 1995.
An obvious concern with the expectation that the total unemployment figure will grow in the not too distant future is that the number of long-term unemployed people will carry on growing. Of course, this not only has unfortunate implications for these individuals but for society and the economy more generally. Consequently, it raises some important and very difficult economic and social policy questions. One important economic question, for instance, is how we tackle the erosion of human capital as more and more individuals are divorced for longer and longer from the labour market. An erosion of human capital affects individuals and society not only in the present, but in the future too.
Articles
UK unemployment falls by 0.1 pct to 7.8 pct Associated Press (16/9/10)
Wasteland: Europe stalked by spectre of mass unemployment Independent, Alistair Dawber (16/9/10)
Job fears despite employment rise Telegraph, Angela Monaghan (16/9/10)
Part-time jobs fuel record rise in employment Express, Macer Hall (16/9/10)
UK unemployment falls to 2.47 million BBC News (15/9/10)
Data
Latest on employment and unemployment Office for National Statistics (15/9/10)
Labour Market Statistics, September 2010 Office for National Statistics (15/9/10)
Labour market data Office for National Statistics
For macroeconomic data for EU countries and other OECD countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and Korea, see:
AMECO online European Commission
Questions
- If the overall number of unemployed people is falling why is the number of long-term unemployed rising?
- The current unemployment rate is 7.8%. But, what do we mean by the unemployment rate?
- Draw up a list of the problems that you think arise out of long-term unemployment.
- Use your list to draw up a series of potential policies to tackle these problems.
- Why do some economists think the current fall in unemployment is a ‘lull before the storm’? What impact might this have on the number of people long-term unemployed?
Under the Basel II arrangements, banks were required to maintain particular capital adequacy ratios (CARs). These were to ensure that banks had sufficient capital to allow them to meet all demands from depositors and to cover losses if a borrower defaulted on payment. Basel II, it was (wrongly) thought would ensure that the banking system could not collapse.
There were three key ratios. The first was an overall minimum CAR of 8%, measured as Tier 1 capital plus Tier 2 capital as a percentage of total risk-weighted assets. As Economics 7th edition page 509 explains:
Tier 1 capital includes bank reserves (from retained profits) and ordinary share capital, where dividends to shareholders vary with the amount of profit the bank makes. Such capital thus places no burden on banks in times of losses as no dividend need be paid. What is more, unlike depositors, shareholders cannot ask for their money back. Tier 2 capital consists largely of preference shares. These pay a fixed rate of interest and thus do continue to place a burden on the bank even when losses are made (unless the bank goes out of business).
Risk-weighted assets are the value of assets, where each type of asset is multiplied by a risk factor. Under the internationally agreed Basel II accord, cash and government bonds have a risk factor of zero and are thus not included. Inter-bank lending between the major banks has a risk factor of 0.2 and is thus included at only 20 per cent of its value; residential mortgages have a risk factor of 0.35; personal loans, credit-card debt and overdrafts have a risk factor of 1; loans to companies carry a risk factor of 0.2, 0.5, 1 or 1.5, depending on the credit rating of the company. Thus the greater the average risk factor of a bank’s assets, the greater will be the value of its risk weighted assets, and the lower will be its CAR.
The second CAR was that Tier 1 capital should be at least 4% of risk weighted assets.
The third CAR was that equity capital (i.e. money raised from the issue of ordinary shares) should be at least 2% of risk weighted assets. This is known as the ‘core capital ratio’.
Before 2008, it was thought by most commentators that these capital adequacy ratios were sufficiently high. But then the banking crisis erupted. Banks were too exposed to sub-prime debt (i.e. debt that was excessively risky, such as mortgages on property at a time when property prices were rapidly declining). Much of this debt was disguised by being bundled up with other securities in what were known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy: the largest bankruptcy in history, with Lehmans owing $613 billion. Although its assets had a book value of $639, these were insufficiently liquid to enable Lehmans to meet the demands of its creditors.
The collapse of Lehmans sent shock waves around the world. Banks across the globe came under tremendous pressure. Many held too much sub-prime debt and had insufficient capital to meet creditors’ demands. As a result, they had to be bailed out by their governments. Clearly the Basel II regulations were too lax.
For several months there have been discussions about new tighter regulations and, on 12 September 2010, central bankers from the major countries met in Basel, Switzerland, and agreed the Basel III regulations. Although the overall CAR (Tier 1 and 2) was kept at 8%, the Tier 1 ratio was raised from 4% to 6% and the core Tier 1 ratio was raised from 2% to 4.5%, to be phased in by 2015. In addition there were two ‘buffers’ introduced.
As well as having to maintain a core Tier 1 ratio of 4.5%, banks would also have to hold a ‘conservation buffer’ of 2.5%. “The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions.” In effect, then, the core Tier 1 ratio will rise from 2% to 7% (i.e. 4.5% minimum plus a buffer of 2.5%).
The other buffer is a ‘countercyclical buffer’. This will be “within a range of 0% – 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital and will be implemented according to national circumstances.” The idea of this buffer is to allow banks to withstand volatility in the global economy. It will be phased in between 2016 and 2019.
The Basel III agreement will still need to be ratified by the G20 countries meeting at Seoul on 10 and 11 November this year. That meeting will also consider other elements of bank regulation.
So will these extra capital requirements be sufficient to allow banks to withstand any future crisis? The following articles discuss this question.
Articles
Global bankers agree new capital reserve rules BBC News (12/9/10)
Q&A: Basel rules on bank capital – who cares? BBC News, Laurence Knight (13/9/10)
Basel III and Sound Banking New American, Charles Scaliger (17/9/10)
Wishy-washy rules might come back to haunt regulators Financial Times, Patrick Jenkins (18/9/10)
Basel III proposal released Newsweek, Joel Schectman (17/9/10)
New Bank Rules May Not Prevent More Meltdowns FXstreet, Henrik Arnt (16/9/10)
Basel III CBS Money Watch, Mark Thoma (14/9/10)
Basel III: To lend or not to lend Investment Week, Martin Morris (16/9/10)
Taming the banks The Economist (16/9/10)
Basel’s buttress The Economist (16/9/10)
Do new bank-capital requirements pose a risk to growth? The Economist, guest contributions
Myners: New rules ‘ignore bank liquidity’ BBC Today Programme, Robert Peston and Lord Myners (18/9/10)
Official press releases and documents
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards Bank for International Settlements Press Release (12/9/10)
The Basel iii Accord Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA)
Details of the new capital requirements Bank for International Settlements
Details of the phase-in arrangements Bank for International Settlements
Questions
- What impact will a higher capital adequacy ratio have on banks’ behaviour?
- For what reasons may the Basel III regulations be considered too lax?
- When there is an increase in deposits into the banking sector, banks can increase loans by a multiple of this. This bank deposits multiplier is the inverse of the liquidity ratio. Is there a similar bank capital multiplier and, if so, what determines its size?
- Why will Basel III be phased in over a number of years? Is this too long?